Mauritius has been considering the possibility
of recognition for some time. Agreement was
reached in 1968 to establish relations
" at a convenient time", but nothing was done
to implement it. Since then the Mauritians
appear to have been dragging their feet.
1967 and iturmed water affinit
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CONFIDENTIAL
for to restore them. Humming to the Frence, the
Tom sisums, who recognised Paing in 1964, are whant to
exchange Automators.
feet.,
or
CONFIDENTIAL
a. In the long term Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Thailand, have indicated interest in
moving towar a a more formal relationship with
Peking, provided that the Chinese agree to
end their support for subversive mov :ments
Sino-
and to recognise the thee Governments.
Indo..esian relations are presently suspended;
Indonesian Wövdusent Winisters have recently
a series of ambiguous speeches in favour of
provid better relations with China out unter the two
wirl tret
conditions above. The Thai Porin Kinister
recently said that a policy of relaxing tension
with China had the support of the entire Thai
apparivalry
Government and The Thais are reducing their
propaganda against China in the hope that the
Chinese wat reciprocate. The visit of a
Halaysian Trade Mission to Peking this month
(when the Ch.nese referred for the first time
to Malaysia rather than Kalaya inbublic
statements) and the tour of Malaysia by a
Hong Kong Communist dance troupe, has led to
speculation about peter Dino-Malaysian
relations. But the Chinese have shown no
disposition to withdraw support for subversive
movements in the three countries concerned,
and it looks as though any move towards mutual
recognition and the establishment of formal
care
between Chung and Macaqua and Vouland, Lame option of relations in the
wave of Inderbia) relations/will be a lengthy process.
19. In the short term therefore themost
likely candidates for recognising Teking appear
to be Iran, Turkey, and Hexico, with Ieru,
rækker
Senegal and Austria is/ more long-term prospects.
But as the moment towards recognition of Teking 15
gatherma
gatmers speed, there could well be ajapate Of
African sad but Thamerican countries
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WIRL S1-0406
Ghana
Belgium
Tumio
CONFIDEN.IAL
before the hinaal Aademibly debate this year on st order to demonstrate
establishing relation ef
Mogrelline
their Ma Logition and in the hope of
se/aid.
receiving Chinese/aid
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CONFIDENTIAL
215
LV Appleyard Esq
Far Eastern Department
FCO
Tny. Dear hen,
RESTRICTED
CHINA/DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
1.
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
PEKING
12 May 1971
twar
mm
In keeping with the spirit of that great new Chinese hynn "All nations
great and small the Chairmen loves them all", the People's Republic of
China and the Republic of San Marino agreed in Paris to establish
consular level relations as from 6 May.
2. To establish relations, San Marino was only called upon to recognise
the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China". This
is the same formula as was used recently when China and Kuwait
established relations and is the "softest" one the Chinese have accepted
in recent years. As San Marino had no relations with Taiwan, it could
have been expected to get off fairly lightly, but not necessarily that
lightly. It may be that the "soft"formula will now become normal at
least for smaller countries. It would certainly make it easier for new
recrito to flock to the Chinese standard. For their part, the Chineso
declared their respect for the "policy of neutrality pursued by the
Government of the Republic of San Marino"!
る。
On 9 May, the People's Daily carried the customary editorial marking the
establishment of relations. These cditorials usually ramble on about the
links between the two countries and/or shercd revolutionary traditions,
but in the case of San Marino, the People's Daily could find little to
say on the subject (under- standably enough) except that:
"San Marino with its long history is the oldest republic in Europe...San
Marino pursues a policy of neutrality. Its government and people adopt a
friendly attitude towards the Chinese Government and pcoplc. The
establishment of official relations...between China and San Marino opens
a new (the first?) page in the friendly cooperations between the peoples
of the two countries...
It was noticeable that the editorial stuered clear of the delicate
subject of philately. Will China and San Marino continue to contend for
hogenony in the stamp narkets of the world, or will consular relations
prove to be a cover for collusion aired at dividing up the markets
between then?
4. is San Marino (like the Principalities of Andorra, Liechten- stein
and Monaco) is not a member of the UN, the Chinese cannot expect much in
the way of political dividends. However, establishing
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relations with San Marino helps to keep the ball rolling.
5. On 8 May, two days after the announcement of the establishment of
relations between China and San Marino, NCNA took the unusual step of
issuing a press communiqué announcing that China and Turkey had started
talks in Paris on the establishment of diplo- natic rolations, This is
the first time that the Chinese have made such an announcement in NONA.
It suggests that the Chinese are confident that a settlement will be
reached. The announcement will also have served as a useful reminder to
other countries that the Chinese bandwagon is still rolling along.
6. According to the French Embassy here, the Chinose and Belgians have
broken off talks for the time being because the Chinese believe that the
Belgian position makes talks impossible (presumably on the expulsion of
Taiwan from the UN). We would be grateful for any confirmation you,
confirmation you, Brussels or Paris may have on this.
7.
The French have also told us that Tunisia and China are
about to exchange embassies and ambassadors. As you know, Tunisia nevor
opened a mission here, though the Chinese had a mission in Tunis until
they withdrew it in 1967.
izou.
7
Gordon S Barrass
Ford,
Copied to:
Miss K M Draycott, Information Research Department, FCC
F Brewer Esq, GMG, OBE, Research Department, FCO
G Duff Esq, PUSD, FCO
J DI Boyd Esq, Washington
P M Howitt Esq, OBE, Carberra
J Howells Esq, Hong Kong
A C Ashworth Esq, OBE, Hong Kong
Chancerius: Wollington, Tokyo, Rome, inkara, Tunis, Teheran,
Paris, Brussels, Florence
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CONTIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE BAITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIR_S
FEKING
4 May 1971
30
(3/22)
LV Appleyard Dsq
For Tastern Department
FCO
My Dear hen,
CHINA/LATIN AMERICA
R
FEC
Ener
LAD pa
Jee
Reki
kremt
257,-
1. A Sino-Peruvian trade crucment was signed in Lime in 29 April and the
two countries were said to be "considering" et:b- lishing diplomatic
relations, according to a Reut、r's Que tch free Lima on 30 April
quoting the Feruvian Fresident.
soor..
L
2. Last week when I spoke to the Chilean Charge d' 'ff dus, Sizor Silva,
he told me that he would be surprised if the Teruvians established full
diplomatic relations with Chian valy
They did not wish to antagonise the US more than By could
The help and were therefore moving towards recognition slowly. same
applied to Cuba. He thou_ht that Feru was likely to the Chile-n pattern
and would agree to the Chinese opening a trade office in Lima before
procceding to full recognition.
L .170W
3. The Peruvian Fresident's remark about establishing 21 matic relations
with China may mean that things will move fast.. 31.cn Silm had envisa;
ed. Perhaps Feru fuels that the US is unlikely to be very displeased at
such a move because now it is so actively
China's willingress trying to improve its relations with Chine.
-
to conduct substantial trade with Teru might also have influenced Peru's
decision. Press reports quote Peruvian officials as caying that Peru
hopes to scll US860 million of fish-nual and fish vil
The trace alone to Ching over any unspccified period of time. agreement
is also said to cover the sclc af Peruvian miner la/ metals to Ching in
exchange for a fairly wide range of Chinese products.
4. When I asked about other Latin American Statcs which vore likely to
recognise China, Silva said he believed that Sounder would make a move
goon.
5. You will have noticed in NCH.. that recently the Chin-su live
For the first been giving the Cubans a more favourable press. time in
many years, the Cubana mntioned in the Hay 21, uluguns hcrc. Shortly
before he left at the und of ¡yril, 31 m2 C: roia, the Cuben Charge
d'Affaires, who was received by Chou n-lei un 23 ril, told me that
although Sino-Cuban inter-statu Alations were likely to improve
considerably in the context of Ching's attempt to form a united front
with the Third World, ho v
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ne
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PONEZIA
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CONFIZITIAL
doubted if inter-party relations would be re-establish...". difference
between the two sides were very great indoor.
6. We would be interested to have Lima's views on the developments in
Sino-Peruvian relations mentioned abovu.
You..
Gordas
Gordon's Barrass
Coniec to:
The
Miss K N Draycott, Information Research 7 opartment, FCC
F Brewer Esq, CMG, ObE, Research Lepartment, FCO
G Duff Esq, TUSD, FCO
J DI Boyd Esq, Washington
TM Hewitt Esq, CBE, Canberra
C J Howells 28g, Hong Kong
AC Ashworth Esq,
Chancuries:
BE, Hong Kong
Wollington, Tokyo, Lima, Santiago, Quito, F.vzn
1
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01
COFTITIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Appleyard (FED)
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1.
This Institute was established in 1949, with one of its declared objects
being to bring together experts on international relations to advise the
Chinese Government. By 1964, however, according to an NCNA report of 19
December 1964, its main function had become the carrying out of
"People's diplomacy". The report claimed that the Institute had done
much to strengthen China's relations with the people of various
countries and to establish non-governmental relations with countries
where China did not have diplomatio relations. The Institute's
membership included officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affaire and
other Governae nt bodies, as well as members of "front" organisations
and "Friendship Associ tions". Chou Enlai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi
were honorary Presidenta. The last press reference to the Institute
which we can trace relates to September 1968 and since then most of the
work formerly carried out by the Institute has been done by the "Chinese
People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries". In 1954, it
was announced that a group of organisations had set to found the
"Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Fereign
Countries". In April 1966, this Association announced it was changing
its name to the "Chinese People 'a Association for Cultural Relations
and Friendship with Foreign Countries". The present Association appeared
for the first time in October 1969, with similar personnel and functions
to the "Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations and
Friendship with Foreign Countries"
2.
The invitation to the Australian Labour Party (Canberra telegram 638 of
12 May 1971) weens to indicate that the Chinese People's Institute for
Foreign Affairs is being re-activated.
JE Heare
Par Eastern Section, Research Department.
Clas To
18 May 1971.
р.а.
R. Bead Esp
plu inseamn the 1945
CONFIDENTIAL
G S Barrass Esq
Peking
CHINESEN 30AL
RESTRICTED
طح
pla 5/5/71
5 May 1971
pa
Your letter of 20 April. You may like to have song more
background information about the confused story of contacts
between the Chinese and Senegal with a view to establishing
diplomatic relations. I enclose a copy of a minute by
Research Department on the subject.
Copied with eno, to:
J DI Boyd Esq Washington J Howells Esq Hong Kong Chancery Dakar
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LV Appleyard
Far Eastern Department
28
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Reference..
727
Mr Appleyard (FED)
CHINA/SENEGAL
+
•
1. Please refer to Gordon Barrass's latter to you entitled
"Chine/Africa" of 20 April 1971. It would be very interesting if China
and Senegal were to establish diplomatic relations; the story of their
past reletions is a somewhat chequered one.
2. Senegal was formerly part of the Mali Federation, which maintained
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists. When the Federation
broke up in the summer of 1960, the Nationalists appointed a Chargé
d'Affaires in Senegal, and eventually formally recognised Senegal in
September 1960. However, in March 1961 the Senegalese Government
announced that it intended to recognise the Chinese People's Republic
(CPR) and the North Vietnamese. In a radio commentary broadcast at the
time, the Minister of Information stated thet Senegal wished to pursue a
policy of non-slignment and to treat as equals the divided parts of
single countries.
3. The Senegalese decision was apparently taken without consulting
either the Nationalists or the OPR. Our mission in Dakar reported that
the Government hoped that the Nationalists (and the South Vietnamese)
would continue to be represented in Senegal. In the Chinese cuse,
however, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Conakry, who come to Senegal
immediately after the Government announcement, soon made it clear that
the CPR would not be represented at Senegal's independence ceremonies
unless the Nationalists were excluded. In any case, it was clear that
the Senegalese Government hoped to postpone the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the CPR for as long as possible.
4. The continued presence of the Nationaliste in fact meant that no CPR
diplomatic mission was established then or subsequently. The
Nationalists continued to be represented in Dakar at the Chargé
d'Affaires level antil September 1964, when the New Ohina News Agency
(NCNA) reported that the Chargé had been expelled. Our records do not
show why this happened, but it seems that no replacement was sent and
relations were regarded as being suspended. Sometime after this
incident, NCNA established a branch office in Dakar, but ea far as is
known, no moves were made either by Senegal or the CPR towards
establishing diplomatic relations. At the United Nations, Senegal, which
had formerly voted for the Nationalists, now switched to suport for the
CPR. In 1965, 1966 and 1967, she voted against the "important question"
resolution, and on the "Albanian resolution", she abstained in 1965 and
voted in fevour in 1966 and 1967. According to the British
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1
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I
I.
I
Ambassador in Dakar in his Annual Review for 1966, the changes in
Senegal's UN voting pattern aprang from a desire to please her African
neighbours, while the Government itself remained wary of the CPR. This
wariness evidently continued, for in June 1968 the two NCHA
correspondente in Daker Were expelled, apparently because they were
believed to have incited recent demonstrations by students and workers.
It mey have been their activities which led Senegal to change her UN
voting again; in 1968, 1969 and 1970 she voted for the "Im, crt.nt
Question" rasolution, and on the "Albanian" resolution she ebstained in
1968, voted aainst it in 1969, and ebsteined again in 1970.
5. Peking reported in June 1969 that a member of the French Embassy
claimed that the CPR was attempting to make contact, with a view to
establishing diplomatic relations, with Senegal and the Ivory Coast
through Guinee end Meli. But our Mission in Dakar felt that this wee
highly unlikely because President Senghor of Senegal was very
anti-Chinese. The President believed that incidents in Senegal's schools
and universities earlier in 1969 had been inspired by the Chinese. Any
hopes the CPR may have had of winning over Senegal were dashed with the
announcement in Dakar on 17 June 1969 thet Senegal and the Chinese
Nɛtionaliste had agreed to resume diplomatic relations. According to our
Consulate at Tamsui, a Nationalist Embassy was set up in, Dakar in
February 1970.
6.
Chinese interest in Senegal is thus no new thing, but with the Chinese
desire for support in the UN, it is likely to become stronger. It will
be interesting to see if the prospect of aid for the Senegal River
Federation can be used by the Chinese to exert pressure on Senegal to
agree on diplomatic relations. It may be too that China's more
accomodating foreign policy will appeal to Senegal and lead her to
abandon the Nationaliste.
JB Hoare
Far Eastern Section Resserch Department
3 May 1971.
Copied to:-
African Section, Research Department. West African Dept (r Bambury)
IRD (Miss Draycott
PUSD (Mr Durrycott)
Duff
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MW 77/4 SALMogen
27.4
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
PEKIN C
20 April 1971
351
Mr Bayan (toes again Lapore NITTO) WALD (Mr. Coding)
Enter
LV Appleyard Esq
Far Eastern Department
FCO
My Dear her,
CHINA/AFRICA
1. Tlease refer to my letters 3/2 to you of 12 and 26 Janu :ry (nct to
all).
2. The visit to Feking of the Mauritanian Forcign Minister, Mouknass,
pointed ur Chinese interest in both the Senegal River Federation and in
Africa as a whole.
L
3.
P-
According to I, the No.2 in the Mauritanian Embassy here who took part
in Kouknass's talks with the Chinese, the Chinusu
The russed the Mauritanians to get Senegal to recognise China. Chinese
argued (plausibly enough) that they could not give r 2 y cffective aid
to the four countries of the Federation with cut being in relations with
Senegal, because without its cc-opur ti n some of the projects are
unfeasible, At the sore time, of cou China is interested in rounding up
one more sur orter for ita into the UN.
4. The Chinese also said that after the "forthcoming" Nation? People's
Congress, the Chinese hoped to son a high level Celo- ration to tour
Africa. It would "probably" be headed by the finister of Forein ffairs,
whoever that might be at the time, ..s you know, Ch'i Peng-fui, the
acting Foreign Minister, is also the Vice-Minister responsible for
Africa and the Middle East.
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try
5. Ly said that the other countries of the Federation agreed that
Chinese aid mul? be more effective if it could be co-ordinated. Por
exemple, Mali was rerticularly interested in making the senegal river
mcru navigable. This would require a lot of work to be done at Bakel
whore Suneral and Mauritania are the riverii o status. Ly said that
discussions had taken plane with Kali nd Guines and approaches were
going to be made to Senegal, H. szi that he thought that Senegal would
recognise China before the UN General Assembly mecting in the autumn.
+
5. Lecording to Ly, Mouknass had come to China to discuss tr
rojects. One was für the supply of fresh water to Nouakchott, which
would require the laying of a new wide bore ripeline 2001 as to the
south of Huakchott; the other was the building of a 'er Nouakchott. The
Chinese srid that they would be willing to undertake both jucts, but to
my surprise Ly was emphatic that
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JIL
CONFIDENTIAL
ter
his government were only likely to accept Chinese assistance on one
project. He said that Mauritania was also discussing the pipeline
project with the West Germans and the port with some other countries. It
was possible that the Germans would build
He said that the Chines. the pipeline and the Chinese the port. would
soon send a technical delegation to Hauritania to study to projects. The
Economic and Technical Co-Operation Agreement, signed with China on 1
April, had only been an agreement in principle. The amount of economic
aid had not yet been fixeč.
7. Ly also obs-rved that although Mauritania had been satisfi d with the
way the Chinese had and were carrying out their aid projects, they had
to, be watched. For example, after somɩ ini, .:1 difficulties with the
Chinese, the Mauritanians had been oblig.... to lay down the law and
refuse to let the Embassy circulate propaganda material except through
the Mauritanian Forción
Ministry.
Invitati, ns to Mauritanian nationals for film-shows
etc had to be handled in the same way.
8.
h
Last week, I discussed Sino-Malian relations with the Fri.
(There are three . xieme
( Counsellor who deals with African affairs.
a Minister-Cou · 81- conseillers dealin with foreign affairs, plus lor)!
French advisors working for the Malian government had, said, reported
that the Chinese had made it clear to the Malia. that if they wanted
more money, they would have to become much "progressive" in forción
affairs. Le Clercq said that thur. i. been some signs of the Malians
doing this alrendy (ie incr、as- support for the Chinese line on
imperialism, national liberati etë), but no new tranche of nid had yet
been a r~UČ,
A
.re
9. Le Clercq also told me that the Chinese were retracking t railway
line from Conakry up towards the Melian berder, so as
He sai hat to make it easier to transport ore down to the coast.
1way as he understood it, there was still no plan to continue the r into
Mali.
10.
If any of the African rosts to whom I am copying this hav any comments,
we should be interested to see them.
ijou
Gordon S Barross
Curled to:
Miss K Draycott, Information Research Department, FOO
F Brewer Esq, CMG, OBE, Research Department, FCO
G Duff Esq, TUSD, FCO
J DI Boyd Esq, Washington
PM Howitt Eaq, OB, Canberra
C J Howells Esq, Hong Kong
AC Ashworth Es, OM, Hong Kong
Chanceries: Wellington, Tokyo, Dakar, Yaounde, Lagos, Acera,
Zambia, Dar La Salaam ›
2.
CONFIDINTI L
125
L V Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department
FCO
My Dear her
RESTRICTED
R
'ED IN
R
....30
CHINA/ALGERIA/WIDDLE MIST
1.
FEC
리
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
PEKING
28 April 1977
W13/v
im
Cym to NED, NAD
Mirim SM $.5
попада
Please refer to my letters: 3/5 to you of 29 December 1970 and 3
February 1971 (not to all).
2.
Lecording to Leclercq, one of the French Counsellors here, the Chinese
are unhappy about the present trend of Algeria's foreign policy. At
first the Chinese scomod pleased with Algeria's decision to flow Libya
and the Gulf States in demanding higher prices for their oil (though
they never made any explicit criticism of the French or the French oil
companies). Although NCNA of 23 April applauded the price risc announced
by the Algerians on 12 April and the new petrolcum law which was signed
the next day, the French claim that the Chinese share their fear that
the Americans might now strengthen their position in Algeria at the
expense of the French. Leclercq claimed that the Chinese had noted
(without the French pointing it out to them) that the Algerians had paid
quite good compensation to two American oil companies and were about to
sign an agreement for the sale of natural gas to the American company,
El Paso.
3. At the same time, Leclercq said, the Chinese are concernel about the
recent report in Aviation Wock that the Russians word now deploying Mig
23s in Algeria. If it is true, the Chinese rrobably fear that the lesser
French evil will not be replaced by a truly independent Algeria, but one
in which the super-powers have increasing influence, which is not what
the Chinese wish to
sce.
4. The Chinese seem harrier about the new Federation of Arab Republics
announced on 17 April, Press comment here suggests that they feel that
it reflects a strengthening of ULR resolve not to compromise with
Israel. In a People's Daily "Commentator" article of 25 April: (the
first Commentator article on Middle East affairs for many monthe) the
Chinese took the line that:
The principled stand against negotiations and reconcilia- tion with
Israel as laid down in the declaration conforms with the common
aspirations of the broad masses of the Arab people and it is a blow to
the scheme for a Middle East Munich being hatched by US imperialism and
its accomplices.
At the same time, they refrain from criticising specific proposals for a
peace settlement (with the exception of that for
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1
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a setting up of a "Palestinian State") and the Soviet Union's close
relations with the UAR. Nonetheless, Leclercq claims that the Chinese
cherish few illusions about the new federation. When he spoke to them
recently, they pointed to the fairly swift collapse of earlier Arab
federations. However, the Chinese would like to get a foothold in Libya
and may hope that the Fresent federation will bring about some change in
Libya's attitude towards China and another vote in favour of China's
entry to the UN.
5. As I mentioned in my letter 3/5 to you of 29 December, the Chinese
are still trying to normalise interstate relations with Cairo, while
voicing support (and giving arms) to the Palestinians. The more militant
of rafat's remarks (though not personal attacks on other Arab leaders)
are quoted frequently in the Chinese press.
6. Although the "Commentator" article is rather stronger in its tone
than what was said by Ch'i P'eng-fei in his speech at the Koroccan
National Day reception on 3 March, it still seems that the Chinese have
no wish to be explicit about their policy. AS the UAR Commercial
Counsellor put it to me on 29 January after Shukeir's visit: "China's
stand on the Middle East settlement will be determined by the situation
on the day a settlement is agreed."
evo
yous
Gordy
Gordon S Barrass
Coried to:
Kiss K M Draycott, Information Research Lepartment, FCO
F Brewer Esq, CMG, ORE, Research Department, FCO
G Duff Esq, FUSD, FCO
J I Boyd Esq, Washington
I M Hewitt Esq, ORE, Canberra
CJ Howells Esq, Hong Kong
AC Ashworth Esq, OBE, Hong Kong
Chanceries: Wellington, Tokyo, Algiers, Faris, Cairo, Tripoli
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COLFÌDENTIAL
A 3 Davidson Esq
UKDEL HAMMI
Par la
:
29 April 1971
27/0
23
हूँ
CHINESE POREIGN POLICY
1. Thank you for your letter of 20 April enclosing a copy of a US Note
on "Peking's People's D#iplomacy". This has been read with interest
here, although we were a little aystified by the last paragraph. We
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.