relations with Communist parties.
(Paragraphs 3-6)
National socurity. The bilator i talks with the Soviet Union have so far
yielded no result but their continuation
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Submitted for
A mos Denon La Mo
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A favourable
Chinese attitude to European interration is largely to be seen in the
context of security against the Soviet Union. The Chinese probably no
longer fear an immcdiate American threat but harp on encirclement and in
the longer term still
The chances of involving the fear & re-militarised Japan.
has resulted in no incidents on the ground.
Chinese in meaningful discussion on disarmament are slight.
(Paragraphs 7111)
Dominance in Asia,
The Chinese seem now to be more in
favour of a negotiation over Indo-China provided American
troop withdrawals are agreed.
llorth Vietnacse ambitions.
They probably aim to curb
Indo-China will be high on
The Fresident may
the agenda for President Nixon's visit.
have to make concessions not to go nway ezpty handed as well as to
acquiose beforchand in Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations. The
announcement of the visit has enhanced China's prestige and rcised
doubts among some friends of the United States, in particuler Japan.
chances of China achieving domination must therefore have increased
though she has not yet deilod how to deal with
Japun.
(Taragraphs 12-15)
The
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Leadership of the Communist World.
China has not unde
and is unlikely to make progress though relations with the
Romanian and Herth Korean parties have improved.
(baru wh 16)
China and the Tird World.
number of Third World
countries have recently recognised Cina. By dislerntic
relations, trade and aid Chine is having some success, though:
China
in aid giving she cannot compete with her rivals. is unsuitable as a
model for development in other countries. China will maintain her
commitment to support revolutionary movements everywher: but may be more
selective in choosing thom in the interests of inter-stutc relations. my
be more difficult to strike in the future.
(Miragonghs 17-20)
China and the super-powOTE.
The balance
China's attempt to pose as
champion of scull and middle-Lized nations ginst the boviet Union and
the United St-tes takon varicus forms including calls for economic
independ ̈nce, support of claius on territorial waters and opposition to
Luclear nonopoly.
The Chinese my pick up sc.u dividends but success will be
limited.
(Paragraphs 21-22)
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China now wishes to enter the United Nations. She may be
difficult to deal with but the ground will be unfamiliar
and she may go quietly at first.
(Pragraphs 23)
On improving national security China has had some success. There have
been gains in Asia, scne in the Third World but fcw in the Communist
World. The new flexibility in Chinese
The present tactics indicates cohesion in the leadership.
tactics will continue and in general bencfit the pursuit of Chinese
ai:21. But she now has a large number of balls
in the air end sons are bound to drop.
(Paragraphs 24-25)
7
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OFFICE OF THE BRIBL>H CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PEKING
2/1
The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc
27 July 1971
CHINESE FORZIGN POLICY: PING PONG AND AFTER
Sir
1.
When I last reviewed Chinese foreign policy in a
despatch written in November 1969, I concluded that the Chinese
were content to "sit on the mountain and watch the tigers
fighting". Since then they have been descending steadily into
the arena. Their entry was dramatised in April by the
reception of the United States Table Tennis Team which ushered
in a phase of so-called ping pong diplomacy while ten days ago
an astonished world learned that a few days before Dr Kissinger had been
in Peking and Fresident Nixon had accepted an invita-
tion to visit China next year. That there has been a change
Does this of approach by the Chinese is obvious enough. betoken any
change in the basic aims of Chinese foreign policy,
how drastic or permanent are likely to be the changes in Chinese method,
and what are China's current priorities in the
external field? These are the questions which this despatch
seeks to answer.
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The Chinese sometimes accuse foreigners, especially
Interners, of taking insufficient account of the effect of
hi tory on the Chinose rind in its formation of foreign
policy. By this they usually moan the effect of the roal
cmi supposed brilistions suffered by China at the hands of
foreigners in the past. They convenicutly forgot their own
national characteristics and prejudices which militate
Gesinst the development of relations on a basis of genuine
un.orstanding and equality. With the prospect of the
ee reditation of the first Chinese Communist Ambassador in
in
* (as well as the visit to China of an American Fresident),
tight be well before embarking on our analysis to recall
an exchange which took place in 1878 between the Empress synger and the
Marquis Tseng on his departure to take up his
a ointment as Minister in London and Paris.
"press Dowager: It is very difficult to manage foreign
arcirs....
Huis Tseng: The difficulty in hendling diplomatic affairs
E
in the fact that foreigners ere unreasonable, while
('masse are ignorant of current events and circumstances.
L
Luso ministers and people usually hate foreigners, as goes
without saying, but we must plan gradually to make ourselves
ung before anything can be done..."
Th presont trend may seem to blie a part of this attitude
}
• it would bo unwise to dismiss it too easily.
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Ains of Chinese Foreign Folicy
ろ。
The aims of China have been defined as:
¿. To defend her territory, to secure her bounderics
by the settlement of outstanding bordur questions and
to recover certain territories which she claims to be
integral parts of China.
B.
To establish herself as the dominant power in Asia,
replacing American and other Western influence and
countering the growth of Soviet influence.
C. To replace Soviet influence by Chinese influence
within the world Communist movement and in the leng
torm to become the loader of world communism.
D.
To replace Western and Soviet influence in the
countries of the Third World where necessary by
championing revolution provided it springs from
indigenous roots; and to set herself up as the rode?
for political, social and economic development.
There is no evidence to suggest that these aims have changed;
but another might be added thoug. it is to some extent subsurd
under the other heads.
E.
To secure a position of maximum importance in the world by making common
cause with small and medium- sized countries against the super-powers
while profes: -
ing not to aspire to super-power status herself; ultimately to load an
international united front against
and
then.
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Methods
4.
The Chinese have in the past used a mumber of methods
to extend their influence:
(i) diplomatic relations, including the provision of aid,
or where these are impossible commercial relations; (ii) unofficial
relations including support for dissident
groups and "popular" diplomacy that is an appeal over the heads of
governments to persons and groups
sympathetic to China;
(iii) relations with Communist parties.
During the Cultural Revolution there was little progress in (i) but it
has been striking that since Canada broke the ice, eight other countries
havo opened relations and several nore are in prospect. "Forular"
diplomacy superseded
conventional diplomacy during the Culturel Revolution and the ping pong
phase is merely another variety of it made nore immediate and vivid by
the presence of foreign groups and
As regards individuals, particularly Americans, in China. Party
relations, the Chinese have gained no worthwhile new adherents though
useful progress has been made with North Korea and Ro. ania which will
be discussed later.
5.
Is the Nixon visit to be characterised as another method? It remains to
be seen whether it is the only one of its kind, or whether for example
Mr Sato will now angle for an invita- tion. For the want of a better
term, it might be called
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stratosphoric ping pong diplonacy, that is to say personal
high level contect preceding any formal improvement in inter- stato
rolatione during which the participants can clarify their positions, and
if necossery reach song measure of under-
otending without definite commitment. How it will work out
nobody knows,
6.
Tho remainder of the despatch will exaine how the
Chinose e pursuing their foreign policy aims as defined
using the various methods I havo outlined.
Medicnal Security
7.
The Chinese probably judge that botwo on the two main
onomios the moro immediate throat still comes from the Soviet
Union. The border talks which have been going on in Poking
since Octobor, 1969 have, so far as we know, produced no agree-
nent on any matter of substance and show no sign of doing so.
The Chincse arc standing pat on the position they took up
before tho talks startɔd: thoy went military disongagoront
behind a line they dofing and they want the Soviet Union to
recognise that earlier troaties were "unoqual". But the talks
somehow continuo. Inter-state relations, including trade,
have devolopod and a potentilly dangerous situation has been
do-fused, incidents on the bordor having virtually consed.
The Chinose campaign for proparations against war continues
in its varicus domestic aspects, but in a lower koy. This
thon is an example of the application of the diplomatic method
to the achievonent of a rajer Chinese ain in a situation
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where ideological rapprocherent is inconceivable and any
The Chinese are form of popular apporl wuld be futile.
not yet secure but they have obtained a respite and as the talks drag on
the likelihood of a resort to force by the Soviet Union, which the
Chinese genuinely feared in 1969,
recodes.
8.
China's increasingly favourable attitude towards W stern European
integration and private tolerance of NATO havean obvicus significance in
terms of security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For the same reason China
dislikes the Ostpolitik of Herr Brandt and moves towards a European
ecurity Treaty.
The latter was a sticking point during
the recent visit of M. Ceausescu,
Logically therefore they
should see the point of Western determin. tion to protect their rights
in Berlin. In private they nay, but publicly they are in a dilemne
because for wedge driving purposes they wish to seem to suport East
Grmany more strongly than the Russians and bcc.use of their attachment
to the hoary propa-
This is one of a randa theme of West German "revanchise".
number of contradictions apparent in their attitude to Europe where
their understanding is lirited and their scope for exorcising influence
small, though they wndoubtedly exploit
ર best they can the independence of the French on defence and
clear watters 28 well as their anti-Americanism in Asia
and clacwhere.
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9.
concern.
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China's southern borders are a cause of less real
Though
The risk of the Vietnam war leading to American
ground involvement in North Vietnar has disappeared and the
Chinese Lust now be convinced that the Aericons intend to
disongago; the questio is, how soon and how fully.
the Chinese have recently declared that the removal of the
Anerican military presence fron Taiwan is a condition for the
normalisation of relations with the United States, this is
bocause the presence, in Chinese eyes, is an interference in
the country's internal affairs rather then constituting any
throat cr potential threat. The recent repeal by the Senato
of the 1955 Joint Resolution under which, among other things,
military action could be taken if an attack on the offshore
islands were dooned to be the prelude to an attack on Taiwen
or the Fescader.s will have been a reassuring sign. The
Chinese continue however to harp on the theme of military
encircleucnt and to condemn alliances such as SEATO and ANZUS
their objections were put very strongly to the leader of the Australian
Labour Farty during his recent visit. The Asian
allics of the United States are without discrimination
designated as "puppets" whose crmed forces are there to carry
out the American policy of using "asians to fight isians".
Though there can be nt reel fear by China cf any of her nain- land
neighbours the Chinese roncin uneasy about the building up of indigenous
militery strungth backed by the West and hence
condemn the Nixon doctrine as a "froud".
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Beneath the mess of propaganda verbirge the Chinese have gnuine and
deep-seated fear for their security from
one quarter in Asia
Japan. ..t heart they right well
profer të see the american military presence continue rather than Japan
taking over a more active militery, in particular
nuclear, mle. The Chinese were concerned about Me sata's
re-arks on the importance to Japan of Taiwan and South Kor.n.
Because of Japan's links with Teiwen, diplomatic relations
between China and Japan seem out of the question at the moment.
The Chinese are however assiduously woning these political
parties and sections of opini-n in Japan favourable to then.
Hardly a day passus without a fresh delogation from Japan
arriving in Peking. All are received at a gratifyingly high
level and have the evils of resurgent Japancs. militarisa and
the bon.fits of friendship drummed into then. The Chinesc
stop short at ~fficial discussions n political netters which
the Japanes. w.uld welccse, but they have received v-ricus
sonier my burs of the Liberal Demccratic Party and are no
doubt le kin to fronte's departure. Were he to "sk tu cone,
The risks for
I do not entirely rule out his being received.
him would be greater then for the Chincs.. In the present
clite and iven the underlying disinclination of ny
Japanese, particul-rly the young, to boc re militarily involved
overguas ngai: the present brand of unoffici·1 Chinesc diplncy
probably pays off.
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11.
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While the Chinese work to contain the military
the cat by various cans they continuo to build up their
nuclear strength.
Their attitude to disema:ent is deter-
ni:.ed largely by the need to retain freedom of action in the nucucar
field. They rust recognise that their proposols for e suxit conference
of all powers to discuss disar rent and agree on the destruction of
nuclear weapons is quite unrealistic, but it serves as a useful positi n
on which to fa l back. This is what they have done in private in
response to the b:viet pr posal for a Five Fower Confurenco. The chances
of involving tho. in any eaningful discussion of the kind proposed soɑz
to ne very slim. protestations that she will never be the first to use
nuclear weapons are probably accepted in the Third World and her ability
as an under-devoloped country to Lake nuclear weapons undoubtedly
enhances her prestige cmong those nations, as well as benefitting her
security vis-a-vis
+ weigh errefully the ether nuclert ww ng who inges
now
Chine's
rick of involve ent at a nuclear level even with prvor so
f behind then.
Deinance in sin
...s I love surgested in the precoding section
12.
Vi. tno!!
-
and by exte:sion Inc. -China is no longer a cause
←
fo concurn to Ching for russons rf security.
But the
qustion of influence remains.
Chine has entorsed the
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Sex in Points nor positively then any previous North
Vic naneso peace proposal. Statorents by Chou En-lai have
nad: it clear that Vietnam will be high on the agenda in
tels with Fresident Kizen. North Vietnamese reactions
to the visit have been defensive in Prris and obliquely
he ile at home. While there has been no weakening in the
baric Chinese position, amely that there can be no negotia- ti before
crican military withdrawal, the Chinese now
I
so to be looking forward to a negotiation and to the kind of Indo-Ching
which night energe from it. They will wish to see a total withdrawal of
American militery support in all
fc: s fro Vietne, Cambodia and Laus, but not necessarily wi drawel of
other support, and to formatirn of broadly bad "neutr:list" governments
on a thing like the Leotian
now ul.
This presents formidable problems in South Vietnan
The Chinese nigh*
an
if anything more so in Carbodia.
be willing to go further to noot Weatorn suscootibilitius th: the Mrth
Vietnamese, and by au doing they would ein tc urb North Vietnamese
ambitions in Ino-China, 13 tuor tr.ed to do by making Phan Van Dong give
an assurance te bi nouk that "after the war" when he had o turned to
pcwur Nech Vietman would respect the incpomience and severeignty of
Imbodia. In the long to this right not roin much, but th Chinese might
see advantage in putting to Fresident Nix:n ti. idea of a donilitcrised,
noutral Indo-China (in effect
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excluding North Vietnam) underwritten by the interested
powers, hinting that China would keep North Vietna: in i ́s
ploco.
13.
One of the objects of ping pong diplo acy in its
criginal forn was clearly to bring influence to bear on the
American Administration to accelerate withdrawal from Vietnær.
The aerican table tennis ter were acce-panied by and
foll wed by crioer. journalists :est of who were to a
greater or lesser extent critics of the war. The Chino: 2
indicated that they alas intended to invite politicians -f
the cand complexion. ..t this time they knew that the visit
-f high level ·fficial criss:ry was in prospect but they we
not sure until Dr Kissinger arrived that the Fresident w uld
COMC. It is now open to then to proced with their original
plex. if they wish nd use the presence of syrmathisors to
exert pressure for sens concussin when the tire cores.
President has gained an rävantage over his opponents in thot
the glaucur an effect of the vicit of any werican politicier
beferohend has been eclipsed by the prospect of his own, out
he has also placel hi self in the difficulty that he can
harvily loave Teking with nothing to show for the visit.
Chinese knew this and are the of re in positi n to ask A
fairly stiff price whether on Vietna er, for cxa.ple Thiwan.
They have chosen seen after Dr Kissinger's departure to ke
public the conditions for a nerulisution of rol-ti:ns with t` ·
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United States thus narrowing the President's room for
to withdraw
igreurunt to the visit if American conduct, for emple at
the United Nations, offends the:t. The likelihood the fore
is that the ricans will acquiesce as gracefully as they
con in Trivan's expulsion.
ranoeuvre and they hold yet another card
14.
..grcerent to the Fixon visit can do the Chinese
nothing but gre in asia. erhanced. The an unconsnt f the visit has seri
usly upset Mr Date who is seen by his opponents to have been upst ged by
Their prestige has boon i ensely
the Americans.
This way wc kon his position and the t of his
L
supporters and haster the "dvance of th-so in the Lib.r 1 Democratic
Farty inclined towards a more rapid détente with Chine. Elsewboze there
has been ? rush by geverrionts allied with or friendly to the United
States to state that
This is nt they too so better relations with Poking.
in itself : be thing, ner has it follow, when the dust } a settlo', that
there will be any rapi chang.. .:f clign- pont, but it = ns that at
finest - cost the Chinese have i..tensifie" pressures on a number of
asian countries towards nom: licatior of relations with then, the mini
uz price for which will be the cstrcising and further
is l tiy of Taiwan, and tn. longer term effect in s
4
crses will be a losuning of ties with the Must.
Ti
f :ilure of the United States të çivo any warring af vir
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intentions,
and the obvi.us dorostic politic 1a tivation
of the :: ve,comt fril to weaken the future credibility of
L
t..
the United St tos sa bulwark ngainst Chin" in sin. For
zory countries relati ns with the West and with the vict
Unin are tor ipertent to be easily disc do but w/the
legiti: rey of China has been as it were und rsed by the
United States and Chine's entry int: the United Fations will
set the curl n the process thetural forces workin
tw rds the rusu pti'n of rugi nel min ti n by Chine : ust
increase.
15.
+
The uncertain factor for the Chines, in this cquetin,
es in the crse of defence, is Japan. The Chinese w. ke up
very late to the twering eernuric strength f Japan and evan now they
have probably not thought through how they right
deal with a th、r isian netion which ust eventually assert
its plitical influence in the region oven if it does not
p so a military threat. Inia has disappeared from the lists and
theref^re i pr ved relating and a bounery settlement will be low on
China's prioritics quite apart from the difficulty presented by her
close relations with
Ins: far as the Chinese and lepenience on the S viet Union,
f cus n the or ble f Japan at cll outsi'e the defence ontext, they
probably regard Jap ́n es destined to play a nagur son uic but a suc
nitry p. litierl relo in a region over which thuy will assure the
natural leadership.
CCHFIDE TIL 13
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Leadership of the Cer-munist World
16. .t the Ninth Congress of the Chincae Cormunist
Party in ..pril, 1969, Lin Fia: procinined the right of other
Comunist partics to fellow th ir own line and condorned the
soviet Union for trying to i: pose unif¬mity. The number
of parties professing full support for the Chinese brand of
Comunist at that time was not i'pressive and the position
has not changed. Party relati ns with North Korea have
beccro closur in step with inter-state relations, which have
i pr^ved as China's public opposition to the supposed increase
in Japan's :ilitary r-le in usia has intensified. But North
Kerca unlike Albania is far from being a Party satellite of
Chinh: Relations with the Rovenian Communist Party have
becue very cordial and the recent visit of M. Ceausescu and
his Farty as well as gevorm ental capacity was an cutstanding
success. But he referred pointedly t: there being no centre
of world ecmunism and, with tightened Sevict control in
Eastern Europe, the Chinese can hope to make no progress
towards their air of h.rding an Eastern orthodox church of
There has any size let alone superseding that in the Wost. been no
progress in Party relations with Yugoslavia which Ching spp rustly does
not regard de Comunist but inter-
atute rolati ns aro ruch better.
The Chinese continue to
pay clab-ra e :ttention to the various "erthodox" splinter
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parties, but probably regard -ny as being wock instruunts
in comparison with more broadly based loft wing revolution-
ary movements or even friendship groups through which the
Chinose can conduct populer diplonacy. There cre cxa ples
in Lytin serica where ang competing Communist and left
wing (ups the Chinese have not apparently accorlel even the
position of primus inter paros to the "crthodox" party.
China and the Third World
17.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.