During the Anglo-Frmah talks inst week I Promen 1-
Xourice mentioned that there had bom sɛme movement in
Chinese relations with Indonesia and Malaysia during the
part for months. You may like to have our commente.
SVPD
辰
2. The Malaysian and Indonesian Governmenta are asking
intressing efforts to strike a mere ¿sian, non-aligned
posture. This attitude may stom partly fren consera óver
Uli redeployment in isia as part of the Timon doctrine,
It my alas reflest a greving realisation in both countries
that they must make more effort than in the past to
to terms with their isim surroundings. This policy
inevitably involves reaching an assommedation of some kind
with China, and ideally obtaining some gesture of acceptance
from 20king. The Chinese can be expected to exereine
te
growing infinase in the area, particularly in view of
their present mare active and flexible foreign policy. Both
Indonesia and Malaysia my fear that hina harbours nasomt
territorial ambitions, which might come to the fore under
nore extroulet leadership. More imediately, they are
deeply concerned about Chinese-assisted subversive novamente
and about possible links between Feking and their own
Overseas Chinees. To some extent the gestures made by both
(19
00 MFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
is
on towards Peking could be
local Chinese community.
3.
sey to this
The Malaysian Government have made a series of statements
over the past months in favour of non-alignment. They have
also revived sarlier proposals for a neutralized South Hast
inia under a guarantee by the thited States, Soviet Union
and China. The Malaysian High Corgission in London has been
trying to set up a dialogue with the Chinese Office here
through the kesenian imbassy, though without success,
gestures have not gone entirely umotioed by Peking.
Chinese Red Cross resmtly offered the equivalms of
x$625,000 in supplies to the Falaysian Ted Cross for flsed
relief. The offer ma hastily accepted by the Malaysian
Bad Gross before the Government could have sosɑnd thoughts,
the Government are in no hurry to rask matters.
lanak roomtly repeated that Malaysia could not enter into
diplomatie relations with Communist Okina mtil she consed
to help the insurgente are working against the osta.lished
Government,
The Indonesien Gevemment has also made some effort
to reduce friction with Poking. They have made someosaics
to the Overseas Chinese in the form of reopening rohoals
damping down anti-Chinese attitudes.
Er Trudonu 100 ẨN
Bjakarta on his way to the Commonwealtà Conference, President
Soeharto apparistly told him that Indonesia vas willing to
normalise relations with Feking provided the latter aŭandoned
her "vituperative and suppressive saapaiga" against the
CONFIDENTIAL
COXFTEENS ZAL
Indonesian Government. This was presumably intended to
In return the Chinese hare
reach the ears of the Chinese.
refused to some extent this anti-Indonesian propaganda.
5.
Chinese relations with Malaysia and Indonesia have toom
complicated by the gradual drift of the two countries
towards a "iro Chinas" position. The Malaysians already
have sensular relations with Taiwan, Though there has been
some strain between the two countries reonetly, the Imlaysians
are adamantly opposed to Talvan's expulsion from the Dr.
At the last General Assembly they voted agaiɔst the Importanš
"mastion Resolution bus abstained on the Albanian. The
Indenssian delegate vas "preset but not participating".
Biree then the Indonesian Government have indiested that
they too are opposed to faivan's expulsien.
mpulsion. In view of
Chinese sensitivity to issues involving the Tmited Bations and
Talvan, any aròdit on other matters assruing to the two
Governzenta in the eyes of the Chinese squld well be
dissipated by a trend towarda stronger links with Tuima,
6. Malaysia and Indonesia can be expected to continue
their efforts to reach an understanding with Peking. In the
ease of Indonesia, much will depend on the balance between
the Army and civilian representatives in the Government,
But in view of the suspicions of Peking of beth Indonesia
and Malaysia, and the problem of Taiwan, any imprOVOGERİ
in relations is likely to be precerLove,
17 March 1971.
Here JVPD
Xe Ritenis PURD
Mr Brewer Research Department
JA & Morgan
Par Instern Departnes
Registry No.
Top Secret.
Secret Conidential.. Restricted. Unclassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT blue minute
Type 1 +
To:-
From
JAL Morgan
Mr Wilford
Telephone No. & BEL
Sir Tomlinson
Copied to
Mr. Aiers SWPD
Mr Ritchie PUSD
Mr Frewer Research Dept
Department
BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
hg
NOTHING
From
globere
Passen
Swed.
lesby the Chimère canke expected to excrine frowing Inference in the
areas, particularly in view of their mare active and flexible foreign,
shiny
PALENT
To some whink the gestures arade by both concatres finestring
MALAYS
CHINESE RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA AND INDONESTA
1.
During the Anglo-French talks last
week M. Froment-Meurige mentioned that there
had been some movement in Chinese relations
with Indonesia and Malaysia during the past
few months. You may like to have our
comments.
SWPD concur.
(increasing
2. It has become increasingly clear flats
á preruences are makina kituntij The Malaysian and Indonesia anovkeen to
strike a
morg Asian, non- aligned posture, This
aptitude may eten partly from concern over
US redeployment in Asia as part of the Nixon
doctrine. It may also reflect a growing
realisation in both countries that they must
make more effort than in the past to come to
terms with their Asian surroundings. This
imevi rahly
policy involves reaching an accommodation of
Obtaining some kind with China, and ideally some gesture
of acceptance from Peking. Both Indonesia and
Malaysia fear that China harbours nascent
territorial ambitions, which might come to the
fore under more extremist leadership.
immediately they are deeply concerned about
Chinese-assisted subversive movements and about Habe links
More
relations mi➡ Peking and their own Overseas
UNP. 3.
Chinese
as a sop bothers local (Inese, community-
The Malaysian Government
have made
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEDL 31-7406
CONFIDENTIAL
The Cat B
Там назива
punte nga test Malay Tam sance moto enter will iplemake bekeken with |
Chane wulst she kamms to help the Anfangfalt whe
working agent the
by babimus Giant
have made a series of statements over the
past months in favour of non- alignment.
They have also revied earlier proposals for
a neutralised South East Asia under a guarantee
by the United States, Soviet Union and China
jona-dačem policy, last year in
Inst
the United Nations the Malaysians voted against
the US sponsored procedural resolution on Chinese representation, but
abstained on the
substantive resolution because it contained
lowance to the bulsion of Taiwan,
The
Malaysian High Commission in London has been
trying to set up a dialogue with the Chinese office here through the
Romanian Embassy, though
Dr. without success When Tun, Temat was in the United Nations last
October he anders
Cangetha
the Haferelen Foreign Minister, Mr Sharp,
asked
to exam the Malaysian non- aligned stand
to Chinese. These gestures have not gone
entirely unnoticed by Peking. The Chinese
the equivalent 177
Red Cross recently offered $625,000
in food supplies the
Malaysian Red Cross for flood relief. The
accepted
offer was hastily snapped-un by the Malaysian have
Red Cross before the Government could think
suond Kinghts.
swive uncut it.
The Indonesian Government has also made
some effort to reduce friction with Peking.
They have made concessions to the Overseas
Chinese in the form of reopening schools and
damping down the anti-Chinese
When
Trudeau was in Djakarta on his way to the
Commonwealth Conference, President Saharto
apparently told him that Indonesia
was
/ willing
CONFIDEN"TAL
WEBL 51-740A
CONFIDEMIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
meaning
willing to normalise relations with Peking
provided the latter abandoned her "vituperative
and suppressive campaign" against the
Indonesian Government. This was presumably
intended to reach the ears of the Chinese,
In return the Chinese have reduced to some
Men's
extent anti-Indonesian propagarda, and have
given less publicity
5.
"donesian exiles in
Chinese relations with Malaysia and
Indonesia have been complicated by the gradual
draft
raft of the two countries towards a "two Chinag
position.
The Malaysians already have
consular relations with Taiwan,
Though there
has been some strain between the two countries
recently, the Malaysians are adamantly opposed
to Taiwan's expulsion from the UN
as Indonesian delegate was "present but not
At the last foren As5 they noted against the Important to Queden
Resolution but abstamed setato. in the Albanian
on other man th
any Greant fecerning to the
tro Goremments in the lies of
The Chrine fold well he
dissipated by
participating", in the chinese representation
Since then the Indonesian Government
tro
have indicated that they are opposed to Taiwan'
expulsion. In view of Chinese sensitivity to
Therfring
issues affecting the United Nations and
Taiwan, tires
of
Preputation & bined by bederit a pione
în nouid fell indo mich time time to come.
Crina by
Malasia and ind
artrand tourmala
stringer hinks wat Tiniwan.
warda
It seems likely that both Malaysia and
Indonesia will perasvere
can be grfected to contrans
in/†
their efforts to
reach ar understanding with Peking. In the
case of Indonesia, much will depend on the
balance between the Army and civilian representatives
Iseñorm in the Government. But in
view
suspicians of Peking entertained by both
Indonesia and Malaysians
counties and the problem of Taiwan, any
CON "IDENTIAL
of the
/ improvement
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEL 51-7406
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
improvement in relations is likely to remain
precarious and subjost
periodic fluct
15.3
Far Eastern Department
RE: IN REGISTRY No.50
DIE
ET MON
BROIT
With the Compliments
- of
The British High CommissioneK.
Shell House,
Harambee Avenue,
NAIROBI.
E Clay
Ana Mayan
FEC 21
JM. 19.3
one: Nairobi 28001
egrams: UKRER
Medero
3
Thur Mason)
3/3
G 8 Barrasa Esq Peking
CONFIDENTIAL
British High Coumission
NAIROBI
16 March 1971
18
In paragraph 2 of your letter of 18 February to Appleyard in Far Easter
Departaent, you said you would be interested to know if there were any
signs that Kenya night change her relations with China.
2.
The Kenyans, of course, have diplomatic relations with China, and have,
since 1963, supported China's claim for a seat in the United Nations.
There has been no Chinese Ambassador in Nairobi since May, 1967, when
the Kenyans also withdrew their mission from Peking
grennda of
zoeizrušity. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires here in Mr. Wang Had-min. The
Kenyans also restrict the movements of Chinese diplomats hereon. As
grounds of ramposity.
3. Relations between Kenya and China have not been good for years. The
discrediting of Oginga Odinga and the Government': revelation of Chinese
support for him, exemplify Kenya's suspicions of the Chinese, This
suspicion has been despened by the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania,
which Kenya regarda very unfavourably. Indeed, it remains an offence in
Kenya to be in possession of Chinese Communist literature,
4. At present, the sort of local politician who might be expected to be
interested in fact shows little inclination to press the Government hard
to improve relations with China. However, the Assistant Minister for
Foreign Affairs, when answering questions on Kenyan-Chinese relations in
the National Assembly before Christmas, said that the Government was
making every effort to improve them. Be also said that China had bought
all Kenya's cotton the previous year, and it was hoped. that China would
increase her purchases in the current year.
5. As a tailpiece however, it is worth noting that the Chinese Charge
presented the President with £28,834 on 10 March to assist Kenya's
drought victims. The Charge also promised that China would be prepared
to supply a further £115,000 worth of food and medical supplies. The
donation represents the first Chinese foray into the limelight for a
long time and it has naturally earned then wide publicity and
expressions of gratitude.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6. Nevertheless.............
CONFIDENTIAL
2
6. Nevertheless, there is little more to this than wind; and it is very
unlikely that the Government would want to see anymore substance
injected into Kenyan-Chinese relations in present circumstances,
Copies to:--
East African Departmeth
- Far Eastern Department
D N Biggin
Information Research Department
FOO
CONFIDENTIAL
I Clay
2/3
G 8 Barrass Esq
office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires
PEKING
CHINESE
申
BRITISH EMBASSY TUNIS
RECE:rch 1971
REGISTRY NO.50
1.:
171
+
FEC 2/1
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ITH APRICAN COUNTRIES
Please refer to your letter to
Appleyard of 18 February.
2.
So far as Tunisia is concerned, there have been no developments since
Tunis tele- gram no. 20 Saving of & December, which was copied to you.
Copy to
L V Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department F.C.O.
J B Wright
Copy LORDITED TRA, PUSD
WAST
NAD Enter pla
AT
FEC 2/
G 8 Barress Esq PEKING
SECRET
5 March 1971
THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFPAIRS
13
In your letter of 6 February you asked for biographical details of all
the people you have identified in the Western European, American and
Australasian Department and in the General departments. I attach a copy
of a Research Department minute" containing as much as we know about
them, This letter is copied with enclosures to CJ Howells, Hong Kọng, A
✪ Ashworth, Regional Information Office, Hong Kong, J DI Boyd,
Washington and P II Hewitt, Canberra.
SECRET
L▼ ▲ Appleyard Far Eastern" Department
ри
D
I
SECRET
Referance........
FEC 2/2
TUL IT I
115
Mr. Dure II S D feist fand a copy for selection and a second copy
forties). Rr. Appleyard, FE.
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
13
In his letter of 6 February Mr Barrase asks for bio- graphic details of
all the people identified by Chancery in the Western European, American
and Australasian depart- ment and in the general departments. The
details are es follows:
Western European, Americar and Australasian Department.
Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Shen P'ing
Ling Ch'ing
T'ang Hai-kuang
Chang Wen-chin ·
Yu-Chan
Chang Yi-chun
Li Pao-Cheng
Yu Chung-chun
.
Became head of the Asian Department of the MFA in 1949. 1954-
Vice-President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Af airs.
April 1964 was appoint- ed a Vice-Linister of Foreign Affeirs. He has
been extremely active in foreign affairs since 1949.
1950 Deputy-Director, Protocol Office, MFA. 1954 Counsellor, Berne.
1955-59 Consul-General, Geneva. 1965-1969 Chargé d'Affaires 8.1. London.
1957 1st Secretary, Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. 1965 Deputy-Director
of the Department of International Relations, MPA. No further reported
appearances until October 1970.
1956 1st Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Denmark. 1963 Deputy-Director,
Depart- ment of Western Europeen Affairs, MFA. No other reported
appearances until April 1969.
1954-7 Deputy-Director, Department of Asian Affairs, MFA. 1958-64
Director, First Department of Asian Affairs. 1966-9 Ambassador to
Pakistan. October 1969 member of the delegetion to neg- otiations on the
Sino-Soviet border.
1958-60 2nd Secretary, The Hague. 1963 1st Secretary, Damascus. 1967-8
Charge d'Affaires 8.1. Damascus.
Interpreter, Political Science and Law Association. 1961 at Chargé
d'Affaires Office, London. 1964 visited London again.
No Record.
1964 Attaché in Helsinki. No other inform tion.
SECRET.
/ Yu Hui-min.
+
+
SECRET
Yu Rui-min
Hu ?
Chu Chui-sheng
Wang Kuan-sheng
2,
man of this name (we do not know his CCC) was on the 1958 diplomatic
list as being in Switzerland. A man of this name (4416/1920/3046) was a
3rð Secretery in Algiers from 1964-1967, and accompanied Chou En-lai on
his December 1963-February 1964 African trip as an interpreter.
The onlyl likely contender is Hu Pen-ya (5170/2609/5069) who was in the
Embassy in East Berlin in 1957-58.
No record.
According to secret information a mah of this name (CCC unknown)
attended the Second Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Guinea in 1962. We
have no other information.
In Appendix C Yu Hun-liang is described as Head of Soviet Section. We
think that this may be Yu Hung-lien (CCC unknown) who in 1962 was 2nd
Secretary, Moscow, and between 1965 and 1969 was 1st Secretary, Moscow.
In Appendix D Lu Vei-chao is named as a Baby responsible member.
According to our records he was named a Deputy Head in June 1970.
3.
Appendix E
Ch'en Ch'u
Hau I-hsin
Yuan Lu-lin (5913/7627/2651)
Ch'i Ming-teung
Han Heu
Wang Hai-jung
1955 Director of the USSR and East European Department, IFA. 1956-59,
Moscon firstly as Acting Chargé d'Affaires and then as Counsellor. 1964
Director of West Asian and North African Affairs Department. 1966
appointed Ambassador to Ghana. August 1970 a leading member of the
Information Department.
See our minute of 9 Februɛry.
1955-57 1st Secretary, Helsinki. 1963-4 Counsellor, Oppenhagen. 1964
Deputy- Director of the Information Department.
No trace.
Deputy-Director Protocol Department sinc 1959. 1964-5 Counsellor,
Moscow.
According to Red Guard posters a niege of Mao Tse-tung. November 1970
was described as a leading member of Protocol Department. Active since
May 1970.
/Chang Li-kuang,•
SECRET.
SECRET.
Reference........
Chang Li-kuang
Li Jen-chieh
Chung Lieng-hang
Wang Chung-li
Kuan Tsung-chou
Liu Ching-yu
Chi Li-te
Fu Heo
A man of this name (CCC unknown) was a 3rd Secretary in Moscow from
1954-56. A man with the CCC given was described as a representative of
the Protocol Department in 1961 and as a Section Head in 1964.
No trace.
No trace.
A man of this name (3769/1504/3810) was Consul-General in Damascus in
1960/61. In September 1963 he was named as Deputy-Director of the
Consular Department. However in June 1970 a man of this name was
7 described as a leading member of the
MFA Asian Department.
A man of this name (CCC unknown) was an attachề in Djakarta from 1961-3.
A man of this name was Student Consul in Kedan from 1956-8. Between
February 1968 and (at least) July 1970 he was Consul-General in
Zanzibar.
We have very little information on him. In 1952 he was in the Consulate
General, Bombey, and in 1957 was in Rengoon and Delhi.
Discussed in our February 9 minute.
22 February 1971
Elizabeth A Wright Far Eastern Section Research Department
SECRET.
L-
L V Appleyard sq
Ec de
Far Eastern Department
FCO
My Dear her,
RESTRICTED
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.