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3-HCV 1967
Mr che le Mya
Mr. Dengon
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FC 2/2095
The Handling of Chinese Foreign Policy
The attached two lettera are of considerable interest and very relevant
to our own problema with the Chinese. The new regulations about dealing
with Foreign Missions (FCI/27) make it clear that more moderate elements
in the Chinese leadership have taken a firm grip on the conduct of
foreign relations and intend to make this known. The decrease in
influence of Yao Teng-shan points in the same direction (FC1/2).
2. I think these lettera add force to what Peking have recently been
saying about finding some way out of the present impasse, The trouble is
that, although the moderate elements in the leadership are taking a grip
on the affairs there is no particular reason why they should go out of
their way to be friendly towards the British and many reasons why they
should be cautious of doing so. This means, I think, that it is up to us
to make some moves which will force the Chinese to reciprocate, It is
quite possible that the atmosphere in Peking is still such that the
Foreign Ministry will be unwilling to enter into anything seeming like
negotiations with us. The best method of reducing restrictions on both
sides may therefore be to put proposals to the Chinese and they only
need to answer by deed rather than in words.
سنا
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(D.C. Wilson) 27 October, 1967
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than of "reciprociting by relocation
the times as come for cautious moves his that direction.
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(FC 3/20)
RESTRICTED
Fc.3/20 1941
FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.
1 November 1967
Ho
Thank you for your letter of 24 October saying that you had not yet
received a copy of the Note we sent to the Chinese here about travel
restrictions. I think it must have been one of the pieces of paper we
avoided sending you in the days when we thought that bag services were
likely to be interrupted for a long time and there would be nowhere to
put material, even when a bag did arrive,
2.
I am now enclosing a copy of the Note in question, dated 24 August. As
you will know from our telegram No. 879 of 13 October, we sent a further
Note to the Chinese on 12 October setting out in rather more detail the
categories of persons to whom the travel restrictions applied.
3. I will try to make sure that you are sent copies of any further
Important Notes. You will probably have noticed that we have recently
been sending the text of most of our Notes en olair to you in Peking so
that the Chinese have the opportunity to read them without relying on
the good offices of their Mission here,
P. Cradock, Esq., PEEING.
مع
RESTRICTED
(D. C. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department
Cypher/Cat.A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1- NOV 1967
(93
J
F2.3/20
Tèlno. 194
30 October 1967
NFIDENTIAL
fee -192
My immediately preceding telegram.
p.a.
92
Following for de la Mare.
To lift surveillance on China's staff would be so slight a Concession as
to be meaningless. We have no analogous agency here. Nearest parallel is
Bank staff in Shanghai who are not (repeat not) under surveillance. With
greatest goodwill Chinese
Absence of
would be hard put to find a reciprocal gesture. overseas trade on the
part of Bank staff is an odd and misleading criterion for distinguishing
between them and their compatriots. Discrimination in favour of Bank may
give Chinese misleading impression that all we are concerned about are
our commercial interests whereas I take it our object is to relieve this
Mission from an intolerable situation and lead the way to a general
détente.
L
2. For reasons given in my immediately preceding telegram concession
must be substantial enough to have meaning to Chinese and to point the
way to reciprocal concession affecting this Kission. The only worthwhile
move would be to relax movement restrictions on all (repeat all)
official Chinese staff. We would retain ultimatum but there is no [2
grps. undec.). If that is impossible we might as a bad second lift the
movement restrictions on staff of Bank and commercial office. This might
again leave impression all we cared about were our trading interests but
it would have bearing on our Mission and might lead to the release of
e.g. the Peters family as well as the Igrp.undec.] in Shanghai. If even
this is ruled out we must at least lift movement restrictions not just
surveillance, on the Bank staff.
3.
As regards modalities, lifting of surveillance alone is just not worth
telling the Chinese about. If, as I earnestly hope, we are able to offer
a substantial concession we must recognize that there is no (repeat no)
hope of thereby engaging the Chinese in a discussion on a mutual lifting
of restrictions. They will never explain themselves in rational terms.
The only way is to inform them of our decision and await a reciprocal
move. In order to shorten the interval between our gesture and any
response I suggest that we inform them several days in advance of the
actual lifting of restrictions. There should be no public announcement.
I agree that in view of your problem with Shenping it would be better to
make main moves in Peking merely keeping Shenping's office informed. I
could obtain an interview with Mr. Hsueh and in reporting our decision I
could add we hoped this would lead to a return to more normal relations.
Mr. Hopson
FILES
F.0. Hd. §.E.D.
P.S.
P.S. Dept.
P.U.S.
Sir D. Allon Fr. de la Mare
Sir C. Crowe
Hr. I.E. Allen
P.U.S.S. (Mr. Rodgers) Hd. Personnel Dept.
CONFIDENTIAL
SSSSS
CONFIDENTIAL
her/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno. 193
CONFIDENTIAL
F23/20/91
Your telegram No. 916.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
192
1- NOV 1967
Fe-3/20
"Taken with accous.
бившевной Seperate Subeefsion
30 October 1967
pay
·FC. 3/20/89.
You
Following for de la Mare.
Your telegram under reference which crossed my telegram No. 189 about
implications of Sino Indonesian settlement has caused me deep
disappointment and concern. I am disappointed at the meagre proposal put
forward which seems to me almost worthless as it stands and concerned at
its apparent lack of comprehension of our situation and its urgency. Nor
do we draw jointly from knowledge of the episodes partly motivated by a
shortage of policemen in London.
2.
I will not repeat here all arguments I have already advanced by letter
and telegram in favour of a unilateral and general lifting of British
representative restrictions in London, but salient facts are as follows:
(a) Her Majesty's Government imposed new movement restrictions
and police surveillance on Chinese in London immediately after attacks
on our Office in Peking;
(b)
It was only then that the Chinese retaliated by imposing much more
severe movement restrictions on us, cancelling existing exit visas and
instituted a freeze on exit visa applications;
(c) Although this freeze has been relaxed for 5 school children
and 2 pregnant wives the Chinese Foreign Ministry have so far refused
all other exit visa applications even on urgent medical grounds and had
made it clear that the freeze will continue until restrictions in London
are lifted;
(d) Her Majesty's Government have so far felt inhibited from
making a unilateral gesture of this magnitude "in present circumstances"
(reference is made to Grey, Watt and Knight none of whom are directly
related to our problem see paragraph 3 below). But the situation has now
changed and present circumstances are more favourable i.e. apart from
Chinese hint that they would favour relaxation of restric- tions
providing we make first move there is a general return to reason in
Chinese internal and external policies, need for cala with Canton fair
impending, departure of Hangchow from London;
/(c) [sic] Unless
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 193 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
2.
+
(c) [sic]
3.
Unless we grasp the nettle now we therefore face prospect of sitting it
out here indefinitely with our women folk and small children some of
whom are in need of urgent evacuation on medical grounds (Blishem
family) with morale inevitably falling and possibility of a reversion to
disorder here and therefore of opportunity of settlement slipping
through our fingers.
I hope these considerations have been fully explained to Minister.
Detention of Grey is as you know specifically related to Journalists in
Hong Kong. Watt is Sui Generis and (for your own information) may have
been doing local trafficking of some kind. Knight is to be subject of
separate talks on Hong Kong border. It is important that we should keep
all these problems separate from that of the normalisation of our own
position. If we try to solve everything at once we shall probably solve
nothing. But in all these cases any détente in Anglo Chinese relations
is likely to help rather than hinder.
In the light of above I hope you will reconsider your whole approach to
this problem. The real "straw in the wind" is that Chinese have as good
as told us how to get out of this situation and revert to normal, Are we
really going to ignore their signal? It is no good expecting any prior
relaxation from Chinese side. They can afford to sit it out more or less
indefinitely if necessary. We cannot. I realise that it sticks in our
gullets to make first move but hard fact is that unless we do so
deadlock will continue and may get worse.
5.
What it boils down to is a choice between:
(a) Seizing present favourable opportunity to make a sub-
stantial concession in the reasonable expection that it will lead to a
thaw or
(b) embarking on a contest of force for which we are ill-
equipped with its attendant risks that the opportunity will be lost and
with its serious implications for health and morale of our staff,
open.
If we choose second course I hope we do so with our eyes
/6. Comments on your
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PENG TELEGRAM NO. 193 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
3.
6. Comments on your report of the Chinese proposal are in my immediately
following telegram.
Mr. Hopson.
FILES
F.0. Hd. F.E.D.
P.S.
PSD.
P.U.S.
P.U.S.S. (Mr. Rodgers)
Sir D. Allen.
Mr. de la Mare.
Sir C. Crowe.
Mr. M.E. Allen.
Hd. Personnel Dept.
DDDDD
CONFIDENT IA L
:
Vr. Denso
Mr. Murray
Wurz
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference...
Fe 3/20 w.91
Flag (91)
Sino-Indonesian Relations
I think Mr. Hopson is correct in saying in his telegram No. 189 of 30
October that the way in which the Chinese have handled the closing of
their Mission in Jakarta shows that less "revolutionary" and more
pragmatic and subtle elements are again operating in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry.
2. The events connected with the sending of ■ Chinese air- craft to
Indonesia to pick up Embassy staff are further evidence to support this
thesis. The Chinese had previously made two demands that they should be
allowed to send an air- craft to Jakarta to fly back members of their
Embassy staff who had been wounded. On both occasions the Indonesians
refused. The Indonesians finally said that members of the Chinese
Wission would only be allowed to leave Jakarta when they received
assurances that Indonesian diplomata from Peking had left China. We do
not know how it was finally arranged to send a Chinese aircraft to
Jakarta carrying the remaining staff from the Indonesian Babassy, but it
looks as though this could only have been a suggestion from the Chinese
side. If so, it is a move which they would almost certainly not have
taken at any time during the revolutionary fervour of the last few
months. It provided a shếc way out for the Indonesiana (which they
hardly expected) and it made sure that no incidents should occur at
airports before the Indonesians left China.
3. The way in which the Chinese have handled this affair is encouraging
from our point of view and suggests, I think, that it may be possible to
arrange some carefél bargaining for the exchange of both Mr. Grey and
Inspector Knight.
I
ساد۵
(D. C. Wilson)
1 November 1967
1
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1
John Densen
дв
√ CON
CONFIDENTIAL
zw.
3038 1/1
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat..
IMMEDIATE -EKING
Telno. 189
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
30 October 1967
seperate mefist
My telegram No. 187.
TO
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31.
30 OCT 1967
√x: FC 3/20
Chinese acceptance of suspension of diplomatic relations with Indonesia
and mutual withdrawal of diplomatic staffs is of obvious interest with
reference to our present position.
This decision must have been highly unpalatable to Chinese who will seem
to be abandoning their large overseas community in Indonesia but became
almost inevitable after attack on Chinese Embassy in Djakarta on 1
October and wounding of most of Embassy staff.
2. That is encouraging in the sense that it indicates Chinese Foreign
Ministry is once again able to take difficult decisions and is
apparently trying to restore some order in foreign relations even when
it entails a tactical retreat. We should however be unwise to draw more
general conclusions and apply them to our own case.
3. The Indonesians in fact gained their objective by extreme violence
leaving Chinese virtually no choice in the matter unless they were
willing to abandon their Embassy staff to mercy of Indonesian mobs, Such
weapons are not available to us. Secondly yhr Indonesian objective goes
beyond ours; They wanted complete suspension of relations whereas it is
our interest to restore normality as far as possible.
I trust therefore that the Indonesian example will not be understood as
arguing for increasing pressure on the Chinese in London. We do not have
the means to make this effective. The Chinese would further limit our
activities here. And the final result of this mutual escalation would be
to make any solution except a total suspension of relations extremely
difficult.
5, As I reported in my telegram No.166 the Chinese have as good as told
me the way out 1.e. by lifting restrictions in London. They have a
technical point in that these were imposed before they announced the
present restrictions on us in Peking. This indicates that they wish to
get off the hook themselves. I have already emphasised that the present
moment, with the Canton Fair impending and the general trend of Chinese
policy returning to reason and normality is particularly favourable to a
settlement. But this favourable period may not last. Nor should we
assume Chinese leadership is united on these issues. Moderates will
require encouragement in the shape of gestures from us.
/6. I do not think
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 189 to Foreign Office
- 2.
6.
I do not think further correspondence would help. Ch-en Yi has not
replied to your letter. He has been ill and
out of things for some time. This is a case where actions are likely to
be more effective than words thus avoiding mutual
polemics about incidents over which I suspect the Chinese leaders would
like to draw a veil.
Mr. Hopson
FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
F.E.D.
SSSSS
CONFIDENTI AL
a bavid
7
FC 3/20110
office of the British
Charge d'Affaires,
PEKING.
24 October, 1967
-FC-3/3/119.
We received in the last ag a copy of the Foreign Office Note of 23
August to the Chinese Office in London on the subject of exit permits.
We do not seem to have received a copy of the Note restricting their
movements in London. It would be helpful if you could let us have this
and copies of any similar communications.
Yours wer
•FC. 3/3/121. Lace
ім
(P. Cradock)
F. Div. Please locate
D. C. Wilson, Esq., Far Eastern Department, FOREIGN OFFICE.
allache (12
21
F.D.
Dft
reply, pleqy copy of -121.
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* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
89
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
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CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret Scoret Confidential
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
}
Priority
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COPY
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NOTHING TO BE WRitten in THIS MARGIN
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In Confidence
EXCiatt.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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15
Your telegram 166.
awation
1. http|P-
Following from de la Mare.
F222/7/30 Cat official lively
1
i
We have for some time been considering the possibility of a quiet
unilate lifting of the
ì
restrictions against the Chinese in London.
Your
unilaterally
letter of 20 October also refers. There is → think no question of our
being able to get agreement to relax the restrictions on the mission
proper
ind on NCNA, evonifat
to-propose, this which
+
Teu para 3 below)s
"k-devel we wished
7
not prepared to do.
=of
the moment. But the Home Office have been representing to us the cost to
cum in(manpower maintaining surveillance over all the official
are. Chinese here and we have been considering the
possibility of taking the
:
Ro Burveillance off
the members of the Bank of China [bon st their
rosić
in Hampstead and at the office.
/would
This
!
INL002009
C
:
would release about a quarter of the total
police force now engaged on these duties.
2. Our reason for picking the Bank of China
Refficials se our first possible step in
e
relaxation is that we consider them to be on a
rather different footing from the mission proper and the NCNA in that
They have shown no overt sign of animosity, have made no
trouble
and give the appearance of wanting
to be left in peace to get on with their
legitimate business laetivities]
Our own
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
170072711.2
business interests have been representing
to us forgoma time that we should ease
the restrictions on them.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.