ADVANCE COPIES TO NEWS DEP AND GIPD.
MY TELNO 2069: SECRETARY OF STATE'S U.N. PRESS CONFERENCE.
CHINA.
Q. YESTERDAY, IN YOUR ASSEMBLY STATEMENT, YOU MADE OUT A VERY GOOD
WE CASE FOR THE NEED TO BRING THE CHINESE INTO THE U.N. HOWEVER, ARE
TOLD THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE TWO TRADITIONAL CHINESE
RESOLUTIONS REMAINS EXACTLY THE SAME AS LAST YEAR. MY QUESTICH IS THIS:
HOW DO YOU RECONCILE SUPPORTING THE SEATING OF THE CHINESE ON THE ONE
HAND AND SUPPORTING ON THE OTHER A RESOLUTION WHICH HAS THE CLEAR EFFECT
IF NOT THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF KEEPING THE CHINESE OUT A BIT LONGER?
A. WE HAVE NEVER SEEN HOW WE COULD DENY THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT
MATTER. IT IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER, AN IMPORTANT MATTER TO A GREAT MANY
COUNTRIES. I DIDN'T EXPRESS ANYTHING NEW. OUR GOVERNMENT'S FEELING HAS
BEEN FOR A LONG TIME THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE CHINESE WERE IN. HOW
MUCH THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONY, AS I SAID
YESTERDAY, IS A MATTER OPEN TO DEBATE, BUT NEVERTHELESS WE THINK THEY
OUGHT TO BE IN AND THAT THIS OUGHT TO BE PUT TO THE TEST. I DON'T KNOW
WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY ALTERATION IN VOTING THIS YEAR OR NOT BUT THAT
THIS IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER TO A WHOLE LOT OF COUNTRIES WE DON'T SEE HOW
IT IS POSSIBLE TO DENY.
Q. CAN YOU GIVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES OF CHINA ENTERING THE
U.N. IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OR LACK OF
IMPORTANCE OF ATTEMPTS BY CANADA AND ITALY TO RECOGNIZE
/A. NO. PEKING?
.2.
A. NO. THAT IS THEIR AFFAIR. WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE
VOTING BRINGS. ON PAST FORM OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, IT DOESN'T LOOK AS
THOUGH THE VOING WILL VARY ALL THAT MUCH, BUT I CAN'T ANSWER FOR CANADA
OR ITALY. BUT WE SHALL KNOW BEFORE LONG.
Q. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT AS YOURS, WHICH
RECOGNIZES THE PEKING REGIME, HAS BEEN TOLD RECENTLY THAT PEKING
IS NOW INTERESTED IN JOINING THE U.N. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE U.N. WOULD, NOT COME
BEFORE NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1972. ARE YOU IMPLYING THAT
IT MIGHT COME AT THAT TIME? DO YOU CONSIDER THIS A NEW ELEMENT
AND IF IT IS THE CASE THAT CHINA IS NOW INTERESTED, WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER
THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE ADMISSION OF CHINA?
A. 1 THINK PROBABLY THAT THE CHINESE ARE INCREASINGLY INTERESTED
ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE NEVER THINK OR ACT IN THE SAME TIME SCALE
AS WE DO AND SO THEY WILL PROBABLY BE QUITE PATIENT ABOUT THIS.
THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK MUST BE OF COURSE THE UNWILLINGNESS OF
A GOOD MANY COUNTRIES TO VOTE FOR THEIR ENTRY, AND UNTIL THAT
OBSTACLE CAN BE OVERCOME THEN CHINA WILL NOT BECOME A MEMBER.
BUT I THINK THAT THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THAT THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THAT CHINA IS BECOMING MORE INTERESTED THAN SHE HAS
BEEN IN THE PAST IN MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
SIR C. CROWE
FCO/MI. DISTRIBUTION:
F.E.D.
DDDDD
:
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file 78
(тие 2069)
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CYPHER/CAT-A-
ROUTINE UKMISSION. REW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2054
CONFIDENTIAL
DTG 2420152
77
TOP COPY
CONFIDENTJAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 24 SEPTEMBER
:oto ro
FEC 2/4
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2354 CF 24
SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARTS WASHINGTON PEKING
BRUSSELS.
67.
MY TELEGRAM NO 1817: CHINESE ADMISSION TO THE UN,
THE BELGIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY HAVE FINALLY ABANDONED THEIR
PROPOSAL AND WILL CONTENT THEMSELVES WITH STATING THEIR VIEWS DURING THE
GENERAL DEBATE. THEY ALSO SAID THAT THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD EXAMINE
THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE ADMISSION OF DIVIDED STATES. WE EXPRESSED DOUBT
ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THIS WITH RELATION TO THE TWO GERMANIES AND THE
BELGIANS UNDERTOOK TO RECONSIDER.
FCO PASS PARIS PEKING BRUSSELS.
SIR C. CROWE
pl
F.E.D.
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
U.H.D.
S.E.A.D.
S.V.P.D.
NEWS DEPT
W.E.D.
W.O.D.
E.E.S.D.
RESEARCH DEPT (W.EUROF. SECTION) RESEARCH DEFT (SOVIET SECTION)
CONFIDENTIAL
THE SCOTSMAN
Cutting dated
23 SEP 1970 19
! Malaysia ́ready to back'
Peking for UN
From HENRY KAMM: KUALA LUMPUR, Tuesday
High Government sources disclosed today that Malaysia. in a major policy
shift, would actively favour and vote for Communist China s admission to
the United Nations.
Malaysia would, however, continue to oppose the expul Kion of
Nationalist China, the sources said.
RESOLUTIONS
on
They declared that the Government of Prime Minis ter Tun Abdul Razak
would vote against both standard Chinese resolutions admission that are
expected before the UN General Assembly next month. The first. favoured
by the United States, would make the admission
Peking 210 "important question." requir- Ingiwo-thirds majority.
to
come
of
The other, usually sponsored by Albania, calls for the admission of
"eking and the expulsion of Taiwan, Malaysia
would drop her opposition to this one, according to the sources, if the
sponsors elimi nated the second demand.
of
The reversal of Malayman policy on China is regarded as an indication
future of politica! development alignments in Asia. It makes Malaysia
the first pro-Western country in South-east Asta 10 break ranks on China
policy.
The development viewed with concern by Americans here, fessed surprise
and doubt. and hope that Tun Razak would reverse such a change In
policy.
who
Was
pro
The Government sources, however, said that the new Prime Minister's
attitude was shaped partially by his per- sonal contacts with the Heads
of State of non-aligned nations at the recent conference in Lusaka,
Zambla, and even more during his subsequent official visits to President
Tito
in Yugoslavia and President Ceausescu in Rumania.
The sources said MalaysIK still considered Peking's att!- tude as
hostile, and pointed to the steady flow of venoMOUS propaganda
broadcasts from the so-called Voice of the Malaysian Revolution, which
emanate from China,
REALISATION
Behind the shift in Malay- sian thinking lies a growing realisation that
the Westerb Powers on whom they hid relied
their defence against possible Commúnist Chinese attack intend to! dise
engage themselves from South- East Asia.
for
76
IN
30
Al the same time, the new FEC 2/4.
Prime Minister said today that Malaysia would continue to improve her
relations with the Soviet Union and the ather Communit countries of New
York Times Europe.
News Service.
-
turer: (hinna
Chinna vre
Malaysia
abstament on the IQR
Ambong they
really will do it.
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from abst to agant
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245
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CONFIDENTIAL
Far Eastern Dentroke
Reference.
186.
(75
Mr. Alan James of the American Embassy called this afternoon to leave on
me some pieces of standard U.S. guidance to missions on well-known
subjects for the General Assembly. They add little or nothing to the sum
of our knowledge.
2.
Korea.
I attach the papers on Chinese Representation and
RE
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2
FEC 2/4.
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J. H. Lambert
15 September, 1970
Rery
M. Relats
2.9
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in China at UN
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CONFIDENTIAL
Chines Representation (Enclosure Two)
LASTAJA
21
The United States position on this issue remains unchanged:
(1) We remain strongly opposed to any proposal which seeks to expel the
Republic of China from the United Nations, substituting the Communist
China in its place.
(2) We will work to obtain broad co-sponsorship and active support of
the Important Question Resolution which would require that any
resolution to change the representation of China must gain a two-thirds
majority vote in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter.
CONFIDENTIAL
W.74
Covering
Confidential
Reference UL 6/11
FEC 2/4
Ente (China at
The UN.) pr
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY Nɔ.50
Don
Mr
Appleyard.....
し
2 SEP 30
Dept
17/%
FEC 2/4
As you may know, it has been our policy for
some years to send selected General Assembly
briefs, on a reciprocal basis, to the Australian,
Canadian and New Zealand authorities after the
consent of the originating Department and the
Department concerned in the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office has been received.
We should be grateful, therefore, if you
would consider whether the attached brief
IOC(70)!? is suitable for action as above.
Would you please confirm thet
have no objection?
لیلیا
ок
PR
(D.M.Read)
United Nations (Political) Dept.
واده
CONFIDENTIAL
74
74
Mr. Wilford
R
FEC 2/4
Ah Assland
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO NEW YORK:
BRIEF ON CHINA AT THE UNITED NATIONS
enter
- see comment
or like 204.
SM
169
I attach talking points and a background brief
Although they are in final
Ma
for the Secretary of State.
form there would be time to amend them if you had any
comments.
2. U.N. (Pol.) Department concurred in the draft.
3. It may be necessary to send a supplementary brief
when the likely voting position becomes clear.
CONFIDENTIAL
SALMugan
(J. A. L. Morgan) 9 September, 1970
Mus
/
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO
HE XXV SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NEW YORK
hips
Briet No. 15: China at the United Nat
General Talking Points
Nations
REGISTRY No. 50
:
10
FEC 2/4
We have voted
The continued exclusion of a quarter of the world's
population does not strengthen the Organisation. for the representation
of China by the Peking Government at the
United Nations since 1961. This remains our policy. We think
it essential that in the interests of world peace China should
be brought more fully into international councils, Chinese participation
is essential for the solution of many major world
problems such as disarmament.
2. China's present foreign policy appears more outward-looking.
The Chinese are resuming more conventional diplomatic attitudes.
We must encourage them in this.
3. There could be difficulties at New York and in the specialised
agencies when the Chinese come in. But this is not a valid reason for
keeping them out, indeed from this point of view the sooner they
are admitted the better.
4.
We nevertheless etill consider that the admission of China is
an important question under Article 18(2). In the face of strong
/ division
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division of opinion in the General Assembly and given the seriousness of
removing a representative from a long-occupied seat, it is hard to see
how one could argue otherwise.
why we vote for the Important Question resolution.
This is
5. The Chinese have on different occasions set out different
versions of the terms on which they would consider accepting
the offer of a seat in the United Nations.
appear somewhat extravagant.
Some of these
Then the time comes, we may find
the Chinese to be more pragmatic.
Far Eastern Department,
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
9 September, 1970.
CONFIDENT LAL
2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO
THE XXV SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NEW YORK
Brief No. 15: China at the United Nations
Background
On 15 Decembar 1961 the United Kingdom Delegate at the
United Nations General Assembly voted for the first time in
favour of the occupation of the China seat by the Government of
the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). The Soviet draft
resolution proposing this was, however, defeated. In his
explanation of vote, the U.K. Delegate reserved the position
of Her Majesty's Government regarding the status of Taiwan (see
paragraph 4 below). Je have since continued to vote in the
General Assembly in favour of resolutions tabled by Albania for
the seating of the C.P.R. and the expulsion of the Chinese
Nationalists, except in 1964 when no vote was taken.
2. The General Assembly in 1961 accepted a United States-
sponsored resultion that the question of a change in China's
representation was "important" under Article 18(2) of the Charter
and that any resolution proposing a change therefore required a
two-thirds majority to pass. The decision of the General
Assembly has been reaffirmed annually since then. In 1965
there was a tie in the vote on the Albanian resolution
/ advocating
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CONFIDENTIAL
advocating the seating of Peking but the prior adoption of the motion
reaffirming that the matter was "important" ensured that the Chinese
Nationalists were in no danger of being unseated. Since then the vote
for the Albanian resolution has been short
We have continued to vote for the of even a simple majority. "important
question" resolution, and have sought to justify this action on the
grounds that the matter is of evident importance and it would be hard to
declare that it was not so under the Charter. We remain, however, the
only country to vote for both resolutions. The Chinese repeatedly
criticise us for supporting what they consider to be a crude procedural
device to secure their
continued exclusion.
Probable Changes in U.N. Voting
3.
Changes in the General Assembly's voting could come this year. For
example, U Thant has in public speeches this year called for
universality of U.N. membership, with China clearly in mind. The
xenophobic attitudes that characterised China's diplomacy in 1966/68,
producing in 1968 a rejection of the Albanian resolution
to seat Peking, have recently been moderated. Last year the voting
returned nearly to normal. China has been attempting to cultivate
support among the countries of the Third World. Canadians are making
some progress in their talks with the Chinese on mutual recognition.
Agreement before this year's General Assembly is unlikely, by 1971 the
two sides may well come to terms. A successful outcome would involve a
transfer of Canada's vote at the U.N. Italy would probably be quick to
follow and other Western countries are interested in establishing
relations with
The
/ Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Pekin.
There is therefore a real possibility that next year's
vote if not this year's could produce for the first time a
simple majority in favour of the Albanian resolution. This
would inevitably weaken support for the American "important
question" resolution which itself is subject to a simple majority.
Eciwan: The U.K. Position
4. We have been careful to distinguish between the question of
China's representation and that of the status of the island of
Taiwan. It has many times been stated as the view of H.H.G.
that sovereignty over Taiwan is undetermined. It therefore
follows that the question of who should represent Taiwan is
equally undetermined.
Delegate made a reservation to this effect on each occasion that
the vote on China's representation was taken in the General
Assembly, By 1966 it was felt that our position regarding Taiwan
was so well-known that restatement on each occasion was unneces-
sary. In November 1966 therefore Lord Caradon included a once-
for-all statement for this purpose in his remarks on China's
representation delivered in the General Assembly.
In 1961 and subsequent years the U.K.
Taiwan: The Island's Future
5. Given the abhorrence on both sides of anything approaching
a "Two Chinas" solution, the unseating of Taiwan would be an
inevitable result of Peking's entry. This will be unwelcome
in some U.N. quarters and of course in the United States. The
inclusion of 750 million mainland Chinese as against the absence
of 14 million Taiwanese is clearly the lesser of two evils,
regrettable though the exclusion of Taiwan would be.
There has
/ been
CONFIDENTIAL
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been speculation that the Taiwanese sight eventually opt for
representation as the Government of Taiwan, but this seems
unlikely.
The Belgian Initiative
6. Last month the Belgian delegation at New York canvassed
support for a draft resolution which, if passed, would have the
effect of seating both China and Taiwan in the U.N. Although
ostensibly based on the legal position that there is only one
China, it proposes in fact a "Two-China" solution. On the
grounds that this would be equally unacceptable to both Peking
and Taiwan and would therefore win no support in the General
Assembly, we declined to support it. The Belgians now appear
on the point of withdrawing their proposal.
Chinese Preconditions
7. Over recent years the Chinese have sought to pose various
preconditions for their entry into the United Nations. These
have not been presented in any one fully authoritative version,
but certain preoccupations have emerged. Essentially, these
concern Taiwan: the Nationalists must be removed from their seat
at New York and in all U.N. bodies. The Chinese sometimes add
that the U.N. must condemn the United States for "occupying"
Taiwan; and that the U.N. must declare Taiwan to be an integral
part of China. The Chinese have also declared that the General
Assembly's 1951 Resolution condemning China as the aggressor in
Korea must be revoked; that the C.P.R. must be offered a perma-
nent seat on the Security Council; and (possibly with an eye on
the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Lusaka this month) that
/ Afro-
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Afro-Asian non-permanent membership of the Security Council
must be increased.
8. It is not clear what the Chinese in fact regard as their
Some of those mentioned above may be
minimum conditions.
bargaining points. The total exclusion of Taiwan and a
permanent seat on the Security Council are China's fundamental
terms of entry.
Far Eastern Department,
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
9 September, 1970.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Mr. Vilfogá
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO IN YO
BRIEF OF CHINA AT THE BESARNIA CIES
Pl
I attach talking points and a background brief
for the Secretary of State. Although they are in final
form there would be time to amend them if you had any
comments.
2.
U.N. (Pol.) Department omeurred in the draft.
3. It may be necessary to send a supplementary brief
when the likely voting position becomes clear.
CONFIDENTIAL
(J. A. L. Morgan)
9 September, 1970
نرم
COVRING CONFIDENTIAL
j
Mr. Insbert (U.H. (POL) Dept.)
*.LV. Beeting on U.X. Affair
7 September
As requested this morning, I attach short brief
China in the U.N.
(J. A. L. Morgan) Fər Zastern Department
4 September, 1970
M. 4/3
KEIDENTIAL
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COM WIR SHATAL
Brief
*.Z.U. Meeting on N,N, Yatters - 7 September
China and the U.N.
The U....... Position
re advocate the seating of Péking in the United Nationa
one of the long-term objectives of British policy.
take the line that if the United Nations is to fulfil properly
its role as an international body in which the views of all
nations are represented, it is illogical that a country which
contains a quarter of the woźd's population should be exeluded.
China's absence benefits neither the United Nations nor China.
We believe that in the interests of world peace it is essential
thắt China should be brought zore fully into the international
community. There are many pressing world-wide probless, for
example, Indo-Chine, disarmament, in which China's views are
important. for these reasons we have voted since 1961 for the
Soviet (later Albanian) resolution calling for the seating
of Peking.
2. At the same time we argue that China " representation is
obviously "important", as defined by Article 13 (II) of the
18
U.I. Charter. This arises naturally from the inherent importance
of the question and the deep division of opinion in the U.N.
revealed by the voting on this issue. For these reasons we
support the American "important question" resolution, though wa
are unique among nations in that we wote for both resolutions.
13.
ze shall
CONFIDE DETAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
3.
Ye shall not be changing our vote this year.
1910 femure) Assembly
▲ recent report from Peking suggested that three
African countries would this year vote for the Albanian
resolution, whilst five others would abstain instead of
voting against. If trea, and asɛwing no other switches, this
would produce a majority of one in favour of seating Peking
i:mediately. If megbars then voted in identical fashion on
the American resolution it is theoretidally possibe that
Peking could take the China seat this year,
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.