that the outside world was gaining the
SECRET
/contd..
Jay
SECRET
- 2
knowledge and be able to defend the Urban Council position. In
particular be asked for brief details of the previous system; why it had
been thought desirable to effect a change; and in particular whether
consideration had been given to calling the deposit a "payment of rent
in advance". Finally, Jay advised that he was positive the local
communist leadership would not vant serious trouble over this matter and
that in his view the proposal concerning laans providing a banker's
guarantee would be acceptable: however, he suggested that unless there
vas great urgency it would be of value if he could pass on his personal
v iews to LI and the China Resources representatives and so ensure that
there was no serious difficulty when Government
enforced the ruling concerning deposits or banker's guarantee.
South China Iron Works
LI
Jay said that he had now discussed with LI the H.K.G. proposals
concerning the purchase of the land at Tsuen Van, had expressed
disappointment at the price suggested, pointing out that the Bank of
China was involved to the extent of HK37.7 million and that in addition
there was another mortgage of HK$1.2 million. LI apparently again tried
to suggest that the H.K.G. was not being reasonable in this matter but
Jay claimed that he "soon shut him up" by again pointing out that if LI
and the Bank of China were dissatisfied with the offer, then they could
always make private arrangements of their own to sell the land - there
could be no doubt, Jay told LI, that the H.K.G. was taking a most
unusual step in giving such consideration to the Bank of China request.
LI undertook to put forward his views to Peking in the near future. Jay
informed me that, contrary to what he had indicated before, he had
suggested to LI that the R.I.G. would be prepared to consider paying
some $77 million for the land (you will recall that previously Jay hadti
suggested that he would start discussions at the lower figure of $71
million).
4.
(1)
Other matters discussed were:-
CHOU Ex-laf: Jay said that he had just heard from Paking that CHOU would
be coming to Canton during September for a few days of discussions.
(ii) As suggested, I mentioned to Jay Denson's proposed visit
in September.
(xi) People's Congress: Jay said he was now quite certain that
the Congress could not be held before the October 1st 20th Anniversary
celebrations. He regards this failure to call the Congress a serious set
back for NAO and his supporters.
(iv) YIEN YEH Bank: Jay said that the communist bankers vere
very concerned indeed at this second robbery in a communist bank. A
large meeting was being held that day in the Bank of China with a view
to deciding what steps should be taken to improve security in comunist
banks. Referring back to previous conversations I reminded Jay that
again the Police
SECRET
/contd...
ד
ן
SECRE
3
were energetically investigating the incident and, as announced in the
newspapers that day, had offered a revard for information, etc.
(x) Jay said that LI had indicated that there were four or Five
"important problems" - "not urgent but important" which he wished to
discuss with Jay within the next weak or 30. Jay suggested that almost
certainly they were to do with Hong Kong and British affairs and that he
would contact me directly be had spoken to LI.
20th August, 1969.
(J. Cater)
"ECKET
Mr. Murray
SECRET
With the Compliments of the
RA. DIVED IN
Political Adviser No.50
TRY
1969
Hong rộng
TSX 4/68
!
KH 3/30/
14.8.69
г
+
Political Adviser
SECRET 2
See Mv 20%.
Dr Willie Ray day.
17+ Both
17+ Cards. 219
I arranged to see Mr. K.C. Jay in the afternoon of Thursday, 7th August,
as I had one or two points to raise with him:-
(1) Kennedy Town Slaughter House payment of deposit by comunist Big
laans, Referring to our discussion on 24th July, I asked Jay whether he
had any information or advice to give on this matter. Jay said he had
spoken to China Resources representatives on this but at first had not
obtained a positive response ? they tended to treat the matter lightly
and said that in any event this vas a matter for MG FUNG HONG to deal
with. Jay then clains that he pointed out the possible seriousness of
the situation: that if the H.I.G, refused permission for the laans to
operate if they did not pay the deposit, this would not only affect the
supply of pork to Hong Kong but also would affect the income of the
Chinese Government which in turn undoubtedly would cause Peking to be
very angry. Allegedly, at a later discussion the China Resources
representatives discussed the problem rather more seriously and Jay
gained the impression that, although they were becoming slightly more
concerned about the matter, nevertheless they felt it to be in keeping
with local communist policy to cause minor trouble "pin pricks" -
vherever possible but without it escalating into something so serious
that Peking's attention might be drawn to it. Jay had intended at this
stage advising the H.K.G. that they should proceed as proposed, /provis-
i.e. to insist on the payment of the deposit or a banker's
ies of
guarantes, but then he had come into possession of information which
indicated that local communists, and probably also Canton, would not be
averse to a confrontation on this issue with the H.K.G., even to the
extent of the supply of pigs being cut off, as presently there was a
shortage of pigs in China and it was said that the need to supply even
the Hong Kong market was becoming embarrassing. In the circunstances,
Jay advised that the H.K.G. should hold its hand in this matter for a
few days whilst he obtained more information on which to base advice.
(2) Border Incidents. Referring to recent discussions with Jay, I said
that small incidents on the border continued: that if they were to go on
there would be a risk of a serious situation developing. Jay said that
he had sentioned this matter locally and had also recently written to
Peking. Again, he felt that locally such action was regarded as "minor
trouble" to cause the H.K.G. embarrassment. I asked whether this implied
that the border officials were involved in, and agreed with, this
policy; after some hesitation, Jay said that he did not think that this
was the case and later agreed to comment on the situation when next he
writes to Peking.
(3) I informed Jay that we had recently heard that permission had been
refused the mission in Peking to send Anthony Grey books of an
uncontroversial nature, Jay noted this but on reflection thought that it
would be unwise to make a special issue of the matter as the date vas
fast approaching when Grey was due to be released.
/Contd.......
SECRET
[
1
2.
SECRET
During discussion of the above points, Jay had
repeatedly returned to his recent warning that local communists intended
making trouble for the H.I.G, as a matter of policy
but that the trouble, he emphasised, would be "small and not big". I
asked whether he had any specific information as to which areas
he communists would be taking this action in, and on this Occasion he
suggested two:-
3.
(i)
(11)
Jay said that the "Motor Drivers' Association"was putting out a great
deal of publicity in an apparently successful drive to recruit mini-van
operators: the main attraction was that the Association had allegedly
made contact with police officers and could ensure that members of the
Association were not prosecuted for traffic offences;
a detailed investigation was now being carried out into the quality of
teaching at Government Primary Schools with a view to discrediting the
Education Department. Local communist circles apparently felt that this
presented a prime target and that there would be no difficulty in
proving that standards in the Government Primary Schools were low and
that in many instances parents preferred not to send their children to
these schools. I suggested to Jay that a similar criticism could
certainly be rade about the communist schools, but he replied that,
whilst this was the case, nevertheless it could scarcely be used as a
meaningful defence when the communists made their attack on the
Government schools.
Jay said that it was becoming quite noticeable that there vas a
difference in attitude and policy between Paking and Canton as to Hong
Kong. The leadership in Peking appeared to be so busy with its own
internal affairs that there was a lack of firm direction a tendency not
to interfere unless there seemed to be an escalation into very serious
trouble. In Canton, however, the line seemed to be similar to that of
local Hong Kong communists: Jay had no doubt that Canton supported the
"positive opposition but no big trouble" policy.
4.
Speaking generally of affairs in China, Jay again epeated that the
situation was very tense and that "very soon" there would be quite
startling news from Peking. Again I tried to probe his as to precisely
what he meant by this but could get nothing other than a long discourse
as to the personal problems involved, CHOU En-lal's apparent opposition
to HAO Tse-tung, and so on. By way of proof that CHOU was exceptionally
busy, Jay said that recently a very senior person had been kept waiting
nine days before CHOU could see him: Jay said that this was nost unusual
as CHOU was well known for working long hours and for always being able
to find time to speak to important people.
5.
Reverting to his comments on the shortage of pigs in China, Jay said
that shortage of supplies was generally the case and that already
serious embarrassment was being caused as contracts negotiated at the
Canton Spring Trade Fair could not be fulfilled,
SECRET
/Contd..
/to me
Lemigrate
good
6.
SECRET
3
I had heard from another source that Jay had recently applied for
approval to emigrate to Canada: indeed at a dinner two days before Jay
had hinted that he might be going to Canada in the not too distant
future, although this had been in the context of a visit to his sons
rather than permanent emigration. Referring back to this dinner-time
conversation, I asked whether Jay intended to leave for Canada in the
near future: he was immediately embarrassed and said that there was a
subject which he had been meaning to discuss with me for some days the
question of obtaining permission to emigrate "permanently" to Canada.
Jay said that this all really started about two years ago when his
eldest son, Alfred, without Jay's knowledge had applied to the Canadian
Immigration authorities in Ottawa for his mother and father to come to
Canada. In the circumstances 1967 disturbances Jay felt that this was an
understandable and proper thing for Alfred to have done, but of course
there could be no question in Jay's mind of leaving Hong Kong "whilst
the British are here". He had only recently re-started action on this as
a result of a discussion he had had with Mr. Bob Wales (Immigration
Officer, Canadian Trade Commission) who, referring to the matter had
suggested to Jay that perhaps Jay would prefer the application to be
processed by his rather than wait for his successor. Jay had thought
this a good idea and accordingly had gone ahead with the application:
Jay explained that normally, depending on family situation, financial
standing, etc. only those with 50 points or above were allowed to
immigrate to Canada very proudly he told me that his score was 94. Jay
then at great length explained to me that there was no possibility of
his being able to go to Canada as his business interests required him to
stay in Hong Kong indeed the maximum time he could be away from Hong
Kong would be five days. He was proceeding with the application mainly
to please his son, Alfred, and his wife (and, I suspect, his concubine)
and also to take advantage of Wales's offer. In any event, Jay said "I
am absolutely certain that nothing untoward will happen in Hong Kong for
the next 10-12 years". Referring back to our conversation of 19th June,
I suggested that this was perhaps a little more pessinistic but Jay
thought not: be felt the position vis-a-vis China could be considered in
the very long term but he did not know whether this necessarily applied
to Britain and as regards his appli- cation to emigrate to Canada he
said, not unreasonably, that countries like Canada and Britain were
constantly having to consider their laws regarding immigration and that
it was therefore as well to make sure now rather than to be sorry later
on. He expressed concern that his application had been held up by the
Special Branch: I asked him when he had made his application and he said
about 26th 27th July. In the circumstances I said that I was sure that
his application was not being held up by the H.K.G. and that if he had
only made application some 11 or 12 days before it was probable that the
application was still with the Canadians. Jay denied this and såld he
knew it was with the Special Branch.
11th August, 1969.
C.C. Mr. Murray (P.C.0.)
Mr. Denson (PEKING)
D.5.B.
H.S.G.
B.S.
-
باشا
(J. Cater)
SECRET
7/8/69
Mr. Murray
MGA8
Miz Any.
With the Compliments of the Me wide
Political Adviser
ра
Hong Kong pa
По водаритель на сука
TSX 4/69
o.♪.
26/5
Political Adviser
L
SECRET
As you are aware, I made arrangements to see Mr. I.C. Jay on the
afternoon of Friday, 1st August, primarily in order to give him details
of our proposals in regard to the South China Iron Works land at Tsuen
Wan.
No sooner had I given Jay the reason for my visit than he interrupted to
say that in the last day or two he had received "several further
approaches" on this matter and that it was clear to him that Peking was
behind the pressure being applied: it later transpired that these
"several further approaches" had been made by two people, unnamed, from
the Bank of China.
3.
-
I talked to the attached brief but gave no detailed information of the
estimated cost of the "deductions" nor of the 10% contingency, but
simply referred to cost of nullahs, roads etc. including resettlement of
people in the area and then indicated that this work would cost in the
region of $6.2 million: thus leaving the offer at about $7.8 million. As
agreed with H.E., I sought Jay's advice as to whether a firm figure,
say, of $7.8 million should be offered or whether there should be an
element of bargaining with our offer starting at $7 million,with a
maximum sticking point of, say, $8 million. Vithout besitation Jay said
there should be an element of bargaining in this: later in the
discussion he proposed that the starting point should in fact be $71
million. I enquired whether this might not appear a little on the low
side in view of the previous suggestion from the Bank of China that they
thought an offer in the region of $10 $11 million would be appropriate:
in saying this I reminded Jay once again that the figure had been
arrived at on the specific basis that the offer should be fair to all
concerned. Jay said that be appreciated this and that he vas not
pessimistic at all about the Chinese reaction to the offer: indeed over
the past few months, because of the delay in reply, he had thought it
desirable to prepare the Chinese for either no offer at all or one
substantially lower than previously suggested. claimed that in these
discussions there had been some suggestion and criticism that the H.K.G.
would make a "good profit" out of the deal but Jay allegedly silenced
all opposition by referring to the obvious fact that the H.I.G. vas
going out of its way in taking a very unusual step in considering this
proposition and that it still remained open to the S.C.I.V. and the Bank
of China to settle their affairs privately: the thought of taking action
against somebody resident in Taiwan or becoming involved in problems of
moving Nationalist supporters from the Tsuen Wan land apparently
appalled the critics. In the aircumstances Jay felt that, although
undoubtedly there had to be grumbles and some fairly hard-headed
bargaining, nevertheless the H.K.G. offer would be seen by the more
reasonable as being a fairly good one.
4.
He
I went on to explain to Jay the problems involved in timing of this
offer: that the offer would have to be approved by Finance Committee,
which was due to meet next on Wednesday, 6th August, but that it would
not be meeting again for another four veeks. Jay promptly said that it
would bé virtually impossible to obtain a reply by tk August:
August; in any event he was not anxious
/contd.........
SECRET
1
to put the offer immediately to the Chinese as this could wrongly be
interpreted as being a response to the very recent pressure which had
been applied to him, In any case it would take him several days to put
the proposal across to local Bank of China officials and even then they
would have to consult Peking. Be thought it vise that some indication of
a date should be given for a reply and said that he would talk in terms
of 10 days to a fortnight. I said that, whilst obviously we would be
guided by him in this, nevertheless he should be careful in the
circumstances not to suggest datelines which might prove impracticable
to meet. Jay advised that he would be seriously embarrassed if this
matter were put to Finance Committee before the Bank of China had
consulted Peking and produced a reply: he suggested that anything on a
subject like this which was put to Finance Committee would be known to
officials in the Bank of China within an hour or two of the Finance
Committee meeting breaking up this information being passed by
Mr. P.C. WOO.
5.
The meeting with Jay became quite lengthy, Jay going over and over again
the way he would approach the Bank of China on this matter and referring
at length to the fact that one of the problems facing the Bank of China
at the moment was the fact that mortgages on the 8.C.I.V. land were in
two parts and that there was a need for "somebody" to tidy up the
financial and legal matters now out- standing before the deal was
finally agreed. It soon became apparent although obviously he did not
say so openly - that the "somebody" in question would undoubtedly be Jay
himself, hoping no doubt to pick up some agency fees. By the end of the
two-hour meeting Jay was decidedly optimistic.
6.
Other points which were made during the discussion were:
(1) Jay said that he had recently received confirmation from the Prime
Minister's office of part of the discussion which CHOU En-lai had with
FEI Yi-ming during the latter's visit to Peking some veeks ago. Jay said
that it generally confirmed what had been reported already in Hong Kong
but he thought it might be of interest for me to hear of one exchange in
particular. Apparently FEI had been roundly criticized for the part he
had played in the 1967 disturbances and in defence of himself he had
asked CHOU why China had to be friendly towards Britain: allegedly CHOU
had replied rather sarcastically "I don't know whether we have to be
friendly or not, but we need Hong Kong - and therefore Britain - and
there- fore it seems sensible to be friendly". Jay was delighted with
this and repeated it time and again and said it was yet another example
of the good sense of the Prime Minister.
(2) When talking of Peking, Jay said that Government officials continue
to express surprise that LIN Piao vas becoming more and more friendly
towards CHOU En-lai and was almost ingratiating himself with him. .
(3) I asked Jay what he thought of the local situation: he said that
local communists were undoubtedly making efforts to woo villagers in the
New Territories and in this he thought they were achieving some success.
Other points of attack continue to be hawkers and mini-van drivers. Be
suggested that Government should
/contd....
-3-
-
take more positive steps to improve relationship with the community
generally but was rather vague as to what these steps should be: be sent
ioned two better educational facilities and more realistic labour laws
(he thought it unrealistic that the H.K.G. should prevent young people
working in industry before the age of 14 when many of them had left
school at 11 or 12 and had nothing to do but go on to the streets). Jay
also suggested that the H.I.G. should avoid obvious problems and gave as
an example the Taivan Film Festival at the City Hall: he suggested that
if it had not been for his efforts to calm down local communists, there
might well have been some unpleasant incidents.
-
-
(4) In view of the comment above, I said that it was almost invariably
the case that in circumstances such as these Government vas unaware of
the "obvious problem" until it became a fact. I gave as an example the
Travel Agency Conference which had been arranged to take place in Hong
Kong at the latter half of September and finishing on 1st October. The
first that Government had heard of this was when the Conference was
announced publicly and at which time it was also learnt that Russia had
stated its intention of attending the Conference, Jay made a note of
this and rather surprisingly said he did not think that there would be
any trouble because of Russia's participating in the Conference: indeed,
he then went on to say that, provided local communists vere advised
ahead of time that things like this might happen, he did not think there
would be serious adverse reaction. He then commented that Chinese
communists vere embarrassed by things to do with Russia and Taiwan but
at the same time vere unsure of the precise public relations action they
should take: he explained this by saying that the communists felt
themselves very vulnerable in relation to activities concerning Taiwan:
that they were concerned that, if they were to make too much of a fuss,
the very reasonable point might be made that, instead of talking so much
about Taivan, they should start putting their words into action for
example, invading Taiwan and so, knowing this was beyond their
capability these days, they tended to keep quiet on the subject.
7.
Jay telephoned me on Sunday, 3rd August, to say that LI Cho-chih was in
Canton and would not be back until the 8th or 9th August: in the
circumstances a reply on the 8.C.I.W. land could not be expected for
another three weeks or so. He also indicated that "others" among the
local communist leadership had gone to Paking and were expected to be
away for some time.
là August, 1969,
C.C.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.)
J.B. Denson (Peking)
D.8.D.
H.8.0.
E.8.8.
(J. Cater)
v/o encl.
5/8/69
MR. MURRAY.
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hong rộng
Kong
3/4
86
(12 Aug. Me Bane shine,
Mr Wilson
M. C
Cantiga
o.r
75+4/68
+
SECRET
Political Adviser
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned during the morning of Thursday, 31st July asking
to see me urgently: accordingly I arranged to see him at 4.30 p.m. that
afternoon,
2.
Jay said that the main topic of urgency he wished to discuss concerned
the South China Iron Works land at Tsuen Wan I he had now heard from two
sources that the matter was considered important and of sone urgency by
Peking. LI Cho chih, the Manager of the Bank of China, had reported that
his Headquarters very recently had enquired what the position was on
this land and had been critical of the delays encountered. Jay claims
that he had reacted rather angrily to suggestions by LI that the delays
showed a lack of sincerity on the part of the H.K.G. It was Jay's
opinion that the pressure from the Bank of China was aimed at him and
not at the I.1.0. Referring to a previous conversation, Jay said that it
was now quite certain that the issue had become more political than
financial: he also had received enquiries on the matter from Peking,
together with an expression of hope that the matter would soon be
resolved. Jay, although claiming to be anxious to see this matter
resolved soon and satisfactorily, went on to remind me of the position:
that if the H.K.G. were to agree to a deal being concluded it may or may
not lead to an improvement in the situation in teras of relations with
China and future co-operation: on the other hand, if the H.K.G. were not
prepared to conclude the deal, then certainly the Chinese would not be
co-operative in their future relations. Jay described this as a typical
communist ploy and expressed disappointment at the pressures they were
bringing to bear.
3.
Referring to my discussion with him on 24th July, Jay said that he now
had specific information concerning a move to set up an additional
channel into the Hong Kong Government: be had found that the initiative
had come from CHÂM Hung of the Bank of China who had made approaches to
Mr. Martin Curran of the Hong Kong Bank. Curran apparently had mentioned
this matter to Jay who had taken the opportunity of firstly advising
Curran to have no dealings with CHAN on this matter, and secondly of
having a warning given to CHAN through LI Cho-chih to cease his
activities. In the circumstances, Jay considered the matter closed and
said there vas therefore no need for me or the H.K.G. to take action.
4.
Talking of the local situation, Jay said that there had been an
interesting recent development in the control and decision-making
machinery of local communist organisations, Working on instructions from
Peking these organisations, including W.C.H.A. and the Bank of China,
now had an executive committee (or as Jay called it, a "Cabinet") to
deal with major problems, particularly those of a political nature: Jay
thought that the reasons for this move included two possibilities:
either (1) the executive committees had been" found necessary because of
disagreement among senior personnel and the committee
/contd.......
پیام
21
나
on den!
SECRET
- 2
vas a device for bringing these people "in line" and making decisions a
group responsibility; or (2) an attempt to take individual personal
authority away from the senior man in the organisation.
5.
VAS TONSE
Jay said that instructions had recently been passed to local communist
organisations that, when referring to Britain and Hong Kong the
comparison should be made that, whilst the British Government was
"imperialist" the Hong Kong Government
I asked why it was thought necessary to make this differentiation and
went on to explain the situation vis-a-vis the British Government and
the Hong Kong Government. Jay replied that the communists understood the
position well enough but that for some time now there had been criticism
both in Paking and in Hong Kong that the Chinese communists seemed to be
concentrating their efforts against the H.I.0, rather than against
Britain: it was in the interests of local Hong Kong communists that they
should be able to show that it was the H.K.G. vhich was persecuting them
and causing trouble this not only rationalised their actions here in
Hong Kong but also, and of greater importance, provided reasons why
subsidies and aid from Peking to the various local organisations were
necessary: in particular, Jay mentioned financial help being given to
newspapers,
-
I
6.
Jay then went over some of the ground covered in our recent discussion
on 24th July and repeated that it was now clear that the confrontation
with the H.K.G. would continue for some time: that it would be
"fragmented" and, although not very violent, nevertheless it would be
positive opposition. enquired whether this would include, say,
difficulties following the sentencing of the Waterworks trade union
people but Jay immediately said that he expected no serious trouble as a
result of the court case: that, although for a while the newspapers
would have to play the matter up, nevertheless it would not be taken
beyond the public relations field.
7.
Jay said that he had been in receipt of some very interesting
information from Peking. He confirmed that the situation there was
becoming tense: that it was now quite clear that the opposition to MAO
was led by CHOU En-lai and that because CHOU was withholding his support
and allegedly that of the Communist Party, there was some doubt as to
whether the People's Congress could now be called. According to Jay, the
main problem centred round CHOU's insistence that he should have the
right to nominate people to six key posts allegedly one appointment had
been agreed and there was partial agreement for another, but this was
not acceptable to CHOU. Jay repeated that if a Congress were not called
before the 20th Anniversary celebrations, or if the Congress were seen
to have been called in a hurry, then it would have been seen that MAO
had been defeated. Jay (a strong CHOU supporter, of course) saw in all
this the true genius of the Prime Minister and was optimistic that CHOU
would be successful: Jay then said what he had said so often before that
if this were the case it would be very such in Hong Kong's interest.
-
جا پاکستان
1st August, 1969.
(J. Cater)
c.c. Mr. Murray (London)
D.8.3.
Mr.
Denson (Peking)
H.8.0.
F.8.$.
Į
CR. 41A
2600077
5,000-2/69-870130
REF. TSX 4/68
TOP SECRFT
Dear Janes
Copy No i
of 2 COPIES
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
5 August, 1969.
And in May
Mr Bayor B1378
Mr Wilson o...
Пе
In your letter FEC 13C/1 of 22 July you asked for our opinion about the
remarks made to Jack Cater about the relative unimportance of 1997.
2.
19/3314
It has always been one of our main problems during these secret contacts
to judge to what extent K.C. was reporting the views or the instructions
of the Chinese Government and to what extent he was expressing his own
views. Jack Cater and I consider that on this occasion he vas speaking
without instructions and expressing his own opinion.
3.
Since you wrote your letter you will have received the full account of
Cater's conversation. It does not add much to our telegram No. 497 but
it does show that 1997 was first mentioned by Cater. K.C. was responding
to that remark and did not himself initiate the reference.
4.
84%
अद
3
is/8.
You will also see that on this occasion the conversation was fairly
lengthy and slightly more relaxed than usual. K.C. was acting out his
part as a loyal British subject, long-time resident of Hong Kong and
independent adviser to the Hong Kong Government. This side of his
character may have been obscured for readers of Cater's reports since in
them K.C. usually appears as the intermediary with the Chinese
Government and therefore to a large extent as an agent of the
communists. But the other side of his character is quite important. His
future is bound up with that of Hong Kong and all his instincts and
habits are essentially capitalist.
5.
Even if the remarks vere K.C.'s personal views and not something he was
passing to us on instructions from Peking, they are still of interest.
He sees enough of our local communists to have quite a good idea of the
course of Chinese policy. A few months ago I read through all Cater's
reports since these exchanges started and I vas left with quite a strong
impression that K.C.'s comments on communist policy were well informed
and valuable whilst his usefulness as a negotiator or as a link in a
negotiating chain vas small. I think there- Fore that his comments on
1997 do have some value as an indication of how the Chinese Government
may think: but obviously they need to be treated with very considerable
caution.
I have shown this in draft to Jack Cater, who agrees
6. with it.
J. Murray, Esq., CMG,
ever
You
tother
w
(A.F. Maddocks)
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, TOP SECRET
LONDON, S.W.1.
24/7
MR MURRAY.
pa Jaya
No
23
With the Compliments of the Bo
Political Adviser
Hong rộng
Mr Sanghuava 13/0
AS
M
Carl
O.R
12018
Ref.
TSX 4/68.
SECRET
/the
Political Adviser
I made arrangements to see Mr. I.C. Jay at 2.30 p.m. on Thursday, 24th
July, Unusually, Mr. Jay was late for the appointment: he had just
attended, with his sons, a large luncheon party given by Bank of China
officials.
2.
I informed Jay that I had one or two minor subjects to discuss with him
but before I could launch on to my short list he started to tell me the
latest news froz Peking and on the Hong Kong front:-
(1) According to Jay, the situation in China was poor: a great deal of
opposition was building up against HAO's policies and be fully expected
that this opposition would soon be shoving itself openly. Already in
Canton the opposition was being spelt out in forthright terus and he had
no doubt that elsewhere feelings ware also running high. Jay expressed
surprise that to date little of this feeling had been reflected or
reported in Hong Kong.
(2) Jay felt that, as a result of the opposition to MAO's policies,
there was some reluctance to proceed with/calling of the People's
Congress: from MAQ's point of view it was essential that the Congress
should be held soon in order to put the final touches to the dismissal
of LIU Shao-Ch'i as President of China. If the calling of the Congress
and the formal deposition of LIU vere not achieved by October 1st, Jay
felt that this would be a serious defeat for MO (presumably LIU's
dismissal should be tidied up in time for the 2017 Anniversary of the
communist victory on the Mainland).
(3) Jay reported that in the circumstances outlined above it was
difficult to assess the precise position of CHOU En-lal; information
received from the Prime Minister's office indicated that CHOU continued
to gain strength and to improve his position in the comunist hierarchy,
but with the situation rapidly becoming fluid again Jay felt it
inadvisable to be too firm in his predictions.
(4) Jay said that the position locally in Hong Kong was also rather
different from what he had forecast it would be some nonths ago; many of
the local communists mainly responsible for causing the 1967
disturbances had been noted some months ago for early removal or
transfer back to China - now, however, it seemed that they would be
retained in their posts. There were indications that local communist
policy would harden against the H.K.G. do not expect riots but certainly
there will be some open opposition and defiance".
3.
"I
Jay seemed genuinely concerned about the situation and it was my
assessment that he was reporting what he honestly believed. Having
spoken for Jay in forthright terns, he then gave the impression of
thinking that perhaps he had gone a little too far and suggested that
this assessment, particularly the forecast of increased opposition by
local communista, should be treated in the strictest confidence between
ourselves and he asked that I should
/contd....
SECRET
بینی
SECRET
2
not pass the information further.
In a rather odd series of comments he said that it was only after many
months that he had come to trust me and therefore felt able to say what
was 'really in his heart'.
4.
At this stage I was able to come back to the reason for my interview
with Jay and make the following points:-
I informed Jay
(1) TANG Chuen - Board of Review recommendation: that the Board has
recently recommended a reduction in one of TANG's two consecutive
sentences and that he was now due for release on or about 10th December
1970. I advised Jay that other cases due to come to the Board of Revier
vere in respect of the longer term prisoners and that it was now highly
unlikely that the Board would be recommending any further reductions in
sentence as in all cases the prisoners had been convicted of serious
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.