contractor - and in a later discussion with LI Cho-chih Jay had enquired
whether, say, China Resources would be prepared to deal directly with
the H.K.G. just as the Ivangtung authorities dealt with the R.K.G, on
the supply of water: LI allegedly said that this would be a very good
idea but expressed doubt as to whether the H.K.G. would approve as he
and Peking were firmly of the opinion that "somebody in authority" vas
anxious to see the monopoly continue in the hands of FOK. I informed Jay
that this in any event was not a matter for consideration at the
oment as the H.K.G. was still under contract to deal with FOX.
(2) Shanghai branch of the Hongkong & Shi S. Bank should not
Bank Peking vere particularly anxious now that the H.1. & S. Bank should
not close its branch in Shanghai. The feeling was that with the improved
climate in relations it would be unfortunate indeed if the Shanghai
branch were closed down. Jay had been asked to use his influence with
Mr. Saunders of the bank to reverse the decision.
(3) Johnston Jay expressed concern that the Chartered Bank might attempt
to obtain an interview for Northcote with LI of the Bank of China: in
Jay's opinion the visit of Pullen to LI the last time Pullen was in Hong
Kong was disastrous. Jay had great respect for the ability and judgment
of Mr. Peter Graham, the local Manager of the Chartered Bank but had
severe doubts about top executives from the Chartered Bank mein office
in London, Jay said that when dealing with communists one must never
"kov toy" and that it was absurd for the Chartered Bank to crawl to the
Chinese when the Chinese vere so obviously in the wrong. Jay saw no
objection, of course, to there being improved relations between the
Chinese and the Chartered Bank but the aim of the Chartered Bank should
be to put across to the Chinese that they were not very pleased at
having one of their employees detained without reason or without trial:
that they hoped this man would be released soon and that, more
important, there should be no repetition of such a case. should be no
question of the Chartered Bank thanking the Chinese for releasing
Johnston. Having said all this, Jay then went on to say that he would
not be surprised to find Johnston
SECRET /contd...
There
SECRET
released within the next week or so.
(4) Jay said that Peking had expressed concern about the large number of
resignations from the Bank of China in Hong Kong: many of these
resignations had been of quite senior employees who had served the Bank
faithfully and well for many years, Jay vas asked to investigate and
comment on this but he was reluctant to do so in case of impairing his
relationship with LI. Peking had also expressed concern at the recent
employment of a number of young school leavers they wondered whether it
would be in the best interests of the Bank to have such inexperienced
and immature people in their employ. Jay felt that the concern here was
that these school leavers vere from communist middle schools and might
well be "over-indoctrinated".
24th October, 1969.
c.c.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.) Mr. J.B. Denson (PEKING ) D.S.B. H.S.G. E.5.8.
ele
(J. Cater)
SECRET
SECRET 7
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Political Adviser
CODET
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned me on Tuesday, 11th November asking for an
interview: he said that the matter was not urgent but that he would like
to tell me of the difficulties facing him concerning "donations",
Accordingly I made arrange- ments to see him the next day at 12.15 p.a.
2.
Be
Jay started the conversation by saying that he had recently been
approached by local communists with a request that he make a donation of
HK$10,000 to the Communist School Fund. Jay said that he had not been
bothered by such requests over the past two years or so: the communists
appreciated the delicate position in which he might find himself if they
had approached him before for money but now that matters were "normal"
they sav no problem in such an approach. The fund's target was HK$1
million, but such vere the tactics adopted by the fund raisers that Jay
thought this target would be confortably exceeded. said that he had been
rather pleased that his contribution had been set so low at HK$10,000:
the Bank of China had been asked to donate only HK$50,000; apparently
CHAN Hang of the Bank of China had suggested that Jay night make a
donation of HK$30,000 but Jay had countered that it was important for
the comparisons to be maintained and that if the Bank of China vere to
pay HI$150,000 he would be quite pleased to increase his donation to
HK$30,000. Jay said that the "bite" was being put on all communist
organisations and those companies dealing
mainly or exclusively with China. He said that certainly people like
E.C. VONG and Henry FOX would be making substantial donations but
"unlike me, Henry FOX and others will be making their donations secretly
and will not openly admit what they are doing".
3.
Jay said
(15
Jay said that for many months Paking had been attempting to persuade the
local communist hierarchy to suspend completely strike pay
("compensation"); it now seemed that at long last this instruction was
going to be put into operation. that a certain amount of grumbling was
expected and possibly a little loss of support but that för the first
time in a long while the local communist leaders felt sufficiently
strong to be able to take this sort of action against the "strikers".
4.
Referring to the situation in China, Jay again commented how shocked he
and local communists had been over the detention of Mrs. Martin and Mr.
McBain in Shanghai. He said that be had now received a little more
information concerning Mrs. Martin: that she was being held for
questioning as her name had appeared in correspondence of one of the
other Britons (unspecified) now detained in Chin. "It was Jay's firm
opinion that Mrs. Kartin would not be detained long and that she would
soon be released. He then went on to say that the wition of detained
Britons in Shanghai had not been improved as a result of the
difficulties arising consequent upon the decision of the Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank to close its Shanghai branch. Jay said that he had now
/contd....
SECRET
SECRET
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received information that Mr. Norman Bennett of the bank, in writing to
Shanghai, had expressed surprise that the Shanghai authorities were
placing obstacles in the way of the closure of the branch bank as this
seemed to be in direct contravention of the vishes of Peking. Jay
suggested that this sort of comment was not vise at the best of times
but at the moment it vas particularly unwise as the relationship between
Peking and Shanghai vas known to be strained.
5.
At this juncture I took the opportunity of raising the question of the
land belonging to the South China Iron Works. Referring to a previous
discussion, I said that it had now become necessary for Government to
write to Deacons (the solicitors) stating that Government was now
willing to re-open negotiations with the crown lessees or their
representatives but indicating that Government vas in doubt as to who at
present represented the company: as it seemed that at least until now
Johnson, Stokes & Haster had been representing the company, a copy of
the letter to Deacons would be sent to Johnson, Stokes & Master. I
suggested that in the circumstances it would be easier for all concerned
if further action were taken through one of these rather more orthodox
channels. At first Jay made no adverse comment and indeed implied that
this was a proper and sensible move on the part of the H.K.G. Later,
however, he expressed doubts as to whether this was the proper "and
legal" thing to do:
in particular, he was concerned about the position of the Bank of China
which held a mortgage on the property it was Jay's opinion that normally
the mortgager should be informed of possible action such as this. I
suggested to Jay that as this matter vas being handled by the H.K.G. in
a normal manner, it must be assumed that "proper and legal" action would
be taken: that in any event, as Johnson, Stokes & Master represented
both the Bank of China and the S.C.I.V., presumably they would keep
their principals informed: and that also I had to assume for myself that
the Attorney General would know as to what was "proper and legal* in
these circumstances than I. Jay took the point and eventually thanked me
for giving him prior warning of Government action. He then went on to
say that he very much doubted whether the 8.C.I.V. could bring together
sufficient finance to pay off the Bank of China: that if this could be
arranged then the Bank of China would be delighted for they would be
getting back the full HK$11.28 million outstanding rather than the
possible HK$8 million which the K.I.G. had indicated as the maximum they
would offer for the land in question.
-
6.
As requested by H.E. the Acting Governor a little while ago, I mentioned
to Jay the Robertson's dinner party at which both H.E. and Jay had been
present. I explained to Jay that H.E. had not expected to meet Jay on
this occasion and thought it politic not to have a concentrated or
detailed discussion with him: this, of course, had been done in the
interests of Jay but H.E. was anxious that there should be no feeling
whatsoever that he was trying to avoid Jay. Jay said
/contd..
SECRET
SECRET
- 3-
at once that he thoroughly understood the situation and that H.E. was
entirely proper on this occasion. Jay informed me that recently he had
received papers concerning the
registration of H.E.'s dogt that in the circulstances it would normally
be necessary under the rules of the Kennel Club for two members of the
Club comittee to inspect the dog. Jay wondered whether H.E. would expect
any "special treatment" in this matter or whether there might be
objection to Jay being a member of the two-man team of inspection. I
said immediately that I was absolutely sure that H.E. would want no
"special treatment" and that equally there would be no objection to Jay
being a member of the inspection tean if this were the usual thing to
do. Jay confirmed that this in fact would be in keeping with normal
practice: that he, as Chairman of the Club, together with the Senior
Veterinary Surgeon, Mr. Auchnie, would form the tea.
7.
I informed Jay that I was going to Sydney for a few days from 17h to
22nd November : be asked that I should contact him some time on the 17th
to see whether there was any "message" For me.
I have now contacted Jay: there is no message and I have promised to
speak to him again soon after my arrival back in Hong Kong on Saturday,
22nd November.
Wo
(J. Cater)
17th November, 1969
c.c.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.) Mr. J.B. Denson (PEKING) D.S.B. E.S.G. E.S.S.
SECRET
A
Mr. Murray
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287 Ma
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27/10
RECLIV.
REGENS: With the Compliments of the Motelop
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17/10/69
Political Adviser
Kong
Hong rộng
Mr Wi
Wilsey 7x Brydy b TSX 4/68/2
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SECPET
社
Political Adviser
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned during the morning of Saturday, 11th October
asking whether I could see him "fairly urgently": accordingly I arranged
to see him at 11.30 a.m. that day.
I
2.
There seemed very little in the discussion with Jay which could be
termed "fairly urgent": the main purpose in his asking to see me vas to
clarify the questions I had posed over the proposed increase in the cost
of "compensation" for sand obtained from China. It was Jay's opinion
that instead of simply following up the question of price increase, the
H.K.G. should take the opportunity of suggesting to the Chinese that
they would like to appoint a new contractor in place of Mr. Henry FOL.
explained to Jay that this was not an immediate problem: that the
possibility of obtaining quotes from others might be considered at a
later date; the immediate probles vas a check as to whether China
Resources had indeed suggested to FOX that the price of sand would be
increased in future from $1.50 to $2.00 per cubic yard. Jay said that
from his discussion with LI Cho-chih there appeared little doubt that
the proposal that there should be an increase came initially from FOK.
He promised to make specific enquiries of China Resources within the
next few days but again counselled that, no matter what answer was given
by China Resources, the proper response to FOX would be that he should
absorb the increase himself and that there would be no question of his
being paid more money by the H.K.G. for sand delivered.
3.
Talking of the situation in China, Jay said that every day that passed
shoved CHOU En-lai to be stronger than ever. Because of this, Jay was
convinced that there would be no serious trouble in Hong Kong as a
result of action by local communists. There had been indications from
the Prime Minister's office that CHOU was seriously concerned still
about China's relations with Russia and,in particular, possible danger
from the U.S.A. In the circumstances, CHOU was openly reported by his
staff as wanting to improve relations with Britain, which he saw as
being a useful source of support in the international scene. In spite of
this, Jay strongly advised that, no matter what sight be said or done by
CHOU in future, it was nevertheless important that the British
Government should bear in mind that CHOU is a real communist and that,
as such, in the very long term he cannot be regarded as "a friend". It
was Jay's opinion that CHOU and the Chinese Govern- ment would
increasingly show favour towards Britain and that it would not be long
before CHOU was seen to be "stretching the hand of friendship" towards
Britain. Asked what form this "friendship" might take, Jay suggested
increased trade, release of Britons detained in China and friendlier
relations between diplomats.
Other matters discussed:-
(1) Commenting on the October 1st celebrations, Jay said that one small
instance of Peking's desire for better relations with Britain could be
seen in the fact that they had been critical of two prominent communists
who, at the celebrations in the Astor Theatre, became so enthusiastic in
their shouting of MAO Thoughts
SEOPET
/contd..
-
SECRET
2
that they included two chants against Britain and British imperialism.
This criticism from Peking had taken the local communist hierarchy by
surprise and they had claimed that they themselves had not been aware of
this breach of instructions.
(2) Communist newspapers Beaming with pleasure, Jay said that he had
been very pleased indeed to note the improved tone in the communist
press in recent days: he had put this improve- ment down to the
recommendation he had made to Peking on the subject a short while ago. I
said that I personally had not been overly impressed by the
*improverent" in the communist press which still remained objectionable:
Jay was a little hurt by this and then amplified his remarks by saying
that an improvement had in fact been made in the VEN VEI PAO, that be
appreciated that the TA KUNG PAO had not made any great improvement but
this could be ascribed specifically to the unpleasant Mr. FSI Yi-ming:
that he was confident that FEI would soon be disciplined and that there
would as a consequence be an improvement even in the TA KUNG PAO.
(3) Referring to Jay's mention of his report to Peking, I took the
opportunity of asking how he had sent this report to the Chinese
capital: Jay said that the message had gone by safe hand (i.e.
by a courier) to Canton, from whence it had been telegraphed to Peking.
I asked whether this was the quickest or most efficient way of handling
such a matter: Jay replied that it may not be the quickest but, as he
wished that the contents of his communi- cation should not be seen by
local Hong Kong commnists, it was in the circumstances the most secure
method of communication. Jay then went on to say unprompted that it was
his impression that if local communists vished to send a message
urgently to Peking they did so directly by wireless: I asked whether be
vas suggesting that wireless messages would be transmitted directly, say
from the Bank of China, and he confirmed that this was what he intended
to imply.
(4) Canton Autumn Trade Fair It was Jay's opinion that this Trade Fair
would be "another failure": that it would be no better, and probably
worse, than the previous Trade Fair. A recent decision had been taken
that all contracts made at the Fair should be in J.M.P.: the authorities
vere a little ungure as to whether this requirement could be enforced
and so had issued instructions that every effort should be made to
conclude at least 40 contracts on this basis.
(5) I informed Jay that I proposed visiting Macau for two days on the
253 and 20h October. Be made no response other than to nod his head and
wish me a pleasant week-end" there.
(6) Jay said that as yet no reply had been received from Peking
concerning the South China Iron Works land at Tsuen Wan: he expected,
however, that Feking's views would be made known within a short time.
(7) Referring to a previous discussion concerning WONG Cho-fan and his
visits to the YUE EVA School, Jay said that WONG had
/contd...
SECRET
SECRET
3
definitely been warned through local communist channels and that he
(Jay) now felt that, provided sufficient official varning had been given
to VONG, the X.,6. should be prepared to take quite firm action. Jay vas
confident that there would be no serious adverse reaction from local
communists if this stp were taken.
19th October, 1969.
ll
(J. Cater)
C.C.
Mr. Murray (P.C.0.) Mr. Denson (PELING)
D.S.B. H.5.0. E.S.5.
SECRET
Mr. Murray or.
| R. EV.D IN
R S: TRY No.
29 OCT 1969
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13
Political Adviser
I arranged to see Mr. L.C. Jay at 4.30 p.m. on Thursday, 25th September.
2.
Referring back to a previous discussion when I had mentioned the
Universal Federation of Travel Agents' Associations Conference, I
reiterated the B.K.G.'s position vis-a-vis this conference : that it had
been privately organised and was by no means an official function. I
also gave Jay brief details of the position concerning applications for
visas in respect of East Europeans. Jay said that the position was
thoroughly understood and that he was quite sure that there would be "no
trouble": had explained the position both to local communists and to
Peking some time ago but had received no adverse reaction.
3.
Jay said that after some thought he had despatched his report to CHOU
En-lai some days ago. He had commented at length on the present
situation and suggested that it was now time for China to take positive
steps to show that her intentions towards Bong Kong were friendly: in
particular, Jay had mentioned:-
4.
(a)
(b)
(c)
the advisability of releasing Anthony Grey before 3rd October when vong
Chak is due for release.
It was Jay's advice that such a move would be favourably regarded by the
rest of the world;
although there had been some improvement in the tone and content of the
local communist press, nevertheless at times the communist newspapers
were very critical of the H.I.G. and probably libellous: Jay felt that
the H.I.G. was particularly sensitive on this score and would only be
really convinced that China intended good relations if and when the
newspapers behaved themselves properly. (In reporting this, Jay
suggested to me that this in many ways was the most difficult
recommendation for the Chinese to that he Chinese to accept but that he
quite genuinely expected to see an improvement over a period of time.);
the problems and difficulties on the border:
Jay had strongly advised that early action should be taken by the
military to ensure that there was no violation of British territory and
that nuisance activities such as the Firing of firework rockets should
be stopped.
Throughout the interview Jay vas in a very confident mood: this may have
been partly due to his obvious pleasure in having been asked to provide
a special report on the local situation for Prime Minister CHOU En-lai.
Jay read into this request a further indication that CHOU was in the
ascendency once again in Peking. At the time of the 9th Party Congress
CHOU had been criticized for bothering about such a small matter as Hong
Kong: the fact that CHOU was now specifically asking for advice on
future policy in Hong Kong indicated to Jay that CHOU felt strong enough
to be able to ignore would-be critics in Peking. According to Jay,
correspondence
/contd.
SECRET
ترانه تريحه
SECRET
2
from the Prime Minister's office tended to show that CHOU was strongly
supported now by the military and that, as reported before, LIN Piao vas
continuing to curry favour with CHOU.
Jay said that, whilst it was true that KAO had been unwell for sone
time, he did not believe that MAO was dying or even seriously ill.
5.
Jay expressed serious concern at the present situation in China. If the
situation in Peking were not quickly resolved he felt that in particular
there would be trouble in South China: already reports had been received
of the serious situation in Iwangsi and there seemed little doubt that
the position in Iwang- tung was deteriorating. Jay expressed the hope
that the H.K.G. vas prepared to meet the consequences of the internal
strife in Ivangtung and wangsi which he felt on present indications to
be almost certainly worsening. According to Jay, there were still
large number of Tao Chu supporters in important positions in the region
and in communist circles there had been much discussion and speculation
that these people vere preparing for the overthrow of the present
leadership in South China.
6.
As for Hong Kong, Jay was firmly of the opinion that the H.K.G, was in a
very strong position "In your overall policy you can now afford to be
quite firm very Firm". With the deterioration in the situation in China
and the full appreciation that Hong Kong is considered to be of great
value to China, it was Jay's opinion that local Hong Kong communists
would be very hesitant before causing trouble. Jay came back to this
"quite firm - very firm" theme on several occasions during the
discussion: towards the end he did suggest, however, that if
possibilities occurred in which the H.I.G. could show some friendship or
desire to improve relationships, then this might be considered, but only
in the context of the overall fire policy. Jay said that be had been
very pleased indeed to see the newspaper report in which it was alleged
that Mr. Anthony Crosland and others had refused an invitation from the
Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London to attend the 1st October
celebrations: Jay thought that this refusal would have shown the Chinese
that the British were not over-anxious to be friendly and would probably
encourage the Chinese to believe that something more positive had to be
done before Britain would publicly accept the hand of friendship.
7.
Other matters discussed were:--
(1) South China Iron Works: Jay said that be expected a reply from
Paxing in the near future. Meantime, LI Cho-chih had again complained
about the low offer made by the H.K.G. but Jay allegedly had told LI
that the H.K.G. was obviously doing China a favour and that if LI and
others did not recognise this, the simple answer vas to reject the offer
and attempt to sell the land themselves.
(2) Sand: Jay said that be had not yet had the opportunity of discussing
this matter with China Resources but he had discussed it at length with
Li Cho-chih. Apparently LI had indicated that
SECRET
/contd.....
SECRET
he was aware that there had been a proposal for an increase in the cost
of "compensation", but he was quite sure that the proposal had come from
Henry FOK himself. Indeed, on hearing
the proposal, LI had not bothered to find out from whom the increased
cost would be obtained he had assumed that in view of the very
substantial profits made by FOX, the increased "compensation" would come
from him, On reflection, LI had become quite concerned about the
proposal and suggested that it was not in keeping with previous policy;
he gave as example the proposal that there should be an increase in the
price of water to the H.I.G. (please see my last report). According to
Jay, LI had then corrented that it seemed a pity that the H.K.3. had
originally insisted on using Henry FOK's services. Jay enquired whether
there would be any objection in the future if others were asked to
tender in addition to FOK: LI said that there was certainly no objection
to this but when Jay suggested thațhe would pass this advice on to se,
LI allegedly said that this might not be advisable: that it might even
be a "threat"to my future career as "clearly those in authority wanted
Fox to
POK continue as the sand contractor". I informed Jay that this was utter
nonsense: that I had been asked to make enquiries about the proposed
increase in the cost of sand and that in any event the consideration and
award of tenders such as this was done on a completely impartial and
honest basis.
26 September, 1969.
Elo
(J. Cater)
c.c.
J. Murray, Esq. (F.C.0.) J.B. Denson, Esq. (PEKING) D.S.B.
H.S.G. 1.5.6.
SCOT
Mr. Murray
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With the Compliments of the
28 GET 1969
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Ha Mangjo. R
Political Adviser
Song Song paper, 127680
27
TSX 4/68 II
Oct.
Political Adviser
SECRET
Lor
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned on the morning of Monday, 29th September asking
whether he could see se "quite urgently": accordingly I made
arrangements to see him at 3.30 p.m. that afternoon.
2.
Jay started the discussion by saying that he had just received some
"very good news" from Peking concerning future attitudes and policy
towards Hong Kong. He said that his instructions from the Chinese
concerning the passing of informa tion to me were to the effect that he
would be receiving three different types of information: the first group
included information/requests which should be passed on specifically to
me; the second was information on which he could use his discretion as
to how much was told me; and the third vas information that ranged from
Highly Confidential to Top Secret and concerning which he would have
strict instructions not to mention to me in any circumstances. Jay
apparently thought it necessary on this occasion to emphasise his own
working rules so that I may understand that normally be "so trusted" me
that he was prepared to provide information which came within the third
category. The discussion that afternoon was apparently to include what
Jay termed as "Top Top Secret"i I tried to appear suitably impressed.
3.
Jay said that very recently instructions from Peking laid down
specifically and more definitely than for many years the line which
local communists vere to take, not only for the period of the 1st
October celebrations but also afterwards and until further notice.
Peking's instructions vere simply to the effect that in no circumstances
were local Hong Kong communists to cause trouble in Hong Kong: that
during the 201 Anniversary celebrations, if anybody were to cause them
trouble difficulties, the communists vere "not to fight back" - if, say,
they had trouble from Nationalists, then the correct thing to do would
be to report the incident to the Police: if the Police caused the
communists trouble, then the communists would have to "back down". It
was fully appreciated by Peking that it might prove extremely difficult
to explain this new attitude towards affairs in Hong Kong and so it was
suggested that by way of explanation to local communists they should be
told that Peking had definite information that the H.I.G. at this stage
would be trying to "trick" the communists into causing trouble by
"fighting back" so that they might have an excuse for taking strong
action against all communist activities: in these circumstances, local
communists were to be told that Peking had decided that for reasons
which they could not state at the present time it was better for China
that there should be no trouble and therefore no excuse for the H.K.G.
to harrass the Hong Kong communists.
4.
As regards propaganda on 1st October and later, Peking's instructions
were that there should be no reference to "paper tigers", "white pigs"
or "yellow dogs": also that supporters should be encouraged not to shout
those MAO slogans which dealt with "wishes" rather than "facts". This
last
SECRET
/contd..
(13
SECRET
2
instruction had apparently caused some concern in local communist
circles as, not unreasonably, they found it difficult to understand:
attempts were being made to clarify the intentions with Peking but
meanwhile local communist leadership had made the assumption that this
instruction meant that they should go slow on slogans which expressed
the wish or hope that the Chairman might live a thousand years, etc.
etc.
5.
Referring to the 1st October celebrations, Jay said that he was hoping
that Mr. Saunders of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank would soon contact him
as Jay proposed advising Saunders not to attend the Bank of China
cocktail party on Septembe 30th: Jay thought this necessary as Saunders
and the H.K.G. might be compromised as Saunders was a member of
Executive Council in addition to being Chairman of the H.K. & S. Bank.
Jay was pleased that Graham of the Chartered Bank had accepted the
invitation to the Bank of China cocktail party but was less pleased with
the way in which Martin Curran of the H.K. & S. Bank had accepted his
invitation to the cocktail party: apparently, and according to CHAN
Hung, Curran had telephoned CHAN to accept the invitation and had then
gone on to say how delighted he was to be attending such an important
function celebrating the tremendous achievements of China during the
past 20 years
why, complained Jay, could he not simply have got his secretary to
telephone the acceptance?
6.
Other matters discussed: -
(1) Jay said that local communists, and in particular those who had had
a spell of imprisonment in Stanley, were now openly boasting that they
had forced the H.K.G. to effect certain improvements "for the people of
Hong Kong": for example, in Stanley Prison the communists had no doubts
that they had been instrumental in forcing the authorities to provide
improved meals, including an extra "prison tea" and also better
clothing. In addition, because of agitation locally, Hong Kong
authorities vere taking a firm line and refusing entry into Hong Kong of
those people unacceptable to China. Jay mentioned in this context an
opera group from Taiwan and said that if indeed a group such as this had
been refused entry it would be a pity: that in his opinion the H.I.G.
should welcome visits from any Far Eastern people and in the case of
Taivan, provided visitors did not purport to represent "China" or "The
Republic of China", they should be welcomed.
(2) Jay said that local communists were pleased with the results so far
achieved to win hawkers over to their way of thinking: in particular,
some success had been achieved in making small loans to havkers and in
encouraging them to take out "Insurance" with communist organisations.
(3) Referring back to his report to Peking, Jay said that he had
commented at length on the more important members of the communist
hierarchy in Hong Kong: that on the whole he had
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/contd.
DEL
3
taken the line that the leadership here vas acting sensibly and could be
trusted to carry out Peking's instructions faithfully: he "even gave a
satisfactory report on LEUNG Vai-lam" - the only exception was Jay's old
enemy, FEI Yi- ming. Jay then spent some time going over all of PBI's
bad points and told me that he had exphasised them in his report: he
then suggested that if one had a real target such as FEI, the best way
to deal with him would be to praise everybody else but to write down
FEI,
(4) Jay said that recently there had been a great deal of talk in
communist banking circles, trying to pinpoint those who vere really
responsible for the 1967 debacle: the people now being mentioned in
connection with this were LAI Ying-chun of the Ivangtung Provincial
Bank, YING Kwong-yick of the Bank of Communications and TSUI Li-fun of
the Bank of China. The last mentioned was said to have particularly
strong influence with the motor workers' unions.
(5) As requested, I mentioned to Jay that WONG Cho-fan vas visiting the
Yue Hwa school far more frequently than previously agreed: the
understanding was that he should have permission to visit the school
once & quarter or more frequently if he had special permission from the
Director of Education. In spite of this it was known that already in
September VONG had visited the school at least on five occasions. Jay
said that he would certainly have VONG Cho-fan warned about this, but
strongly recommended that the H.I.G. should now on its own part issue a
firm warning to WONG.
(6) Jay reported that POON of the Bank of China had recently returned
from the Mainland: POON was looking very sunburnt and much slimmer and
Jay, with a great deal of pleasure, said that obviously POON had
"volunteered" to work on a farm. Whilst in China, POOM apparently
visited Peking where allegedly he was told in quite firm terns that
Peking was far from satisfied with the manner in which Hong Kong
communists had acted in 1967 and that it was expected in future they
would behave themselves and be better disciplined.
又
(J. Cater)
3rd October, 1969.
c.c.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.) Mr. J.B. Denson (PEKING)
D.8.B.
H.S.G.
I.8.8.
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Mr. Murray
155
307
日
With the Compliments of the
Hyperial
9
Political Adviser to Why AW
No Witset
Hong Kon Me Bayc of
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22/9/69 A Aqua
TSX 4/68
3/10 7/0 Carter. 3/10
+
SECRET
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14
Political Adviser
I arranged to see Mr. K.C. Jay at 4.15 Tuesday, 16th September,
2.
- 3 OCT 1969
i. on
3/22/2
As requested by Mr. Haddon-Cave, I mentioned to Jay the correspondence
recently exchanged between Government and Mr. Henry FOK concerning the
supply of sand to Hong Kong. I informed Jay that Fok had recently
reported that China Resources had verbally stated that in future the
"compensation" for sand would be increased from $1.50 to $2.0 per cubic
foot. I told Jay that past experience had certainly taught me to be very
cautious when dealing with Mr. Fok and accordingly it seemed vise to
check whether indeed China Resources had decided definitely that there
would be an increase in the cost of sand to the H.I.G. Jay commented
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.