this many times. They habitually alain that the ball is in our court and
that they expect "deeds rather than werde" in Hong Xanɛ (1.e, that we
should let them dietata to
Kong us how to run the Colony). In practice, however, they have mellowed
and it is now possible to summon the Chinese Chargi d'Affaires mi
interia in London fer discussion of business without the preceedings
degenerating into a shouting match.
What you report about the present relative scurtesy of your Chinese
colleague corresponds in general with the pattern as it has been
reported from a number of posts.
3. Finally, rather than wishing to inhibit your contacts with Muino Ming
we should see a positive advantage in your maintaining then on the lines
described in your letter. If he is prepared to Recept hospitality in
your house or elsewhere so much the better, So dal relations with
Chinese officials exist neither in Londen nor Peking. We shall therefore
waleone acoeunts of your own emcounters with the Chinese both as regarda
substance and general tone.
If you want guidance on any particular peint that comes up in
dinesssion, please do not hesitate to write or telegraph, Meanwhile, I
am enclosing a piese of paper setting out our present public position on
Anthony Grey and other British subjects.
A. 3. P. Smart, 1q..
RA:1300N.
CONFIDENTAJ
/5.
+
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
I am sending copies of this, together with copies of your letter, but
without enclosure, to James Allan in Peking and Michael Wilford in
Washington.
(J. D. I. Boyd)
PU ATIAL
(URI) DE 391799 1500μ 2168 Bw.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Resincici. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
DRAFT Letter
To:-
CONFIDENNI
A. B. P. Smart, Esq., RANGOON.
In Confidence
---
Type 1 +
From
J.D.I. Boyd
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Copy to:
J. K. Allan,
Poking.
K. M. Wilford,
CG, Washington
0 Seats Sept берт SPAY 1h wilsm
fini
(
that
CONTACT WITH CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFA IMES
In your letter 3/28 of 9 May you asked for
guidance regarding your contacts with the Chinese
in replying. Chargé d'Affaires in Rangoon and his staff. I have
I apongo for
the delaye
discussed your letter with Security, Department.
refainting
Subject to observation of the usual rules there is no
A
objection whatsoever to these contacts.
2. As you will remember from your time in News
Department we have our little difficulties with the
Chinese. However, it is our position that we are
anxious to get relations back to normal.
We have told
the Chinese this many times. They habitually claim
that the ball is in our court and that they expect
should let them dictate li va how to run The Colony "deeds rather than
words" in Hong Kong
In practice,
Hong
however, they have mellowed and it is now possible to
summon the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in
London for discussion of business without the
proceedings degenerating into a shouting match. What
you report about the present relative courtesy of your
Chinese colleague corresponds in general with the
pattern as it has been reported from a number of posts.
3.
a
Finally, rather than wishing to inhibit your
contacts with Hsio ing we should see a positive
advantage in your maintaining them on the lines
described in your letter. If he is prepared to accept
COMENTUMIKAL
/hospitality
CONFIDIVELAL
hospitality in your house or elsewhere so much the
better. Social relations with Chinese officials exist
neither in London nor Peking. Te shall therefore
welcome accounts of your own encounters with the
Chinese both as regards substance and general tone.
That comes up in discusson 4. If you want guidance on any particular'
point,
please do not hesitate to write or telegraph.
Meanwhile, I am enclosing a piece of paper setting out
<and othe~ Buhigh misjets,
our present public position on Anthony Grey.
5. I am sending copies of this, together with copies
Jack witment attornie,
of your letter, to James Allan in Peking and Michael
Wilford in Washington.
l be
inclose?]
-[NB]
To issue
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
L
+
Confitents and
Fr. Grifiths crity Department)
Mr.C. With loses SEAT (Ass Sincl
Contacts with the Chinese Mission. Rensoon
Please see Kr. Smart's letter at folio 35. I attach a draft reply. We
should like Mr. Smart to make the most of his contact with the Chinese
but you will presumably wish him to adhere to the basic rules governing
such contacts. I have tried to include this point in the first paragraph
of my draft. Please amend it if you think fit.
|
(JD. I. Boyd) Far Eastern Department
20 May, '69
Mr Harrytten Jons
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reason
to amend
HR
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draft in
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Mr. Boyd F.ED.
29.
have
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objections to
Carolyn Saclain paką 51s als
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP
L
CYPHER CAT A
PEKING TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
PRIORITY
TELNO 338
CONFIDENTIAL
3 JUNE 1969
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO
39
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 338 OF 3 JUNE.
- 3 JUN 1969
FEC 251
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG, POLAD SINGAPORE, WASHINGTON
AND RAWALPINDI.
WE HAVE HEARD THAT CHANG T'UNG (FORMER DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT AT CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) WILL
SHORTLY BE APPOINTED AS AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN.
FCO PASS HONG KONG, POLAD SINGAPORE, WASHINGTON, RAWALPIND1.
MR. DENSON
FILES
F. EASTERN D.
S. ASIAN D.
NEWS D.
I.R.D.
P.U.S.D.
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/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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Military Attache '55-60
Whas been served as a
(Stolatdan and White Haw Jolle), Charge
the war Jaredo (st Jopli
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CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
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With the compliments of
John Drew
Far Eastern Department.
FEC 25/3
BRITISH EMBASSY
BUCHAREST
22 May 1969
(32/4(8))
PRITRICTED
BRITISH EMBASSY,
BUCHAREST,
22 May 1969
31
مام
Contacts with Chiassa Diplomats
Please refer to your letter 1/1 of 30 April 1969.
In view of your latɩer you may be interested ir: a recent sonversation I
had with the Chinese Chargé d'affaires, La khu hin /lthough he is Ko. 7
(out of 10) in the Diplomatic List, he has been the Chargé here for at
least two years.
kost of the other thiness have been sent home to experience the Cultural
Revolution. la speaks some Rumanian and some English and is the only
Chinese I have met with whom ong can have anything resembling a normal
conversation.
2.
At a National Day Party at the height of the gino/soviet border dispute
I had a long talk with him. I said that I had spoken to the Russian
Counsellor who had explained to me what the situation was on the
Sing/Soviet border and that I would be interested to knew the Chinese
version. He then gave ar intelligent and reasoned account of the dispute
as the Chinese saw it. He was well briefed on the historical back-
ground and offered to send me sose information material about the
dispute.
3. He spked me what the Russian had said, I said to him that the Russian
version differed somewhat from the Chinese version. of course in Britain
the prees had tended to take the Russian side more than the Chinese
side, I said that I thought in general the British public opinion would
favour the Russian explanation of the dispute. The sain reason for this
whatever the logic was the contimed Chinese detention of Anthony Gray, I
said that I thought that if the Chinese vere to relsust Grey there would
be a much better chance of making their point of view known in Britain
and in the west in general over the border dispute with Russia,
0.0.H. Walden, Esq.,
office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,
Peking.
..........
RESTRICTED
2
4. My. Ma said that the problem of Grey was a separate issue. He then
gave the usual line about the journalists in Hong Kong. I pointed out
that the Journalist in Hong Kong vere of course a separate issue.
Surprisingly enough he tried to argue logically why it was not a
separate issue. I returned to the point about the Chinese receiving a
more favourable press in Britain if Grey were released and we continued
the discussion quite sensibly for a few more minutes. At the end of our
talk he suddenly switched back into gear and said that in any case
whatever happened the Chinese were not going to release Grey.
5. We parted on the usual reasonable (for relations with the Chinese)
terms. He even asked after my wife. Ma is
certainly more human than most Chinese. He once told my wife that she
was very pretty!
6. Since this last conversation the Emblasy receives more Chinese
information material than before, sometimes addressed to the Embassy and
sometimes to me personally.
0.0. Far Eastern Department.
RESTRICTFD
(John Drew)
RESTRICTED (3/58)
J.D.I.Boyd, Esq. Far Eastern Dept. FCO
With the compliments of
CHANCERY
ী
I have infund BBC
(J.0. KERR) J
sscinding
ما
5.
of forecasting (c) M. Wilom Graft!
во
cc RD (CK)
сс
照
IRD PUSIX
BRITISH EMBASSY
MOSCO
Moscow the Dept-
Sechej YPD
21 May, 1969
pojęzyc
(3/58)
RESTRICTED
BRITISH EMBASSY
MOSCOW
21 Hay, 1969
37
•
Contests with Chinese Dinlerats DEC 25/3
Thank you for your letter 1/1 of 30 April, in-response to which I now
enclose a copy of a minute describing a further call at the Chinese
Embassy. In view of your interest it may be worth adding some further
minor points about the conversation, which was notably relaxed and
pleasant, and lasted for over an hour and a half,
2. I had originally asked to see my previous contact, Mr. Chang Ta-ke,
and so began yesterday's conversation by asking about his health. He
had, it transpired, returned to Peking, and Mr. Li Feng-lin explained
that although he himself was in his third year here, postings to Moscow
were now shorter
I than in the past, "because of the heavy burden of work". showed some
surprise at this reason, and he went on to explain that the diplomatic
staff of the bassy now numbered only eight people this compares with 28
on the Soviet diplomatic corps list. Those still here were consequently
kept very busy, despite their lack of contact with 8 oviet official
bodies. Including supporting staff, total Chinese Embassy personnel now
numbered only 40 by comparison with some 250/ 300 in better days.
Because of this massive reduction it was no longer possible to
specialise in particular aspects of Soviet affairs or Sino-Soviet
relations, and his own sphere of responsibility covered both internal
and external aspects of Boviet policy. Moreover, the conditions of life
in Moscow were of course very testing, and Embassy staff were glad to
return to Paking after a fairly short stay.
-
3. At this point I asked about harassment and surveillance by the Soviet
militia, saying that I had seen no recent reports of further incidents,
and wondered whether the pressure had eased. He was adamant that the
situation had not improved at all. The Embassy was still "protected" day
and night by a dozen silitiamen - even the Americans rated only half as
many.
4. At one stage I mentioned the reports that the Chinese Ambassador to
Albania would shortly return to his post, and asked if he would be the
first of many, Mr. Li Feng-lin replied that be very much hoped so - but
that he was quite sure that the Ambassador to Moscow would not be one of
the first back,
5.
Towards the end of our conversation I remarked on how well-informed Mr.
Li Feng-lin was about Anglo-Soviet relations. He at once replied that he
found the B.B.C. broadcasts very
0.0.H. Walden, Esq.
PEXING
RESTRICAED
RESTRICTED)
9금
useful. He could not listen to transmissions in Russian because "our
(Soviet) hosts have decided to make that very difficult", but he had no
trouble in picking up Chinese language broadcasts. He added that the
grammar and vocabulary was a little old-fashioned, but still quite
easily under- standable, and he congratulated me on an excellent
programme, broadcast a month ago, about the historical background to the
Sino-Soviet frontier dispute, adding that it was not surprising that
Russian language transmissions should be jammed if they carried equally
fair reports.
6.
Through-out the conversation, Mr. Li Feng-lin seemed anxious to be
accommodating and friendly. The only points which he was clearly
unwilling to discuss were Soviet/North Korean relations, and the case of
Mr. Gray, which I raised in response to his mentioning Brooke, He seemed
more oncoming than Mr. Chang Ta-ke had been during my previous call, afd
after some hesitation and a request to know who else would be present,
he has accepted an invitation to lunch with me later this week, I shall
let you know if anything of interest is said.
7.
On one point recorded in para. 2 of my minute, I should perhaps add a
comment. Mr. Li Feng-lin's claim that 8imonov expressed a desire to
return to China as a war corres- pondant "when war came" is not strictly
accurate. Simonov recalled his previous war service in China, and the
tenor of his articles (my letter of 7 May to Boyd) seemed designed to
suggest that there was a real risk of a major military conflict along a
broad front, and to stir up a patriotic feeling of involvement in events
on the frontier. But he did not actually say that war was bound to come
or that he would return when it did.
8.
I am copying this letter, with enclosure, to Boyd in Far Eastern
Department, and Wallaby in Eastern European and Soviet Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
RESTRICTED
(3.0. Kerr)
H. of C.
RESTRICTED
3/58
Copies to
viogne Ditasa
Walden, Dz
Chinese Embassy
I called this afternoon on Mr. Li Feng-Lin, a Third Secretary. After
some general conversation, which I shall repert by letter to Peking, I
asked 5.9.1,Bayć, sq. about the Chinese Co-Chairman's reply of 11 Xay to
Par sastera
Dept.
C.L.G.Mallaby,
Esq.
3.E. & S.Dept. FCO
the Soviet proposal to reconvene the joint Commission
I said that since en Navigation in Border Rivers. the Soviet press had
as yet made no reference to the reply, I should be interested to hear
whether RDJ Did reactions to it had been privately conveyed. Kr. Li
Fang-Lin think that meaningful talka would open in Khabarovsk in
mid-June?
2. He replied that he did not think there had been any Boviet response,
that it was typical of the totally biassed Soviet reporting of
Sino-Soviet matters that the Soviet Co-Chairman's telegram had been
published but not the Chinese reply, and that he was very doubtful
whether the Russians would talk constructively in Khabarovsk, Their
present tactics seemed to be to strive to appear as the reasonable party
while contimally creating obstacles to meaningful discussions. Xoreover,
their anti- Chinese campaign seemed to have been deliberately
A new round of press hetted up in recent weeks. vilification had got
under way, and Simonov's Pravda articles had significantly increased the
temperature of the polemic. Had I noticed that 8imenov had said that he
hoped to return to China as a war correspondent when war came? Had I
seen that he envisaged a var affecting not only the Sino-Sorict but also
the Bino-Mongolian frontiert To publish such articles in Puzia was a
clear provocation, Koreover, Kosygin's New Delhi speech had been an
extraordinary analgam of anti-Chinese lies and mis- interpretations. One
could only assume that his intention was to frighten the Indians and
force them to close ranks with KosoOW, And if so much had been said
publicly, how much more must have been said in private round the
conference table? In general, there seemed to be a new burst of Soviet
propaganda and diplomatic activity directed against China - against this
background it was hard to see fruitful discussions developing on any of
the points at issue. Nevertheless, the reasonableness of the Chinese
position would be set out in devastating detail when the official reply
to the statement of 29 Xarah was made and published.
3.
I asked when this would be, but Ir. Li Feng-lin had no information about
timing. I also asked whether it was also intended to reply to the Note
of 11 April, but he thought that this would not be NECESSARY
With the help of his diary and an air- line timetable, he showed that
Chinese representative; would have had to leave Paking for Koscow on the
day that the Note vas received by the Pabassy in order to be here for
talks on the date suggested by the Russians (15 April). In other words,
the Bote had been a transparent provocation, and did not merit a reply.
RESTRICTED
I then mentioned the rumours of further frontior insidente on 26 April
and 2 Hay. These, he said, probably originated with Soviet official
and had, as far as he knew, na basia in fast. He pointed out that
serlier and totally unfounded rumours of Chinese interference with
Soviet supply trains to Vietnam had been described as coming from
"poureen close to the Ministry of Foreign Trade". The latest stories no
doubt had a similar provenanos, He claimed to know nothing of any Soviet
protest,
5. I then asked what significance ir, Li-Peng-lin attached to Podgorny's
current visits to North Korea and longolia. It was very noticeable that
he did not wish to comment on the visit to North Korea,
On and trios switched at once to another topic. Mongolia, he said that
Russian leaders frequently visited Ulan Bator: "They come and go there
as
Kongolia they plase". And this was not surprising was a classic example
of a colony. He dõubted whether there was much significance in a visit
by Podgerny at present the Longolian Government would do as Kosoer said
with or without personal explanations from Soviet leaders. I mentioned
the reports of Deputy Foreign Hinister Jargasaikhan's tour, and he
seized on this point, saying that he too had seen reports, and that the
anti-Chinese nature of Jargasaikh- un'a nosenge would of course have
owed a lot to previous instructions from Zozoow, He then asked me what
information I had about the Humanisa visit to Słomoor on 15 May. Be
agreed that the World Conference was the likeliest subject of
disemasion.
6.
The name of Vistor Louis came up during ou discussion of possible
souroes of Bescor rumours, and Kr. Li Fmg-lin turned to the subject of
Leuia' Taiwan trip, which he took very seriously. I asked whether he had
any information about a visit to Fossow by ^r. An Th-llsiu from Taiwan,
an. He replied that he knew that the visit had taken place, and imagined
that, like Louis, Dr. Ku Yu-Hsin had been used as a courier. He agreed
that a Soviet/Taiwan rapprochement was at first sight unlikely, but
thought that it in fact fitted quite logically into the present pattern
of Soviet diplomatie nativity.
7. Ir. Li Feng-lin then asked whether we thought that Louis was a 10ß
officer, and how TO 188655ad
Jould it affect our his latest article on Breaks. relations with the
Soviet Union? I replied that there was no doubt that Louis van at least
used by certain soviot organisations, and that if the sub- stance of his
article were to turn out to be corrcat, this would of course osmpliosto
Angle-Dovist relations. Public interest in the Broska osse was very
creat - as, of 8.urse, also in the case of ur. Grey. (KP, Lå Fengslin
was clearly aware of the Orey case,) le zakod about the original charges
against, Brooke, and suggested that a retrial on nere serions charges
might be intended to increase the attractiveness of
i said that that night an exchange for a Soviet agy. indeed be the case,
and that the publie outory in "ngland would be considerable if Brooke
vere to be further detained on a tramped-up charge, Taphasising that I
knew nothing of the detalls of the Brooks osse, I said that this would
be similar in effect so detaining without trial i innseost zan -
/and such
RESTRICTED.
and such behaviour sould only worsen relations Mr. Ld Feng-lin replied
that he was sure that I vas voll aware of the Chinose position on the
ease of Mr. Grey. He then changed the subject, and I did rot purens it,
8.
The subjects on which he seemed nost interssfed were the Xosygin Indian
visit and speech, Simonov1a articles. the Rumanian visit here, and
Louis. He dismissed the rumours of new border olashes and seemed
cocosrɔed only to use them to illustrate 1.is thesis that the Russians
were deliberately trying to build-up tension in Sino/ Soviet relations,
(J.0. Kerr)
19 Max. 1959
DASWRIGTED
EN CLAIR
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN AND COMNON:EALTH OFFICE
TELNO 314
UNCLASSIFIED
20 MAY, 1969
крите
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No.50
20 MAY 1969
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 314 OF 2 MAY. RFI HONGKONG,
POLAD SINGAPORE, WASHINGTON AND PARIS.
FEC 253
WE UNDERSTAND THAT GENERAL HUANG CHEN, FORMER AMBASSADOR
TO PARIS AND A MEMBER OF THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, WILL SHORTLY RETURN TO HIS
POST.
NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO PEKING ARRIVES THIS EVENING,
HR. DENSON
FILS
F.E.D.
V.E.D.
+
لیہا
+
1
3/28
Jean John,
CONFIDENTIAL
:
25/1
Fee 25/3
Interesting ins
от O Mr Walm
(c) CC:RD IRA
B
35
BRITISH EMBASSY,
& Gulin
Rysi
+ Submit
RANGOON.
9 May, 1969.
partes 511 5/6
I wonder if you could guide me on the extent to which it would be proper
for me to develop contact with the Chinese Chargé here, Hsiao Ming, and
his staff.
2. Since my arrival at the end of September last year, I have come
across him at several parties and, while I have always had to make the
first move, I have found him most agreeable, and ready to discuss at
length such subjects as the incarceration of Tony Gray, Chinese
involvement in Burma and their attitude to our measures in Hong Kong.
(For my part, Gray is usually the jumping-off point.)
3. He has at no time seemed reluctant to continue any conversation, no
matter how disparate our views
While he, appear after a few moments exchange. quite naturally, usually
parries my questions with stock replies, he is clearly aware that I know
that he knows that he is trotting out text book answers especially when
he deliberately answers a question which I have not asked. Indeed, his
interpreter has once winked at me when translating a particularly
disingenuous response.
-
4. This interpreter, Ha Yu-chen Third Secretary, who left for a posting
to Feking in March of this year (I have not yet had any real contact
with his replacement), is a very bright, young-looking man and speaks
excellent, if at times slightly Dickensian, English. He never talked on
his own account, but I always gained the impression from his manner that
he was a reasonable man, embarrassed by some of the unnecessary
differences between us, and one who could be impressed by fair argument.
John Boyd, Esq.,
Far East Department,
F.0.0.
CONFIDENTIAL
L
CONFIDENT IAL
I am
5. As far as I have been able to observe, the only "Western" diplomat
who talks at any length to the Chinese at these receptions (although the
French Ambassador exchanges a few words from time to time). I do not
want to stick out like
a sore thumb by too frequent encounters, especially if our current
"social policy" towards the Chinese makes this improper. What do you
advise?
6. Would you wish me to continue to maintain contact simply along the
lines I have described? If so, are there any particular questions which
you would like me to ask Hsiao Ming? Would you wish me to go to the
extent of inviting him to my house or to a meal in more neutral
territory? although I very much doubt if he would come.
Jans
Pera
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.