1
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FM BGRAD AUG 13/69 NO/NO STANDARD
TO TT EXTER 968 DE PARIS
INFO PARIS TT LD# BOHN WSHDC DE PARIS MOSCO CANDELNATO DE LDN
BAG :PRGUE WSAW DE LUN
VISIT TO BGRAD-MARK GAYN
AS YOU KNOW MARK GAYN WAS IN BGRAD AT BEGINNING OF WEEK AND HAS NOW
DEPARTED FOR DUBROVNIK AND ALBANIA.
2.GAYN SAW A/SSFA UVALIC YESTERDAY WHO SPOKE TO HIM AT LENGTH ABOUT
CHINA AND SOVIET UNION.GAYN WAS KIND ENOUGH TO GO OVER HIS NOTES
WITH US AND WHILE WE WILL NOT/NOT TRY TO REPORT THEM VERBATIM
SOME HIGHLIGHTS MAY INTEREST YOU.PRESUMABLY IN DUE COURSE MOST OF WHAT
UVALIC TOLD GAYA WILL APPEAR IN TORONTO STAR ADD IT IO NALLY
IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT MANY OF UVALICS COMMENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED
TO YOU IN EARLIER COMMUNICATIONS.
3.IN CONTEXT OF YUGOSLAV-CHINESE RELATIONS UVALIC THOUGHT THERE
WAS SOME LTD IMPROVEMENT.THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD SIGNED A TRADE
PROTOCOL.YUGOSLAVIA HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE CANTON FAIR AND THEIR
CHARGE IN PEKING WAS NOW BEING RECEIVED BY OFFICIALS OTHER THAN
PROTOCOL.UVALIC REMARKED THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT
PEKING WOULD APPOINT AN AMBASADOR TO BGRAD HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT CHINESE
MERCHANT SHIPS WERE USING YUGOSLAV PORTS FOR TRANS-
SHIPMENT OF COMMERICIAL PRODUCTS.
4.UVALIC SUGGESTED TO GAYN THAT RIVALRY PETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCO HAS
...2
(83)
PAGE TWO 968 RESTA NO/NO STANDARD
BASED LESS ON IDEOLOGY THAN ON POWER POLITICS.HE HELD VIEW HOWEVER
THAT MADIST SOCIALISM WOULD REMAIN AND THERE WOULD THEREFORE
CONTINUE TO BE IRRITANTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES E
IF THERE WAS HO/NO POWER RIVALRY UVALIC ALSO ARGUED THAT SOVIET
UNION HAD VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE IN PEKING.HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT
WHILE BORDER CLASHES NIGHI TEMPORARILY BE RESOLVED THE
LIKELIHOOD OF LONG-TERM CONTROVERSY WOULD CONTINUE.HE ALSO
SUGGESTED THAT PEKING WOULD LIKE TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT BORDER
STATE UNDER OF COURSE CHINESE SUZERAINTY.THIS WAS HOT/HOT LIKELY
TO MAKE CHINESE/SOVIET RELATIONS MORE TOLERABLE.UVALIC DOUBTED
WHETHER THERE WAS MUCH SCOPE FOR SOVIET SUBVERSION IN CHINA PROPER
ALTHOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY MOSCO WOULD TRY TO STIR UP TROUBLE IN ORDER
AREAS SUCH AS TIBET ETC.
5.UVALIC DISCOUNTED THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE SOVIET UNION EMBARKING ON A
MAJOR MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH PEKING OR ON USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE EVENT THAT LARGE SCALE HOSTILITIES WERE TO DEVELOP.HE SUGGESTED
THAT POLAND AND THE EAST GERMANS WERE COUNSELLING MOSCO TO BE
CAUTIOUS IN THEIR CHIMA POLICY.
6.UVALICS REMARKS TO GAYK ON CZECHO WERE IN PREDICTABLE TERMS AND
IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT/NOT SAY ANYTHING NEW.HIS REPLY
TO GAYNS QUESTION ON THE ROLE OF MILITARY IN THE SOVIET UNION
WAS ALSO UNEXCEPTIONABLE HE ARGUED THAT FOLLOWING THE CZECKO
CRISIS LAST YEAR THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY" HAD" PERHAPS
MAD-
DIMINISHED SOMEVANT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE SOVIET POSTURE WAS SO UNPOPULAR.
ON THE OTHER HAND HE THOUGHÍ BREZHNEV WAS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE
MILITARY AND THEREFORE IN A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION.KOSYG IN
AND SUSLOV WERE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THEIR SPECIAL SKILLS
WILLIAMS
\sc 25/3)
CONFIDENTIAL
Far Eastern Department
4
24/8
18 August, 1969
84
Chin
bassador.
You wrote to Terence O'Leary on 24 July (3/378) about the new Chinese
albassador to Kabul, Hsiah Pang-chih, You may find it useful to have the
following details sulled from the 1964 List of Leading Personalities in
China:
2.
Haiah was a party worker in Central China in the 'forties. From 1950 to
1952 he was a Deputy Seeratary of the CCP wahan Municipal Committee; in
February 1952 he was dismissed from all his posta
(including that of head of the Organisation Depart- sent and Secretary
of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the Municipal Party
Commiɩtee), having failed in his duty to prevent miscarriage of justice
which had been engineered by other party officials. He had been
rehabilitated by January 1955 when he became an Assistant to the
Kinister of Communications. He was an Assistant to the Minister of
Supervision frea Xovember 1955 until July 1958; a Deputy Minister of
Bupervision from July to Septembar 1958; and a Deputy Minister of
Justics from September 1958 to April 1959. He was apparently transferred
to Shanghai at about this time, and was Secretary-General of the CCP
Shanghai Munisipal Committee by March 1961. He was appointed Ambassador
to Bulgaria in July 1962.
We have had reperta from a mauber of posts that with the gradual
resumption of a more normal diplomatic style by the
Chinese their ambassadors are selling on their British and other
colleagues. Should Mr. Haish call on your Ambassador, we should be most
grateful to have an account of the proceedings,
Copies of this letter go to the recipients of yours.
3. Cepi
11. X. Iwans, Esq.,
KABUL.
(J. D. I. Boyd)
CONFIDE
(HAI) DA. 391999 - 1500u 1989 Hv.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
FEC 2512 DRAFT Letter
25/3
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret. Secret.
Confidential
Restricted.
Unclassified
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
To:-
M. K. Ewans, Esq., KABUL.
Type 1 +
From
J. D. I. Boyd
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Copy to:
Chancery, Peking Chancery, Sofia
Chinese Ambassador
You wrote to Terence O'Leary on 24 July (3/378)
about the new Chinese ambassador to Kabul, Hsieh
Pang-chih. You may find it useful to have the following
details culled from the 1964 List of Leading Personali-
ties of China:
Haich was a party worker in Central China in
the 'forties. From 1950 to 1952 he was a
Deputy Secretary of the CCP Wuhan Municipal
Committee in February 1952 he was dismissed
from all his posts (including that of head of
the Organisation Department and Secretary of
the Discipline Inspection Committee of the
Municipal Party Committee), having failed in
his duty to prevent a miscarriage of justice
which had been engineered by other party
officials. He had been rehabilitated by
January 1955 when he became an Assistant to the
Minister of Communications. He was an Assistant
to the Minister of Supervision from November
1955 until July 1958; a Deputy Minister of
Supervision from July to September 1958; and a
Deputy Minister of Justice from September 1958
to April 1959. He was apparently transferred
to Shanghai at about this time, and was
/over
Secretary-General of the CCP Shanghai
Municipal Committee by March 1961. He was
appointed Ambassador to Bulgaria in July
1962.
2. We have had reports from a number of posts that
a unse
with the gradual resumption of normal diplomatic sły
pracode by the Chinese their ambassadors are calling
and oltiv
Hsieh
on their British colleagues. Should Mr. Here call on
Mark
your Ambassador, we should be grateful to have an
account of the proceedings.
3. Copies of this letter go to the recipients of
yours.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
+
Reference.
objection to letter going from you.
SAD
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SOUTH ASIA DEPT.
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OFFICE
4/8/69
LONDON, S. W. I
RESTRICTED
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FRITISH EBASSY,
KABUL.
24 July, 1969
82
T
7
(3/378)
this dean rescue,
Dusj m
357 vi
Yew Chinese Ambassador to Kabul
ev
the*
Would you please refer to my letter of 1 July, in which I reported,
inter ali arrivai here of a new Chinese Chargé d'Affaires.
2.
Charge di
The Afghans have now announced that they have given their 'agrément to
the appointment of a new Chinese Arbassador to Afghanistan, Hsieh
Tang-Chih by name, ic believe that he served as Ambassador to Bulgaria
before the Cultural Revolution.
3. I en sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Peking and
Sofia, the latter of whom may perhaps have on record an assess- ment
dating from his time there.
T. D. O'Leary, Esq., South Asian Department, P.C. O.
Rajustin Copy to F..).
FED. P.LLID. J.LD.
RD.
Martin (E. K. EWANS)
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N",61
31 JUL 1969
FSA25/3
RED
papas
IN. R.GISTRY No. Bo
- 8 AUG 1969
L
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Our M. 4 in Stock(Shma charly belongs to the "new
left:
Abromein, sprinted encheure!
AMB 141
Mhr buitul me
siteng
BRITISH EMBASSY,
Enter (Chimene
Dips)
STOCKHOLM,
12 August, 1969.
124
19 AUG 1969
Ec. 253
Dear Wilson
With reference to your letter FEC 25/2 of 25 July, you might like to see
the enclosed minute by my Military Attaché on the reception given by the
Chinese Defence Attaché on 31 July last.
For what it is worth, I would add that the Chinese duly redeemed his
promise to call on my Service Attachés, the meeting being confined to
the usual courtesies.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Peking.
C. Wilson, Esq.,
Yours
ever,
? copy to Washington
wall
Mr.
Yo.
hom Rointme
Reé
amy + ene L Chry
w'at com
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth office,
London, S.W.1.
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Reference.......
M 3/1
H.E.
Copy to:
D.A.
1st Sec.
Your Excellency,
In accordance with ".E's wishes, I attended the so-ca72 x Chinese
Republic Armed Forces Dey reception held at their Embassy on Thursday,
31st July 1969. Dressed in service uniform, I arrived at 1725 hours. In
the entrance hall, a bespectacled Chinese was laughing with a group of
young Swedes at some anti-imperialist literature displayed on the walls.
He managed to disengage himself to susrest "You signee bookie". Having
done this, I ascended the stairs to the reception hall, where I was net
by two Hao smooked Chinase, one of whom spoke to me in English and
introduced himself as "Attache for Navy, Army and Air Force".
This was obviously eng Yung-Chen. Further attempts at conversation were
confined to his saying "Attache for Navy, Aruy and Air Force".
The rain reception room presented an interesting spootacle. The table in
the centre was loaded down with Chinese food of all descriptions and a
small bar was set up on one side of the room. The guests for the most
wert appeared to be the dregs of Stockholm, not on'semester, attired in
shirts and jocns and who obviously had a proz'ound dislike of soap and
water, in spite of the hot Stredish summer. Some of their offspring were
also present. The main occupation of those prosent appeared to be the
gathering of large platefuls of food, and then to elbow their way to tho
bar for a drink. The walls were covered in anti-tnerican propaganda,
written in Swedish, including references to atrocities committed in Viet
Nam. Having failed to rule contact with the rather peculiar guests, who
seemed to rapará me as a creature from outer space, and having been
elbowca out of the queue for e-glass of refreshment, I joined the other
Service Attaches there in uniform (fron Poland, Finland and France), and
a group of officers from the Swedish Ministry of Defence. The latter
were goggle eyed at the proceedings, and expressed their disgust that
one's uniform should be sullied at such an occasion.
As the evening was warm, I departed after half an hour to quench my
thirst elsewhere. Ky leave taking of the "Attache for Navy, Arvy and Air
Force" was short. I told him, through his interpreter, that I would be
interested to hear what connection some of the guests had with the Armed
Forces reception. Also, I demanded to know why he, as a new arrival, had
already paid official visits to three other Service Attaches in
Stockhola, yet no attempt had been made, as required, to arrange an
introductory visit to the British Service Attaches. Apologies were
conveyed on his behalf, and this he promised would be remedied within 24
hours. arriving outside in the fresh air, I found my driver in
conversation with two Swedish policamen. The latter expressed their
astonishment that certain individuals under police observation should be
the guests they had observed entering an embassy reception.
Сп
ay Mish
Colonel
8th August 1969
Y.A.
1523
し
4/8.
бо
27) 8
CONFIDENTIAL
BERISH HICH COMMISSION,
IN
REGISTRDAN÷LS-SALAAM.
August, 1969.
RECEIVED IN REGISTRYN 2|8 |15 AUG 1969, FEC 25/1
R+an R+ a
6/11/2 (S)
- 7 AUG 1969
CT 3|301|1
Dear Eric,
JET
Chinese diplomatic representation
In late January 1967 the former Chinese ambassador to Tania (Ho Ying)
was recalled by his Government to takɩ art in the Cultural Revolution.
In June he was replaced here by Chung Hsi-tung. On my return from London
the latter paid a courtesy call on me on 23 July, which I returned on 28
July.
2. He was ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1961 until he also was
recalled to take part in the Cultural Revolution, probably in early
1967. He speaks at least enough English to exchange everyday greetings,
and I suspect knows more; but he prefers to use his interpreter. I found
Chung intelligent and urbane, anxious to be affable and give a good
impression of himself. When I offered him tea and said I hoped he liked
it English- style, he said with good humour that he did - "And why not?
it's red tea
H
3. At our first meeting Chung got on to the subject of communist and
western ideologies. I found him quite ready to argue lines put out by
me, but more often anxious to fall back on dogma as if well rehearsed
during his recent time in the Revolution. He frequently smiled when
making a point. But there was no doubt about the condescension in his
smile at my remarks about British socialism. When I reminded him that
everyone in Britain was free to express his opinion about the Government
and Prime Minister he blandly countered by saying that the people of
China venerated their great Chairman because they were a disciplined
people looking to him to destroy utterly the feudalism and exploitation
they had suffered under for centuries at the hands of their own former
rulers as well as foreign countries.
4. He asserted that it was now only in China and Albania that pure
marxism-leninism was practised: Soviet revisionists had abandoned the
purity of communism and were combining with the American imperialists to
the
L. G. Le Tocq, Esq.,
East African Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreig.w.1.
CONFILINTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
challenge China. But China was well prepared and would stand firm. He
reverted repeatedly to this theme and was vitriolic about the United
States and the Soviet Union equally. China regarded 90% of the people of
the world as being "good"; but the United States was among the 10%.
Britain (he thought!) was by and large among the 90%. When I asked him
why in that case our wish for good relations with China had been
rebuffed, he Inurediately launched into the question of the Hong Kong
newspapermen. He dismissed my protestations of Anthony Grey's innocence.
If Britain stretched out the hand of friendship China would take it; but
if we raised a clenched fist China would repel it.
5. Chung ended by saying that it all depended on the good will of other
countries. For example (he said), when he left me he was going to call
on the Indian high commissioner, notwithstanding the differences between
them. But if he saw the American ambassador at a party on neutral ground
here he would not even shake hands with him. He did not go so far as to
say the same of the Soviet ambassador, but he made it generally clear
that he lumped the Russians with the Americans.
6. My return call was taken up more with discussion of our respective
attitudes to Tanzania. Chung was at pains to impress on me that his
Government wanted to help Tanzania maintain its independence and make
social and economic progress. I countered by saying that Britain
regarded Tanzania as fully sovereign and independent and did not
question the country's independence and its ability to maintain this.
The ambassador brushed this aside by suggesting that I had a special
position in Tanzania since the country was a member of the Commonwealth.
I left him, I hope, discomfited by making no comment except that above
all Britain respected the sovereignty of Tanzania.
7. He smiled knowingly and remarked that Britain still ran a newspaper
here. I said firmly that ""The Standard" was a private business
enterprise which reflected Tanzanian thinking and certainly not British
views: it often attacked British policy. Chung then said that, however
that may be, the paper also indulged in anti-Chinese propaganda. A week
or so before it had reported that the Chinese Government had issued a
set of postage stamps portraying revolutionary leaders and groups in
Afro-Asia and Latin America, among them
Mr. Odinga in Kenya and Mr. Babu in Tanzania. He wanted to tell me that
no such stamps had been issued, and that
2.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
the report was "a complete imperialist fabrication" deliberately
propagated by "The Standard" in an effort to harm Sino-Tanzanian
relations. I refuted this allegation and suggested that the report had
probably simply been picked up from agency material. I was sure that if
the ambassador had any observations on it the editor would be happy to
discuss these with him. At his request I gave him Mr. Grinshaw's name.
8. In the course of further talk about Tanzania, Chung asserted
repeatedly that he and his people were in the country for the sole
purpose of helping it. The railway, for example, was something for its
benefit, although the Chinese purpose in building this was of course
misrepresented by China's enemies. I reacted in his style and smiled as
knowingly as I could. The
conversation drew to an end with affable enough greetings on both sides.
9. The conclusion of the episode of the stamps was as follows. The
editor told me next day that the New China News Agency representative
had already called on him that moming and questioned the report. But in
the meantime Grimshaw himself had looked again at the source of it and
become suspicious: it was not in fact an agency report, but a glossy
brochure with some of the thoughts of Mão on the front cover and an
imprint on the back purporting to be that of a philatelic society in
Peking; and it contained good reproductions of the stamps in question.
In fact, Grimshaw had realised too late, it was a clever fake put out by
some anti-Chinese
source.
10. At this, and having been approached by the NCNA, Grimshaw decided to
retract the report. He did so, and accompanied the retraction by an
editorial condemning resort to such mean and misleading practices. I and
others think this was an unnecessarily gratuitous apology; the factual
retraction would have sufficed. But of course "The Standard" is walking
something of a tightrope at present and Grimshaw wanted to play safe, at
whatever cost to appearances. Besides, he feels it could be useful to
develop relations with the NCNA, whose influence on his rival, "The
Nationalist", is marked.
11. Finally, to end this China saga. On August 1 Chung held a reception
in the grounds of the Embassy to mark the 42nd anniversary of the
People's Liberation Army. Invited to it were the few Heads of Missions
(including myself and the Russian), with wives, who are
3.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
I
in relations with Peking; otherwise the scores of guests were Chinese of
all classes, nondescript Tanzanians, mostly of middle and lower class,
and the usual bearded "freedom fighters". The leading Tanzanians were
the M.F.A. Director of Protocol, Babu the Minister for Commerce and
Industries, and (in the absence in Leipzig of the Commander) Colonel
Kashmiri on the Tanzania People's Defence Forces. Appropriate to the
occasion, as well as to the growing Chinese interest in the PDF, he was
clearly the guest of honour and given punctilious attention by his
hosts. Although I thought I detected a certain embarrassment and
discomfort on the face of this able and agreeable Tanzanian officer of
Indian origin and British training, he was soon lost among the front-row
Chinese applauding the turgid and tedious film of the proceedings of the
Ninth Conference of the Chinese Communist Party nearly two hours of
-
monotonous shots alternately of io and other Chinese leaders addressing
a vast gathering of delegates and of the latter hysterically applauding
the speakers. A dull evening, but notable as the first social occasion
in the Chinese Embassy here (apart from National Day) for at least two
years, and as my first ever Chinese reception.
Eours ever
Grace Paillis
(H. Phillips)
copied to:
Nairobi Kampala Lusaka
Zomba
Moscow
Peking
Washington
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
[
3/28
RG
¿
DIN
Y No 50
મંત્ર
15 AUG 1969
KEC 25/3 My Dear Keith
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 14
- 5 AUG 1969
FAB3|301|1
2) RD (Hnlishment)
3) IRD
BRITISH EMBASSY,
RANGOON.
31 July 1969
Зая
4) P.US, D. (Mr Weston) 5) P.ir. Hamyllin 30. O PA est
Call by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires
paja aqu
You may be interested to know that Hsiao Ming called on me the other day
to say goodbye the first of icial move from him, apart from party
invitavions, I havə mua since my arrival here in October,
1967.
2. He was is usual smiling and inscrutable self. He spoke in English
part of the time. and occasion.lly called on the services of á youtiful
interpreter whose English was, in fact, much worse than his own.
Somewhat to my surprise, he stayed for about three-quarters of an hour,
mostly spent in cross-examining me on my views as to the outcome of the
Internal Unity Advisory Body exercise. I spoke to him fairly freely on
the standard lines generally accepted by the diplomatic comunity in
Rangoon as the most likely interretation of current events. Hs130 Ming
seemed articularly interested in the possi- bility of a Come-back by U
Nu and directed his molt searching questions to the latter's position
and that of U Ba Swe. I was pretty non-commital but said, as my own
purely personal view, that I thought it u:likely that U Nu and his
supporters could make any pact on the current Burmese scene so long as
No Win maintains the unity of the Army.
K. Ham/lton Jones, Esq.,
South East Asia Department,
F.0.0.
CONFIDENTIAL
I
BRITISH EMBASSY,
RANGOON.
3. My attempts to get something out of Hsiao Ming in return were not
very successful. I asked him for his view of the current development of
Sino-Burmese relations, and while he did not say anything positive, he
seemed to nod acquiescence to my suggestion that, on their siue, the
Burmese
.ous to get back to a correct, if not rel.tionship with China, and from
Chin se seemed to want much the same.
Sueme Very c. theirs
4. F. o Ming clearly wanted to be friendly. He fled up by confirming
that I woulu be atten.. ; nis farewell party.
Ути
Sur
(Trafford Smith)
CONFIDENTI
1
1
Kr. Boyd,
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