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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
King Charles Street,
YEAR STAMP
1968/9
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后 FEC 25
Dear Dap
24/3
Mr App (1)
BRITISH MBASSY
BAGHAD
CL
123
15 December 1969
Chinese Embassy in Baghdad
I paid a courtesy call on Mr. Chang Shu, the First Secretary and
temporary Charge d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy today. Most of the
conversation was about generalities and is not worth recording but Chang
Shy mentioned that an Ambassador would shortly be appointed to Baghdad
as part of the continuing process of re-establishment of diplomatic
links at the higher level after the Cultural Revolution.
2.
Chang Shu himself has been back in Peking for some time and only
returned to take up his post as Chargé d'Affaires a month ago.
Far Eastern Department,
F.C.O.
(Embassy
c.c.British Embassy,
Peking.
Your ar
In oth
(J. M. Symons)
ple
MAY
F
30 OCT 1969
ا برح
25:3
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orričˇor the British-
Charge d'Affairs.
PRIM
21 October, 19).
(199
Contuct with Chinese diplocate
In his letter 5/56 of 23 September to George Kalden, Kerr saked whether
there ware my particular pointe om which we should welcome commit from
your ocousional Chinese contacto. The following points ure of special
current interest to us, sad are subjects on which you may be able to
elicit useful comment.
2.
(a) Why will the Chinesa net accommodate Ruosion wishes
in the Khabarovsk azon, which norms to be the crux of the boundary
dispute? Do they have a specifie economie interest in this area, or is
it a matter of principle on which accommodation would advarsely affast
important interests elsewhere in their orders?
(b) would the Chiasse be prepared to reach: a solution on di.
puted arons based on the mtual coding of territory in which the other
side hare an co...nomic or strategic interest ("island swapping")! (50e
point 3 of part 5 of the Chiness document on the Sino-Soviet frontier
published on 6 Cetober).
(=
3. what trade matters are sufficiently important to be a subject of
talks between Kosygin and Chou En-lai, and to be mentioned in the
Chinese statement of 7 Getober" specifically, is it a matter of:
(1) technical back-up/additional mahinery/replacements
for Soviet pluits und equipment sold in the past?
(11) produsers' goods which arennot obtainable elsewhere
8.g. oil produetz, minerale:
(111) aircraft?
Do the Chinese regard the soviet Union as the only available source of
sircraft to expend their domestic sertides or open an international
airline?
0.C. Clark, Esq., British Embassy,
MOGOO...
I don't suppose we shall get which
Chance to try these ant on our
Interyd 197
howing. Ar K
в
$
Loz
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Will the
What is the Chinese attitude to East Zuropean comtries and Partios (we
were struck by the presence of a Csech at the dinner party referred to
in kerr's letter of 25 September) ↑ Whinese contime to pretend to the
leadership of the existing world conmmist movement, or promote relations
with individual East Europeʊn statas ca a bilateral basis? What are the
prospects for a new independent communist international, as apparently
advocated by Comrade Hill? An interesting document in this context is a
People's Daily article published as XCXA item 090905 *Karxist-Leninist
revolutionary farces san, ot be vanquished by abuse', which I am afraid
we have not previously reported. It is an interesting attack on
Areshner's reference during the June conference of commumist parties to
"elements bostils to commniss", It included the following passages:
"a thorough break must be sade with, and a resolute struggle
must be enged against revisionisa..........without such a break with and
struggle against opportunim, there can be no development of Marxism and
the international commist movement....". "It is the demand of the times,
the danand of the revolution and the demand of the people that
revolutionaries within those soummist parties and workers' parties whose
leadership has been usurped by the revisionists, rmagades and scabs and
which have degenLOZ VAL should breek away from such parties in rebellion
against revisioniss and re-establish genuine revolutionary parti-c of
the proletariat.
5. What is the order of Chinese domestie priorities? Where doss higher
education stand in these priorities, and are the universities likely to
reopen in 19707 How does the present state of the party and state
bureaucracies compare with that existing before the cultural Revolution.
will a ner stata constitution be necessary; ssbodying, for instance, the
revolutionary committeos as the new state organs:
6. Recent Chinese statements on the U.8.A, imply that the Chinese would
respond to any American change of policy. How would China view a
withdrawal of U.8. troepe from Taiwan,
7. Copies of this letter go to Mallaby in Eastern kuropean and Boviet
Department, and to Boyd in Far Sastern Department.
(J.D. Laughton)
KESTRICTED
(3/58)
29 OCT 1969
98
(126)
Pany
MOSCOW
BRITISH EMBASSY,
Camberdage Hi M
Ri)(FF)
Boyd FET / PL Taw Tomy for FFD pla. 4525/23 September, 1969. R
(Macmaster)
Puso
вете
Contact with Chinepa Diplonate
In view of your earlier interest I should perhaps describe a dinner I
attended at the Chinese Embassy last week. The hostsvære an almost
totally silent First Secretary, T'ang T'eng-yi and my very voluble
friend Kr. Li Feng-lin, who is a Third Secretary, asoioted by three more
junior members of the Embassy staff and the N.C.U.A. correspondent: my
fellow guests a Czech, a Rumenien, a Yugoslav and a French diplomat, and
the A.F.P. correspondent. Li Fong-lin dominated proceedings throughout,
appeared to be enjoying himself inaonsely, and told me in an aside at
one stage that he very much regretted that it had "only now become
possible" to give such an entertainment in the Embassy. It was in fact
rather an enjoyable ovening.
2. The A.F.P. correspondent had only just filed his story of forthcoming
Bino/Soviet talke in Koscow, and he came in for a good deal of badinage
about it, but our hosts were renially unwilling to comment on its
veracity. Li Feng-lin did however make the valid point that A.F.P.
acomed to find no dearth of Boviet or East European Bourooo willing to
supply newsworthy items on the Dino/Soviet Bituation. He advanced the
familiar (and probably corroct) theory that Soviet orricials choose as
deliberato policy to issue through soni-official channels items of
information/disinforzation designed to boost their "persistently
reasonable" image with the Western press. I pointed out that on the
evidence issued here a number of Western Journalists had concluded that
the semipalatinok incident had otortod with a Soviet attack. ile
dismissed this with the remark that the Ruosiana were not skilful enough
to mislond overy correspondent, but wont on to say that he took my
point: the Soviet posture was not invariably the same. Interestingly, he
aitod as an example of an item released by the Russians with
spinechilling intent the story of a possible Joviet pre-emptive strike
against nuclear installatione in 3inkiang. According to him, this was
first issued here, and then wrongly ascribed to the Americans. I
oountored by naking whether the theory that the nuclear installations
had alrendy boan removed to a safer distance from the frontier was not
similarly officially inspired in Peking. "Not at all", he said, "the
Indiane said it first, and I doubt if it's true",
3. Apart from this exchange, the only episodos worth noting were a short
conversation on Sino/Soviet trade and an interesting remark about Chou's
return from Hanoi, both of which we have already reported. I tried to
extract an explanation for the differenos
G. G. Hĩ. Walden Esq.,
PEKING.
RESTRICTED
between the two communiques on the Chou/Kosygin talks, but was told
repeatedly and firmly that, evidently, no communique had been agreed.
(The theory (Peking telegram No. 534) that the Chinese unilaterally
altered an agreed text, which seems to me very likely, was rejected out
of hand). My hosts claimod to have no information at all about the
content of the talks this could well be true, since the Embassy appeared
at the time of the C.P.C. Congress to be about a week behind the course
of events in China. Li Feng-lin did however say at one point that it
would be interesting to see the turn-out of official Soviet guests at
the Embassy on 1 October " since following Kosygin's visit the Russians
might choose to appear in greater strength. It will indeed be
interesting.
-
4. I leave Moscow shortly for Rawalpindi, (where I am enjoined to call
at once on the Chinese Mission,) but Li Peng-lin has twice checked that
contact will be maintained here. He is himself due to return to Peking
in Hay - he will have spent three years in Moscow without a break but
since it seems fairly clear, particularly in view of his remark reported
in paragraph 1, that a decision in favour of exchanges with us has been
taken, I imagine that they will outlast him. You might therefore wish to
consider whether there are any particular points which you would wish
Gerald Clark to raiso apart from the obvious Sino/Soviet questions
-
on which our conversations have ao far centred.
5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Christopher Wallaby in East
European and Soviet Department.
RESTRICTED
(J. 0. Kerr)
¡
1
|
¡
Reference
J.D.I. Boyd,
Faci
Far Eastern Department. the
22 OCT 1969
Pamato Fec 2513
Sino-Soviet Border Talks
Please refer to my minute of 21 October giving particulars of some of
the members of the Chinese delegation.
2.
NONA (English) gives the romanisation of the last named delegate as Wang
Chin-ching and not Wang Ching-ching as given in the World Broadcast
series. This suggests that this member is the former Second Secretary
from the Embassy in Moscow who was among the Chinese diplomatic
personnel who returned to China in February, 1967, after having been
injured in an "attack" on the Embassy.
3. I attach an additional copy of this minute for Peking.
(F. Brewer)
Far Eastern Section, Research Department.
23 October, 1969.
Copied to:-
I.R.D.
P.U.S.D. (Mr. Weston)
Mr. Orchard, Soviet Section, R.D. Mr. J.F. Ford.
97
(25714) (547)
Dear Boyd,
CONFIDUCIAL
R
R
- 8 OCT 1969
FEC 25/2
SA
16/00
ĥ sep
E BASSY
(96 поведта.
the
Mn 29/c 27 September, 1969.
Chinese Ambassador
padanio
Thank you for your letter FLC 25/3 of 18 August.
изтро
2. Mr. Hsieh duly called on the Ambassador on 21 August. Even the fairly
short delay since the presentation of his credentials was not entirely
of his making, since the Am- bassador had been away from Kabul for part
of the time.
3. Mr. Hsieh is a pleasant enough man with a vaguely scholarly air about
him which chimes in well with the short biography published in the local
newspaper from which para. 2 of my letter or 7 August was taken; the
extract from "Who's Who in Communist China" (Hong Kong 1966) which was
enclosed with Cynthia Stephenson's letter or 23 July
(PID 3/3) to Rundle, specifies further that his job at Shanghai
University was Commander and Political Commissar of the Militia
Division.
4. He stayed with the Ambassador for about 20 minutes during which, as
is usual in courtesy calls, nothing of great substance transpired; in
reply to a question, he said that there was now no movement over the
frontier in the Pamirs (part of the old Silk Route; but no wonder - the
passes are very high and difficult) and said he shared my Ambassador's
wish to get up into the Pamirs during his stay in Afghanistan. My
Ambassador in due course returned the call, and had a cup o' tea in a
wark inne, red, in the Chinese Embassy; on his expressing an acsienic
interst in the fhoughts of Kac Joc Tung, L. Hsieh usad ha would be gled
to Provide a copy in English am in fact sent over the next day two
well-produced books in impeccable English, one containing extracts from
the works and another, select- ed passages from speeches. Both were
printed at the Foreign Language Press in Peking in 1967.
mi
J..T. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
F.C.C.
L
T:
GUMMIKANATAL
1 -
1 T
5.
That is perhaps more interesting is that Ir. Hsieh has also paid a
courtesy call on the Indian Ambassauor. Mr. Mehta told my Ambassador
about this in some detail, seeming perhaps to read more into the
minutiae of dipló- matic politesse than they really warranted, but on
being told that Ir. Tehta had served in Chunking during the war, Mr.
Hsieh said that he very much hoped that "Mehta would be able to visit
the People's Republic to see what miraculous progress had been made
since the overthrow of the renegade (etc.) Chiang Kai Shek clique and,
rather more surprisingly, said thet for his puit he would very much like
at some unspecified time to pay a visit to Delhi.
6. In general, the Chinese Embassy scen to be moving back into the
normal diplomatic round, and have just issued handsome crested
invitations to their National Day on 1 October.
I am sending a cop of this letter to the Chancery at Peking.
Гото ей склаву,
Martin Ewans
(M.K. Evans)
+
COFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
I
25/3
Exten
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
RIGORY NO.30 12 SEP 1969
BRITISH EMBASSY.
STOCKHOLM.
5 September, 1969.
Ka 25/2
J
Dear
Wilson.
Pil24 10
72
On
With reference to my letter of 22 July last you may care to have a short
account of my return call on my Chinese colleague this morning. this
occasion I made a point of raising topics of political interest.
On Anglo-Chinese trade, which I said had doubled in the last year, the
Ambassador said that his Government welcomed trade on the basis of
equality and mutual advantage. In reply to my question, he confirmed
that by equality, he meant not a perfect balance but freedom from
discrimination.
On the Sino-Soviet conflict, I was given the propaganda line. I was
interested to see how the Ambassador smiled by way of emphasis whereas
his interpreter raised his voice. "The Soviet
revisionists and new Czars have invaded Chinese soil and are trying to
take it from us. soil and are trying
attacked, we will attack.
We have a slogan:
If
If the United States
Imperialists join them, we will fight them too.
'Down with the Soviet revisionists, down with the U.S. Imperialists'. If
they attack us, our people will rise as one man and attack them. Their
own people will attack them. They will hasten their doom."
At one point Wang Tung asked me what my Swedish friends, including my
Swedish official friends, thought of the conflict. I replied that I
assumed that he had the same sources of information as I had and, when
pressed, I said that the Swedish people disliked war though they would
fight if attacked. (I obviously could not tell him that we had discussed
the Sino-Soviet conflict with the Swedes at the time of the Prime
Minister's visit.) My personal view, since the Ambassador had asked for
it, was that the
/Great Powers
C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.7.1.
2
COFIDENTIAL
195
CONFIDENTIAL
Great Powers were determined that it should not come to war between
them.
On Soviet talk of a security system in South- Fast Asia, Wang Tung said
that the Russians (his interpreter said Russians first and then added
Soviet revisionists) had learnt their ideas from the United States. They
were building a system of military pacts to encircle China. I remarked
that I knew little about Soviet ideas on the subject but that I thought
they were not necessarily thinking of military pacts but perhaps rather
of what, for wa nt of a better word, I call a co-prosperity scheme. As I
expected, this provoked a reminder that the Japanese had committed
aggression on China in the name of co-prosperity; that Hitler had called
his conquests the New Order; that the Russians had justified their
occupation of Czechoslovakia by reference to the Socialist Commonwealth;
and finally that the United States Imperialists had proclaimed what they
called the Free Community (sic).
To conclude Wang Tung gave me a short lecture on the iniquities of the
Russians and the Americans whom he described as simultaneously
conspiring and competing with each other. He drew my attention to our
withdrawal from East of Suez and to the creation there of a vacuum which
the Russians and the Americans were racing to fill. The two villains
were also cooperating in India.
At one point the Ambassador remarked that the Finns were about to
acquire a muclear power plant from the Russians. I said that, according
to my information, there had been a call for tenders and that among
others the British had put in a bid. The contract was however given to
the Russians. It was anybody's guess when the plant would actually be
built. Wang Tung did not pursue the point.
talk.
I suppose that all this is normal Chinese small Wang Tung and his
Defence Attaché are now
/being seen
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
being seen at diplomatic parties and I have no doubt that I shall bump
into them again. I do not propose to report future conversations,
however, unless you tell me that even the repetition of slogans, which I
assume you hear on all hands, is of interest.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Peking.
Yours
мая,
hom Loss
CONFIDENTIAL
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|
I
Fr. Wilso
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FEC 25/3 (94).
Reference.
u.
ро
uri
We have very little information to add to what we provided for Peking in
June this year as you will see from the following.
2.
Wang Tung
Wife believed to be named Liu Feng.
1954-8: First Secretary, Tirana.
1959-62(7) Chargé a.i. Tirana.
1964:
1966:
Counsellor, Bucharest.
Chargé a.i. Bucharest,
In March, 1964 he accompanied a Rumanian CP Central Committee delegation
on its visit to China.
Our post in Bucharest observed in February, 1967, that Wang had quickly
established a reputation for being more disagreeable and pugnacious even
than
his predecessor. He spoke no Western language.
We shall be pleased to provide for Embassies biographical information on
Ambassadors as the need arises.
Brewer.
(F.Brewer)
Far Eastern Section, Research Department.
25 September, 1969.
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94.
YED INgrice of the British Charge
SY No.50
SEP 1969
旨
KEL 257/3
d'affaires,
Peking.
1 September, 1969.
Russons?
Dear John,
In Sir Archibald Ross's letter 25/3 of 22 July to Colin Wilson he
pointed out that the Embassy in Stockholm had not received any
biographical information about Wang Tung, the new Chinese ambassador to
Sweden.
2. We are hoping that you will have responded to this, since we have no
information on ang over and above what you gave us in your letter JEG
25/3 of 19 June, (1.e.) that prior to his last appointment as Counsellor
and Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest he had acted as Chargé d'Affaires in
Tierana.
5. We should be grateful if you coula undertake to provide biographical
information in other cases as well; we plead our usual excuse of no
records.
4.
I am copying this letter to Chancery, Stockholm.
Your ever
K. Ll. Davies
J. D. I. Boyd,
.D.,
F.C.0.
Mr.
Portup you
could help
пр. вани разрешил в де
half Va. And a bite for care in your
This findes
cay
stina
Yung.
to Sei Bordenbald Ross.
вари
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