detail the contents of earlier correspondence on the subject
since a wide measure of agreement has been reached by those
concerned on the purpose of the unit and the size of its
establishment.
2. When I mentioned this question to you recently you seemed
somewhat sceptical about its usefulness and you may care
therefore to read in addition my minute of 9 September
to Personnel Department and related correspondence.
3. I attach a letter from you to Sir Leslie Konson.
Hong Kong Department concur.
but we build qu
a dir
stage!
40.17/1
podpatric
Mi tvilso
We spoke insouth you
spoted/acouts
object to my additi
SECRET
Atomy. Mr"/>
itsoz
(C. Wilson)
16 October, 1969.
י
SOHYIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET
1
Fing
Flag 1
å
Mr. Filford
3ir Leslie Konson
Sir Leslie Mossomis visit to Hong Kong
October, 1969: Extern.' Affairs
Sir Leslie may care to look at the attached background
papers on developments in China and the Sino-Soviet dispute
on which he will no doubt be expected to express views when
he visits Hong Kong. The papers attached are the briefs
which were prepared for our consultations on China with the
Americans in Washington.
The only new development in the
Bino-Soviet dispute has bean the Chinese agrement to begin
talks with the Russians on the border problem as foreshadowed
in
în paragraph à of ear spesking notes.
2. As regards Sino-British-Hong Kong relations the
position remains as set out in our savingram No. 2 of
22 August. Then the dust has settled on the Grey case and
Chinese intentions become clearer towards the twelve British
subjects still detained in Chins and towards the remaining
'confrontation' prisoners in Hong Kong we shall be reviewing
our tacties. This is a subject which will be discussed with
the Governer of Hong Kong when he is in London. A particular
concern of the Hong Kong Jovernment is the possibility that
the Chinese will now bring pressure to bear on us to release
the Chinese prisoners and Sir Leslie will no doubt hear a
great deal about this when he is in Hong Kong. He night
therefore care to refresh his memory on the pros and cons
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRIT
/ of the
19
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SEORET
of the argument as set out in Er. Murray's submission
of 21 August.
3. I hope to submit a separate brief on the problem of
appointing a China-watcher in Hong Kong about which
Kr. Hurray has already had preliminary discussions with
Sir Leslie. Te are awaiting Personnel Department's
approval in principle for the establishment of a post.
Copy to: Hong Kong Dept.
(C. Filson)
10 October, 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING 3FORET
see flas
же
is Cradock's
し
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference. FBC 13/13
Copied: IEM 2/1/Hong Kong
XEM2/1/ Peking.
China watching in Hong Kong
8.
Although there is a sible station in Tokyo with a close interest in the
subject, several British Agencies (including I.R.D. and the J.S.I.S.)
already devote staff to it in Hong Kong, and we trade information with
the Americans and others, I think we should accept the requirement for a
First Secretary post at Grade 5 level, as proposed in Mr. Wilson's
minute of 9 September.
2.
As I read the papers, the job would be one of political reporting and
the incumbent,would be required to liaise with the other parties in Hong
Kongo cover the subject, sash from their own standpoint.
3.
These papers speak of a First Secretary with "supporting staff", I can
see no real need for the supporting staff to amount to more than a
U.K.-based P.A. I think we should require "our" man to take advantage of
his co-China watchers clerical staff to the extent that this may be
necessary (and, indeed, possible).
4. Mr. Wilson mentions bas-fast that our Paking Mission's main sources
of information have virtually disappeared during the last kissä ylikas
in justification for a new post in Hong Kong Although writing from
Peking on 31 December, 1968, Mr. Cradock
argued that the task in Hong Kong should be regarded as "complementary"
to that performed in Peking, and said he could not accept the argument
that the Hong Kong post could only be provided at the expense of a
matching reduction, In view of Mr. Wilson's remarks in paragraph 3 of
his minute, I think we should nonetheless press for some form of
compensating saving from Peking.
5.
Apart from the Chargé d'Affaires, so far as I am amaze the only staff
concentrating on political work are the First Secretary and Head of
Chancery (Grade 5A) and an R.A.2 Officer of Second Secretary rank, I
would suggest that this should be the post to be given up in emhange for
a new post at Grade 5A and 32/3 level)in Hong Kong.
6. Sir L. Monson proposes to discuss this question with the Governor of
Hong Kong in mid-October. If this discussions lead to a solution of the
problem of where to house the new officer, I propose that we should then
lobe no time in approaching Paking about some form of compensating
saving. On the basis of Mr. Wilson'a minute, there would presumably be
no difficulty in enlisting support from the Far Eastern Department,
I
S.R Cowhi
(J.R. COWLING) 22 September, 1969.
Mr Igray (Personnel Operations dear)
You will see mort Mr Day
مل کیا عام
received a way 1 is Wiles minuti
CONFIDENTIAL
below abouer a new pour in Hong Kong.
is Joes Peronel Ofis have
which
muger
viens
be woven into the
No Corling
une proferied by with which I agree?
2.
above
I suspeurs mar there cancered
with this discussion
wy
already
have someone in mind for this wed job - Hang Kang, un no Resear Pffins
in Peking
ров
بين
candidate pann
سهام
3. Are our
long
likel
متقدم عنهم
1
tearing of having
a muffarcis aandre f
سقف المحسن
Clivere
Speaker and our short tem
diffettive of placing
luisre
speakers in port where they
Chinare very
spank
17 60 - то
much in complies?
can understand they
many be- cand we not a lead consider a slight slippa
حمد
so
to speak in the Chinese language programme, so we don's have to mind of
having no jobs for Chinese speaker/ for still keep up
and stock of chinese
for Ras speakers well amough for
in
(.r. Widdon (F.E. Deft?
We spoke abat
iscursur
I did make
I can
(o Ime
you
long
Reliure 24/9
Dr. Day 262, Baray.
& Danfumus whe
series of pist, Acamshaka
your deft) I with Sofd to talk to
vxtreming
:
I
When Making Master
1 Carly 24 il love
(c) Cuverall in
Pekning?
2 ig I frems the
ku. Fughers
१
speaker?!
tro
་
Please Concent a
rfly with op
Ops.
пред
17
I thin hai is
is right
go along
witer tingeneve idea
which a sensith one.
of
The establishment prestand
фрейто
wise ther
Loween easure
grading, Casu. J
fac
G
And
alas hu
If en canavi
7.5. Apar
Прог
(ana oro auging lain to)
Offe
ん
Lesians case might венал
br +
кори
9
Reference.
Ir-r---------
-.---- . - -‒‒‒‒L.
+
Mr. F. Mills (Personnel (Policy) Department)
(17
i
:
China-watching in Hong Kong
I attach correspondence with Hong Kong and Peking about the possibility
of improving our China-watching activities in Hong Kong. We had hoped to
have cleared our lines with those concerned before putting a proposal to
you but we have run into some problems over the location of a
China-watching unit in Hong Kong. As it seems unlikely that these can be
resolved at the level of Political Adviser in Hong Kong, Sir Leslie
Konson has agreed to take up the question with the governor of Hong Kong
when he visits the colony in October. However, before he does so we
should like to have your approval in principle for the proposal.
2.
There is perhaps no need for me here to argue in : detail the importance
which we attach to obtaining accurate information on developments within
China. Our position in Hong Kong and our other interests in the area
require that we should be capable of
į producing forecasts of political trends inside China.
China-watching will therefore continue to be an important activity in
our diplomatic work.
3. But during the last twelve months, with the phasing out of the
Cultural Revolution, our ability to gather information inside China has
considerably diminished, Supplies of Red Guard posters and broad-
sheets, the Chinese ban on the sale of provincial newspapers to
foreigners, have meant that our Mission's main sources of information
during the last three years have now disappeared. The Mission's
principal sources of information are two or three permitted newspapers
and journals and the exchange of information with other foreign
colleagues in Peking who, of course, are in a similar position. The
position has in fact got worse since this corres- pondence was initiated
some nine months ago and it is unlikely to improve in the short term.
This strengthens the argument for looking elsewhere for additional
information on China.
4. Hong Kong is clearly the best available source, although a case could
possibly be made out for Tokyo The fact that many governments, of which
the United States is the beat example, have chosen Hong Kong as their
China-watching centre is evidence of this. In addition Hong Kong is the
centre for a good deal of private research on developments in China and
the international press corps is largely composed of China specialists.
Our own effort, however, is very fragmented. IRD have an office there
but its main concern is to produce locally information material for use
by the press and to distribute IRD's own China output. The Ministry of
Defence have an intelligence gathering organisation, J819, concerned
largely with the interrogation of refugees from the mainland. Although
the Political Adviser's Office may well have had a China-watching brief
at one time, it is now fully occupied with the political problems of
Chinese-Hong Kong-British relations and it could not
/be expected
Flag A
Flag
Floge
Floyd.
Flog tå
I be expected to take on additional work.
|
5. It was these considerations which prompted Mr. Maddocks, the
Political Adviser, in his letter of 2 December to propose making more
use of Hong Kong's unique situation for collecting information on China.
Departments in Whitehall considered his proposals and in paragraphs 5
and 6 of his letter of 29 January Mr. Murray examined in detail the
nature of the problem and the possible terms of reference of a
China-watching unit in Hong Kong, Both Feking and Hong Kong have
subsequently agreed with this analysis of the problem.
6. As regards the size of a China-watching unit the Political Adviser
recommended in his original letter a fairly large establishment of three
or four officers. We are of the opinion that an officer of First
Secretary rank with supporting staff would be capable of handling the
material in the first instance. However, I understand that officers of
Grade 5A are in short supply. Provided therefore that the officer was a
Chinese speaker, with previous experience of China- watching, I can see
no objection to either a Second Secretary or an officer of more senior
rank filling the slot.
7.
For the moment we have been unable to agree with Mr. Maddocks the
location of a China-watcher in the Hong Kong set-up. For various reasons
we ruled out the Regional Information Office and the Trade Office (see
paragraph 8 of Murray's letter of 29 January and his letter of 14 May to
Haddocks). In the event we felt that the Political Adviser's Office
would be most suitable and suggested a stratagem that we thought would
satisfy Hong Kong susceptibilities on the employment of UK Government
officials. Mr. Haddocks has now replied that his colleagues in the Hong
Kong Government are unhappy about our proposal. His reasons are set out
in his letter of 27 May. In general we do not find his objections very
convincing. But clearly we have taken the correspondence as far as we
can at this level and if we wish to pursue it further our proposals must
be put direct to the Governor.
8. In this Department's submission of 30 July, 1968 on, the future of
our Mission in Peking the question of our China-watching capability was
touched upon.
It was suggested that the Political Adviser's Office in Hong Kong might
well be the most suitable place from which to view Chinese affairs. We
also drew attention to the importance of finding useful employment for
the FCO cadre of Chinese speakers and it was our impression that
Personnel Department was conscious of this problem and would be
sympathetic to any proposals which we might make, on this question. The
importance of this subject was endorsed in subsequent minuting on the
submission. I realise that we are now under great pressure to economise
and that any proposal to create an additional slot must be looked at
with particular care. Nevertheless, China, according to Duncan, is to be
regarded as an area of special effort and we need to keep a careful
watch on our information gathering arrangements to see that we are
making the most of our opportunities.
19.
|
¡
:
I
|
·
Copy to:
Mr. Day
(Personnel Operations Department)
L
I
I
Reference...
¡
9. In short, there is a requirement for a China- watching officer in
Hong Kong. We believe that the job could be done by a Chinese-speaking
officer of First Secretary rank. I should be grateful to have your views
and those of Kr. Day, to whom I am sending a copy of this minute.
bifrom
(C. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department
9 September, 1969
16
-
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Murray
China-Watching in Hong Kong
We spoke yesterday about Mr. Carter's minute of the 1st August of which
you had already had a copy.
2. I told you that I would, if it was so desired, be ready to raise this
matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker who will be administering the
government of Hong Kong during the Governor's absence on leave at the
time I have in mind to visit the Colony, viz, about 15th October. I
would not however propose to write to Sir Hugh in advance of my visit.
3. I understood this would be acceptable to you. In that event I would
be grateful if nearer the time of my departure I could have some
speaking notes on the basis of which I could talk to the O.A.G.
wow?
(L. Monson)
5th August, 1969
In the interval Į Mink that
Gre
shanke my to
obtain the preliminary approval of the administratio
departments for
forpeal.
Jul & As
Mr Wils
۹۴
CONFIDENTIAL
4/5
Sir L. Monson
CONFIDENTIAL
15
China-Watching in Hong Kong
As I understand this correspondence, Hong Kong has raised
two principle objections to our proposal :-
(a) Lack of accommodation. This is valid for the present,
(b)
but as Mr. Maddocks says at (14) it could probably be
overcome when new Government offices are completed towards
the end of the year.
It would lend fuel to local suspicions (e.g. among
unofficials on the Councils) that the Political Adviser
is working for the U.K. rather than for Hong Kong. This
would seem to be what is meant by the passage at (8)
which reads:
it would be a disadvantage, and
possibly some embarrassment, to be responsible, even
theoretically, for an officer working for the U.K.
Government."
The point is made with greater clarity in
the sidelined passage of paragraph 2 at (14). That
these suspicions exist in a Colony that has throughout
its history been touchy about U.K. intervention in local
administration has to be taken into account however
unreasonable they may be. A practical consideration is
that if these suspicions gained ground unofficials on the
Standing Finance Committee might be disposed to query
Hong Kong's responsibility for meeting the entire cost of
the Political Adviser's office. For the same reason it
would not be wise tazas to make much play of the argument
that, because of the constitutional position, there must be
U.K. participation in the conduct of Hong Kong's external
relations.
CONFIDENTIAL
/ 2.
CONFIDENTIAL
2. I might add that I think there is also an element of some general
distaste (even unease) that there should be within the Hong Kong
Government machine an officer working for another
government over whose activities neither senior Hong Kong officials
nor the Governor would have any control. We would, I am sure, encounter
the same feeling in this office if I were to ask, for
example, on Hong Kong's behalf, whether they could post one of their
officers to this department to oversee the affairs of the Hong Kong
Chinese community in the U.K., with access to relevant papers held by
this department and possibly Migration and Visa department. The first
reaction would be to question why such an officer could not be
accommodated within the Hong Kong Government Office;
would be expressions of urease on security and other grounds.
would rate my chances of getting agreement on this at much less
than 50: 50. And if the outcome were successful I have no doubt there
would be restrictions such as (we have been sharply reminded) are
apparently imposed on the Hong Kong man in Brussela.
there
I
3. I am sorry now that I suggested using the comparison with Hong Kong
appointments in Brussels, Washington and Geneva. I still
think it is a valid point. But I am afraid we have opened
-
ourselves up to the barbed rejoinder about the "arms length" treatment
of the Hong Kong representative in Brussels see paragraph 4 at (14). I
had heard reports about this, but it is only in the last week that
I had confirmation in a letter from the Brussels Embassy that this
attitude has been taken up as a matter of "deliberate policy".
I think this is a pity;
U.K. officers representing Hong Kong in Geneva and Washington and of the
Hong Kong officer in Brussels must be a little hurtful. I do
the contrast between the treatment of the
not know whether there is anything we can do about it.
14.
4..
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
40 I still hold to the view that our proposal should be put
direct to the Governor at a reasonably high level, despite
Mr. Maddocks' expectation that the Governor would be even less
likely to look favourably upon it. If the crux of the matter is
the effect our proposal would have on the Political Adviser's
position, we should I think have the Governor's own assessment of
this and of his chances of being able to handle any criticism or
side-effects the appointment might give rise to among his unofficial
advisers. Whether the approach is made now by letter or can wait
until you visit the Colony in October must depend to some extent
on the urgency of the proposed appointment.
It could be a
combination of both, if you were to write to the Governor now in
fairly brief terms concluding that this is one of the matters you
would like to discuss during your visit. On the whole I am
inclined to favour this course. Unless Sir David Trench has quite
firmly made up his mind (which I doubt in this case), my own
experience is that you will find his much more ready to be persuaded
in discussion that on paper.
5. It seems to me that, subject to the views of Far Eastern and
other interested departments, there is one carrot we could dangle
namely, that this officer would be available (at a pinch and by
agreement) to help out in an awkward staffing situation in the
Political Adviser's office, such as we have now made provision to
meet next year. Both Mr. Maddocks and Mr. McLaren (his deputy)
are due to follow each other on leave next year,
lengthy period with only one officer en poste.
that an officer who is due to go to a S.E. Asia post later in the
year should fill the gap in Hong Kong for part of the time before
taking up his other appointment, Hong Kong paying salary,
This means a
It has been agreed
It may not always be
allowances and outward passage costs.
CON
TIAL
/ possible
CONFIDENTIAL
possible to make such arrangements.
If the China-watcher coulä
occasionally fill a shortish gap, it might be represented to Hong
Kong that they would have a relief on the spot and that there should
be economies in expenditure as a result.
1 August, 1969
b. 5. Carter
сал
(W. 8. Carter)
Hong Kong Department
Copy to:
Mr.Murray
CONFIDENTIAL
Sur A. Galsworthy.
24/5
I sla velume an
opportunity to discuss
"China. watching" in Hung
King with you, and wanke
be most grateful if you
could look fust at foluis
12
Sin Leslie
14
Jan Uunny.
26 June
Sin Arthen saia perhaps for would kindly tube
this on now.
b85
·24/7.
C8. 41A
24,900-4/65-147951
CONFIDENTIAL
1:2 1
RGI
REF.SCR 2/4841/69
- 6 JUN 1969
Dear Jank
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
27 May, 1969.
I
раброе
FEC 1215 face para 2 sawasted oddel
Fastime it with Sur A. Gulwulling from leave.
Thank you for your letter FEC 13/13 of 14 May
about China Watching in Hong Kong.
2.
80. 18/
I have not consulted the Governor but I have taken the opinion of
Geoffrey Hamilton, Mike Clinton and Alastair Todd on the suggestion that
the China Watcher should be part of my office. All three dislike the
suggestion.
Their reasons are those set out in paragraph 4 of my letter of 11 March.
The administrative problems could no doubt be overcome, especially when
a new Government building is completed here towards the end & of this
year, but the other objection would remain. The heart
of the matter is that the Political Adviser, who comes here for a
relatively short time after several years in the Diplomatic Service, is
bound to be something of an odd man out in the Government Service here.
Anything which emphasises the difference between him and other officers
of the Hong Kong Government is to be avoided. The appointment under him
of a Diplomatic Service officer who would be working only for London
clearly falls into that category. The Hong Kong Government does not feel
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.