fco-21-490-detention-of-anthony-grey — Page 7

National Archives 英國國家檔案館 All

would be possible to extend the offer to read 'release to China or
Macao': he felt that the prisoners vould be more likely to accept such a
proposition as they were in the main

I said thought to be most reluctant to agree to go to China. that
personally I could see no objection to this but that I would check with
H.E. as soon as practicable. I said, however, that in

I said that

these circumstances we would, of course, expect the communists to
arrange for the Macao Government to say that they would be prepared to
accept the newsworkers. Jay also asked whether it was really necessary
for the newsworkers to sign a formal statement be request that they
wished to be released to Macao or China. there vas room to manoeuvre on
this particular point but that undoubtedly H.E. would require some firm
indication that this was indeed the wish of the prisoners: for example,
it might prove acceptable if the prisoners vere to make such a statement
orally in front of, say, à prison officer and one other witness.

10.

Jay, for some reason or other which even now is not clear to me, thought
that this extension of our proposal might find acceptance with the
Chinese. Accordingly I said that I would seek H.E.'s approval of the two
points made above and I agreed to see Jay next day at 11.30 a.m.

11.

As you are avare, I cleared the points concerning release to Macao and
the question of signature on prisoners' statements with H.E. during the
morning of Saturday, 22nd February.

12.

I sav Jay again at 11.30 a.m. on 22nd February. expressed great pleasure
when I told him that he could proceed along the lines discussed the day
before.

/contd..

SECRET SECRET

III.

C.S. 41C

2600079

30,000-1/67-152117

No.

Top SECRET

ор

108

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,

LOWER ALBERT ROAD,

HONG KONG.

117

hr. Wilson Mr. harayor.

Reference Hong Kong telegram

No. 138 of 11th February, 1969.

(372

RECEN ARGI!

18FLB00J

J. Murray, Esq., CMG, Far Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, LONDON, S.W.1.

Кас

beli

Tor SECRET

SECRET

13.

At the request of H.E. I also once again made it quite clear to Jay that
neither the H.K.G. nor H.E. could accede to "demands": if the Chinese
were looking for a "kow-tov", then they were going to be disappointed.
If on the other hand they had something reasonable to propose, then we
should be pleased to consider and if possible negotiate.

14.

I informed Jay that it was my impression that clearly there was a great
deal of pressure on the part of the Chinese For an early settlement: I
wondered why the 11 newsworkers had become so important to Peking, and
why was it that suddenly there was a sense of urgency. Jay gave his
opinion that the 11 newsworkers themselves vere inmaterial so far as
Peking was concerned, but that Peking was looking for a "settlement" and
that it seemed to them that this question of the release of the 11
newsworkers was the best final and full solution. He thought that timing
was probably important at the moment as at this particular time CHOU En
Lai vas known to be very strong in Peking: that, in the way that things
often occurred in Peking, this need not be the case say in a few months'
time when somebody else could be moved into a position of authority. In
particular it was the hope of the Peking Government to hold a People's
Congress in May: whilst it was possible that CHOU might improve his
position still further, there remained the possibility that his strength
would be less.

15.

Jay then commented that, in discussion with LI Cho-chih, LI had said
that "somebody" had said to him that the British tactics would be to
wait until September when 10 of the newsworkers were due for release and
then attempt to try a one-for-one swop with Peking: such action,
according to LI, would definitely not be acceptable indeed, LI referred
to such tactics as being "child's play".

16.

I enquired of Jay whether he had any information concerning the
conditions in which Anthony Grey was being kept: he said that he had a
definite impression from what had been said in recent communications
with Peking that Grey's conditions had been much improved since Cradock
sav him last November.

17.

Jay was particularly anxious to make one point with me: he said that he
and one or two "reasonable people" had been for some time trying to
persuade Peking that they would get nowhere with violence if local
communists were well behaved and reasonable things would improve. It was
Peking's view that already they had done a great deal to quieten down
the situation (for example, no violence, the Ta Kung Pao had been
brought under control, there was no political trouble from the trade
unions and Peking had continued to pay strike pay in order to ensure no
trouble, etc.). In spite of this, Peking felt that there had been no
tangible result so far as they were concerned (I immediately refuted
this and, as I had done on several occasions recently, pointed to the
very substantial concessions which the H.K.G. had made, but Jay pointed
out that he CHOU was was merely repeating Peking's opinion and not his
own). now anxious to show the more militant people in Peking that by
being reasonable he could "get results": he would want "something" to
show his political critics.

24th February, 1969

c.c.

D.S.B.

H./A.R.G. E.S.S.

(J. Cater)

SECRET

Political Adviser

SECRET

Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned yesterday afternoon asking for a discussion -
"not urgent" : accordingly I arranged to see him at 11.30 a.m. this
morning.

Jay said that he had now received a reply from the Prime whilst
Minister's office concerning our proposal of 27th January: substantially
the same as that given through LI Cho-chih, neverthe- less it was much
"softer" in tone and, Jay thought, more hopeful. The message read:-

*Suggestion made is very difficult to implement at this

moment: therefore it does not find favour with us. Try to explain
pleasantly to the other side the position. Although we have decided to
improve our relationship, to try to put into effect something now which
is not workable would only have the reverse effect. In trying to explain
the position nicely, be careful not to lose your integrity or demean
yourself."

(10%)

Jay said that he had seen LI again since receiving this message from
Peking and that on this occasion LI had passed a comment on the whole
situation which had caused Jay to "ponder deeply". LI allegedly said
that it was his view that, if this proposal had been made in response to
the "approach" in early November, it would have been acceptable to
Peking. Clearly, said Jay, something happened between then and the
present time to change the Chinese thinking on this subject: on
reflection, he felt that it was probably the statement made in London by
HSIANG of the Chinese Mission: as indicated before (please see my report
of 11th December, 71968) this statement by HSIANG was allegedly purely
personal and

unauthorised.

Jay said that already he had passed back through LI the H.K.G. comment
on the Peking reply that the H.K.G. would be pleased to consider ways
and means of overcoming the Chinese difficulties if they would care to
put forward proposals. The question of suggesting that the H.K.G. would
facilitate, for example, contact with the nevsvorkers in order to
ascertain their views on "release to China" should, in Jay's view, be
left a day or two longer before being put forward as his own idea. Jay
said that he had reported to Peking that he had met Denson, whom he
found to be a charming

He had not so far person who undoubtedly would try and be helpful.
suggested that Peking might care to make a gesture of good will (for
example by way of, say, releasing Anthony Grey) but would consider doing
this later when Denson goes to Peking.

I asked whether Jay had any further information concerning Grey's living
conditions: he said that he had no specific information that Grey's
conditions had been improved but, from the tone of correspondence and
indirect references to Grey, he was convinced that there had been an
improvement in conditions since Cradock's last visit to Grey.

Referring back to our previous conversation on the Bank of China
personnel, Jay said that three had definitely been dismissed but that he
now understood that dismissal action was now contemplated only in the
case of two more employees. Again he promised to obtain for me the names
of these employees.

/contd....

Top

SECRET

As I was leaving his office Jay asked whether I had any further news for
him about a possible offer by the H.K.G. for the South China Iron Works
land at Tsuen Wan:

I apologised please see my report of 21st December, 1968.

for the delay in handling this matter. I said that this vas a complex
problem but that I hoped to have a firm reply for him in the not too
distant future.

12th February, 1969.

c.c.

D.S.B. H./A.R.G.

E.S.S.

ме

(J. Cater)

TOP SECRET

T3x 89

Date:

WONG

KONG GOVERNMENT

SECRET SECRET

Political Adviser

SECRET

(106

had

I telephoned K.C. Jay at lunch time yesterday and made arrangements to
see him at 2.30 p.m.

I stated my wish to clarify the telephone discussion hich I had/with Jay
the previous evening and, in particular, the point made about the price
for Grey and alternative possibilities. It was as vell that I sought
this clarification, for it is now quite certain that there was a
misunderstanding on my part. Expanding on the cryptic message passed the
night before, Jay said that in the reply from Peking through LI, the
comment was made that the proposition now made by the H.K.G. posed very
serious diffi- culties for the Chinese Government and indeed so far as
they were concerned"it was worse than just letting Grey go without any
price being paid! A further,minor,misunderstanding was also cleared up
at this meeting: the previous evening Jay had led me to believe

this point that he had spoken to LI after my meeting with him (Jay)
cropped up during general discussion and Jay apologised for apparently
misleading me: what he had intended to convey was that the three points
had in fact been mentioned to him by LI at their· meeting on the morning
of the previous day but that Jay had "forgotten" to mention them to me
the previous afternoon.

I said that the Peking decision had been carefully · considered by H.E.
the Governor who fully appreciated the difficulties which Peking
undoubtedly faced. For his part, H.E. would be pleased to assist Peking
in overcoming difficulties facing them in this matter. We vere avare, of
course, from Jay's confidential and personal comments of the real
reasons "behind Peking's refusal. We were, however, reasonably
intelligent people and no doubt would have been able in any event to
have guessed fairly accurately these reasons. In the circumstances we
would like Jay to put to Peking the suggestion that we would facilitate
a Chinese approach to the newsworkers in order to ascertain whether or
not they wished to be "released to China". We would guarantee If this
that there would be no publicity of facilities so given. vere agreed and
the Peking fears were not realised, then presumably

On the other the proposal for the release of Grey could proceed. hand,
however, if Peking's fears vere in fact realised and some of the
newsworkers refused to co-operate, we should nevertheless consider that
the H.K.G. had carried out its side of the bargain and would expect
Peking to be prepared to do something about Grey.

Alternatively, and bearing in mind the understanding that in any event
Peking would like to have the nevsvorkers back in China for "study",
perhaps the possibility of deportation should be reconsidered: whilst
from the H.K.G. point of view the act of deportation would have to be
formal, nevertheless it could be kept quiet and point of departure of
the newsworkers could be at the choice of Peking: For example, through
Lo Wu at night time, via a Rari River boat or even to Macau on the
assumption that the Macau Government could be persuaded by the Chinese
to receive these people. I made the point, however, that eventually of
course the fact of deportation would become known.

/contd...

SECRET

2 -

SECRET

If the above were unacceptable to Peking we should aksa be prepared to
consider any other alternative which Jay or Peking cared to recommend in
order to overcome the Chinese difficulties.

If indeed it was thought easier to release Grey "with- But price" then
clearly we should be pleased, but I warned that in these circumstances
the Chinese should not expect anything dramatic in return. I suggested
to Jay that if indeed they were looking for an excuse to release Grey,
an excellent reason would soon present itself in the form of Mr. John
Denson: perhaps as a gesture of good will the Peking Government may wish
to consider releasing Grey on Denson's appointment as Charge d'Affaires
"a clean slate", etc., etc.

Jay said that he doubted whether the Peking Government would be pleased
to receive direct comments such as this from the H.K.G. as Peking was
particularly anxious and sensitive about any

In the doubt that their supporters vere other than 100% loyal.
circumstances he felt it desirable that he should say officially that
the H.K.G. appreciated the difficulties which Peking faced in this
matter but nevertheless would be pleased to assist in

He then overcoming these difficulties if this vere possible. personally
would go on to make suggestions concerning contact with prisoners and so
forth. As for the possibility of releasing Grey as a "gesture of good
will" on the appointment of Denson to Peking, Jay thought that this was
a proposal which he should properly make directly to Peking on his own
initiative rather than through the LI channel. Talking of the question
of loyalty Jay said that in a recent conversation LI had indicated that,
for the first time since 1950,,it had become necessary to dismiss three
employees of the Bank of China: according to Jay because of "disloyalty"
Jay promised to obtain the names of these three men for me. In addition,
there were another three Bank of China workers who were about to be
dismissed. Another problem facing the Chinese on the question of the
nevsworkers, according to Jay, was that "behind closed doors" the trade
union groups in Hong Kong had been very critical of the N.C.N.A. and
Peking Government decision to seek only the release of the 11
nevsvorkers for Grey. In many ways, Jay said, Peking's position is
impossible. At the present time they were able to argue that, by
continuing to hold Grey as hostage, they were speaking from a position
of strength and attempting to force the H.K.G. to accept terms dictated
by them in settlement of the Grey case: there was deadlock there was
little positive ason for trade union groups and others to claim that
their interests had been overlooked. Once negotiations had been
completed, however, and Grey released, thd door would be open for the
trade union groups to argue and complain. Partly because of this, Peking
had agreed that strike

It was Jay's pay should continue to be paid to "strikers" opinion that,
even if the H.K.G. had agreed to release the news- workers in the
Colony, Peking could not guarantee to persuade them to go to China,
although they were anxious to "study" them.

whilst

In all this, and in spite of the true reasons, it was Jay's opinion that
Peking would continue to oppose release to China of the nevsvorkers,
using the simple excuse that they could not countenance such a
deprivation of rights: i.e. the right of any Chinese to stay in Hong
Kong.

SECRET

/contd..

SECRE

SECRET

I asked Jay whether he had any news of Johnston. He merely repeated what
he had said on two or three occasions in the past: that the Johnston
case was a particularly difficult one and that he felt Johnston had been
far from

that he had become "too friendly" vise in his activities: with a Bank of
China official in Shanghai and had been over- energetic in seeking
information about the "Financial situation" Jay said that he would
mention the Johnston case when next he had good reason for so doing in a
communication to Peking, but that he felt that the circumstances were
such that he could not

He indicated that, in the do this with any great enthusiasm,

past when he had asked questions about Johnston, he had been "warned
off" and that recently he had been given the reason for such varning -
that the Johnston case was in the hands of the

according to Jay, this indicated a very "security forces":

Jay was critical of the attitude adopted serious situation. by the
Chartered Bank, and in particular the attitude of the Jay felt that the
Mr. George Pullen: Chairman of the Bank, Chartered Bank attitude was far
too soft and that they gave the

It was Chinese the impression of being over-anxious to please. Jay's
opinion that the Chartered Bank had little to lose in this matter and
might well gain if they were to take a rather tougher line.

8th February, 1969.

ме

(J. Cater)

c.c.

D.S.B. H./A.R.G. E.S.S.

OP SECRET No Ex 88

GOVERNM

KONG GOVE

SECRET

SECFE

HONG

}

Political Adviser

SECRET

Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned early yesterday (6th February} asking for "an
urgent interview"; accordingly I arranged to see him at his office at
3.45 p.m. but warned that as I had a previous engagement I would have to
leave him by 4.30 p.m. at the latest.

Jay vas in a much more relaxed and confident mood than he had been the
day before: indeed he started our discussion off by saying that he felt
very much better and had been "rather depressed" the day before.

In the light of our discussion of the previous evening (5th February)
Jay said that he had given a great deal of thought and consideration to
the whole situation and was determined to clarify matters. Accordingly
at 8.20 a.m. (Jay said that by arrangement with LI Cho-chih they
telephoned each other at this time if there were something important to
be discussed) Jay says that in a rather cold, off-hand manner he invited
LI to his house at 9 a.m. for an important discussion". Rather to Jay's
surprise LI vas anxious to oblige but said because of other urgent
affairs he could only reach Jay by about 9.20 a.m. (Jay's comment on
this was: "I knew he had nothing important on, obviously he wished to
finish his breakfast").

Jay says that the discussion with LI was lengthy and very friendly. The
first point discussed was my report that FEI Yi-ming was attempting to
open up a new channel into the H.K.G. According to Jay, LI made some
pretty hard-hitting comments about FEI and his character: allegedly LI
said that if the information had not come through this channel he would
have serious doubts about its accuracy. FEI was already in a great deal
of trouble with Peking and if it were established that he was indeed
attempting to open a channel without the blessing of Peking they would
be very angry indeed. Li said that FEI in no circumstances would act in
this way without first clearing with, and obtaining the approval of,
LEUNG Wai-lam: LI felt certain that LEUNG would not have encouraged FEI
in this matter without checking either with LI or vith Peking. LI
undertook to make confidential enquiries about the matter. In discussing
FEI he said that FEI was not trusted by the communists, that they were
avare that some time ago he had made approaches to the French with a
view to "getting out": LI further said that the communists were hesitant
about putting too much pressure on FEI by way of disciplinary measures
for fear that in an extreme situation he might defect to Taivan. At this
Jay said that it had also been reported to the H.K.G. that FEI vas
preparing to go to Peking: LI thought this highly doubtful and said that
he certainly was not avare of such a proposal. In the present
circumstances he also very much doubted whether FEI would really like to
go to Peking at this particular time. If he did, it might be in Peking's
interests to "entertain him" there for some time.

Regarding the concern which I had expressed the day before about the
security of the channel so far as the Chinese were concerned, LI,
according to Jay, was adamant that FEI had not been told of the

LI said that LEUNG Wai-lam proposals presently under discussion,

TOP

TSX 82

846.69

HONG KONG COVERTIMENT

SECRET

/contd....

SECRET

ว

SECRET

was aware that LI had contact through Jay with "somebody in authority"
in Hong Kong but that even LEUNG knew no more than this: it was possible
that LEUNG may have hinted to FEI some- thing along these lines. LI
allegedly said that FEI was a very dangerous but a very clever man: he
thought that FEI's comments on the proposals about the release of the 11
newsworkers were little more than intelligent guesswork. However, LI
appreciated that the circumstances looked most suspicious and undertook
to carry out a security check. At this stage LI apparently had said that
LEUNG Wai-lam had recently gone to Peking for discussions: LI thought
that it was probable that he would be seeing CHOU En Lai to receive
directly instructions on communist activities and in particular N.C.N.A.
activities in Hong Kong. LI allegedly said that when he saw CHOU on his
recent visit to Peking CHOU had said that it was important that LEUNG
Wai-lam should make regular contact with K.C. Jay "so that he would not
make the same mistakes as he did last year". By now it was almost 4.30
p.m. and so, indicating that I would have to leave soon, I asked whether
there vas further nevs of the Croziers. Jay said that they had been
expected yesterday but due to aircraft trouble they had been delayed: he
would let me know the exact time of arrival and whether any assistance
would be required concerning entry of the Croziers into Hong Kong and so
forth.

As I was about to leave Jay said in some surprise that he was sorry that
I was leaving so soon as he had not yet been able to pass his important
message to me. He then said that LI Cho-chih had now heard on his
channel from Peking (Jay thought the message emanated from the Communist
Party) that the H.K.G. proposal was "unacceptable". Jay then went on to
explain that LI'S instructions were that no explanation was to be given
at this time to the H.K.G. for this "decision" although there was no
objection to LI explaining the reasons to Jay. The real reason,
according to LI, why this decision was necessary is that the Chinese
have no direct or specific control over the 11 newsworkers nov in
prison: Peking was allegedly concerned that some, or perhaps all, of the
nevsworkers might refuse to make the request to be released to China: if
asked or given a free choice some might even ask to go to Taivan: this
would be very embarrassing indeed. LI then said that it was not the
intention of Peking that these newsworkers should stay in Hong Kong even
if they were released before the expiry of sentence: the Chinese
authorities really knew very little about these people they may have
been "brainwashed" while in prison: they might really Just be
trouble-makers in any event Peking would prefer to have

them back in China for a while where they could be studied. Jay claims
that at this stage he was a little sarcastic and suggested that it would
seem odd to the H.K.G., as indeed it seemed extra- ordinary to him, that
the prisoners vere thought by Peking to prefer to stay in a Hong Kong
prison about which they had made many criticisms, rather than go back to
China. To this LI commented that surely Jay and even the H.K.G. realised
that the communist protests over prison conditions were to do with
propaganda only.

I suggested to Jay that the reply from Peking was almost unbelievably
quick: I wondered whether due and proper consideration had been given to
a proposal which had been the subject of a great

SECRET

/contd..

SECRE

SECRET

deal of thought and discussion, not only in Hong Kong but also in
London. Jay for his part did not feel that the speed of the reply
indicated in any way a lack of serious consideration on the part of
Peking. He suggested that the possibility of the news- workers being
released to China would have been one of many and that a tentative
decision to reject such a proposal would already have been made. Jay, in
reply to a question, said that he would still expect to hear something
specific on his own channel with the Prime Minister's office in Peking
but that in the circumstances he did not think that the reply would.be
any different although perhaps further explanations as to why the
proposal had been rejected might be forthcoming. I indicated to Jay that
my own personal reaction to the reply was to wonder whether Peking was
really serious in their alleged desire to de-escalate the situation in
Hong Kong, to solve the embarrassing problem of Anthony Grey, etc.,etc.
My own view was that they were being entirely cynical about the whole
matter and in spite of professed fine intentions, continued to act in a
barbaric manner. I emphasised that this vas a personal view and that I
would, of course, be reporting back directly to the Governor. At this
stage Jay became anxious to explain that the Chinese were in fact
serious and keen to reach an agreement which was acceptable to both
sides but it was quite clear that they had their problems also, which in
their eyes might be just as serious as, or even more serious than, those
facing the H.K.G.

II.

In the early evening I reported directly to H.E. the gist of the above
and then, as I was leaving Government House, I received a message to
ring Jay urgently: this I did at his home address.

Jay said that he had been anxious to reach me as he had just received
information that the Croziers would be crossing the border into Hong
Kong on the "first train" next morning. He asked whether action could be
taken to ensure that so far as possible the Croziers' arrival did not
attract publicity. I said that I would see what could be done,

10.

Jay then said that he had had a further discussion with LI Cho-chih
after seeing me and that LI had three further points to make which he
had "Forgotten" to mention to Jay that morning. They were:-

(i)

(ii)

LI was anxious for the H.K.G. to know that the Chinese would in no
circumstances make propaganda out of the negotiations nor indeed would
any mention be made in the press of them. (I commented that this had
been my understanding all along and that therefore there was nothing new
in the comment.)

LI was keen for me to know that in his discussions with CHOU En Lai,
CHOU had expressed the high regard which he had for I.C. Jay and that
this had been commented upon in the communication which LI had received
from Peking rejecting the H.K.G. proposal. (I said that I had been told
on numerous occasions by Jay of the high regard in which CHOU held him
and therefore, although interesting to hear again, it was scarcely
anything new.)

SECRET

/contd..

(iii)

SECRET

Rather surprisingly Jay then went on to say that LI was most anxious
that I should not misunderstand the true meaning of the message which
had been passed to me that afternoon: that it was not meant to be a
closing of the door but an indication that there were serious problems
involved in the proposal put to Peking by the H.K.G. : that nevertheless
Peking was very well aware of the difficulties and problems facing the
H.K.G. in this matter. Accordingly I should know that the release of the
11 news workers for Grey was not the only price: that something else
might be agreed or Grey might be released without the release of anybody
from a Hong Kong prison. In the circumstances, and as this discussion
was being conducted over an open telephone line, it was agreed that I
should meet with Jay again on the following day.

7th February, 1969-~

c.c.

D.S.B.

H./A.R.G.

E.S.S.

(J. Cater)

SECRET

■

Political Adviser

SECRE

SECRET

Yesterday afternoon Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned asking to see me "urgently".
Accordingly I arranged to see him soon after 5 p.m. that evening.

Jay start ed the discussion by saying that the previous day, 4th
February, LI Cho-chih had contacted him asking for an urgent meeting.
Such was the urgency that Jay Found it necessary to cancel a luncheon
engagement. He arranged to see LI in the latter's office in the Bank of
China. On arrival at the Bank of China Jay encountered, very much to his
surprise, Mr. Dick LEE, who was in the company of Messrs. PUN and TAM of
the N.C.N.A. According to Jay, Dick LEE, "an old friend", was clearly
embarrassed at seeing Jay at the Bank of China just as Jay was
embarrassed to meet Dick LEE.

LI Cho-Chih explained to Jay that he had the previous evening received a
letter from Peking enquiring as to the reaction of the H.K.G. to the
approach of early January. Apparently this letter had crossed with LI's
report to Peking on the proposals of the H.I.G. made to Jay on Monday,
27th January. In this latest letter from Peking the definite statement
was made that if the H.K.G. vere to release the 11 nevsworkers then this
would definitely secure the release of Anthony Grey. According to LI,
this was the first time on which Peking had been quite specific on this
proposition: that previously there had always been some let-out in the
wording of the Peking proposals such as 'if the H.K.G. vere to release
the 11 nevsworkers then Peking would probably respond with the release
of Grey, etc.": now, however, according to LI, there would be no doubt
that if the 11 nevsvorkers vere released then Grey quite definitely
would be released also. At this point I asked Jay for clarification: vas
LI nov saying that the only price for Grey was the 11 newsworkers? In
other words, was Peking indicating that Grey would not be released
unless the 11 nevsvorkers were released from prison. Jay denied that
this was the position: if Peking accepted that release of the
nevsworkers in Hong Kong were impossible the position would still be
open for them to release Grey either for another price not yet specified
or even no price at all.

Jay was most anxious that the H.K.G. and the British Government should
now make up their minds definitely whether they

with vere prepared to release the 11 newsworkers in Hong Kong: great
emphasis he expressed the opinion that if later, because of pressure in
London, the H.K.G. were forced to accept the Chinese demand that the
newsworkers be released in Hong Kong, this would cause very grave
embarrassment and the position of the channel and indeed of the H.K.G.
would be very much impaired. He asked whether

I would raise the question once again to ensure that the H.K.G. and the
British Government were quite firm on this point. Showing some
exasperation, I said I was not prepared to raise this issue again: time
and time again I had said quite specifically that the H.K.G. was not
prepared to release the convicted newsworkers in Hong Kong and quite
recently I had told Jay, in the expectation that he would pass the
message on to Peking, that the British Government also had said that
release of the 11 nevsworkers in Hong Kong was quite out of the
question. I reminded Jay of our

/contd.

TOP

TSX. 83

8 £669

ERNMENT

SECRET

discussion on 27th January when, in response to a question, I had said
that the possibility of the newsworkers being permitted back into Hong
Kong after the expiry of the full sentence would raise grave
difficulties but if a firm pro- posal were made on these lines the
Governor might be prepared to consider it, possibly case by case.

There followed a long and rather shapeless discussion concerning
Peking's possible reactions to the H.K.G. proposals. Initially Jay
expressed grave doubts as to the possibility of success but as the very
one-sided discussion continued he appeared to talk himself into a rather
more confident mood and his final opinion was that with Peking anxious
to conclude matters there must still be a good 50/50 chance of success.

Jay then went on to mention the Croziers and the fact that they were
soon to be allowed to travel to Hong Kong: he was anxious to receive my
support and co-operation in ensuring as far as possible that there
should be no publicity on this matter. He had already spoken to Mr.
Saunders of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank who would be doing his best to
keep the matter quiet: he would let me know nearer the time" the details
of the Croziers' arrival in Hong Kong so that necessary action could be
taken to minimise knowledge of the Croziers' arrival. He said that the
N.C.N.A. Shanghai and the N.C.N.A. Peking had been very concerned about
the release of the Croziers and had brought a great deal of pressure to
bear on CHOU En Lai to reverse his decision. LI Cho-chih, in discussion
with Jay, had said that he was sure that Jay did not fully appreciate
the problems which CHOU En Lai had had to solve and the opposition he
had had to overcome before getting the Croziers released. So far the
N.C.N.A. Hong Kong were not aware of the intention of the Chinese to
release the Croziers. In commenting on this Jay said that not only would
they (N.C.N.A. Hong Kong) be very angry but in particular FEI Yi-ming
would be upset as for long he had supported a policy of keeping Britons
in China in detention as hostages.

This mention of FEI gave me an opportunity to raise

two points:-

(i)

I informed Jay that we had received reports to the effect that FEI was
attempting to start up a new channel of communication into the H.K.G.:
although it was not quite clear precisely hov FEI proposed to proceed,
it was understood that FEI was discussing the possibility of either

fco-21-490-detention-of-anthony-grey — Page 7

Comments

Private Research Note