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Distribution:- Departmental
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Hong Kong Newe Consular
Your telegrams Nos. 444 and 445: Anthony Grey.
We have given your recommendation regarding publi-
city sympathetic consideration. We share your feeling
of irritation that the Chinese should be gaining any
merit whatsoever from their slightly more lenient
treatment of Grey. Nevertheless, we are reluctant to
publicise the Chinese refusal to deliver the books. In
the United Kingdom publicity can, in the present
circumstances, only make the handling of the case more
awkward there will inevitably be further comparisons
in the press between the handling of the cases of Grey
and Brooke; and press comment is likely to be directed
as much at our failure to secure Grey's immediate
Whe_am "feluctant li strumbali publicing. relcase as at the Chinese
treatment of him. Furthermore,
hesitate to become with the approach of October we have serious
reservatia usy involved
with the Chinese in a new exchange of
accusations regarding the conditions of Grey's detention
IRD IPD Copies to:-
THERE WE ARE THEREFORE
48. RELUBSANT TO
STIMULATË PUBLICITY
17302
6/8709
}ગ્
which might in any way jeopardise the prospects that
/his
his case will be resolved then.
(11316) Id 192077 300m 10768 G WIt had tip.36)
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-.
PERSONAL AND CODENTIAL
926
Faler
JETS
4 August, 1969
Thank you for your letter of 25 July
about Anthony Grey. I found it extremely
923
well argued, and indeed moving.
Nevertheless,
it does not cause me to alter my views.
I cannot accept that my announcement
regarding Gerald Brooke has invalidated the
approach we have so far adopted in the Grey
affair. The overriding difference between the
two cases, and the one most closely engaging my responsibilities to
which you refer, is the
difference of context. As I said in the House,
there is nothing in the manner of Mr. Brooke's
release that is incompatible with the long term interests of this
country. I continue to hold the view, however, that the premature
release of the newsworkers in Hong Kong would
have damaging consequences for our position
/in the
Gerald Long, Esq.
General Manager,
Reuters Limited,
85 Fleet Street,
Lands
CONDENTIAL
in the Colony. If I may speak frankly, our
position there rests on the confidence of the
local people in our intention and ability to
retain our control of the Colony in the face
of Chinese preasures. Anything that led them
to believe that we were no longer able to
maintain our authority aould quickly be
disastrous. In particular it could very
quickly affect the morale of the police and
civil service, on whose loyalty we must depend
but who can have little hope of leaving the
Colony in an emergency. I know that you have
not accepted our assessment of the risks of
the premature release of the newsworkers.
But with the wellbeing of some 34 million
peqle at stake we cannot afford to take risks
in this direction.
You say that you cannot accept that there
is any parallel between the deal made over
the Krogers and the proposed deal with the
Chinese to release the Hong Kong prisoners
outside the Colony. I would agree that the parallel is not exact; and I
would also accept
the precise point of difference which you
/underline.
COMMENTAL
underline. In each case, however, we were
prepared to accept the premature release from prison of the persons in
whom the other side was intereated. It was my judgment that the national
interest required that in the case of
the Chinese prisoners we must stipulate that
they should not on release remain in British
territory a stipulation which was not necessary
in the case of the Krogers. Quite frankly,
if the Russians had stipulated that the Krogers
should remain in this country I am doubtful
if any arrangement would have been acceptable.
But within this prescribed limit we have, in my view, shown a good deal
of flexibility. Since August 1967, when Mr. George Brown indicated to
the Chinese his readiness to try to
arrange the release to China of the newsworkers in return for an
undertaking that Orey and other
British subjects would be free to return to the
United Kingdom, we have put variants on this
formula to the Chinese on a number of occasions,
We tried to ease the path for the Chinese by
refraining from insisting that the newsworkers
should go back to China and by offering them
instead the possibility of release to Macao and
/the
CONFIDENTIAL
the return to Hong Kong at a later stage.
(You are the only person on our side outside the government who has been
taken into
confidence about the details of these matters).
All this the Chinese, in their intransigence,
have refused.
You refer to the question of Grey's
health. He has certainly conducted himself with great robustness and
fortitude, and much good
sense. He has been called upon to put up
with a great deal on our behalf; and I assure
you that this is well recognised both here and in Hong Kong. As you must
know, had there been evidence of a collapse of his physical and
mental health, we should have been faced with
very serious decisions indeed. There might
indeed have been an argument on humanitarian considerations of the most
pressing kind for
sacrificing what I regard as the national
interest. We are, however, talking here
hypothetically;
it is fortunately the case that
Grey remains in reasonably good health and
spirits.
/In reply
JAL
In reply finally to the question which you
pose in very human terms at the end of your
letter, I can only sum up. I feel very deeply
for Grey, and I deplore the ordeal to which he
has been subjected through circumstances entirely
beyond his own control. In efforts to put an
end to that ordeal I have gone as far as my
Judgment of my wider responsibilities would
permit me. But the terms which the Chinese
have been trying to exact have seemed to me
quite unacceptable when measured against the
special circumstances of Hong Kong and the
national interest; and our efforts to achieve
any modification of these terms have been
frustrated by Chinese intransigence. By early
October the Chinese terms will have been met
by the release on their due dates, with
remision, of the newsworkers. I am as confident
as it is ever prudent to be when dealing with
the Chinese, that the Chinese will live up to
the assurance given us in May by their Chargé
d'Affaires here and thereafter release Grey from
detention.
(MICHAEL STEWART)
**H GAZ PODST. HEDGE TO CRUZW11)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret,
Confidential
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
DRAFT Letter
To:-
Gerald Long, Esq.,
General Manager,
Reuters Ltd.,
85 Fleet Street,
London, 3.C.4.
וח--r--זויי'
In Confidence
Loster despatched by Petente Sacretary's Dept.
- 5 AUG 1969
Type 1 +
From Secretary of State
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Thank you for your letter of 25 July about
Anthony Grey. I found it extremely well argued, and
indeed moving. Nevertheless, it does not cause me to
alter my views.
I cannot accept that my announcement regarding
Gerald Brooke has invalidated the approach we have so
far adopted in the Grey affair. The overriding
difference between the two cases and the one moat
closely engaging my responsibilities to which you refer,
is the difference of context. As I said in the House,
there is nothing in the manner of Mr. Brooke's release
that is incompatible with the long term interests of
this country. I continue to hold the view, however,
that the premature release of the newsworkers in Hong
Kong would have damaging consequences for our position
in the Colony. If I may speak frankly, our position
there rests on the confidence of the local people in
our intention and ability to retain our control of the
Colony in the face of Chinese pressures. Anything that
led them to believe that we were no longer able to
maintain our authority could quickly be disastrous.
In particular it could very quickly affect the morale
of the police and civil service, on whose loyalty we
must depend but who can have little hope of leaving the
Colony in an emergency. I know that you have not
accepted our assessment of the risks of the premature
/release
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEBL 51-7406
release of the newsworkers.
But with the
wellbeing of some 34 million people at stake we
Cannot
afford to take a risks in this direction.
You say that you cannot accept that there
is any parallel between the deal made over the
Krogers and the proposed deal with the Chinese
to release the Hong Kong prisoners outside the
Colony. I would agree that the parallel is not
exact; and I would also accept the precise
point of difference which you underline. In
accept each case, however, we were prepared to the
premature release from prison of the persons in
whom the other side was interested.
It was my
judgment that the national interest required
that in the case of the Chinese prisoners we
must stipulate that they should not on release
remain in British territory - a stipulation
which was not necessary in the case of the
But within this prescribed limit we
Quite frankly if the Russians had stipulated that the Kroger Krogers
should remain in this country I am doubtful if any arrangement would
have heen acceptable,
have, in my view, shown a good deal of flexi- bility. Since August 1967,
when Mr. George
Brown indicated to the Chinese his readiness to
try to arrange the release to China of the
newsworkers in return for an undertaking that
Grey and other British subjects would be free
to return to the United Kingdom, we have put
variants on this formula to the Chinese on a
number of occasions. We tried to ease the path
for the Chinese by refraining from insisting
that the newaworkers should go back to China and
by offering them instead the possibility of
release to Macao and the return to Hong Kong
/at
WYCEL 51-7406
+
The sentence in
at a later stage. (You are the only person on
our side outside government who has been taken
into confidence about the details of these
matters). All this the Chinese, in their
intransigence, have refused.
You refer to the question of Grey's
health. He has certainly conducted himself
with great robustness and fortitude, and mu ch
segical brackets, but good sense.readily admit that he has in a
Suget it need
not be said so
starkly. It is implied clearly mough in what 2 bollows.
Mysomliser
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
"/vi The Sift agreed it was
betta, to muit his .
yo ala
way been penalised for those qualities? He
has been called upon to put up with a great
deal on our behalf; and I assure you that this
is well recognised both here and in Hong Kong.
As you must know, had there been evidence of
a collapse of his physical and mental health,
we should have been faced with very serious
decisions indeed. There might indeed have
been an argument on humanitarian considerations
of the most pressing kind for sacrificing what
I regard as the national interest.
We are,
however, talking here hypothetically; it is
fortunately the case that Grey remains in
reasonably good health and spirits.
In reply finally to the question which
you pose in very human terms at the end of
your letter, I can only sum up.
I feel very
deeply for Grey, and I deplore the ordeal to
which he has been subjected through circum-
stances entirely beyond his own control. In
efforts to put an end to that ordeal I have
gone as far as my judgment of my wider
responsibilities would permit me.
But the
/terms
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WIEL SE-7406
terms which the Chinese have been trying to
exact have seemed to me quite unacceptable when
measured against the special circumstances of
Hong Kong and the national interest; and our
efforts to achieve any modification of these
terms have been frustrated by Chinese intransi-
gence. By early October the Chinese terms will
have been met by the release on their due dates
with remission, of the newsworkers. I am as
confident as it is ever prudent to be when
dealing with the Chinese, that the Chinese will
live up to the assurance given us in May by
their Chargé d'Affaires here and thereafter
release Grey from detention.
you the
4/8
Ephemera
Demethert
There was
n the
on
classification chaft letter you submitted for the Secretary of State;
signative
Private Office
Mir mynd H/2.
ши
그는
To see liller in its final form. Re Prass Sevetang's intervention,
I gather from The Tell. That mis K is more now anxion li leave!!
+
157
Sir S. Tomlinson
SECRET
1925
THE GREY AND BROOKE CASES:
MR. LONG'S COMPLAINT
Before submitting my minute of 31 July covering a
draft reply to Mr. Long's recent letter about Mr. Anthony
Grey, I tried to confirm with Mr. Long that the reply would
be for his eyes only. (I assumed this to be the case since
Mr. Long's own letter was marked "Private and Confidential".)
Mr. Long was, however, absent from his office for a couple
of days.
I
2. Mr. Long returned my telephone call this morning.
said that in drafting the reply we had assumed that it would
be for his eyes only and that accordingly the draft
(a) had referred to the delicacy of our position in Hong Kong
in terms which we would not use publicly and,
(b) had mentioned the proposals made to the Chinese through
covert channels, of which he was the only person outside
government to be taken into confidence.
Mr. Long immediately confirmed that his whole correspondence
with the Secretary of State about Mr. Grey had been on this
basis, and that the reply to his most recent letter would be
certainly treated with similar discretion. If he subsequently
wanted a reply which he could show more widely, e.g. to members
of the staff, he would be in touch with us again.
SECRET
1-
C
+
SECRET
3.
Mr. Long referred to the Daily Express report that
Mrs. Grey was about to write to the Secretary of State
drawing comparisons between the Brooke and Grey cases.
He said that this was on her own initiative;
had nothing to do with it.
Copies to: Private Secretary
Mr. Baker
Mr. Godden
Sir L. Monson
Mr. Carter
Mr. Haydon
Reuters had
Jane Ummy.
(James Murray)
1 August, 1969.
Mnomlison
Private Jeretory
учеро
love
SECRET
- 2
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
Sace
1924
of State
Flag A
Flags
B and C
Flag D
Flag E
Sir S. Tomlinson
THE GREY AND BROOKE CASES:
MR. LONG'S COMPLAINT
F
K
r
- 8 AUG 1969
Far 134/1
In a letter to the Secretary of State, Mr. Gerald Long,
General Manager of Reutera, takes the view that the
announcement in the House of Commons on 24 July concerning
the agreement made with the Russians for the release of
Mr. Gerald Brooke invalidates the arguments we have offered
in recent months for refusing to release in Hong Kong the
eleven imprisoned newsworkers linked by the Chinese with
Mr. Grey.
RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend the despatch of a reply in the terms of
the attached draft. Hong Kong Department and East European
and Soviet Department agree.
BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT
3. Mr. Long has in recent months argued that to secure
Mr. Grey's release we should immediately pay the Chinese price and
prematurely release the eleven newsworkers in Hong
Kong. His views are set out in letters which he wrote on
17 and 24 February to the Secretary of State, who replied
on 28 February. He spoke similarly to the Secretary of
State on 1 April (paragraphs 2 and 8 of my submission of
3 April). However, following on two developments in May,
the reduction'in Wong Chak's sentence which meant that all
the eleven newsworkers would be out of prison by early
SECRET
- 1
-
COVERING TOP SECRET
SECRET
October and the assurance given us by the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires that Grey would be released from detention when
the newsworkers had been released, Mr. Long seemed to me to
have accepted that we were likely to let matters take their
course in Hong Kong until October. The decision about the
Brooke affair has clearly upset him.
4. We foresaw that the manner of handling Mr. Brooke's
release would have repercussions for the Grey affair.
We
have tried to discourage comparison between the two cases
but already we have been subjected to some questioning by the
press. On 24 July the Secretary of State was asked by
reporters if the handling of the Brooke case set a precedent
for the treatment of Mr. Grey. He replied:-
"There are very important differences between Mr. Grey's
case and this. We had suggested to the Chinese some
time ago that one might be able to get the release of
Mr. Grey in return for the release of certain Chinese
newsworkers in Hong Kong, they to go back to China in
the way the Krogers will presumably go back to Poland.
The Chinese made it quite clear that an arrangement of
this kind was not possible. What was in issue there
was that the Chinese newsworkers should be released and
should be free to continue to reside in Hong Kong to
carry on their occupation. You will realise that is
rather different from what is proposed in relation to
the Krogers."
(It is to this reply that Mr. Long is presumably referring in
his fifth paragraph.)
SECRET
- 2
SECRET
Flag F
Flag G
Flag H
5.
Generally, News Department have been able to deal
with press enquiries by the use of the three points put
forward in paragraph 3 of my submission of 23 July.
However, Mr. Long's letter, which is powerfully argued,
cannot be answered simply in these terms.
6. As a preliminary, there is a policy point to be
decided: should we in the reply hold out any hope that the
newsworkers may yet be released before their due dates?
In our telegram No. 444 of 4 July to Hong Kong the Governor
was informed that if he were to decide that the time had
come when the premature release of the newsworkers by a
matter of weeks would be regarded by the Chinese as a
gesture of accommodation rather than an act of weakness, we
should not want him to exclude this. However, it is clear
from his telegram No. 588 of 24 July, that the Governor has
no such step in mind. I intend to submit separately about
but in the meantime our reply to
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.