risks of the premature release of the eleven news workers
in Hong Kong continue to outweigh the advantages of an
immediate settlement of the Grey affair. It may be felt
that the argument has laid undue stress on the factor of
public confidence in Hong Kong. It is always difficult
to pronounce with certainly on the likely effect of any
particular action in Hong Kong. Nevertheless we must
leave ourselves a margin of error since any action which ghs
lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have
lost our nerve could very quickly become disastrous,
Admittedly there would be much to be said for taking risks
in Hong Kong and indeed for swallowing a lot of our pride
if we could really settle all outstanding cases of British
subjects not only Mr. Grey. But the prospects of this
-
are remote. There is little to indicate that the remaining
British subjects are being held as hostages. They, like
the majority of other foreigners in trouble in China, are
held for a variety of alleged misdemeanours on their part.
Their cases would only be resolved slowly and with difficulty.
If we were to try to extend negotiations for the release of
Mr. Grey into a comprehensive bargain covering other British
subjects as well, I am sure that this would not help the
latter and would impede any progress over Kr. Grey. (This
is not to rule out the possibility that the solution of the
Grey problem might lead to some slight improvement in the
-
- 8 -
SEQUET
/atmosphere
+
+
SECRET
atmosphere of Sino-British relations, which could in the
longer term enhance the chances of other British subjects;
but we should not expect any early results). Thus the
only immediate dividend we can expect from the release of
the news workers is the release of Mr. Grey; and,
important though it undoubtedly is on humanitarian grounds
to terminate his ordeal as soon as possible, this does not
seem to me to justify our pressing the Governor to take
what he regards as an unacceptable risk in Hong Kong.
Copies to:
Mr. Godden
Kr. Baker
Sir A. Galsworthy
Sir J. Johnston
Mr. Carter
James Hurray 28 March, 1969
- 9 -
SECRET
1
Mr. Baker
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
M' Mix way,
LET
Арена
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The Moutonom, 1913 17 Schy 1913. 175 Baya 0.1.
I think we ought to be
prepared
to swallow
a
219)
a lot of our pride if we could really gabr liquidation of all the
outstandary cases - notaily
DAG 17/3
Grey.
Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
Since we may shortly be faced with hard decisions
about Mr. Grey, the Reuters correspondent detained in Peking,
the P.U.S. may care to look at my submission of 28 February
(attached) which contains a full review of the problem.
2. At his meeting with the Secretary of State on 27 February
Lord Shepherd duly expressed his misgivings about the present
state of the case. He voiced doubt whether we could resist
the pressure of criticism which would arise in Parliament and
the Press if we failed to settle the affair soon. He
expressed the view that the eleven remaining newsworkers were
a declining esset and that their release in September might
not be regarded by the Chinese as worth the release of Grey.
Accordingly he argued in favour of the early release of all
the eleven newsworkers. The Secretary of State simply
undertook to reflect carefully on the matter and to discuss
it further in due course.
3. Since then our efforts at a bargain through covert
channels with the Chinese in Hong Kong have made no progress.
Unless there is a surprising break in events we shall shortly
have to conclude that these efforts have failed. I would
propose in any case to submit on the matter again at the
end of next week.
び
James Velmang.
(James Murray)
10 March, 1969.
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
Ed (5084)
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Reference
209
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Secretary State REUTER?
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Mr Wilson
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208
The Rt Hon Michael Stewart CH MP Seeretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Downing Street
London SW1
April 1 1969
pa
| FEC 130|1|
4017/4
Dear Mr Stewart
I am most grateful to you for having seen me again today about Mr
Anthony Grey, and for your great personal interest in this matter.
I feel, I must confess for the first time, some encouragement about Mr
Grey's situation, since we ean now allow ourselves the hope of seeing
him released in the not too distant future.
With all good wishes.
Yours sincerely
Beads!
Gerald Long General Manager Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4
Telephone Fleet Street 6060
Reference...
162012/5
(207
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2.
Aumany Suery
Since we spoke I have had further thoughts.
-
I think it most important that we should avoid giving the impression
that we are warning the BBC off Borger - or anyone else just because we
don't like his politics. It is simply that on this subject Borger (an
active member of The Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding) is bound
to be hopelessly parti-pris; and it is folly, and makes life harder for
us, when the BBC present him as an independent consultant.
3. Having looked again at the script I must repeat that it is grossly
misleading; 1.0. we object not just to the choice of man but also to the
fact that his views want unchallenged. I would hope that you could also
make that point.
4.
In detail the programme was misleading for the following
TO280118:
5.
(a) It wholly omite to mention that while Grey was detained and remains
detained without the Chinesa even pretending that he had done anything
wrong, the eleven remaining news workers were tried before a court of
law and sentenced for specific orimes.
(b) It implies that the judicial system of Hong Kong is the
administrative plaything of the FCO. But in fact what the Chinese are
asking is that we should monkey around with the sentences passed in
courts of law simply to meet administrative convenience. The
implications of this for the principle of respect for the law in Hong
Kong are obvious.
(c) It suggests a widespread resentment in the House of Commons against
the judicial system of Hong Kong. In fact the interest has been confined
to a rather small group of MP's and gave something of the impression of
an organised campain.
(d) it suggests that the judicial system as a whole in Hong Kong is
"Totalitarian". In fact, the only area remotely open to question on
these grounds is the existence of certain emergency regulations brought
into force in the emergency of 1967. These will be de-activated just as
soon as the security situation permits. Heanwhile, only four men remain
detained without trial under these regulations. They have nothing to do
with the øloven convicted news workers with whom the Chinese authorities
have linked Grey.
I shall be delighted if you feel like making any of these points to your
contact. I do hope you can at least suggest the strength of our feeling
on this subject. It can only encourage the Chinese in their hostage game
if through the ABC they get the impression that their propaganda hes us
on the run.
JoBut
(J. . I. Boyd) car astern Department
27 Kar. '69
Дда
Mr. Boyd. I discussed at length with Dan
ravas it informelly,
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very unlikely that Roland Berger
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2/4/69
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SECRET
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Private Secretary MB 31/
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Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
The Secretary of State has agreed to see Mr. Gerald Long,
General Manager of Reuters, at 4.0 p.m. on 1 April. The
Secretary of State last saw Mr. Long on 12 November, 1968.
I attach speaking notea.
The General State of the Case
Flag A 2. I attach a copy of my submission of 28 March in which I
have recommended that we should not press the Governor of Hong
Kong for the immediate release of all eleven news workers in
Hong Kong; but should let matters take their course there with
the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey will be let
out shortly after the normal release of the news workers in
September, but almost certainly not before. The Secretary of
State may, however, prefer not to make up his mind about this
recommendation until after his talk with Mr. Long.
The Probe in Hong Kong
3. Mr. Long is familiar with the attempt we have been making
through covert channels in Hong Kong to secure the release of
Mr. Grey in return for the release to China of the eleven newsworkers. I
had obtained authority to tell him of it in general terms during
my Conversation of 28 February, before his departure on tour. A
Flag B record is attached. It remains to inform Mr. Long that in our
judgment the probe has been a failure and that the Chinese have
no interest in a compromise arrangement.
SECRET
SECRET
Flag C
The Problem of the Eleventh Newsworker
4. We have endeavoured throughout to take Mr. Long as far
as possible into our confidence. On this occasion we shall
wish to give Mr. Long an indication that we now expect all
eleven newsworkers to be out of prison by September in the
normal course of events and that we thus see September as the
terminus ad quem of the Grey affair. This is, however, a
matter of some delicacy.
The Secretary of State will presumably
wish to avoid giving Mr. Long a categorical assurance at this stage
that we see the way clear to the release of the eleventh man;
and will also wish to avoid going into the details of how we
should hope to achieve this result.
Mr. Grey's letter of 7 January
We
5. Mr. Long is likely to refer to a letter of 7 January from
Mr. Grey to his mother, the contents of which were widely
publicised in the British press. I attach cuttings. The
letter expressed Mr. Grey's understandable dissatisfaction with
the lack of success of our efforts to secure his release.
believe that the Chinese saw this letter as a possible means
of bringing pressure to bear on H.M.G. and gave it rapid passage
to this country. Although Mr. Grey's letter was bitter, it was
however well argued and suggested that his mental faculties
remain unimpaired.
Representations to the Chinese
6. Since Mr. Long's last call, we have made representations
to the Chinese authorities on behalf of Mr. Grey on the following
occasions: during the call of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires on
SECRET
SECRET
Lord Shepherd on 9 January;
at an interview at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Peking by our outgoing Charge d'Affaires,
Mr. Cradock on 11 February;
and at the initial interview of his
successor, Mr. Denson, with the West European Department of
the Ministry on 8 March. On the last occasion the Chinese
told Mr. Deneon categorically that Mr. Grey now had access to
his own library on the first floor of his house.
Visite
7. Mr. Long may raise the question of a further exchange of
visits (by the Charge d'Affires in Peking to Mr. Grey and by
representatives of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong to
the eleven imprisoned news workers).
Clearly we cannot rule
out a further exchange of this kind. But the following points
have to be borne in mind:-
(a)
Each
We wish to keep auch exchanges within bounds.
visit by the N.C.N.A. representatives in Hong Kong
to the convicted news workers provides the communista
with a propaganda victory; suggests that we are ready
to discriminate in favour of certain categories of
prisoner; and reinforces in quasi-consular standing
of the N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong.
(b) A further visit to Mr. Grey will inevitably generate
a new wave of public concern for his plight. In the
glare of publicity it will be harder to m ke the discreet
arrangements proposed by the Governor for shortening the
sentence of the eleventh news worker.
(c) We shall do Mr. Grey no service if we visit him before
SECRET
SECRET
we are in a position to give him a broad hint
that we are confident that his ordeal will end
in September.
The timing of any visit must
therefore depend on the speed with which the Governor
of Hong Kong completes his review of the relevant
prison sentences. We have impressed on him the
desirability of rapid progress.
Hunay
Jauns Money
(J. MURRAY)
31 March, 1969
Copiis to: Me Soddew
Sir J. Johnston.
CONFIDENTIAL
SPEAKING NOTES
Anthony Grey, your correspondent detained in Peking,
continues to be very much on my mind. The Head of Fer
Eastern Department has been keeping you in touch with develop-
ments. I am glad to have the opportunity of re-emphasising
my personal interest.
The Probe in Hong Kong
2. You already know of the existence of a probe through
covert channels in Hong Kong aimed at securing the release
of Mr. Grey in exchange for the release to China for the
remainder of their sentences of the eleven newsworkers
remaining imprisoned in Hong Kong. We were not sanguine
about the chances that such an exercise might succeed.
Nevertheless, we thought that we owed it to Mr. Grey to try;
and we made every attempt to accommodate Chinese susceptibilities
during the negotiations. Unfortunately the result is as we
feared. The Chinese have simply attempted to beat us down
further. They have showed no sign of willingness to accept
this very reasonable compromise solution, but have simply
returned again and again to their insistence on the premature
release in Hong Kong of the eleven remaining convicted news
workers. It would appear that a solution as such is not what
they desire. They are holding out for a solution which will
give them the maximum propaganda advantage and do greatest
damage to our interests in Hong Kong. Our offer has now been
on the table for two months. I think we must conclude that it
has failed.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The Problem of the Eleventh News Worker
3. I fear that this brings me to the conclusion that there
may be nothing, short of conceding a highly damaging outright
victory to the Communists over this issue, that we can do
until September of this year. In September, as you know, ten
of the eleven remaining newsworkers will be due for release (with
remission of sentence) in the normal way. We should
have in the meantime to consider what to do about the eleventh
who would not normally be due for release until February,
1971. If Mr. Grey has still not been released by this
September I should very much hope that we shall find a way
to effect the release of the eleventh man at that time simul-
taneously with the other ten. I should underline that this is
a hypothetical situation. While I am confident that we shall
man,
find a way I should not wish you to take this comment as a
formal commitment.
I should also like to emphasise that it
is made in the strictest confidence.
Mr. Grey's letter of 7 January
4. We must take account of Mr. Grey's health and his state
of mind.
His letter of 7 January to his mother, which was
shown to us by Mr. Horton of Reuters,
he is understandably bitter about his
suggests that while
long detention, his
general balance remains unimpaired. This is something which
must be kept constantly under review on the meagre evidence at
our disposal. Meanwhile I have been encouraged by the fact
that our new Charge d'Affaires in Peking, Mr. Denson, was told
at his initial interview with the West European Department of
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mr. Grey now has
access to his own books upstairs.
Mr. Grey's doubts about
his health seem also to have been set at rest.
Co-operation of Reuters
5. Our handling of this case will continue as hitherto to
depend greatly on your own co-operation. I hope that what
I have told you will satisfy you that I am anxious to do all
I can to secure the release of Mr. Grey, short of taking
measures which in my considered judgment would be highly damaging
in Hong Kong, I have instructed the Head of Far Eastern
Department to continue to keep you closely informed of develop-
menta. Even if we foresee little prospect of progress before Sepgember,
this does not of course imply that we shall cease
in the meantime to keep up pressure on the Chinese, particularly
as regards the detailed conditions of Mr. Grey's detention.
Consular Access:
Further Exchange of Visits (if Mr. Long raises the
point)
6. Naturally I do not rule out consideration of a further
exchange of visits, by our Charge d'Affaires in Peking to Mr. Grey
and by representatives of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong
to the eleven news workers; but we should have to choose our
time with care. I have in mind the difficulty of taking measures to
solve discreetly the problem of the eleventh news
worker in the glare of publicity that a consular visit to Mr.Grey will
inevitably provoke. And following on from this, it might be best not to
have a visit to Mr. Grey until we are in a position to give him a broad
hint that we have reasonable grounds for expecting that his ordeal
should end in September.
CONFIDENTIAL
Lory ON
મે
FEC scli
PERSNAL AND COMFIDENTIAL
Raval.
Me Month an 31/3 To Bope / 1/2 1/4 O...//
Mr Wilson
Dear James,
Office of the British Chargé
d'Affaires
Peking
25 March, 1969
isl
E
Thank you for your letter of 13 Karch enclosing
a copy of John Moreton'a report on his discussions in Hong Kong about
detainees and convicted prisoners (Saigon Telegram No. 140 of 7 March).
2.
48+
We have now received Hong Kong Telegram No. 242 of 21 March which
indicates that the Governor intends to follow the time-table on
releasing detainees set out in paragraph 1 of Moreton's telegram. I am
grateful for the
efforts which I know you have made to bring about the releases sooner
but I am well aware, from my own experience in Hong Kong, of what the
difficulties are. It so happens that the first release on 2 April will
come shortly after the departure of Mrs. Johnston (assuming that this
takes place as planned). The Chinese might regard this as a response
which would, in my view, be no bad thing provided that the two events
are not directly linked in public.
Hak fie
3.
It was ironical that the news of Kra. Johnston's exit visa reached us at
exactly the same time as your telegram reporting the News Department
statement of 19 March, We are inclined to think that the Chinese were
not aware of the statement and that the delay in the grant of the visa
was caused by delays in the Chinese bureaucracy. In any case, we think
that the statement did no harm probably the reverse and we agreed with
its terms, subject to the one reservation made in my telegram No. 204 of
20 March,
FEC
4.
I had a talk this morning with Sultan Hyder, the Manager of the Pakistan
International Airlines office in Shanghai who was speculating that the
grant of an exit visa to Mrs. Johnston might indicate that investigation
of Johnston's case had revealed nothing substantial against him and they
might shortly let him go. It would be unwise to build on such a theory
but the fact that, according to Cannings, the Chinese are to allow
Johnston to receive letters from his family is a good sign. This
privilege has not to my knowledge been granted to anyone else under
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.