- 5-
of whetting the Chinese appetite for further concessions,
these are:
(a) By equating visits to Mr. Grey with visits to
more than the two N.C.N.A. journalists, we
make it likely that an exchange, if it can
be arranged, will have to be on the same basis.
This would not matter much if all the journalists
could be deported to China; but it would be
unacceptable if the Chinese demanded instead
that they should be released in Hong Kong.
(b) We are conceding that the N.C.N.A. are in a
special relationship to members of other organisations in Hong Kong (who
may even be British citizens); in the past they have acted
mainly as an intermediary for the Chinese Govern-
ment. This could be the thin edge of the wedge
and will need handling with care. We must ensure
that the Governor retains the right to decide who is properly in the
category of those to whom visits
can be allowed.
10. Despite all the difficulties, I think we must try to use visits in
Hong Kong as a means of securing acoess to Mr. Grey. This will nean
persuading the Governor to go a little further than he has at present
offered to do. He will have to be given
In the a chance to comment before a decision is finally made. attached
telegrams I have suggested a way in which the opera- tion might be
handled, providing that the Governor and Sir D.
Hopson agree.
/11.
7
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11.
Although we are still waiting for a reply to the approach
made to the Chinese on 7 February about visa problems for our
Mission and Chinese intentions with regard Mr. Grey (including
the suggestion of an exchange), Sir D. Hopson does not think
that a separate approach now on prison visits would cut across
the exercise. I agreei it could even provide us with an
opportunity to prod the Chinese into replying to our proposals
of 7 February.
12. It must be recognised that the proposed approach, even if
it fails, is as far as we should go in making concessions in
Hong Kong to gain access to Mr. Grey. To go any further might
we would be abandoning
put at risk our position in Hong Kong;
the policy of firmness which in our dealings with the Chinese
over the Colony has brought us through the recent troubles,
and we would be encouraging Chinese hopes that we can still
be pushed into making substantial concessions there. for the
sake of our Mission and other British subjects in China,
can be little doubt that the achievement of some form of
"Kacao-type" situation in Hong Kong remains the ultimate Chinese
objective.)
Les to:
Kr. Samuel
Kr. Carter, C.O.
James Humaye.
Hung
(James Murray)
22 February, 1968
In Mr. Rodgers' absence aboveth the draft telec
(There
Consular Department. subject to C.O. clearance.
C.O.
concurred with my wines
ཏི པཱདིནཏཱི
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RECAVED IN
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28FCC
F013/8
T.ILNO. 325
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
23 FEBRUARY 1968 (H.K.D. & F.D.)
+
+
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 325 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING,
FOLLOWING FROM GALSWORTHY,
,
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 234: PRISON VISITS.
YOUR TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED AFTER OUR TELEGRAMS NOS 323 AND 324
HAD BEEN APPROVED.
*.
WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE FULLY ACCEPT POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2
OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS IS REFLECTED IN
PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 323.
3. WE REALISE THAT YOU WOULD PREFER THAT NOTIFICATION OF CONDITIONS (+)
TO (V) SHOULD FIRST BE MADE TO CHINESE IN PEKING (PARAGRAPH 3 YOUR
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE HOWEVER
STILL FEEL ON BALANCE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THE DISCUSSION
WE OF DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN HONG KONG. RECOGNISE
THAT WHEREVER THE NOTIFICATION IS MADE THERE IS RISK OF FURTHER ARGUMENT
ABOUT THE CONDITIONS, AND ALSO OF CONFUSION
BUT BY THE CHINESE IN TRANSMISSION BETWEEN PEKING AND NCNA, CIR
ASSESSMENT IS THAT ON THE WHOLE THE BEST CHANCE OF SETTLING THIS ASPECT
OF THE MATTER LIES IN DIRECT EXCHANGES WITH N CNA ** HONG KONG. WE TAKE
POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 3.
SUGGEST THAT HOPSON SHOULD ADD (PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF OUR TELEGRAM 324) THAT
THE SPECIAL VISITS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY GREEMENT ON
ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL ADVISER YD NG NA. A PHRASE
OF THIS SORT WOULD GIVE SOME PROTECTION
INST CHARGES OF BAD FAITH IF THE CHINESE PRODUCED A LIST OF SUCH LENGTH
THAT IT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN TOTO AND THE WHOLE
RANGEMENT BROKE DOWN IN CONSEQUENCE.
CONFIDENTIAL
14.
CONFIDENTIAL
CCTORWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO HONG KONG
2.
YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. WOULD WE NECESSARILY WANT TO REFER AT THIS i STATE TO
A SINGLE VISIT? CLEARLY IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE COULD
ONLY BE ONE SET OF CHINESE VISITS IN EXCHANGE FOR ONE VISIT TO GREY. BUT
IF WE ACHIEVE A VISIT TO GREY ON THE BASIS NOW SUGGESTED, WE MIGHT WELL
WANT TO TRY TO REPEAT THE PATTERN CFUTURE OCCASION OR OCCASIONS. WE FEEL
THEREFORE THAT IN E'IDEAVOURING TO MOUNT THIS OPERATION WE SHOULD USE
LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD IMPLY NEITHER THAT WE WERE THINKING PURELY AND
SIMPLY IN TERMS OF A ONCE FOR ALL OPERATION, NOR THAT WE WERE INTENDING
IT RECESSARILY TO BE A PRECURSOR OF OTHERS TO FOLLOW.
YOUR PARAGRAPH 5. WE THINK THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE VISITS ALL
TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME,
SINCE THE CHINESE MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO GREY UNTIL THE VISITS
7 HAVE ALL BEEN MADE OR AT ANY RATE ARRANGED. WE FEEL THAT YOUR POINT
SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO THE CHINESE UNTIL WE KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE
NUMBERS INVOLVED MAKE SPACING A NECESSARY STIPULATION.
c.c.
RIMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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F.E.D.
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CYPHER/CAT A
PE 67% CONFIDENTIAL
SÍMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
ELEGRAM NUMBER 212
by
PD4/1 (303)
P
19 FEBRUARY 1968
ONFIDENTIAL
DDRESSED CO TELNO 212 OF 1974 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING.
1
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NË 51
28 FEB 1968
FD1318
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·
*CKING TELEGRAM TO FO 129: PRISONERS.
** WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME TO TRY TO CLARIFY JUST WHAT IT IS
+
1 AM BEING ASKED TO CONCEDE FOR GREY'S SAKE,
THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE
HERAL PRINCIPLE OF VISITING BUT ABOUT CAS WHAT IS OR IS NOT
\ ''FORMAL'' VISIT SEMICOLON AND (B) TO HOW MANY PEOPLE **FORMAL
SITS CAN BE MADE.
THE RULES ABOUT VISITING WERE SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 2(A)
* MY TELEGRAM 1908 OF 23RD DECEMBER. THIS TELEGRAM PERHAPS
RRS IN NOT MAKING IT CLEAR HOW LIBERALLY THE RULES ARE NORMALLY
TERPRETED. IN DETAIL:
(1) ALL PRISONERS ARE, OR CAN BE, VISITED REGULARLY ONCE A
WTH. MORE OR LESS ANYBODY WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES
WIND FRIENDS CAN BE LET IN TO SEE THEM ON THESE VISITS PROVIDED
EY DECLARE WHO THEY ARE, WHICH IS A SIMPLE SECURITY PRECAUTION
. THE ONE HAND AND A PROTECTION FOR THE PRISONER ON THE OTHER.
E PRISONER MUST ALSO AGREE TO SEE THEM SEMICOLON OBVIOUSLY
·ISONERS CANNOT BE FORCED TO SEE PEOPLE THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE.
>> EXTRA VISITS TO INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS CAN BE APPROVED FOR
ASONABLE CAUSE AT THE PRISONER'S REQUEST. AGAIN, ANYBODY
VTING TO SEE A PRISONER FOR ANY SPECIAL REASONS IS OF COURSE
EE TO ASK TO VISIT HIM SEMICOLON IF THE REASONS ARE COMPELLING,
E VISIT CAN BE ALLOVED AGAIN SUBJECT TO THE PRISONER'S
-
GREEMENT. A PARTICULARLY RELEVANT EXAMPLE IS THAT AN EMPLOYER
USUALLY GRANTED ONE VISIT TO AN EMPLOYEE. THUS, ON 14 FEBRUARY
VEN THE MANAGER OF THE COMMUNIST YIEN YIEH COMMERCIAL BANK ASKED
J
SEE SIX EMPLOYEES HE WAS ALLOWED CACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHERS FROM
HE BANKO ONE VISIT TO EACH OF THEM (UNDERLINE NEXT WORD) INDIVID-
ALLY.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(c) TO
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CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 212 TU JOKKONAZALTH OFFICE
-
2
-
(U) TU COMPLETE THE BACKGROUND, UR HULĖS GIVE ANY PRISUNER A
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO HIS CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE AT ANY TIME:
BUT THIS OF COURSE REr'ano To A FORMAL KEPRESENTATIVE.
4. THE QUESTION IS WHATELOR ARMANGALENTS FOR THE "FORMAL"
VISITS REQUESTED BY THE CHINESE CAN BE MADE 11THIN THIS FRAMEMURA
OF THE NORLAL VISITING PATTERN SET OUT ABOVE. I am NOT at all
CLEAR "WHAT THE CHINESE INTEND THE MUND "FORMAL" TU MEAT SEM) - GULON
BUT FROM OUR POLIT OF VIEW THERE ARE TWO POINTS THAT IT is
ESSENTIAL TO AVOLD CONCEDING:
(A) ANY MELISS.UN UP A FORMAL RIGHT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF COMUNIST
URGANISATIONS TO VISIT PRISUMERS, PARTICULARLY ĦIDE AND ILL-DEFINED
CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS OR GROUPS OF PRISONERS
TOGETHER SEMICULON AND
(B) THE IMPLIED ADMISSION OF SUME FORM OF QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS
FOR N
ALTHOUGH WE MAY HAVE USED C F G ORGAND AS CHANNELS FOR COMUNICATION FROM
TIMS TO TIME, I STILL FEEL HE NEED Tɩ BE VERY CAREFUL IN THE LÜMPTERM
INTERST OF HUNG KONG ABOUT GLACEDING QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS TO TRY. THE
CONCESSION THAT WE HAVE ALREADY LADE, UN GRANTING AN 1 ~ NA VISIT
TONNA'S OWN EMPLOYEES CAN BE JUSTIFIED UNDER OUR EXISTING RULES.
5. ON RECONSIDERING THE LATTER NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE FÜR US TU KANË A NEW PROPOSAL TO THE CHINESE THAT WOULD GO SULE
WAL TOWARDS MEETING THEIR REQUEST "ITHOUT CONCEDING EITHER OF THE Tau
PRlivlPLES ABOVE. I WOULD SUGGEST TELLING THEM THAT IN THINKING FURTHER
ABOUT THEIR REQUEST FUR VISITS TO JOURNALISTS (PARAGRAPH 1(A) Or Pialmu
teletham 84) IT (CCURRED TO US THẤT THAME MIGHT HAVE DEEN A
MISUNDERSTANDING. TWO POINTS TERE NOT CLLAR TU
US:-
(1) WHAT THEY MEANT BY ■ 'FORMAL' VISIT AND
(11) TU PREMISELY WHICH INDIVIDUALS THEY WISHED THE VISITS TO KE PAID.
WE WERE ALWAYS READY TO APALY OUR RULES FUR PRISON VISITS IN A
REASONABLE MANNER. IF THEY WOULD SUPPLY US WITH THE MAKES OF THE
ADDITIONAL JOURNALISTS [PGP. OMITTED] ESTIUN, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
CONSIDER FIRAITTING SINGLE VISITS TO EACH OF THEN INDIVIDUALLY BY RIS
EMPLOYER AND/OR A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL OF THE ORGANISATION EMPLOYING
HIM, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:- (1) The rkiSONER LUST "UT
ÚRJEST.
(11)EACH VISIT LUST DE TO A PRISONER INDIVIDUALLY.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 212 TU COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3.
-
A
¡11) THE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO EACH PRISONER AT ANY ONE TIME MUST
DE REASONABLY RESTRICTED, 1.E. TO TWO OR THREE VISITORS.
(1) THE TIMING MUST BE CONVENIENT TO THE PRISON AUTHORITIES.
C/O VISITS SHOULD NOT NORMALLY LAST MORE THAN 15 MINUTES EXCEPT WITH
GOOD REASON (THIS LIMIT IS APPLIED GENERALLY TO PRISON VISITS IN THE
INTERESTS OF VISITORS SINCE INTERVENING FACILITIES ARE NOT
LIMITED AND LONGER VISITS WOULD OFTEN MEAN VISITORS WAITING LONGER )
VISITS ON THES BASIS CWHICH H.M CHARGE COULD MAKE OUT WERE RATHER
ECIAL CONDITIONS IF THIS WOULD HELP) WOULD NOT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT,
HEY WOULD ALLOW PATRIOTIC JOURNALISTS' TO BE VISITED BY THE
ITORS OR MANAGERS OF THEIR PAPERS COR SOMEONE SIMILAR) BUT NOT BY
4
N.C.N.A. PER SE. IF HOWEVER THE CHINESE MAINTAIN THAT 'FORMAL'
4
ISITS MEAN SOMETHING MORE, I SHOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHEN THEIR
"XTRA REQUIREMENTS WERE KNOWN.
1. ON THE OTHER HAND IF, BEFORE MAKING AN APPROACH, H.M. CHARGE WOULD
SH ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION, OR ANY MODIFICATIONS WITHIN THIS
AMEWORK, I WOULD OF COURSE BE GLAD TO TRY TO MEET HIM.
JSSIBILITIES ARE :-
A TO HINT THAT AN N.C.N.A. OFFICIAL COULD ACCOMPANY THE EMPLOYER,
> TO ARRANGE THAT INTERVIEWS TAKE PLACE IN THE ROOM WHERE LAWYERS
LE PRISONER CLIENTS, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT MORE COMFORTABLE THAN THE
DOMAL ARRANGEMENTS AND MIGHT BE THOUGHT MORE
FORMAL'
WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR HOYEVER THAT I WOULD PREFER NOT TO
KE THESE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD RATHER TOO GREATLY DISTINGUISH
THESE PEOPLE FROM ORDINARY PRISONERS AND I WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER
FORE FINALLY AGREEING.
·
THE OPPORTUNITY MIGHT ALSO BE TAKEN TO ENQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT THE OPOSED
HSUEH PING/GREY EXCHANGE.
L
LEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING. AS MYTEL 69.
SAR D. TRENCH
L
[KEPETITION TO PERING,
REFERRED FÜR DEPARTLENTAL DECISION]
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ORIG. Com on FII (1)
COFIDEITIAL
TOP GU
ITH
RESTYD N
TO COMLOUNGIN OFFICE
26 FEBRUARY 1968
CYPHER CAT A
MEDIATE HONG KONL
LEGRAM NO 241
4
TIDENTIAL-
MYTEL w/Reed.
L
ADDRESSEÒ SECRETARY OF STATE RFI PEKING MYTEL. NO. 76 DATED
KTH FEBRUARY.
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 323. 324, AND 325 PRISON VISITS.
ARCHIVES No.31
27FEB 1968
FD13/8
I AM NOT ANXIOUS TO PROLONG THE DISCUSSION, BUT YOU NO DOUBT APPRECIATE
THAT THESE TELEGRAMS SUGGEST SIX ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS WHICH, IN
VARYING DEGREE, WILL DISTINGUISH THESE PRISONERS AND WHICH I AM
ACCORDINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING- <1> THE INCLUSION OF N.C.N.A. IN THE
VISITS AT ALL, WHICH
I HAVE HOWEVER ALREADY INDICATED I WOULD ACCEPT IF NECESSARY: (11) USE
OF THE SPECIAL ROOM, WHICH COULD WELL BE AWKWARD IF CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS
ARE INVOLVED WITHOUT ADEQUATE SPACING. HERE AGAIN, HOWEVER, 1 AM
PREPARED TO SO ARRANGE, ALTHOUGH I SCE LITTLE REASON TO VOLUNTEER THE
PROPOSAL:
<ID> YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 323, PARAGRAPH 3. TO ALLOW VISITS
BY MONA ALONE WOULD BE A FURTHER KOVE AWAY FROM OUR CURRENT PRISON
PRACTICE AND IN THE DIRECTION OF GRANTING NCNA A SPECIAL STATUS. I DO
NOT MYSELF SEE WHY WE SHOULD THINK IT NECESSARY TO CONCEDE THE POINT IN
ADVANCE, LET ALONE TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN TUTTING THE CONCESSION INTO
THE MINDS OF THE CHINESE, SINCE
CARE PREPARED TO ALLOW A RESPONSIBLE OFFICER OF THE EMPLOYING
QORGANISATION TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE EMPLOYER:
CIVO YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 323, PARAGRAPH 4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERHAPS IT
WOULD BE BETTER TO SAY NOTHING INITIALLY ABOUT TIME
IBITS, AND LEAVE IT TO THE CHINESE TO RAISE THE POINT:
EVERTHELESS THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM UNLESS THE
(UMBERS ARE LARGE AND CANNOT BE CONVENIENTLY SPACED:
CONFIDENTIAL
/(V) YOUR
!
P
Hiệu HỒNG TƠI RIAL,
CONFIDENTI AL
241 TO COBIONYBARITI OFFICE
<V> YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 225, PARAGRAPH 4. ODVIOUSLY THE MORE OFTEN
'SPECIAL VISITS' ARE REPEATED. THE MORE WE DISCRIMINATE IN FAVOUR OF
COMMUNIST PRISONERS, AND THE GREATER RISK OF EMBARRASSMENT HERE. I WOULD
NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF LATER EXCHANGES OF VISITS IF THE
FIRST SET WENT WELL AND WE ACHIEVED THE QUID PRO QUO IN RESPECT OF GREY:
BUT I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE ENTER INTO NO COMMITMENT ON THIS POINT IN
OUR FIRST APPROACH TO THE CHINESE:
(VI) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 325, PARAGRAPH 5. I WOULD DO MY BEST TO ARRANGE
VISITS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT THIS DEPENDS ON NUMBERS AND WHETHER
ANY ADVERSE INTEREST IN THESE VISITS
IS AROUSED PUBLICLY.
2 1 WOULD STILL PREFER NOT TO CONDUCT THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH NCNA IN
HONG KONG SEMICOLON BUT IF WE DO SO I WOULD STRONGLY ADVISE THAT IT BE
DONE BY EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES CAT LEAST AT FIRST) BECAUSE CAD IF WE
DISCUSS POINTS OF SUBSTANCE CAS OPPOSED TO PURELY ADI1IN- ISTRATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS) WITH NONA HERE WE ACCORD THEM IN EFFECT THE QUASI-CONSULAR
ROLE THAT CCF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM 323) WE
WISH TO AVOID CONCEDING.
(B) THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE HORE INTRANS IGENT ABOUT HONG KONG PROBLEMS.
THAN THE KEA AND OUR CONTACTS WITH THEM ON OTHER MATTERS HAVE BEEN
RESTRICTED TO EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES ON THE TELEPHONE. IT COULD BE
DIFFICULT AND TAKE TIME TO GET A TWO-WAY DISCUSSION ARRANGED. (THER?
'OULD EASILY BE LONG ARGUMENTS ABOUT FEETING PLACES).
(C) A DISCUSSION WITH NONA COULD BE MORE EASILY REPRESENTED BY THEN
AS FORCING US INTO NEGOTIATION HERE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY HOWEVER THAT
IF PROPOSALS FOR A DISCUSSION AROSE NATURALLY AND WITHOUT RISK OF
EMBARRASSMENT WE COULD NOT CONSIDER IT.
3. YOUR TELEGRAM 324, PARAGRAPH 3.
| SEE CONSIDERAPLE RISKS IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE
PREPARA LO ALLOW VINETS TO AN UNL, THETEN NUBIUR CAS PARAGRAPHE 10A)
ISLEGRAN Ra SKAS TO IMPLY) | WE ARE TO ARGUE ABOUT THE MATTER
IN HONG KONG LATER. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD NOT OFFER
CONCESSIONS ON MATTERS WHICH ARE OF SUBSTANCE TO US BEFORE THE
/CHINESE
CONPPL DEPTAI
t
1
+
TORG VALEURA
L
16. OLMAL FCICE
-3-
.IKESE HAVE PRESSED US TO DO 30, AND WITHOUT OUR HAY LIG ANY
ASSURANCE THAT AS A RESULT WE SHALL GAIN ACCESS TO GREY.
1. YOUR TELEGRAM 324, PARAGRAPH 10A).
I SUGGEST WE NEED TO STRIKE A CAREFUL BALANCE ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH
REPRESENT OUR TERMS AS SPECIAL CONCESSIONS. I CONCEDE WE CANN
* PRESENT THEM AS BEING PERFECTLY NORMAL CESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE
A VITIONAL CONCESSIONS NOT PROTOSED) AS THIS YOULD BE BOTH TOO
TRANSPARENT AND UNLIKELY TO SATISFY THER. BUT TO MAKE OUT THAT THEY
VORE QUITE UNUSUAL CONCESSIONS WOULD BOTH HAND THEM A FROPAGANDA
ICTORY AND CUT THE GROUND CUT FROM UNDER MY FEET HERE, WHERE 1
"UST DO MY BEST TO REPRESENT THEM AS NOT UNDULY ABNORMAL.
.. AS A CONCRETE PROPOSAL, I SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING FOR THE LAST
SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1(A) AND FOR PARAGRAPH 1CB) OF YOUR TELEGRAM
24: IF THE NAMES OF THE JOURNALISTS AT PRESENT IN PRISON ARE
SUPLIED TO US, WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE (PROVIDED THAT THE PRISONER
DOES NOT OBJECT) TO A SPECIAL VISIT TO EACH INDIVIHJALLY BY HIS
PLOYER AND ONE OTHER OFFICIAL OF THE NEWSPAPER EM 1.0YING HIM
ERICOLON OR ALTERNATIVELY ONE KONA REPRESENTATIVE, IF THIS IS
KEFERRED'.
H.H. CHARGE WOULD I HOPE STRESS THAT THOSE IN QUESTION MUST AC
TONA FIDE JOURNALISTS, AND HE MIGHT THEN GO ON TO ENQUIRE THE
CIDERS LIKELY TO DE INVOLVED. HE COULD THEN SUGGEST THAT AFTER
..EEMENT ON THE NUMBERS IN FEKING THE NONA IN HONG KONG SHOULD
COMMUNICATE TO THE POLITICAL ADVISER THE NAKES OF THE PRISONIRS
'ND THOSE PROPOSING TO VISIT THEM, IN ORDER THAT APPROXIMATE
h
THES OF VISITS AND OTHER DETAILS MIGHT BE COMMUNICATED TU NCHA.
1. FINALLY, 1 CAN ONLY REPEAT HY WARNING THAT ALL THESE CONCESSIONS
AND ARRANGEMENTS MAY RUN US INTO DANGEROUS REPURCUSSIONS HERE, BUT
I CANNOT OF COURSE SAY UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THEY WILL DO 50.
1. 0. PLEASE PASS POKING 76.
AD. M
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1
Talk FOR DETARTZENTAL DECISION]
*MELT L DISTHEMATION
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ADVANCE COPIES SENT
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Oria. copy on Foil Bo
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CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING
no
FOREIGN OFFICE
Telmo 147
26 February 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE - Nm X!
2CFEB,308
| FD 13/8
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of 26 February, Repeated
for information to Hong Kong.
Your telegram No. 324 to Hong Kong:
Prison Visite.
In making approach here I shall have to refer to conversations with
Hsueh on 28 January and 31 January in which he questioned that
arrangements be made for "responsible officials of NCNA" to visit NCNA
and "patriotic" journalist prisoners,
Hsueh will assume we are prepared to meet Chinese on this
It will question and that therefore NCNA will be making visits.
therefore be necessary for me to state at outset that a NCNA
representative will be allowed to accompany employer in each case in
calling on patriotic" journalist, rather than be asked, ma your
paragraph 1(b) suggeste.
10
2. I have no other comments and hope I may now receive authority to make
approach if possible tomorrow 27 February.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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Telno 145
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE
flu
24 February 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 31
2CFEB.368
FD13181
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 145 of 24 February, repeated
for information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 23: Prisoners.
In view of the considerable delays to which a solution of this question
has already been subjected and of importance generally of getting
perpetuating movement as soon as possible, I trust I shall be receiving
very early authority to proceed as suggested in paragraph 3 and
paragraph of telegram under reference. I attach great importance to the
inclusion of NONA representative.
Foreign Office pass Hong Kong No. 94.
Sir D. Hopson
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