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FOREIGN OFFICE
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PRESS - FOREIGN JOURNALISTS - IN.
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REFER TO
DATE
DEPT.
NAME
DATE
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12.7.67.1
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FILE No.
FD13/8
SECRET
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PART
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-
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
RE
ED IN
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
ARCHIVE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 575
"AY 150.
RET
FR/3/8.
LAST PAPER
TOP COPY
120
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
7 MAY 1968
F
JB
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 575 OF 7TH MAY RFI PEKING.
116
PEKING TELEGRAM 362: GREY.
copy.
doar.
sn also
be entered on Srem
FROM THE HONG KONG POINT OF VIEW THESE PROPOSALS CLEARLY RAISE
REAL DIFFICULTIES. THE FACT IS THAT THE POSITION OF GREY 15
fici
NOT A MATTER OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THE POEPLE OF HONG KONG SEMI-
COLON AND THIS IMPOSES VERY STRICT LIMITS TO THE EXTENT TO
WHICH WE COULD JUSTIFY LOCALLY CONCESSIONS MADE HERE ON HIS
BEHALF.
52
2. AS OUR TELEGRAM 1909 OF 26 DECEMBER TO CO INDICATED, THE
IDEA OF RELEASING THE TWO NCN A MEN TO CHINA IN RETURN FOR GREY'S
RELEASE WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTABLE HERE. BUT THERE IS IN FACT
NO LEGAL OR MORAL PARALLEL BETWEEN GREY'S POSITION AND THAT OF
THE TWO CONVICTED NCNA PRISOMERS SEMICOLON AND TO RELEASE THE LATTER
HERE UNCONDITIONALLY, COULD NOT REALLY BE JUSTIFIED
LOCALLY ON ANY REASONABLE GROUNDS, IN PRINCIPLE IT WOULD PROVIDE
AN EXTREMELY AWKWARD PRECEDENT. IF THE CHINESE KNEW THAT WE WERE
PREPARED TO REMIT THE SENTENCES OF THESE TWO CONVICTED PRISONERS
AND RELEASE THEM PREMATURELY IN HONG KONG IN ORDER TO STRIKE A
BARGAIN WITH THE CHINESE, IT WOULD BE FOOLISH OF THEM NOT TO
PRESS US TO REL ASE MANY MORE PRISONERS THAN TWO. IN THE LONG RUN.
HAVING CONCEDED THE POINT OF PRINCIPLE, WE MIGHT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE
TO RESIST DEMANDS FOR THE PREMATURE RELEASE OF ALL THE CONVICTED
PRISONERS HERE. AN EARLY MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD RISK GRAVELY
UNDERMINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND SUGGEST THAT WE WERE BEING
PUSHED ALONG THE PATH TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMUNISTS' DEMANDS.
3. THE COMPROMISE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER
REFERENCE MIGHT JUST BE PALATABLE TO PUBLIC OPINION HERE, PROVIDED
THAT THE CHINESE KEPT THEIR PART OF THE BARGAIN. BUT IF THEY DID
915
SECRET
/NOT
E
SECRET -2-
NOT AND WE WERE CVIOUSLY TRICKED, PUBLIC REACTIONS COULD BE VERY
CRITICAL AND WE HIGHT FACE SOMETHING LIKE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE.
FOR THIS REASON IT WOULD SEEM VERY DESIRABLE AT LEAST TO TEST OUT
THE GROUND WITH CHOI COUR TOP SECRET TELEGRAM 496) FIRST, BEFORE
STARTING TO BARGAIN ON THE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF GREY'S
RELEASE.
4. OF COURSE THERE ARE STRONG HUMANITARIAN REASONS FOR DOING AS
MUCH AS WE CAN TO GET GREY OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT IT SEEMS
DOUBTFUL IN ANY CASE IF TAKING A VERY EARLY INITIATIVE ON HIS
PROBLEM IN ISOLATION WILL NECESSARILY PRODUCE THIS RESULT. I AGREE
WITH PARA 6(B) OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT IT MIGHT
INSTEAD BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND ENCOURAGE THE CHINESE
TO RAISE THEIR BIDS. WE WENT SOME WAY IN OUR STATEMENT OF APRIL
19TH TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR TO THE C P G AND TO GIVE THEM
OPENINGS IF THEY REALLY WANT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING
HONG KONG ISSUES. THERE IS SOME REASON TO THINK THAT THEY MAY STILL
BE CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM SEMICOLON AT ANY RATE
LI CHOH- CHIH COUR TELEGRAM 440) LEFT HERE ON APRIL 23 ALLEDGELY
FOR TALKS IN PEKING AND HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO HONG KONG. THERE
DOES SEEM TO BE A REAL RISK THAT AN EARLY APPROACH ABOUT GREY ON
THE LINES OF PARA 5 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE COULD CUT
ACROSS OUR OTHER LINES OF CONTACT SEMICOLON AND THAT BY SUGGESTING
WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH
THIS PARTICULAR CASE, WE WOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO A MAJOR WEAKNESS
IN OUR BARGAINING POSITION.
5. OUR FEELING IS THEREFORE THAT FOR THE MOMENT IT WOULD BE BEST
TO CONCENTRATE ON RELATIVELY MINOR MOVES TO ALLEVIATE GREY'S POSITION
SEMICOLON AND NOT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS FOR
HIS RELEASE UNTIL WE HAVE HAD MORE TIME TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS A
RESPONSE (EITHER THROUGH THE MFA OR OUR OWN LOCAL LINES OF
CONTACT) TO THE OPEN INGS PROVIDED IN OUR STATEMENT OF 13TH APRIL.
OPENINGS
SECRET
16. AS
+
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO.575 TO COMMONWEALTH OF-ICE.
-3-
6.
ABOUT
Is REGARDS THE POINT IN PARA 8 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE
+
'CLEMENCY' FOR CONVICTED PRISONERS, THIS IS THE MOST
DIFFICULT END OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE POLITICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL POINT
OF VIEW. IF WE ARE THINKING OF ENTERING INTO SOME SORT CE BARGAIN ABOUT
THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS, THE POSITION OF THE DETAINIES WOULD PROVIDE US
WITH A MUCH EASIER FIELD IN WHICH TO MANOEUVRE, SINCE THEIR RELEASE
WOULD INVOLVE NO INTERFERENCE WITH
THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
7. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNOR
WHILE HE IS IN LONDON.
-
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING 213.
MR. GASS
[REPETITION TO PEKING REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL
DECISION].
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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Orus. copy on F213/8 203
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RECEIVED IN
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-3 MAY 1968
FD1378
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Copy
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F213/8/202
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CONFIDENTIAL Hong kong Dept.
co. 6A/5.
118
cypher/cat A
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CONFIDENTIAL
TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 2 MAY 1968
2 May 1968
FD1378
4/5
1
Aadressed to Hong kong telegram No. 261 of 2 may, Repeated for in
ormation to roreign Office.
1our telegram wo. 197 to me: Grey.
kexerence sub-paragraph (h).
Are prisoners allowed
or would they be allowed chess sets?
sir . пopson
FILES
F.v. r.E.D.
V.U. n.K.Dept.
DININININ
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TO
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP CUPI 17
RECEIVED IN
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ARCHIVES No.31
Teino 540
30 April 1968
-1 MAY 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Прав
FD138
90
Addressed to Peking telegram "9, 197 or 30 April, repeated for
information to Commonwealth Ofiice.
Grey.
Your telegram No. 253 [telegram no. 356 to Foreign office]:
(a) 304 prisoners (including the journalists) are in singie cells and
204 are 3 to a cell. The remainder, mostly young persons in other
Institutions, e.g. open prison, are in dormitory accommodation.
(0)
Those who work are in constant contact with fellow inmates. Those who
refuse to work have one hour's exercise per day, taken in groups of
about 80.
(c) No (repeat no) prisoners are in solitary confinement.
(á)
Prisoners have access to the library as required, There
is also a "travelling" library service.
(0)
Unlimited quantities or books can be sent to prisoners, who are normally
allowed 3 books at any one time. Lagazines are also unrestricted.
(r) 15 minutes.
(g) NO, except in cases of emergency.
(n)
Playing cards are generally not permitted, to prevent gambling, though
in practice a prisoner is allowed caras in his cell. Prisoners have no
access to radio.
(1)
Prisoners have access at any time to prison orricials. In addition, a
J.P. visits the prison every fortnight.
Foreign Office please pass Immediate Peking 197.
hr. Gass
[Repeated as requested]
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
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CONFIDENTIAL
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 1 MAY 1968
116
Cypher/Cat A
MORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telegram No. 362
CONFIDENTIAL
29 April, 1968
FD13/8
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 362 of 29 April, Repeated for
information to Hong Kong.
My telegram No. 348: Grey.
I hope approach as recommended in support of my telegram under reference
may succeed in bringing about some improvement in Grey's conditions. We
must however also give further consideration to moves that might lead to
his release.
2. We have had no official reply to our proposal to release Hauch P-ing
to China in exchange for Grey but in view of Lo Kuei-po'a negative
responses to our offer of 13 April that Communist prisoners might be
released to reside in China we must assume that a renewal of offer of
release to China whether of one or both of N.^.N.A. prisoners would be
rejected by Chinese.
3. It might be possible to get Chinese to accept an arrange- ment
whereby Hsueh P-ing and Lo Yu-ho would be released and would - "ask" to
reside in China until their sentence expires on understanding that they
would be free to return to Hong Kong afterwards.
4. We must accept however that the Chinese may well insist on
unconditional release in Hong Kong of one or both N. C.N.A, men and it
is worth noting that in discussions last week with Bargmann the West
German correspondent, Hong Kong Communist leaders are alleged to have
stated price for grey was for both to be released in Colony. In last
resort unless we are to abandon our efforts to obtain Grey's release I
think we shall have to be prepared to agree to this.
5. I therefore recommend that I be instructed to approach Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officially and inform them that you wish me to initiatie
negotiations for the release of Grey. AB part of this first approach I
suggest I should refer to our previous offer to deport Haueh P-ing, to
Lo Kuei-po's rejection in general of such procedure, and hint that a
compromise satis- factory to both sides might be reached if it were
agreed that Houch P-ing should be released on clear understanding that
he would volunteer" to visit China (perhaps in response to an invitation
from the Chinese Government)" and stay there until his sentence expired,
after which date he could return to Hong Kong if he wished. offer would
be made initially for Haueh P-ing but could be increased to include Lo
Yu-ho as a later concession if necessary. We should have to get a firm
understanding from Chinese on simultaneous release of Grey. Only in the
last resort would be consider offering simple release in the Colony. We
should also have to resist attempts by Chinese to include all their
"patriotic" newspaper workers in the deal, though I presume that if
Chinese accepted our compromise on "deportation" the objection to
increasing the numbers would not (repeat not) be so great.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6. I recognize
CONFIDENTIAL
2
6.
I recognize that these proposals are open to considerable objections:
7.
(a) To discriminate again in favour of N.C.N.A. prisoner
raises obvious difficulties for Government of Hong Kong.
(b) Further approach by us might be read [? grp, omitted]
Chinese as a sign of weakness and encourage them to insist on a higher
price e.g. release in Hong Kong of other newspapers employees and
possibly other confront- etion prisoners. On the other hand they have
sometimes responded favourably on the limited occasions when we have
made conciliatory moves.
(c) The Chinese might refuse to treat on Grey in isolation
from other Hong Kong 188usa. This seems to have been their grp. undec.]
coolness in response to our proposals of 7 February on visas. We might
therefore find that we were initiating further discussions on Hong Kong
at a time when we would prefer to leave it to the Chinese to make the
next move.
As against this there are the following considerations :
(a) Our concern about Grey's well-being.
It seems highly
likely that until the two N.C.N.A. men are contacted Grey will remain in
custody. Iinless we make some move the earliest date he might expect to
be released would be September 1969 (earliest date by which both
N.C.N.A. men would be free allowing for normal remission).
(b) It is just possible that the Chinese who may find publicity
on Orey embarrassing particularly the new wave which will presumably
follow the newe of my visit would be prepared to deal with his case in
isolation from other Hong Kong issues,
(c) Even if they insisted on bringing in other issues, in the and they
might regard the release of the two N.C.N.A. men as providing them with
"victory" that they need to sign off in Hong Kong, accepting the release
to China of the other prisoners in whom they are interested.
8.
This leade on to the question of a larger act of clemency affecting
other confrontation prisoners, as discussed first in your telegram No.
2047 to Hong Kong and Hong Kong telegram No.1501 of 1967 and more
recently in correspondence ending with Hong Kong telegram No. 92 of 19
January. I should be glad to have your views and those of the Governor
on whether the prospects of such a step are now any brighter and what
our longer term plans are for dealing with confrontation prisoners, ¿ven
if we are fortunate enough to return to normal movement for staff of
this office and for bank staffs in Shanghai we cannot expect to get back
to anything like normal relations with the Chinese until the issues of
prisoners is dealt with and this is bound to affect the whole range of
issues, in particular the treatment of British subjecte in detention in
China.
CONFIDENTIAL
/9. I should
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 362 to Foreign Office
3-
-
9.
.
I should be grateful for your early comments on the proposal about Grey.
We shall for example have to decide whether to combine such an approach
(should you approve it) with one about visits etc. (my telegram No. 348)
or to keep them separate.
Foreign office pass Priority to Hong Kong No. 257.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated es requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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CONFIDENTIAL
Ed (4206)
Reference.
013/8
NB
FOLIOS, (91
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the a love entered
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Thanks
پیل
CYPHER/CAT +A+.
RESTRICTED
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER $28
RESTRICTED
تنا
list
TO COMMONWEALTH OFF ICE
26 APRIL 1968.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 APR 1968
pa
1/5 F01378
114
ADDPESSED CO TELNO 528 OF 26TH APRIL RFI PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAN 721 : GREY.
1
WE APOLOGISE FOR INADVERTENT USE OF DETAINEES IN OUR TELEGRAM
522. WE SHOULD OF COURSE HAVE SAID 'PRISONERS**.
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