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FD315
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* Please send copies of the following telegram
4
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.315
TO:
From Peking
6 December, 67.
Hong Kong Situation (4 China's attitude.)
(Initials)
(Signed)
(Department)
(Date)
Action taken in Communications Department :
(Date)
6/19/67.
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION
3
En Clair
IMMEDIATE
Telno. 314
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
UNCLASSIFIED
R:
IVED IN LARG. VES No.31
6 December 1967
- 7 DEC 1967
FD3/5
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 314 of
6 December.
Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington and POLAD Singapore.
I was summoned to the Foreign Ministry this afternoon and received by
the Deputy Director of Western Europe, who made an oral protest about
recent events in Hong Kong. He mentioned the closure of Chung Hua school
and the raiding of four other schools, the arrest of the headmaster of
Chung Hua school, the banning of "Youth Garden Weekly", the judgment for
libel against Wen Hui Pao, the arrest of two film directors and
searching of film studio premises, the raiding of the Kowloon branch of
the Motor Transport Union and three other unions.
2. Mr. Hsueh characterised these acts as further suppression of Chinese
in Hong Kong which he said completely gave the lie to the British
Government's professions about improving relations. Hsueh said he had
already lodged a serious protest on 27 November which the British
Government had completely disregarded. He was now instructed to make a
further protest. He then went on to say that the Hong Kong question was
at the nub of Sino/British relations and that these uld not be improved
or normalised until the Hong Kong problem was solved. Indeed, if the
British Government continued its suppression of Chinese in Hong Kong,
relations could only deteriorate further.
3. I once more contested his version of these events, explaining that
they were necessary actions on the part of the Hong Kong Government to
protect the population against acts of terrorism, I repeated that the
responsibility for these events lay with those who had instigated
schools to take part in the terrorist campaign and the newspapers to
make libellous statements. I therefore rejected in protest.
4.
In conclusion I confirmed that it was the British Government's desire to
improve Sino/British relations, but that the Government of Hong Kong
nevertheless had its responsibilities for maintaining law and order
there, which they were determined to carry out. I also pointed out that
whereas Hong Kong was indeed a major problem in Sino/British relations,
it was in such circumstances when serious problems existed between two
countries that their diplomatic representatives should be able to carry
out their functions normally and thus contribute to a solution.
5. Mr. Hauch expressed disagreement with my statement, and went on to
say that we talked constantly about improving relations but our actions
belied our words. If the British Government sincerely wished to improve
relations they must first of all stop suppression in Hong Kong.
/6. In reply to
Peking telegram No. 314 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
6.
In reply to my question he confirmed that the Chines Government intended
to publish a summary of this conversation.
Mr. Hopson
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no
TO:
314 From Peking
6 December, 67.
khong trong
Situation 18 China's Attitude
(Initials)
(Signed)
(Department)
(Date)
·
Action taken in Communications Department :
Cur
·
(Date)
6/12/67
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION
UNCLASSIFIED
Entir
2
ARCHIVES No 3:
The
1967
FD315
BRITISH CONSULATE,
TANSUI.
23 November, 1967.
I enclose copies of two recent editorials in the English-language press
here about the possibility of negotiations between Her Majesty's
Government and the People's Republic of China over Hong Kong.
2. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Anthony
Elliott in Hong Kong.
приземе
(R. J. Bray)
J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.B.E.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON. S.W.1. The
J.
Thi
ル
umor be Poule of
Si WiTeching
quartor
per
ke
Cuma 1.
15 NOV 1967
No Need For Talks
PRESS reports suggest that Lon-
dʊa and Peipang may hoid tulks on Hongkong next month.
From the British point of view. what is there to talk about?
The Chinese Communists began the Hongkong terror and they can stop it
any time they wish.
If Great Brian starts paying a price for the rewìsuur of Hongkong
struggle, that will be the end of British control of the crown colony.
Peiping wants what it has in Macao -a facade of colonial government bo-
hind which the Communists pull all the rtrings and exercise all the
power
In Hongkong, Gu's world death or imprisonment for tens of thousands of
anti-Conimuart activists.
We refuse to belrose that the Brit- ish will sell out the free Chinese
paple of Hongkong They have no reason to do so.
If the Communists are now pre- pared to talk. that is ample proof that
their Hongkong machinstións have failed
Red newspapers of the colony are continuing to attack the British. The
terrorist bombines have not beca stop- ped.
Nevertheless, the Communists have kust all except their theme:,
kárd-core support. The people have boyceited Communist stores. They are
cooperat- ing with the authorities as never before.
London's course in Hongkung should be to grant more democratic freedoms
to the loyal anti-Communist Chinese of the colony and go after the Red
terrorists harder than eve.
17 the British have learned anything from the Hongkong experience and
their munication in Peiping, it should be that the Red Chinese negotiate
only in order to have their own way When victory is not in sight, they
do not talk.
Dennis Hopson, the courageous British representative in Peiping. bas the
night idea: Hold your head up high and keep your mech shut. If indon
removes hat, as rumored, the Mauists with interpret this as a sign of
surrender. Hopson is a symbol of British strength and resolution that
may be a bit unachuomistic but is just what Loudon needs. His presence
telis Peiping that the British and frec Chinese cannot be pushed around
in Hongkong and have no intention of surrendering in the face of the
main- Ini-instigated teret.
1
China Port
16 NOV 1967
.
Negotiatious With Peiping Over Hongkong Crisis?
In the midst of the endless bombings and dis- turbances in the
Hongkong-Kowloon area rumors have cropped up in the British colony to
the effect that London may negotiate with Peiping for a solution of the
present crisis. Au AP despatch from Hongkong dated November 13 reported
that, according to an anti-Communist Chinese newspaper there, Peiping
and London officials may meet in Tokyo early next month to discuss ways
to end the trouble-making activities of the Communists. The Chinese
newspaper said the meeting would be held "for the purpose that neither
side would lose face."
Another AP despatch from Hongkong dated November 14 reported that
Chinese newspapers there had identified the man sent by local Communists
to Tokyo to talk with the British about the situation in Hongkong and
relations between Britain and Red China as Ko Chuk-hung, chairman of the
Communist Chinese chamber of commerce in the colony. A Hong kong
government spokesman, however, is reported to have declined to comment
on the newspaper reports. In the meantime, Communist newspapers in
Hongkong are continuing to attack "British Fascist authori ties."
Pending further developments it is impossible to ascertain at this
moment whether there is any factual basis for the reports on the holding
of nego tiations between British and Peiping officials in Tokyo. Be that
as it may, we wish to point out that one thing the British authorities
in London and Hongkong should consider carefully is whether or is
whether or not it is worth while to hold negotiation with the Chinese
Communists. To our opinion, the rumored negotiations are utterly
meaningless. Negotiations of this kind invariably involve the question
of give and take. What can the Chinese Communists be expected to give?
Presumably they may agree to call a halt to the bombings and
disturbances in the Hongkong Kowloon area, but it may be regarded as a
certainty that they will not do so without "taking" something In other
words, they will insist that the British make
certain concessions.
What concessions can the British make? Strictly speaking, the British
authorities in Hongkong have done nothing wrong. For many years up to
the outbreak of the Communist-inspired riots early in May the Communists
had been permitted to carry on their normal activities without the least
interference. Communist newspapers enjoyed perfect freedom in continuing
their Red propaganda. Communist trad- ers and the Peiping regime's
trading agencies con- tinued to make huge profits every year. And the
Communists were also permitted to
operate their schools in the colony. What more can the Commu- nists ask
for?
We know what they will ask for. If the rumor- ed negotiations are
actually held in Tokyo, or any-
where else, the Communists will surely confront the
British with many unreasonable demands. Those demands. ПО Inatler
phrased, will add up to one thing; namely, that the how skilfully or
deceitfully Chinese Communists must be given a free hand in doing
anything they please. To be specific, we can perniitted to do the
following things: to do whatev. easily visualize that they will demand
that they be er they like against all anti-Communist Chinese in the
Hongkong-Kowloon area; to deal with
deal with special severity with all Chinese well known for their loyal-
ty to the Chinese government in Taipei; to be free to make all Chinese
in that area study Mao Tse- tung's thought; to require all Chinese there
to make contributions to the Communist coffers in one form or another;
to have a voice in the administration of the British colony.
Obviously Britain's acceptance of the demands listed above will result
in making Hongkong another Macao. Frankly speaking, this is the very
objective. the Chinese Communists have been trying to achieve during the
past months by staging a long series of riots and terrorist acts. Are
the British ready to let the Communists attain this objective? If
Britain were willing to humor Red China to that extent, all Britons in
Britons in Hongkong might as
Hongkong might as well pack up and clear out of this part of the world
lock, stock and barrel. But we know for certain that Britain is not
ready to beat such an ignominious retreat.
If the British are not willing to kowtow to the Communists, then it is
quite clear that they have but one course to pursue; that is, they must
stick to the firm stand they have taken thus far. As we have pointed out
in these columns before, the trouble with the British in Hongkong is
that their stand is not firm enough. Up to now they have been entirely
too lenient in dealing with the Communists, includ- ing those already
arrested. Excessive leniency can only have the effect of inviting the
Communists to make more troubles. There will be no end to these troubles
if the British continue their present semi- soft policy in the hope that
the Communists might some day show a change of heart.
And let us repeat that all negotiations will be fruitless unless the
British are ready to surrender to
the Communista.
1
TELEGRAM SECTION Room 124 K.C.S.
Communications Department
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180 from Peking 26/10.
এ
TO:
Heng Когд
Borde inachents.
Kang
(Initials)
(Signed)
(Department)
(Date)
Action taken in Communications Department :
29.
(Date)
26/10
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL k TOP COPY
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
[ARC
30 OCT 1967
lno 180
CONFIDENTIAL
Є
FD315
26 October 1982
203/5
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 180 of
26 October.
Repeated for information to Hong Kong and to Washington, and Political
Adviser Singapore.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1582 to Commonwealth Office: Projected Meeting at
Frontier.
It may be useful to you to have my comments of the present situation as
seen from here.
2.
The first point I should like to establish is that sooner or later we
shall have to talk to the Chinese about Hong Kong not only in order to
effect the release of kidnapped policemen, but to give the Chinese
opportunity of disengaging (if that is what they desire) without
complete loss of face, and of re-asserting control over their men in
Hong Kong.
3. My second point is that talks should be local between Hong Kong
Government representatives and local Chinese Authorities. I realise that
this raises the spectre of Macao, but if talks are kept local it should
be easier to confine them to local issues whereas if we get involved on
a Government to Govenment basis it would be more difficult to avoid
wider issues which it is not in our interests to raise at present.
4.
My third point is that now is a good time for talks. The Chinese have a
special interest in maintaining calm before and during Canton Fair which
opens on 15 November and closes on 15 December. Any threats they make of
causing trouble at present are therefore likely to prove hollow.
Furthermore present atmosphere in China with Chow En-lai apparently very
much in charge and trying to re-introduce some sanity in foreign
relations is more favourable than it has been for a long time. But it
may not last. Although we shall certainly have to be wary, it is on the
whole encouraging that Peking should be prompting talks.
15. Finally,
CONFIDENTIAL
"Difcused with c.o. (il. Carter)
in festhäs
o lake nuts account
lebgrams of the
2.c.
CONFIDENTIAL
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 180 TU FOREIGN OFFICE
2
Finally, I hope it will be possible to keep situation of s Mission here
entirely separate from Hong Kong problem.
this
As you know we believe it is directly related to restrictions at present
placed on Chinese in London. I think this is another reason for lifting
these as soon as possible before we get engaged on talks about Hong
Kong.
Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Hong Kong 71
and Priority Singapore 9 and Washington 7.
Mr. Hopson
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