principle and in requital for any flexibility shown by
the Chinese, e.g. in kicking out (instead of keeping)
the Vickers-Zimmer engineers. If it does less violence
to the Governor's conscience to release detainees rather
than condemned men, we could start with the former. But
we should almost certainly have to let some of the latter
out sooner or later.
(f) However transitionally, I think we shall need to be ready
to cut down on the U. 3. Navy's access to Hong Kong. It
has never been clear to me why they cannot, for a time at
least, make more use of the Philippines. It will not kill
the Hong Kong retailers to forego a little business.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(g)
CONFIDENTIAL
(g) In dealing with the misdemeanours of Chinese Communist
schools, could we not be more selective;
for instance,
closing down science laboratories rather than
deregistering the schools outright?
CONFIDENTIAL
HWA..!^/?
Criv. No. 3
SEP 1968
FD 315
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Hang Kam Deft като
11 September 1918
LONDON, S. W.1.
C.S. 41C
2600079
30.000-1/67-852117
No.
SCR 3/3571/68
SECRET
D
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT.
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HONG KONG.
2nd September, 1968.
Деси Судониала,
Here are six copies of a Special Branch comparison of concessions made
to the Communists and vice versa since May last year.
2.
Copies have been sent to Singapore
to JIC(FE) and to Peking.
your sincerel
Oi monde. it, thi is not more
শ
ayamy! In chi
(J.Ad Harrison)
defensing in pryrese
Moder
In cho that HK Sud have dist done then't pot in making concession,? My
Denon in A.W. Gaminara, Esq., ngwin putting wis catant Commonwealth
office, in perpaganda start;
Whitehall,
remains live that even if HK Swi
fyer Bit vun of
hany
London S.Wele what countrinis nomnes insistence
cutam cmystima
Me
Encls.
0
Bry
Encen+PA
This is
He
a amassin is curentiishi, retains
on aShemma i regulation my
M
useful, but is clean interided as evidena agamor concessions in general.
Since the Coniex regard Hong Kong
comming,
of the moth
Yo umagne
as
part
It is uniealiste
that concessions can
ever be seciproca, of that Britis milfy laws will not be challenged
REF: GEN/13/1860
ECRET
Copy No.
13
of
26
Copies
+
Special Branch,
Police Headquarters,
Hong Kong.
23rd August, 1968.
À comparative study of concessions made by the Chinese Commists and the
British and Hong Kong Governments
related to the communist confrontation in the Colony
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the concessions which have been made since
the onset of the Chinese communist confrontation with the Hong Kong
Government in Hay, 1967. (Governor's Committes Xesting Hinute No. 395/68
refers). For the purpose of this study and to present a realistic
picture of the policies and attitudes of both sides it has been
necessary to accept a fairly wide interpretation of what is meant by the
term "concession". In consunist eyes to conform with an established law
or principle of conduct can be a concession. By the same token the great
restraint shown in enforcing that law must also be held to be a
concession
by Governsent.
2.
It has been found useful to attempt to categorise concessions, as set
out in Annexures 'A' to 'D' to this paper. Firstly there are those which
have been made on a reciprocal basis and have sterned from negotiations
or at least from an intimated prior agreement; these are limited to two
instances, the Border talks of November last year and the special visits
to prisons in Hong Kong, resulting in access to Grey in Peking (Annexure
'A'). Secondly those concessions made by the C.P.G. and E.M.G.
concerning visas and restrictions on movement of Mission staff which,
although not directly affecting Hong Kong, must be considered in the
context of this paper as the C.P.G. authorities clearly intimated
SECRET
/that
+
ECRET
2.
that the Hong Kong question was a major factor (Annexure 'B'). The third
category contains concessions by local comunists and the Hong
Kong Government arising from changes in communist policy, mainly the
cessation of violence as a major means of confrontation, and a change to
a political 'struggle' (Annexure 'C'). The fourth category which is,
in fact, the largest, lists the many concessions made by Government
since May, 1967, either as a clear cut conciliatory act or as a part of
the very many restraints which were placed, as a matter of Hong Kong
Government policy, on perfectly justified action against communists in
the Colony (Annexure 'D'). In this context the aim was to make it
perfectly clear that Government did not wish to bring about any
aggravation of the situation and was doing all in its power to reduce
tension within the bounds of maintaining law and order.
NEGOTIATED CONCESSIONS
3.
The Border Talks (Annexure 'A') illustrate yet again the
communists' determination to extract the maximum concessions during any
negotiated settlement; indeed their conduct during the meetings with
Hong Kong Government representatives soon made this clear. It could be
claimed that the subsequent firmer control exerciced by C.C.A. personnel
in the Border area was a direct result of the talks, but this can be
attributed equally to the change in communist policy at about that time
concerning the future general conduct of confrontation (see Annexure 'C'
(b) and (c)). In any event the agreement by the Chinese authorities to
allow
unhindered repairs to the primary fence was not honoured, and
harrassment
of British Security Forces has continued from time to time to the
present
day. While access to Grey was permitted, again this was only in return
for
special visits to 15 prisoners in Hong Kong, to whom access had never
been
denied.
DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS
On the face of it, the Chinese would appear now to be considering
a return to normal diplomatic practice in respect of visas for
representat- ives of H.M.G. However it is somewhat unrealistic to
consider the visa
question in isolation or to suggest that the possible current change in
the communist attitude on this matter is stemming directly from the
relaxation of what was little more than an academic restriction placed
on the Chinese
RET
/Mission
¡
DECRET
Hission staff in England.
-3-
Clearly that this is not to be a direct
reciprocal concession is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the
latest C.P.G. move to issue visas followed the Hong Kong Government
announcement of steps to de-register the communist Chung Wah Middle
School. Rather was it probably the result of a combination of factors,
one of which may have been some forewarning of the British diplomatic
campaign which was set in motion at the end of July, with a view to
bringing sons pressure to bear on the C.P.G. regarding visas. However
the lifting of movement restrictions in London and Peking can be seen
as a reciprocal concession, although the C.P.G. still continues to
impose
restrictions as it sees fit.
CONCESSIONS RESULTING FROM CHANGES IN COMMUNIST POLICY
5.
As mentioned above, the largest group of concessions by
communista in Hong Kong falls within Annexure 'C', and emanates from a
deliberate change in policy towards confrontation in the Colony.
As early as September, 1967, some local C.P.G. commercial organisations
were already attempting to return to normal business, rather than
engaging in subversion and violence. However, with the advent of the
Peking instruction in December, 1967, to end the violent phase of
activity, this move quickly became more widespread. By the end of that
month, through the offices of the local communist leadership, this
instruction had been effectively enforced. This new communist tactic was
not prompted by any response to conciliatory actions by the Hong Kong
Government but by a realisation of the failure of their previous policy
in the face of determined resistance
by Government and the community as a whole. Nevertheless, the fact that
this major change took place must be regarded as a highly important
change of policy. In ending violence Peking demonstrated that control
had been
reimposed over local militants and indicated a willingness, albeit to
serve
her own ends, to see a return to more normal conditions in Hong Kong. It
is considered that it is within this context that the firmer control
exercised by C.C.A. personnel in the Border area and the general
lowering of tension there should be seen. The Hong Kong Government
responded with a number of restraints and concessions including the
general cessation of police action against communist representatives.
KON-RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS BY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
6.
Since May 1967, the Hong Kong Government has ande numerous concessions,
in the form of restraint in not taking justified action
SECRET
/against
I
!
:
SECRET
against communists in the Colony.
The extent of this holding back is woll illustrated by the list
contained at Annexure 'D'. In some instances this restraint was
exercised for tactical reasons, for example to ensure the fullest public
support before taking steps to stop a certain line of communist
activity; in others it was in the hope that the communists would respond
with some reduction in the level of their opposition to Government. In
many cases, of course, it was because of political factors outside the
Colony. However, in general these concessions have met with little or no
response by the comunists and Government has been left invariably with
the alternative of allowing increasing pressure against its authority or
taking positive action. In this direction it is noteworthy that, in
broad terms, the communista have usually retreated in the face of firm
moves against them,
g wonder
CONCLUSIONS
7.
The Hong Kong Government has made many concessions during the
confrontation with the Chinese comuniste but has received little in
return. Indeed experience suggests that such conciliatory gestures,
whether they are clear cut actions or restraints, are not normally
reciprocated voluntarily by the communista. Instead there is evidence
that, on occasions, any such moves are misinterpreted, namely as a sign
of weakness, thus encouraging the opposition to increase their pressure
on Government. This is not to say, of course, that any form of
negotiation with the Chinese authorities should be ruled out. However it
is considered that H.M.G. or E.K.G. are only likely to obtain a
reasonable settlement where it is clear to the communists that our
Governments will not be intimidated or agree to concessions without some
clear guarantee they will result in reciprocation by the other side.
SECRE
GEN/13/1860
"CRET
Annex 'A'
Agreed Concessions on a Reciprocal Basis
Two agreements have been reached with communists, namely those resulting
from the Border talks in November, 1967, and theas culminating in access
to Grey in Peking and visits by N.C.N.A. and communist newspaper
representatives to prisoners in Hong Kong connected with journalism.
(A) Border Talks"·
(1) Concessions by the Communists
(2) Concessions by Bong Kong Govt.
(a) Agreement that the primary Border
fence might be repaired without hindrance. (In fact repair parties were
stoned frequently from Chinese Territoryh
(b) The release of two P.C.s detained in
C.T. and the return of their motor cycle and of the belongings of Senior
Police Inspector Knight who had,
during the talks, escaped from C.T.
(a) The removal of those portions of the
secondary fence on land farmed by
C.T. residents;
(b) The re-opening of the Man Kan To Bridge; (c) A guarantee that
production and normal activities, including the study of the
works of HAO by residenta of G.T. while on British Territory (B.T.)
would not be hampered;
(d) Release of five persone to C.T. who were
charged with committing criminal offences
in the Colony;
(e) Compensation paid for crops allegedly
damaged as a result of Chinese
Territory farmers being unable to
cultivate them owing to the closure of the Man Kam To Bridge;
/(1)
SECRET
:
:
SECRE
(1) Compensation paid for graves of C.T.
residents allegedly danaged during
construction of military positions
in B.T..
(B) Prison Visits
(1) Concessions by
the Comunista
(2) Concessions by
Hong Kong Govt.
Access to Grey by staff of British Mission in Peking was permitted on
23rd April, 1968,
the first since his confinement on 21st July,
1967. There is also evidence that the
conditions under which Grey is held have been relaxed slightly, in that
he has been allowed
to write a letter home and is allowed on
occasions to collect some of his belongings
from other parts of his house
Special visits by personnel of the Hong Kong
Branch of the N.C.N.A. and communist newspaper representatives were
permitted on 9th and 10th April, 1968, to 15 persons employed by local
communist newspaper organisations who were
serving prison sentences in Hong Kong. (N.B. These prisoners have
received normal monthly visits by relatives and friends since
their conviction in 1967).
SECRET
SECRET
Annex 'B'
GEN/13/1860
Concessions by the Chinese Peoples Government and
Her Majesty's Government not Directly
Affecting Hong Kong
(1) By C.P.G.
(a) The partial lifting, on 29th November, 1967, of restrictions
on the movement of the Mission Staff imposed in August, 1967; (b)
Granting of exit visas to a limited number of the Mission Staff
as well as to certain families after a delay of several months; (c) A
general undertaking on 27th July, 1968, that outstanding
exit visas would be issued (of the 18 outstanding at this date,
nine have since been issued including one for H.H. Charge
d'Affaires).
(2) By H.M.G.
(a) The lifting in November, 1967, of the movement restriction on
Chinese Mission Staff in London imposed in August, 1967;
(b) Relaxation in April, 1968, of a requirement for exit visas
for members of the Chinese Mission in London imposed in August, 1967.
SECRET
+
GEN/13/1860
SECRET
Annex 'C'
Communist Concessions Resulting from Apparent Changes
in Policy and responses by the Hong Kong
(1) Concessions by
the Communists
(2) Concessions by the
Hong Kong Govt.
Government
(a) A general compliance with the law and
co-operation with Government in
certain cases, e.g. applications for permits; payment of outstanding
rates and other fees to Government; payment of fines by the three
suspended
newspapers prior to reopening; overt
compliance with Education Department
regulations, at least during school
inspections; abiding by censorship
decisions for theatrical and film
performances; complying with health and
fire regulations in comunist owned or controlled buildings;
(b) A general toning-down of the violent
language in the communist prees although material continues to be
published which
is in breach of the law;
(c) The establishment of stricter control by C.C.A. personnel in the
Border area apparently with a view to preventing
serious Border incidents, although
sporadic minor harrasements such as stone throwing at British Security
Forces
still continue;
(d) Leaving the Hong Kong Government shunting engine at Lo Wu free from
posters and slogans since 10th June, 1968.
(a) The cessation of police searches of
Trade Union and other communist premises since November, 1967, except
when major
breaches of the law have occurred.
/(b)
SECRET
CRET
- 2 -
-
(b) The suspension of action on arrest lists
of leading communists who were involved
in subversive activities;
(c) Withdrawal of arrest warrants for
(a)
communists wanted for criminal offences,
except in relation to serious and
violent cases;
The indefinite deferment of civil action
(libel suit) by Government servants against cozaunist newspapers;
(e) Restriction to token enforcement of the
13 conditions which were specially brought
to the attention of communist schools in
August, 1967, by Government;
(f) The remittance of caning sentences on
students imposed on conviction for
serious offences;
(g) Withdrawal of a deregistration notice
served on the communist controlled Paikoo
Dockyard Chinese Workers' Union upon this
body guaranteeing to stay within the law
in future;
(h) A general amnesty in respect of arms,
atrunition and explosives from 15th to 28th January, 1968;
(1) The gradual withdrawal, since May, 1968,
of British Military personnel from forward
positions on the Border.
SECRET
GEN/13/1860
SECRET
Annex 'D'
Other Concessions by the Hong Kong Government
(1) Actual Concessions
(a) Normal storage and distribution charges waived in respect of the
'gift rice' offered to Hong Kong communists by the Kwangtung Provincial
Support Committee and permission given to import part of amount as a
non-commercial consignment and outside the quota. (The Communists have
not in fact taken advantage of this); (b) Re-licensing of the Silver
Theatre on 17th May, 1968, (closed in
June 1967 when it was used for inflammatory broadcasts and the storage
of weapons) although known to Government that new licensee was
representing original communist licence holder; (c) The three suppressed
newspapers allowed to recommence publication
on 18th February, 1968, some two weeks before the expiry of the
suppression orders when it became apparent that the communists were
under the impression that the six months' period of suppression
commenced on the date the original suspension order came into force
instead of the date of the Court's verdict.
(2)
Concessions in the Form of Restraint by the Hong Kong Government (a)
Except when deemed to be in flagrant defiance of the law and
likely to cause a breach of the peace no action taken, as a matter of
policy, against processions, meetings, delegations and
picnics;
(b) No immediate action against inflammatory posters in May, 1967; (c)
Careful limitation of any arrest action and detention under Emergency
Regulations; no attempt was made to arrest C.P.G. officials or certain
senior communists in Hong Kong, although the arrest of many such persons
could have been justified clearly during the violent phases of communiet
activity; (d) No action against the premises of communist banks or
C.P.G.
owned commercial firms, organisations or vessels, although they were
used as bases for violent subversive activity, including
broadcasting of inflammatory speeches and so forth;
(e) No prosecution of the six major communist newspapers, although
they were and still are in daily breach of the law.
/(1) No......
SECRE
7
SECRET
-
- 2 -
(f) No action to close major communist schools, other than the
Chung Wah Middle School where bombs exploded, although there was
evidence of their staff and students' involvement in
violent activities;
(g) No general move to deregister communist unions or associations,
although many have ceased to meet the requirements of the law and in
some cases strong grounds exist, through their involve- ment in violent
phases of last year;
(h) No restrictions placed on the movement between Hong Kong and
China of Communist officials.
(1) Since the beginning of confrontation C.T. farmers have been involved
in a number of incidente on the Border; apart from Sha Tau Kok, these
occurred mainly at Lo u, Ta Ku Ling and particularly Kan Kan To where
they were supported by coolies, also from C.T. and involved attacks on
security forces, the abduction of one Police officer and serious injury
to another and the seizure of hostages and weapons from security forces.
Throughout the tension and dangerous situations so caused, security
forces behaved with great restraint and thus avoided what might have
become a major escalation. During the whole of this time, apart from a
period from mid-October to the end of November, 1967, when the bridge at
Man Kam To was closed following the abduction of the Police officer, no
restriction was placed on the entry of these farmers into B.T. despite
the trouble they had caused.
(1) Arrest warrants issued in December, 1967, for six staff of the
Hon Wah Middle School who failed to pay fines imposed by the courts were
not pursued to the extent of raiding the school or
staff premises;
(k) Rent for a G.I.S. teleprinter in the premises of the Hong Kong
Evening News was waived for the period from 21st August, 1967, the date
of auspension of the newspaper, to 18th January, 1968, the date on which
the teleprinter was repossessed;
(1) Supervision Orders in respect of released communist prisoners
not enforced to the extent of raiding communist premises to effect
arrest when the supervisees fail to comply with the
orders;
CRET
(m) Communists......
+
L
SECRET
-3-
(m) Communists sentenced to terms of imprisonment for offences
committed during confrontation have been granted full
remission of sentence, even though their behaviour while in
prison was such that they did not merit this,
(n) Withdrawal on 3rd April, 1968, of three arrest warrants issued
in respect of a breach of licensing conditions by the commu-
nist Han Yang Theatre on 1st October, 1967;
(6) Arrangements made in June 1968, for a representative of the
Hong Kong Government Waterworks Department to once more cross
into Chinese Territory to agree monthly figures of water supplied to the
Colony although no guarantee as to his safe conduct (in
the event he was subjected on the first occasion to harrassmert by
Chinese personnel);
(p) No action taken to remove an illegal structure built in June,
1968, by labourers from Chinese Territory on British Territory
at Han Kam To;
(q) The release in July and August, 1968, of a total of nine percons
detained under the Emergency Regulations before the expiry of
their respective Detention Orders.
SECRET
+
Flag A
Flag B
SECRET. Covering
TOP SECRET
110
Kr. Wilkinson
HONG KONG
RECFIVED IN ARCIMVES No.51
200EC 1967
FD3/5
In his telegram 1840 of 9 December, the Governor of
Hong Kong suggested that the Chinese might be trying to tell
us that they would be prepared to talk over the whole problem [of Hong
Kong in fairly reasonable terms. In his comments
in Peking telegram 347 of 14 December, the Chargé d'Affaires
said that he thought it much more likely that the Chinese
wanted mutually tacit agreement for a de facto de-escalation
rather than any general discussion with us.
2. I had a meeting with the Commonwealth Office this morning
at which we had a general discussion of the issues involved.
Commonwealth Office have produced a draft telegram which we
have revised and which is now attached.
3. I suggest that the draft might be discussed with Er.
Rodgers at the meeting this afternoon.
M. Redgur.
Deanolds, I ayove
with the telegram.
ре
Jou
Hurry
(James Murray) 18 December, 1967
Whilhnion
18/111.
SECRET comoring
TOP SECRET
1812.67
I have informed To Carter (c...) that the tel. way essure.
paled.
Reisbae.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
F.E.D.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
FD315
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should wi10
reach addressee(s)
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
Despatched
Top Secret Secret
Confidential
Bastriated
En Clair. Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to;;
Mot
HONG KONG
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