نسا
With the compliments of
12
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 7
Mr. W.S. Carter
гра сод OA
CEIVED IN {
ARCHIVES No.31
LONDON, S.V.1.
20 JUL 1967
..
E. Bolland Esq.,
FD!|3
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.7.1.
+
Forster
CONNE PEITIAL
Contos tor
Sir Arthur Galsworthy Mr. Godden
Mr. Bolland (7.0,)
Your minute of 12 July regarding the interview which the Secretary of
State gave to Sir Albert Rodrigues on 10 July.
2. We have recently re-examined with the Foreign Office the question of
making representations or protests to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in
London (paragraph 3 of your minuta); This was in response to a
muɛrastion by Feking that our protests sight also be delivered in Londen
where they would not be subject to the same delays as Mr. Hopson had
experienced in Paking. Our conclusions are summarinod in paragraph 2 of
7.0, telegram Jo.604 to Peking which reads as followss-
"We asked you to contact the Minister of Foreign Affairs inmediately in
order to ensure that the Chinees Central Authorities should be avere of
the seriousness with which ve viewed theas incidents and to make it
clear to them that EX.C, were fully behind the Hong Kong Government in
dealing with them. Ve sextmed you would be able to couray the message
quickly without, if necessary, waiting for a formal interview. Although
we are, of course, ready to pass messages here, we are not able to speak
to any high ranking Chinses an you may be able to do and consequently we
can get no worthwhile de response or feel of the atmosphere as you
clearly did, for example, en 9 July. Shạn Ping acte se s mere
transmission belt and all we get from him is a recital of abusive X.Pak,
statements and People's Daily articles. Furthermore, a message through
Shen Ping will not reach the K.F.A, an quick as one through you. We
think therefore that it is better if we can pass messages through you
unless there is a particular reason fur making representations in
London",
3.
I am sending a oggy of this minute and a copy of
yours to Mr. Bolland (Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Ofrios).
(V.S. Carter)
14.7.67.
COMPADEPTIIAL
KR. CARTER Curtis Green
(COPY)
CONFIDENTIAL
Copies to:
Sir A. Galsworthy Mr. Godden
Sir Albert Rodriques had a good talk with the Secretary of State on July
10th. The object of the visit, as you surmised, was to get some more
positive statement about Hong Kong's future out of the Secretary of
State. Sir Albert argued that the key to the situation was to retain
business confidence and, more important, mass confidence. If people were
continually told that the Chinese were going to come in anyhow some day
and if they did not co-operate now they would be in trouble when the
Chinese did arrive, eventually they would begin to reinsure. As far as
the business people were concerned, there was not much movement of
capital 28 yet, but a lot of them were thinking of moving to Taiwan.
It was important to keep reiterating in positive terms that the British
meant to stay. The Secretary of State authorised Sir Albert to say, if
he thought it necessary on his return, that he had had a talk with the
Secretary of State who had authorised him to say that what Lord Beswick
said in the House of Lords still represented H.K.G's policy.
2.
In a general discussion of the situation, Sir Albert said that the
Chinese were looking for a paper victory. The Hong Kong Government had
won the first two rounds and the Chinese had to find some way out of the
impasse. They had been frustrated at every tum. What worried bin was the
fact that a large number of "bad hats" were now out of work and ready to
make trouble. He thought that the deportation of four or five of the top
leaders at the right moment was probably the best next move. The
Communiste had good organisation but not much in the way of experienced
leadership. If the deportees refused to cross the border or the Chinese
refused to acoapt them, this would be a considerable propaganda victory
for the Government. Otherwise, morale was terrific and he had never
Before found such a response from the ordinary people. Chinese pressure
on water and food supplies had been a great mistake and had alienated
the ordinary people. The police had been quite excellent and, in
consequence, had retained the sympathy of the man in the street.
3. In conclusion, Sir Albert asked whether there was any point in making
protests to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London. Tho Commonwealth
Secretary said that we would look into this, but did not hold out much
hope of getting anywhere by so doing.
SDL
0.G. Forster
12th July, 1967.
Ed (1626)
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FA
Minutes.
27
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Minutes.
FD 1/3
SEE ANNEX
FJ (1626)
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W
Minutes.
25
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TEX
นา
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
24
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers.
13 JUL 1967
10113
Secretary of State has sean.
Su 10
7
HUNG KONG
1 was disturbed by the equivocal tone
and the content of the Commonwealth Secretary's
reply to supplementary questions about Hong Kong
in the House this afternoon. He was asked by
Balniel to state that it was the Government's
intention to maintain the status quo and avoided
a reply. Pressed by Lodds-Parker to give a
categorical assurance, he merely said that we must
fulfil our full responsibilities and obligations
in Hong Kong. Pressed again by Fletcher-Cooke
to give a firm assurance he said that a reply
would not be helpful at the moment and implied
that a firm statement might make things more
difficult for us.
1 can hardly believe that these remarks
will help us at all, either in terms of morale in
Hong Kong or Chinese judgment of our intentions.
I would have read them to imply that we are very
uncertain about the future and are possibly
prepared to consider getting out.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
We shall possibly see in tomorrow's
papers how much damage has been done but when
you have read Hansard you may feel that the
matter is sufficiently serious to raise in
Cabinet.
WTR
William Rodgers
10 July, 1967.
c.c. Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
CONFIFENTIAL
стра Entir
AP.A.
From: P. Nailor, Head of DS22
MINISTRY OF defence Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone; whitehall 7022, ext. 3287
23
SECRET
ET
Cali
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(
and it
DS22
Your reference:
DS22/9B
Выл. ра
Dear Sykes,
IRENEENVEEN IN 1997 & Resubmit
ARCHIVES No.31
1.. JUL 1869
FD1/3
З
چالی
I am sending you separately a copy of my letter of 10th July to Carter
at the Commonwealth Office with our piece for the long-term paper on
Hong Kong (C165/5(67) 1st Meeting). You may agree that this will need
tying in with the Foreign Office con- tribution on the prospects of
American involvement (para. 5(c) of the outline) and, unless you think
the splicing better left to a later stage, we should be glad to see to
it in whatever manner you suggest.
M. Bolla
22/1
Yours sincerely,
Nétéo
RAJyke Chris Howell 10 Pug
11-V" (FOR Peter Nailon) {afailo
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reached me today sur
regrer
K.A. Sykes, Esq.,
Head of Defence Department,
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SECRET
ET
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9
1
With the Compliments of
J522
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall London, S.W.I.
WHItehall 7022
DS. Form 4
From:
P. Nailor, Head of DS22
S SECRET Sa
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1 Telephone:
WHitehall 7022, ext. 3287
10th July 1967
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
DS22
and quote: DS22/9B Your reference:
Dear Carter,
I enclose the Ministry of Defence contribution to the long- term paper
on Hong Kong which Moriarty agreed should come direct to you.
You will see that we deal only with the garrison as the section on
intelligence is being prepared separately by the JIC. We shall also be
in touch with the Foreign Office about paragraph 5(c) of the outline
paper; it is not for us to examine the possibility of American
involvement, but I think this should be mentioned in connection with the
defence of Hong Kong at some point in the paper, in the general context
of trying to define what "identifying aggression" means for third
parties.
2.
I am sending copies of this letter to Sykes and Butler at the Foreign
Office and to Moriarty and Foster at the Cabinet Office.
Yours sincerely Peter Navior
W.S. Carter, Esq., Commonwealth Office, Church House,
Great Smith Street, 3.W.1.
SECRET
SECRET
SOCKET
Reference:
D822/98
FING FAN
TES OF DEPENCE CONTRIBUTION TO KONINGSTAR CIFICE DHAFT
Until recently the Army had 62/3 major units in Hong Kong(1)
which, with supporting units, totalled about 7,300 British and Gurkha
troops; there are also about 1,300 locally enlisted persoanel in toe
Colony, A further Gurkha battalion has now been moved temporarily to
Hong Kong. There are no RAF aircraft normally stationed in the Colony.
The Royal Navy is represented by two coastal mineswe-pers and a frigate.
2. The garrison has three purpose5; to assist the Hong Kong government
maintain order, to help the civil authorities control the frontier and
to identify aggression in the event of an armed Chinese attack.
3. In any internal security situation the Hong Kong government could
normally be expected to defer the direct involvement of troo: as long in
possible. Eevertheless in serious disturbances the garrison, even if not
called on, is easential as moral support for the Hong Kong police and as
a visible guarantee of our inten-
to control the situation. In the event of grave internal disorders most
of the garrison might have to be retained for Enter Bec ty tanka leaving
only a small force available for the frontimi. This would be a
calculated risk as Chinese fi-ssure at the border, right accompany
disturbinoes in Hong Keys.
•
e
ite frotireole the warrison can sexist the pollon to oftus of refugena
oz to control incursions by troulle-
It ent sho. 1imited nilifery threats and would thus astile forcan to
deving and "ount a clearly recogni ant] - I order to invole the Colory,
The garrison could not,
de und Borg Kury gainat a deliberate Invasion. The se evilmstel to have
an vry (41,000 men) within enay nch of Hong Kong, They have a further
amy plus an artillery division (7)%(ken) within 20% silen. They could
also comand the air.
-
F..
Te save detailed plans for the reinforcement of dory Kong by ...ir and
aea from Singapore/"alaysia, but there would probably bé exojatel only
while the situation was still under control or
are, te pone circumstances, to cover a withdrawal.
+
No agould be anlikely to be able to reinforce effectively 1f the
internal situation rot out of control as a result of increased pressure
from Peking, including possibly a nase influx from China into the
Colony: nor could we reinforce effectively in face of outright invasion.
If internal security collapsed
coumetanoes would not favour evacuation. It is unlikely that ilitary
reulotunce could then prevent or much delay a Chinese take-over, after
wich the Chinese would be able to dictate highly unfavourable term of
surrender.
2 Britian battalions, 3 Gurkha battalions, 1 light regiment of
artillery, 1 armoured qar squadron, 1 field engineer squadron
par
Jul, 1751
SECRET
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
ラ
FD
Minutes.
W
EX
22
M.F.P
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
FO
Minutes.
21
See
AXIN
'EX
B.U.SM
34
SECRET
HONG KONG/CHINA
T!
RECEIVED IN
"ARCHIVES No.31
1 3 JUL 1967
FD1/3
I attach a copy of a minute which I have sent to Sir A. Galsworthy and
to the other members of the "Hong Kong Committee".
W.20
2. I think it is going to be up to us in the Foreign Office to keep the
Hong Kong Committee alive and active, and although not all its members
will be direßtly concerned with some of the points raised in this minute
I am working on the assumption that the more we can get them all
interested in all aspects of the problem the greater our chances of
getting the committee to do some useful work.
1
agree.
Aff. de balan
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 July 1967
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1. JUL 1967
FD13
Jír A. Galsworthy
HONG KONG/UNIKA
Mr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him
today.
2. He said that the long Kong Association had not this morning to
discuss what could be done to restors, repert restore, business
confidence in Hong Kong. I said that "restore" implied that confidence
was being lost and Er. Keswick agreed that this was so. He said that a
number of fastanses had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu-
facturers saxing enquiries about transferring their activities to
formoss, or even to this country. The loss of eonfilence, he said, want
all the way down from managesent to labour. The ordinary worker, who"
was being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate
himself to the clearly changing times.
3. Mr. Keewiex said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Exsoutive
Council now in this country, expected to call on the Commonwealth
Jearetary on Xonday next, 10 July.
He was likely to sar Mr. Bowden to make a public statement either in his
own nuze or in that of X.1.0. making it clear tout ve intended to stay
in Hong Kong and were not going to be intimidated by Chinare threats.
Kr. ..oiriques night sok Kr. Bowden to make it clear that we were
staying certainly until 1997 when the leases on the Leased Territories
expire and that even then we would not expect tamely to walk out but
would seek to renegotiate the lease.
I said that speaking personally I doubted very such whether my minister,
or H.X.G. collectively, would be prepared to ba committed to 1997 or
beyond. (Mr. Laswick sencurred). Again speaking personally, I did think
however that given our obligations to the people of Hong Kong H.X.G.
might be prepared to consider a publić statement to the effect that
present Chinese tactics were not going to frighten us into running away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign
ships in Chinese porta. with referanse tɔ the two recent incidente in
Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans
and posters and their officers and erev seereed and intimidated. Mr.
Laswick's own view was that in spite of thes- difficulties we shouli no:
curtail or abandon our shipping trade with China but he said that a new
consideration had arisen in tast the Merchant Shipping Officers Union
(this may not be their exact title) were
SECRET
/becoming
Je Shorthand (persis)
it Bollya
P.A. 26%,
اکام
(ه
ебіс
"17"
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese
ports. Kr. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether
it would advisable to spread the word around in shipping oirales
throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be
subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently
suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Feking that a
general boycott of Chine by foreign shipping mig:t be in the offing.
I suggested that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in
mindi
6.
(4)
that sinos, as far as we know, so far only British ships had been
affected, the Chinese would know immediately that the international sove
had been instigated by us and that they sight take it out on us by
banning British shipping altogether. In such circumstances couli Mr.
Keswick and his associates rely on the solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to to it only through shipping channels or would they expect
some help from us? I explained that it waO technically quite feasible
for us to have the appropriato menuage spread around in shipping eireles
throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such
official action by H.M.G. would help or not.
Mr. Leswick unlertook to think these points over and let me know.
7. I also asked Kr. Keswick both in relation to Hong Kong in particular
and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to
sabait to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed
out that, quite apart from what might happen in liong Kong itself,
further Chinese mob setion, for instance against our mission in Peking,
night raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatis
relations with China, I explained that our present view was that we
should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China
was so fluid that a change of policy there might easily take place and
perhaps it might be for the better. Mr. Keswick fully concurred. At
first he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within
China in six months; he then
SECRET
corrected.
STORET
corrected himself and said that his long experience of Chinese affaire
had taught his that what might rationally be expected elsewhere to take
a given time would take three times as long in China. He therefore
substituted sighteen months for six.
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 July, 1967
20
Go:des toi Mr. Hall, C.O.
Mr. Peck
Mr. Uwart-Bigge (2 copies) Kr. Bolland
5102ET
SECRET
Sir A. Galsworthy
HONG KONG/GITNA
Kr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him
today.
2. He said that the Hong Kong Association had met this morning to
discuss what could be done to restore, repeat restore, business
confidence in Hong Kong. I said that "restore" implied that confidence
was being lost and Mr. Keswick agreed thạt this was 80. He said that a
number of instances had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu-
facturers making enquiries about transferring their activities to
Formosa, or even to this country. The loss of confidence, he said, went
all the way down from managenent to labour. The ordinary worker, who was
being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate
himself to the clearly changing times
3. Mr. Keswick said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Executive
Council now in this country, expected to call on the Commonwealth
Secretary on Monday next, 10 July. He was likely to ask är. Bowden to
make a public statemɑnt either in his own nane or in that of 8.3.0.
making it clear that wa intended to stay in Hong Kong and were not going
to be intimidated by Chinese threats. Mr. Rodriques might ask Mr. Bowden
to make it clear that we were staying certainly until 1997 when the
leases on the Leased Territories expire and that even then we would not
expect tamely to walk out but would seek to renegotiate the lease.
4. I said that speaking personally I doubted very auch whether my
minister, or H.X.G. collectively, would be prepared to be committed to
1997 or beyond. (Mr. Keswick concurred). Again speaking personally, I
did think however that given our obligations to the people of Hong Kong
H.M.G. might be prepared to consider a public statement to the effect
that present Chinese tactios were not going to frighten us into rumning
away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign
ships in Chinese ports. with reference to the two recent incidents in
Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans
and posters and their officers and grew voereed and intimidated. Mr.
Laswiek's own view was that in spite of these difficulties we should not
surtail or abandon our shipping trade with China but he said that a new
consiisration had arisen in that the Merchant Shipping Pping Officers
Union (this may not be their exact title) were
JEORST
/becoming
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese
ports. Er. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether
it would advisable to spread the word around in shipping oireles
throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be
subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently
suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Peking that a
general boycott of China by foreign shipping might be in the offing.
6.
I sugested that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in
winds
(=)
that since, as far as we know, so far only British ships had been
affected, the Chinese would know immediately that the international sove
had been instigated by us and that they night take it out on us by
banning British shipping altogether. In such circumstances couli Hr.
Kaswick and his associates rely on the solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to do it only through shipping channels or would they expect
some help from us? I explained that it wLE technically quite feasible
for us to have the appropriate message spread around in shipping ciroles
throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such
official action by H.M.O. would help or not.
Coswick undertook to think these points over and let me know
7. I also asked Mr. Loowiek. both in relation to Hong Kong in particular
and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to
submit to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed
out that, quite apart from what might happen in Hong Kong itself,
further Chinese nob sation, for instance against our mission in Peking,
might raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatic
relations with China. I explained that our present view was that we
should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China
was so fluid that a change of policy there night easily Mr. Kesriek take
plase and perhaps it might be for the better.
At first he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within
China in six months; he then
SECRET
/corrected
SECRET
sorrected himself and said that his long experience of Chinese affairs
had taught him that what night rationally be expected elsewhere to take
a given time would take three times as long in China. He therefore
substituted eighteen months for six.
(A.J. de la Xare)
6 July, 1967
Copies to:
Mr. Hall, C.o.
Kr. Pack
Kr. Zwart-Bigge (2 copies) Kr. Bolland
SECRIT
SEORET
Sir A. Halsworthy
HONG KONG/CHINA
Mr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him
today.
2. He said that the Hong Kong Association had net this morning to
discuss what could be done to restore, repeat restore, business
confidence in Hong Kong - I said that "restore" implied that confidence
was being lost and Mr. Keswick agreed that this was so. He said that a
number of instances had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu-
facturers making enquiries about transferring their activities to
Formosa, or even to this country. The loss of confidence. he said, went
all the way down from management to labour. The ordinary worker, who was
being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate
himself to the clearly changing times.
3. Ir. Keswick said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Executive
Council now in this country, expected to call on
He was the Commonwealth Secretary on Monday next, 10 July. likely to ask
Kr. Bowden to make a public statement either in his own name or in that
of H.M.G. making it clear that we intended to stay in Hong Kong and were
not going to be intimidated by Chinese threats. Mr. Rodriques might ask
Mr. Bowden to make it olear that we were staying certainly until 1997
when the leases on the Leased Territories expire and that even then we
would not expect tamely to walk out but would seek to renegotiate the
lease.
4. I said that speaking personally I doubted very much
her any minister, or B.M.G. collectively, would be prepared to be
committed to 1997 or beyond. (Mr. Keswick concurred). Again speaking
personally, I did think however that given our obligations to the people
of Hong Kong H.M.G. might be prepared to consider a public statement to
the effect that present Chinese taotios were not going to frighten us
into running away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign
ships in Chinese ports. with reference to the two recent incidents in
Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans
and posters and their officers
Mr. Keswick'a own view was and crew coerced and intimidated. that in
spite of these difficulties we should not curtail or abandon our
shipping trade with China but he said that a new consideration had
arisen in that the Merchant Shipping Officers Union (this may not be
their exact title) were
/becoming
SECRET
bey
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese
ports. Mr. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether
it would/advisable to spread the word around in shipping circles
throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be
subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently
suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Peking that a
general boycott of China by foreign shipping might be in the offing.
6.
I surgented that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in
mind:
(a) that since, as far as we know, so far
only British ships had been affected, the Chinese would know immediately
that the international move had been instigated by us and that they
might take it out on us by banning British shipping altogether. In such
circumstances could Mr. Keswick and his associates rely on the
solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to do it only through shipping channels or would they expect
some help from us? I explained that it was technically quite feasible
for us to have the appropriate message spread around in shipping ciroles
throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such
official sotion by H.M.G. would help or not.
Mr. Keswick undertook to think these points over and let me know
7. I also asked Mr. Keswick. both in relation to Hong Kong in particular
and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to
submit to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed
out that, quite apart from what might happen in Hong Kong itself,
further Chinese mob sation, for instance against our mission in Peking,
might raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatic
relations with China. I explained that our present view was that we
should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China
was so fluid that a change of policy there might easily Mr. Keswick take
place and perhaps it might be for the better. fully concurred. At first
he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within China in
six months; he then
/corrected
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.