4295
+ 112 4800
4613
187
9410 9356
54
Primary Schools and Special
253
233
-
20 2112
1734
378
2365 1967
398
Classes (10)
Night Schools (7)
W.C.E.P.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
Schools
CONFIDENTIAL
64
36
-
28
659 543
- 116
485
321
- 164 1208
900
300
3866
3768
98
318
356
38
906
474
432
5090
4598
-
492
1402 1300
- 102
1402
1300 102
-
123
106
17 123
106-
-
17
Total Schools
(46)
679 680
+ 111628 |11134
-
494 5777
5512
265
1514
901
-
61319598
18227-1371
including night
schools (11)
N.T. Schools (4)
Correspondence & Fine Art Schools (2)
--
GEN/14/368/50
C
COMPARATIVE FIGURES
-
1967-1968
CIRCULATION OF COMMUNIST NEWSPAPERS
APPENDIX 'D'
S.F. W
April 1967
March 1968
Ta Kung Pao
27,000
17,000
Wen Wei Pao
24,500
18,000
New Evening Post
44,000
53,000
Ching Po Daily
74,000
44,000
H.K. Commercial Daily
80,000
54,000
Cheng Wu Pao
42,000
27,000
Afternoon News
13,000
10,000
Tin Fung Daily News
10,000
10,000
H.K. Evening News
35,000
15,000
349,500
248,000
CONFIDENTIAL
I
F
I
|
CONFIDENTIAL
GEN/14/368/50
CONFIDENTIAL
C
F
O
APPENDIX 'E'
VALUE OF IMPORTS FROM CHINA
1964-1967
G.F. 10
1964
1,969.9 million H.K. $
1965
1966
2,322
million H.K. $
2,769
million H.K. $
23% of Colony's imports 26% of Colony's imports
27% of Colony's imports
1967
2,282
million H.K. $
22% of Colony's imports
CONFIDENTIAL
FAN
With the Compliments of the
¡ RECEIVED IN
Political Advi ARCHIVES No.31
Hong Kong
- 5 APR 1968
FDI1
TS 1/3/1168/47
TOP SECRET
345
January 25th, 1968.
(44
I enclose a copy of a paper prepared by the L.I.C. on the present policy
and tactics of the Communista here and possible developments in the
future. It has been seen and approved by the Governor.
2.
I am sending a copy to James Kurray in the Foreign office who was
present at our discussions on the paper. I
200 an also sending a copy to Reg Hibbert in Singapore.
(T.A.K. Elliott)
trany.
I have been hearing this in my
Much the same grommet
imm
auspatch from the Soumer
dorfling
1.5. Carter, ssq., 0.V.o., Commonwealth office, London, 8,#.1.
Certusl
to thish the C.O. whe
rfly, both to be usculature wi
Whitehall in que
CAMAGE.
По
TOP SECRE
By Are the
F
|
RECEIVED IN TOP SECRET.
ARCHIVES No.31
- 5 APR 1968
File Ref: GEN/14/368/16
Page No. 1 of 12 Pages Copy No.2 of 30 Copies
Special Branch,
Hong Kong Police.
344
Date: 15th January, 1968.
Communist Confrontation with the Hong Kong Government
Possible Future Communist Policy and Tactics
Introduction
Since the start of confrontation the communist
effort in Hong Kong has followed a series of phases, some
more violent than others. It now seems clear that one
major phase has just ended and we are about to enter
another. This paper examines briefly the present stage
in confrontation and communist policy for the immediate
future; it also attempts to assess the tactics the
communists may use to implement their policy.
Present Situation
2.
The Police action against the trade unions, which
started in mid-July, disrupted the communist labour
movement to a large extent. Members were apprehensive
about visiting union premises in any large numbers and
many leaders went into hiding. Communist trade union
representation in Government Departments, essential services
and the key industries of the Colony was severely
depleted by the dismissal of employees who stopped work in
support of the communist strike call. However during
the last month there has been steadily increasing
activity in union premises, the number of members
attending meetings is growing and efforts are being made
to attract to the unions those members who did not obey
/the.....
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*6008179-67. 317
TOP SECRET
the calls for strike action.
Page 2
Many union leaders have
emerged from hiding and efforts are now underway to
rebuild the Federation of Trade Unions control structure
which existed prior to July, 1967.
3.
While much emphasis has been placed on the role
of students by the communist propaganda machine, they were involved only
to a relatively small extent during the
early stages of confrontation. A number of inspections
of the major communist schools by Education Department
passed off without any serious breach of the directives
which had been issued to the schools by the Director of
Education but from September onwards there was an increasing use of
students in "bomb" incidents, culminating in an explosion in the Chung
Wah School which led to its
closure by Government. Political indoctrination and
subversive teaching in the schools is continuing at a high level and
there is little doubt that they are fostering a
hatred for any form of lawful authority in the Colony.
Nevertheless, there have been a number of pointers
recently that the schools are returning to something like
pre-confrontation conditions; fees have been paid for a
small number of students to enter the Hong Kong Chinese School
Certificate examinations, despite open criticism by the schools of the
"slavish examination system", and one Headmaster has openly proclaimed
that, although his school
still supports the "struggle", he has no intention of
abandoning academic studies.
4.
Although three of the nine communist newspapers
are currently suppressed, the communists still have a
forceful propaganda machine. Of late, the newspapers have been somewhat
more moderate in their terminology, but
/articles.....
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+
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Page 3
articles in breach of the law are still published and
their virulent anti-Government propaganda continues
unabated. Communist press circulation has slumped badly
(from 340,000 pre-confrontation to 207,000 now) and there
has been a corresponding swing of readers to the anti-
communist press. In an attempt to remedy the situation
the newspapers have decided to give less prominence to
confrontation news.
5.
Of the other propaganda media, probably the
most effective at present is Radio Villa Verde in Macau
which broadcasts attacks on the Hong Kong Government
several times a day. However, these have toned down
since the middle of December in line with the local press.
In general, Hong Kong affairs attract little attention
from the China Mainland broadcasting stations, but from
time to time Radio Canton and the Kwangtung Provincial
Station, put out propaganda broadcasts on the Hong Kong
situation. The use of "mosquito" newsheets containing
inflammatory material has declined considerably but
propaganda items, such as calendars bearing anti-salinity
cartoons and pamphlets, resembling banknotes, attacking
devaluation, are still distributed frequently to the
public.
6.
A return to more normal conditions in communist
banking and commercial concerns has been apparent for
some time. Since the 1st October celebrations communist
officials have attempted to resume at least some of their
former contacts in local business circles and return to
pre-confrontation banking transactions. The more blatant
propaganda material has disappeared from many China Products
shops where trade is now believed to have risen to about
/70%......
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317
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Page 4
70% of the pre-confrontation level.
7.
Since the first week in December there has been
a marked decline in bomb incidents, and no genuine
explosive devices have been planted since 25th December.
The number of hoaxes has also decreased sharply, accompanied
by an absence of any reference to violence in the local
communist press.
8.
Since the conclusion of the border negotiations
there has been no further serious incident, and the
P.L.A., which seems anxious to maintain a firmer control
in the area, has made some attempt to restrain the
militant elements in Chinese Territory. However minor
incidents, including frequent stone throwing, continue
and could lead to a serious clash.
9.
Gestures of support for the local communists by
the Chinese authorities have continued to be mainly of
a moral nature rather than tangible assistance. The
"Kwangtung Provincial Committee to Support the Hong Kong
compatriots", formed in Canton in November, has done
little but make promises of unspecified assistance,
although initially providing a useful boost to communist
propaganda within the Colony.
Communist Policy
10.
As early as September, 1967, there were definite
indications that the more moderate local leaders,
including some C.P.G. appointees, and a faction in China,
felt that the violent stage of confrontation should come
to an end. Indeed immediately prior to the 1st October
celebrations, acts of violence almost ceased. Waves of
/bomb.
TOP SECRET
TA
GJ. $17
TOP SECRET
Page 5
bomb incidents resumed soon after, and it appeared that
the militant elements were, once again, the predominant
force. However there were significant signs that the
communist authorities were becoming more aware of the
economic realities of the situation; the supply of water
was resumed on schedule at the beginning of October,
C.P.G. banking and commercial concerns received instructions
from China to restore normal business and the long term
nature of the struggle was given more emphasis in
statements of local communists published in the press.
11.
At the end of October the majority of the senior
C.P.G. appointed local officials left the Colony for
China for what has become a protracted stay. At the
beginning of December secret and delicate sources indicated
that other officials, who had paid short visits to Canton
in November, had studied important policy papers on the
confrontation whilst in the city. The papers apparently
advocated some form of de-escalation, but it was clear
that these officials felt that explaining such a policy
to the masses involved considerable difficulties. A few
days later the Deputy Director of the local N.C.N.A.
Branch, who had been in China since October, returned to
the Colony. Reliable intelligence, at that time, indicated
that he had been in Peking and had later held an important
meeting in Canton on confrontation with a senior member
of the C.P.G., probably CHOU En Lai. Immediately
following his return, the communist press ceased to refer
to violence. It is now known that he had received a
directive from the authorities in Peking that local
violence must cease, and a long term "political" struggle
was to be waged against the Hong Kong Government, based
on the intensified study of MAO's works.
TOP SECRET
/12.......
09170
4170 4ər, 317
TOP SECRET
Page 6
12.
By the third week in December the new policy.
line was being passed to the lower ranks in all fields of
communist influence. The explanations for this change in
tactics varied according to the extent to which the
audience had been involved in violence; these ranged
from a blunt admission that the use of force had been
wrong in local circumstances, to statements that a victory
had been won and consequently emphasis should now be laid
on the political aspects of the struggle. Local leaders
went to great pains to ensure that the new policy was
implemented, and the recent marked decline in bomb
incidents, and the absence of any form of violent
demonstration has shown that a measure of control has now
been enforced.
13.
A further and perhaps more important development
was revealed in a recent statement by a local communist
Leader to the effect that the authorities in Peking are
now exercising direct control over communist activities
in the Colony. He asserted also that the new policy of
non-violence had been brought about by economic factors.
The latest instruction from China, apparently issued at
the beginning of January, calls for an urgent and
comprehensive report on the progress of confrontation
during the last two months, including a genuine survey of
public opinion on this matter. There are strong grounds
for believing that this report will be used in Peking as
a basis for formulating future policy on Hong Kong •
14.
Reaction to this new policy among communists in
the Colony has, of course, varied. The initial feeling
was one of bewilderment, followed by some resentment
among the more militant cadres, but by a sense of relief
/among..
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Go88570 - Kur. 117
+
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Page 7
among the moderates that the violent phase of confrontation
had ended.
The next phase of confrontation
15.
It is too early even 'to guess what decision the
Peking Government will reach as a result of the report
referred to in para. 13 above. So long as the Cultural
Revolution continues in China and particularly in
Kwangtung, it will be difficult for them completely to
disengage from opposition to the Hong Kong Government.
It is clear that the local communists here have no
intention of abandoning their long term aim of obtaining
a victory over the Hong Kong Government similar to that
achieved in Macau. Hard intelligence shows that the
communist leadership realise that they must consolidate
their own ranks, and obtain a wider measure of support
from the local population if any progress is to be made.
16.
It seems likely that, for the time being,
communist organisations will stay within the law, at
least overtly, in an attempt to avoid giving Government
a reason for taking action against them. By means of
study groups, family visits, and extensive propaganda
they will seek to re-assure their supporters they have nothing to fear
from Government, in an attempt to lure
them back to active participation in communist activities.
The exception to this overt "compliance with the law" is
likely to be the communist press which, although
considerably milder in tone than it was at the height of
confrontation, is still publishing articles that are in
breach of the law. These newspapers may well feel that
they are safe from Government action providing they do not
/increase..............
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67. 117
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Page 8
increase their current level of attacks on Government.
The press remains not only the major propaganda weapon
of the communists, but also their main channel of
communication with "the masses" and it is known that they
have been instructed to present more credible propaganda
in an attempt to revive their daily circulation.
it is stressed that these policies may change quickly
when the report referred to in para. 13 above has been
assessed in Peking.
17.
However,
A period of intensive study of the Thoughts of
MAO is underway, with study groups, large scale meetings
and exhibitions at communist premises. This campaign will
continue and expand, at least in the foreseeable future;
the aim in the words of a senior local communist, is to
"make the whole Hong Kong community red" and "Hong Kong a
socialist society and the population a big school of the
Thoughts of MAO Tse Tung", The probable results of this
campaign, in practical terms, are debatable, but it should
not be forgotten that the continual study of the "little
red book" breeds fanatics with no respect for law and
order.
18.
The "friendly hand and the smiling face" will
become a feature of a united front campaign to remove the
communists from their present isolated position in the
community and to increase their influence over as wide a
sector as possible. Prominent citizens will be the target
of social and business approaches, and among the workers
moves are underway to persuade them to return to the
unions. The communist labour movement can be expected to
resuscitate its many welfare benefits, and is already
conducting a wage increase campaign, in conjunction with
/the......
TOP SECRET
KP. 217
TOP SECRET
Page 9
the communist press. Emphasis will be placed on the
exploitation of social and economic grievances, both real
and alleged, and the communists will support any issue
which they feel will ingratiate them with the public and
arouse antagonism against the Government. In the latter
case Government must expect to be misrepresented and its
employees subjected to subversion and vilification, in
particular the Police Force will be a main target for
attack.
19.
The workers who obeyed the various communist
calls to strike will, undoubtedly, present the communist
leadership with one of their main problems. Paying out
"strike" money on an indefinite basis, will present a
serious and continuing drain on their resources and there
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.