FEBRUARY, BUT TO DELAY ACTUAL DEPORTATION UNTIL
WE HAVE HAD A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE CHINESE REACTION TO OUR LATEST
PROPOSAL ST PRESIMABLY THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD BE COMMITTED
/10
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIA I.
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 231 TO HONG KONG
-2-
TO CARRYING THROUGH THE DEPORTATION BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED VISIT ON
22 FEBRUARY: BUT WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS A MAJOR DIFFICULTY.
鹿
I (280)
3. WE AGREE WITH PEKING TELEGRAM NO.106 THAT AN ATTEMPT TO PUSH TWO
UNWILLING DEPORTEES ACROSS THE FRONTIER MIGHT WELL BOOMERANG,
AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THEREFORE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE
TWO EITHER TO SIGN SOME FORM OF WORDS OR AT LEAST TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS
ORALLY TO BE SENT BACK TO CHINA.
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!.
HONG KONG
6 February 1968 (F)
A
REGLIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.51 | 1C FEB 268
I
FOSITI
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 221 of 6 February, repeated for
information to Peking.
Peking telegram No. 96: Prison Visits.
F313210 Has there been any reaction from N.C.N.A.?
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IMMEDIATE
Telno 150
3 February, 1968
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CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated for information to Peking.
16/2
telegram No. 150 of 3 February,
reply sent
p.a.
Not Reed
Your telegram No. 192:
Communist Prisoners.
roposed scheme of operations:-
Following would be our
(a) Te would put the two prisoners into solitary confinement and ask
them to sign a statement broadly on the following lines:
'I .
as a supporter of the Chinese People's Government, have given great
thought to my present position in H.K. and now wish to be offered the
opportunity to cross the border into the Chinese People's Republic.'
We would make it clear to them at this stage that if they were released
to China they would not be permitted to return to Hong Kong.
(b) Whether or not they signed, we would at once approach the China
Merchants Steam Navigation Co. contact; tell him that it was our
intention to release the film stars to China and that we would be
resenting then at the border at a specific time and date; and ask him to
inform the border authorities requesting them to accept the prisoners.
If he asked us directly whether they would ever be allowed to return to
H.K. from China, we would reply in the negative; but we would not
volunteer the information.
(c) Unless clear and positive indication were given to us from the
Chinese side that the filk stars would not be accepted in China, we
should present them at the border accordingly; if they were refused, we
would return them' to detention.
(d) There is a possibility that the Communists night demand to interview
the prisoners before indicating whether or not they would accept them:
This we would have to refuse,
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/(e) We would
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2.
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG Telno 150 to COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-2-
(e) We would not propose to initiate any publicity for the operation if
it went smoothly, but we should of course
work out a propaganda contingency plan against the event of a breakdown
or leak, and in order to ensure that the incident did not do too much
damage to the credibility of the
deportation weapon.
There is a problem about timing. The prisoners receive regular
fortnightly visits of which the next is due on 8 February. Since these
visits provide an obvious opportunity for their political friends to put
pressure on them, it is plain that we should aim to get the operation
completed in the period between visits. It seems doubtful if we could
carry the whole lun through in the five days between now and 8 February;
I should therefore be inclined in any case to postpone action until
then.
5. It occurs to me, however, that the situation has now somewhat
changed. The purpose of these moves (apart from Hong Kong's interest in
getting rid of as many Communist supporters as possible) is:-
FE 3/3 (10)
(a) To test whether it would be worth attempting to pursue the proposal
to exchange Grey for Hsueh. But judging from the interview reported in
Peking telno 98 to Foreign Office, it seems clear the Chinese intend to
extract the last ounce of value from holding Grey and that to offer the
film stars may achieve nothing except to risk an unfavouracle reaction
and further demands;
(b) To start a train of moves which hopefully would lead to F23/3204
some amelioration of the Peking Mission's situation.
But
from Peking telno 72 to Foreign Office it now looks as if there is a
chance that the Peking Mission's movements problems can be settled
without bringing in Hong Kong, and it might be risky to complicate the
issue by proceeding with the film star operation at this particular
moment.
In raising these doubts, I do not wish to suggest that I am unwilling to
proceed I an very ready to do so. Apart from our 'Good Riddance'
argument, we have to face the problem here that a number of prisoners
who were convicted during the early days of the disturbances here had
deportation orders made against them, and that these are due to be
carried out when the prisoners are released in the next month or two.
(The first release is on 19 March.) So we cannot indefinitely postpone
testing the deportation weapon, although we could rescind the orders on
individual cases where the behaviour of the persons concerned justified
it, we could not hope to do this in all cases.
/5. I should
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HONG KONG Telno 150 to COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
5.
I should be grateful for your urgent views and those of Peking.
F.ü. please pass Immediate Peking as mytel 50.
Sir D. Brench
[Repeated as requested]
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