litere mez O
mazdance effect. On 29 June the Communista
also organised a four-day strike of food distributors.
was only partially successtol but they did manage to prevent
1
supplies of fresh food reaching Hong Kong from China.
This
2. The attitude of the Chinese Government appears to have
changed little during this period. The policy they are
advocating for the local Communists in Hong Kong still appeara
to be the gr
support coupled with
demonstrations of their power by organising strikes. They do
not yet appear to have taken any decision to force an immediate
British withdrawal. The latest Chinese Government pronounce-
ment on Hong Kong was an editorial in the "People's Daily" on
5 July (Peking telegram no. 825 attached) which sought to
represent the strike as
mplied that strike
action was expected to continue. The only new and significant
point about this editorial was the emphasis it placed on the
/"crimes"
SECRET
I
SECRET
2
This is an undisguised threat to those Chinese who have
supported the Hong Kong Government. It is likely that
intimidation of such Hong Kong Chinese will be a major
feature of the Communists' campaign from now on and it could
be a difficult one to combat.
3.
Two official committees have now been set up to advise
on Hong Kong. One as part of the
to produce an interim and longer term study on the
prospects for Hong Kong and on what action we should take
depending on various possible developments. The other,
under the
Office, is
planned as a directorate at Under-Secretary level to co-
ordinate action on Hong Kong and consider ways in which we
can maintain the confidence of our friends in Hong Kong and
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KON3 (0.A.G.)
X117
(159
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 3 JUL 1967
FDI|1
Cypher
D. 12 July, 1967. R. 12
10162
IKMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 1014
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
H
H
Peking No.408,
11
H
POLAD Singapore No. 234,
ра
palag
Repeated
Washington No.224,
Canberra No.60
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
Sitrep as at 12.00 hours 12 July.
There were again disturbanças, en Hong Kong island
Wanchal, following
in the easton areas of Korth dỡ the same pattern as the previous two
nights. A curfew was imposed on the shi
northern shore of the island from ed by midnight. The Wah Fung emporium
at North Point which was again a focal point for rioters, was damaged by
fire.
2.
During the late afternoon there were attacks on buses in Kowloon, By
1830 on the island determined attempts were being made to stop public
transport, the main trouble areas being Wanchai and Korth Point. Many of
the more active members of the mob appeared to be dismissed transport
workers and a degree of control was exercised by four motor cyclists all
subsequently arrested. The crowds again adopted hit and run tactics with
the police, using Communist premises as refuges. Police and public
transport were stoned; bottles, including some filled with quick lime,
were flung or dropped | from buildings and a number of minor fires were
started. Police used both tear gas and denli ams to re-establish control
but there were only minor casualties. An explosion near a pelice vehicle
was probably caused by a home-made bomb which may indicate that these
weapons are now to be used in
Towards midnight, a fire broke out in the ground floor of the Wah Fung
emporium. Firemen were hampered by bottle throwing but with police
protection succeeded in putting it out. The ground and first floors were
damaged. The cause is not certain but it could have been tear gas
missiles. By mignight the situation was quiet and it has remained so
except for a further case of bottle throwing from the Wah Fung store
this morning directed at a police patrol removing posters.
CONFIDENTIAL
B.
3.
CONFIDENTIAL
Public transport has again been normal this morning having stopped at
21.00 hours on the island yesterday There has been one case of
intimidation reported and
there is no doubt that considerable apprehension is building up among
transport workers about the present trend of eventa.
4.
There have been a total of thirty-two arrests
on the island during the last twenty-four hours. Two of these had been
wounded by gun fire and one by falling off his motor bicycle, There were
no police
casualties.
5.
The Communist press today gives prominence to protests about the arrest
of the N.C.N.A. reporters and alleges deliberate police action to danege
Communist premises. Right-wing papers unanimously call for stronger
Government measures.
6.
There is every indication that the Communist plan to continue with and
extend their present campaign of Tiolence with the police and public
transport as the main targets. They obviously believe that these tactics
have given them the initiative which they intend to exploit.
((Passed as requested)
(Advance copies passed to Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson, Bolland and
Denson, Foreign Office (F.E. Dept.),
Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Glorer,
News Departnert Downing Street.)
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CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. K. MacLellan
158
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (O.A.G.)
RII?
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No. 31 12 JUL 1967
FDI ||
Cypher
D. 11 July 1967
R. 11
++
0800Z
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
No.1006
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated to:
Peking No.405
POLAD Singapore No.231
Washington No.223
Canberra No.59
(S. of 3. please pass PRIORITY to all)
My telegram No.999,
·156
po
}
PD13/80
A
Sitrep as at 11200,
Trouble again broke out in the Eastern District of Hong Kong Island
about 2230. Once again the Wah Puang China Products Company emporium and
other CPG-owned buildings in the area were involved. The pattern was
similar to the previous night. The crowd, never particularly large,
dispersed into alleyways on the arrival of police and reformed
elsewhere. AB before, few, if any, members of the public joined in.
Busea
tras stopped and burned. During this incident * and killed. Attempts
were made to set fire to buildings, including a clinic, and also to
vehicles; windows were smashed. The police were constantly bombarded
with stones and bottles, the latter often being dropped from above from
the Wah Fung emporium and other CPG-owned buildings in the area. Some
were reported to contain acid. The situation was restored by about 0200,
except for a further short attack with bottles on a police working party
at about 0500. Kowloon remained relatively quiet.
2. Police ammunition expenditure was mainly tear gas shells and
cartridges, some of which had to be fired into buildings including the
Wah Fung emporium to discourage bottle throwers. Ball ammunition
expenditure was one round each from a carbine, 38 revolver and a Greener
gun. Police casualties
F
were three injured and admitted to hospital and 18 slightly hurt. One
civilian was killed (stabbed) and another injured and admitted to
hospital. There were eight arresta in the whole Colony, including this
injured man. Among them was a NCNA journalist (see my telegram No.1002).
3 Despite the attacks on public transport yesterday there was no
decrease in the numbers of buses and trams running today. Police are
providing patrols for routes.
(Passed as requested)
(Passed to DSAO for Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary, Mr.
Glover (c.o. Nowe Dept.) Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland, Wilson and Denson
(F.0. F.E. Dept.)
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#
Mr. Bolland
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CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
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Commonwealth Office
S.W.I.
ARCHIVES No.31
HWB 13/7
11 JUL 1967
7 July, 1967
159
کھلی
7.
Dear Eddie,
Foll
its
Toom, 10
I enclose a copy of despatch No.1164 of 23rd June 1967 from the Governor
of Hong Kong reporting on the principal developments in Hong Kong during
the period 15th December 1966 to 4th June 1967. We are arranging to
print it.
2. Te shall be sending a formal reply in due course. to make:
(a) Paragraph 16, third sentence in the phrase
Te
I have two comments
"compel Paking to intervene militarily in Hong Kong", I think that
"directly" would be a better and broader description of what we have to
fear than "militarily".
(b) Paragraph 20
+
the despatch is dated 23rd June.
Interruption of food supplies has since occurred for four days from June
29th.
Please let us know if you have any comments for incorporation in our
reply.
Yours
Bunny
(W.S.GARTER)
I have no additurias comments. I alloch a dratt, reply.
Who brime
E. Bolland Egg Foreign Orrife, Whitehall, London, S..1.
..
7
SECRET
MELIG OF. IN
Ref: SCR 1/4841/55
SECRET
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG.
No. 1164
sir,
DUPLICATE
I have the honour in this despatch to attempt a review of certain major
events which have affected Hong Kong since my last periodic despatch
dated 15th December, 1966, up to th June, 1967
2.
The progress of events in China has continued its shadow on the Colony,
The imposition at the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967 of some
measure of control over the youthful and hitherto totally
finen kou vuls at first encouraged a less anxious mood amongst residents
here. However, by the early spring, events in China and the apparent
inability of the regime to control "Red Guard" mobs effectively even in
Peking re-aroused apprehension about what the future held for China and,
by extension, for Hong Kong.
3.
In the spring of 1967, the situation did not look too dangerous. By the
end of March, border incidents (mainly matters of commune officials
across the border chasing refugees into British territory), which had
earlier in the year created Fome concern, ceased. The military takeover
of the administration in Kwangtung province came to be seen as a measure
for ensuring stability in the province and therefore very welcome from
The Canton Fair which took place from
mid-April to mid-liay, while not particularly successful in business
terus, was taken as a sign of a reasonable degree of normalcy in
Kwangtung. However, a number of fairly minor events which occurred
within the Colony and which suggested the possibility of a repetition
here of the crisis in Macau still gave cause for alarm.
4.
In 1966, for the first time in many years, events in Macau had beco
On 15th November a scuffle took place on Talpa Island between the Macau
police and pro-Communist supporters over the illicit reconstruction of a
Communist school, The pro-Communists in Macau took up the matter as a
major issue, perhaps largely because of the encouragement given to
revolutionary militancy by the Cultural Revolution in China; but perhaps
also because they may have genuinely feared that the incident indicated
a A hardening of the Portuguese policy toward the Communists. new
Governor of Macau arrived on 25th November and soon thereafter was
besieged by a series of delegations from various pro-Communist
organisations demanding cẻ domen and satisfaction for the incident. The
situation rapidly deteriorated and calm as eventually restored only
after eight Chinese had been shot dead and well over a hundred injured.
THE RIGHT HONOURABLL
HIERERT BODEN, C.3....., M.F.
/5..
SECRET
CHIEF PEGISTRAR'S OFFICE 27 JUN 1967
TH
E
SECRET
2
5.
There then began a period of nearly two months of negotiations
Portuguese for a settlement. The local Communist leadership in Macau
demanded public apologies by the Governor, dismissal of certain
officials, and compensation for those killed and injured and those who
had suffered loss; while the C.P.G., through the Kwangtung Foreign
Affairs Bureau, reinforced these demanda and added one of their om, the
cessation of Kuomintang activities in Macau and the handing over to
China of seven K.L.T. agents arrested by the Portuguese in 1963. A
policy of conciliation at almost any cost eventually had to be accepted
b. the Portuguese Government. Towards the end of January an agreement
was reached that the Kacau Government would issue a formal apology for
the two incidents, recognise the guilt of the officials concerned, pay
compensation amounting to the equivalent of over hk 2 million, hand over
the seven K.K.T. agents and take action to restrict K.M.T. activities
271 Macau in future. Today, although the administration of the Colony
remains nominally in the hands of the Portuguese, it is quite clear that
their authority to impose their vill, at any rate on supporters of the
C.P.G., has almost entirely disappeared.
6.
Although Hong Kong's involvement in all this was minimal, the
implications of the
re-instantial. It appeared that the C.F.0. still conside ed that the
advantage of having Macau (and hence Hong Kong) under sliedenistration
were too important to sacrifice and that they had deliberately avoided
taking back Hacau, but had used t】 the dispute to seduce more limited
alm K.E.7. activities an ufluchce in the Province and the imposition of
the maximum degree of hur For tuguese authorities. A vere obvious
Lessons YOW here in
7.
By
the elimination of
the
The first demonstration that these lessons of kacau had been learnt by
the Communits in Hong Kong came in pe
and Maroj pon, under pressure from the Hong Kong Seamen's Union
(H.K.S.U.) the Royal Interocean Line (R.I.L.) management was compelled
to apologise publicly and dismiss the captain of one of their ships, who
had shot and wounded four Chinese members of his crew whilst in
Australia. In April pro-Communist workers in a number of other companies
began to put pressure on the
ats and a new spirit
of militanoy amongst the rank and file became obvious. at the same time
it became clear that pro-Communist leaders had released the tight
control which they had hitherto exercised over their union members and
were, in accordance with the precepts of the Cultural Revolution,
allowing the
r freedom to
le". The pro- Communist prose was also becoming increasingly abusive,
attacking the Government on a variety of grounds but particularly over
the issue of visits of American ships and servicemen to the Colony.
8.
In these conditions there was grave danger that a comparatively minor
issue would stret
cozialration. The spark as provided by a dispute which arose in April in
two artificial flower factories where the management
/ was
SECRET
8063460 0.T. 316
SECRET
- 3-
was trying to impose more stringent work schedules. On 6th May
disturbances broke out outside one of the factories in Kowloon and as a
result 21 persons were arrested (including the Chairman of the union
concerned with the artificial flower trade), The next day, the union,
which was later backed by the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions
(F.T.U.), made four demands to the Government - the release of all those
arreated, the punishment of those responsible and the payment of
compensation, a guarantee of workers' safety and finally that the police
should not henceforward interfere in labour disputes. This was followed
on 11th May by further disorders in which 143 people were arrested. On
each occasion, the police were forced to intervene after repeated
warnings when the crowd refused to limit its behaviour to peaceful
picketing.
9.
In the early stages of the crisis which followed, up to lup kay, the
trouble was confined to le
It was supported by paid hooligans and centred on the courts in which
those arrested on 6th and 11th Hay were being tried, around the
artificial flower factory, and in a resettlement estate near by. The
police behaved with reat restraint and, with the aid of nick cur ews on
th lay, succeeded in restoring order. Altogether 556 people were
arrested; 28 Police and 39 others were injured. The only fatality was a
bystander killed by a stone.
10.
On 15th Hay, the situation took a more serious turn when a statement was
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking condemning the
British Government and authorities in Hong Kong for acts of brutal
suppression and fascist atrocities in collusion with the United States.
It also listed five demands which were to be accepted unconditionally
and immediately. These included the immediate acceptance of the four
demands of the Hong Kong Unions, the release of all those arrested in
Hong Kong with apologies and compensation, the cessation of all Fascist
measures and a guarantee against any recurrence of such incidents.
11.
On 16th Hay, as the trouble in Kowloon began to subside, the focus
shifted to Hong Kong Island as the result of the presentation to
Government House by pro- Communist delegations of petitions supporting
the "five demands". Seventeen Hambers of the All Circles Anti-
Persecution Struggle Committee, which had been formed as the ostensible
spearhead of the agitation for acceptance of the "demands", twice
appeared outside the gates of Government House demanding, in an
offensive and peremptory way, to see me. When this was refused, the
temper of the demonstrators became hotter. The numbers of delegations
quickly grew and their members became increasingly arrogant, demanding
and noisy. quantities of posters were affixed to the gate at the
entrance to the Government House grounds. By 20th May, crowds of over
3,000 were involved and, being denied immediate access to Government
House, spread out into the city creating trouble wherever they went,
egged on by inflammatory and anti-European broadcasts over loud speakers
from Communist-ormed concerns particularly the Bank of China. The climax
came on 22nd May hen a major
/trial ....
SECRET
DOOSANI O F. JH
SECRET
4
trial of strength took place. Twice the crowds tried to break through
the Police cordons round Government House and a well planned but poorly
executed attempt was made to dramatise police brutality by the
manufacture of false victims and the maximum exploitation of real
casualties. Elsewhere in the city dangerous crowds built up and traffic
was brought to a standstill when bus drivers abandoned their vehicles
blocking all the major roads, while there was renewed trouble in
Kowloon. A night curfew was declared in the north of Hong Kong Island,
and measures forbidding any public procession or meetings.ithout police
approval were brought into force. Order was restored and, with this, it
could be said that the first violent phase of the confrontation with the
Communists had ended. The police had behaved with exemplary restraint
despite bearing the full brunt of Communist propaganda and being exposed
over long periods to deliberate provocation. The total number of arrests
had risen to 816. Casualties were now 35 Police and 83 others injured,
but there had been no further fatalities.
12.
The Foreign Secretary's strong protest to the Chinese Charge' d'Affaires
on 19th Kay had most valuable bac¶ on mort during this critical period,
while the arrival of Sir Arthur Galsworthy, Mr. Bolland and ir. Carter
on 21st May served to emphasise H.b.G. 's complete support for a do
cermina uron
13.
Our own counter propaganda at the time achieved considerable success in
demonstrating the limited support on which the Communists would rely.
The campaign to get individuals, institutions and communities to declare
their support for law and order evoked a moi with well d
their support to Government. Fund which rapidly built up
sou na et
ally pledging So. too. aid the Police Education
llion as a gesture of
thanks to the Police for thei" successful action in controlling kuce.
The countering of rumours, the encouragement of resistance to
intimidation and the exposure of the more blatant Communist claims ere
also tackled successfully.
14.
It must now have become clear to the Communist hierarchy here that they
lacked the broad base of support fron which to intimidate tl:e
Government.
They had
live, but could not afford to alienate the Chinese majority who, despite
their innate patriotism, had demonstrated their disinterest in indeed,
abhorrence for any forcible
-
change in the status quo.
15.
A new phase therefore opened on 23rd May, when Communist tactics
switched to the labour field and a series of token strikes began in all
public transport and utility companies as well as in other concerns
where Communist influence predominated. This policy was backed by
intimidation and increasingly virulent propaganda in the local Communist
press, by posters and over mainland Chinese radio stations, the police
still being the main object of attack. The stoppages were successful in
that they succeeded in keeping the dispute before the eyes of the public
without, however, inconveniencing anyone greatly or disrupting the life
of the Colony seriously. The policy could be said to be effective within
its limited scope, but it was essentially defensive in nature though it
carried the threat of major strike action in the future.
SECRET
/ 16
6003160 G P 316
SECRET
5
16.
The battle is now one, on our part, to preserve public confidence in our
ability to maintain control here (which is what all but a handful
desperately hope we can do); and, on their part, to break this
confidence down and persuade or terrorize sufficient numbers into
compliance with their commands. Neither ve nor the Communists have much
freedom of manoeuvre. On our side, we cannot afford to provide a casus
belli which would compel Peking to intervene militarily in Hong Kong or
provoke an unauthorised intervention by extremists in Canton. We have,
therefore, to proceed very carefully in our action against the press,
unions and particularly against the C.P.G.-owned concerns which provide
the direction and backing for the local Communists. On the Communist
side, they must at all costs gain more support amongst the general
public. They cannot do this by causing disturbances which upset the life
of the Colony; on the other hand, they cannot allow the issue to drop
even temporarily. Their situation has been worsened rather than improved
by the ambiguous terms of the editorial in the People's Daily in Peking
on 3rd June. This, though arrogant and offensive, appeared to lay
emphasis on the need to plan for a long drawn out struggle with the
definite implication that the local hierarchy cannot expect active
support from China other than by way of propaganda.
The danger is that the more militant rank and file may take this
editorial, which was given wide publicity here, at its face value and
see in it an encouragement to further action, thus making it more
difficult for the more moderate of Communist leaders to exercise
restraint.
17.
A second major factor is the situation in China. Accounts of disorder
approaching anarchy continue to come in. It may become increasingly
difficult for Peking to exercise
hotheads, both here and
in Kangtung. There is al rays the possibility that extremists in Canton
might try to come to the aid of their fellow countrymen here, in
defiance of Peking. However, the Chinese Army is the authoritative body
in Kwangtung and it exercises firm control over the border area. This
would Beem to lessen the likelihood of such action.
18.
It is too early as yet to assess with any accuracy what effect the
present confrontation with the Communists will have on the economy. If,
as appears likely, it continues for some time, the consequences could be
seri damage done to Hong Kong's reputation
eff twent centre for foreign and local business alike will continue
until some sort of accommodation (tacit or otherwise) with the
Communista is reached which can be seen to have some degree of
permanency.
19.
There has been no noticeable effect as yet on exports and, provided that
the present Communist-inspired stoppages are not switched from utility
services to the industrial sector, there is no reason why there should
be any significant loss of exports. In this main sector at least the
economy should remain strong. The tourist trade, however, is likely to
be affected to some degree depending on whether any more disturbances
occur.
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.