15.
The Auxiliary Air Force has been called out since 11 May so as to
provide "spotter" assistance for the police with its helicopters.
16. Every effort has been made to maintain contact through
intermediaries with individual Communists of influence. While at present
little can be achieved through these channels it is clearly important to
keep them open.
(Passed as requested and advance copy
for Sir Saville Garner)
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Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SPORET
+
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FO1/1
83
Cypher
D. 24 May, 1967. R. 24
1300Z.
ps
FLASH SECRET
No. 688.
Repeated
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
"Peking No. 261. * POLAD Singapore No. 126. H Washington No. 137.
(Please repeat
PRIORITY to all).
人
-zv
(82
My telegram No. 680 (not repeated).
Following from Galsworthy.
Following is our analysis and appreciation.
In the present state of overspill from the Cultural Revolution and given
the Chinese propensity at this time for irrationality, we cannot be sure
what are China's intentions towards Hong Kong or how they will react to
any given situation. With this reservation, as seen from here it does
not look as though Peking intends at present to force us out of Hong
Kong. Our assessment is rather that the local Communista felt that they
must act here increasingly in accordance with the principles of the
Cultural Revolution (one of the "sins" of the Hong Kong Government is
that it had "limited" the effects of the Cultural Revolution in Hong
Kong), and accordingly seized the incident at, inter alia, the
artificial flower factory as a suitable opportunity for doing so. This
seems to have been a mistaken initiative by the local Communists,
representing their response to their understanding of current trends of
thought in China, rather than a policy deliberately directed from
authoritative mainland sources. But once the local communists had
committed themselves, Peking, on the basis of misleading reports of the
local situation, felt not only that the must react in support, but also
that they could exploit the situation in order at least to humiliate us
to such an extent as to ensure that in future we would be much more
quickly sensitive to Peking pressure (e.g. over U.8. warships), and if
possible to force us to accept a Macao-type situation.
2. This situation is therefore essentially political. Although it arose
from a genuine labour dispute, it could as easily have arisen from any
other incident involving the Authorities here. From the cutset the
original labour dispute was taken over and exploited by the Communist
press and organisations. Although the management, belatedly, sought the
assistance of the Commissioner of Labour in settling the dispute, the
Communiste rejected his efforts, maintaining as a matter of principle
that the Government has no status or role to play in labour matters.
13
SECRET
SECRET
3. The local Communists seem to have misjudged the temper of the general
public in Hong Kong, which has shown itself strongly opposed to the
imposition of a Macao-type situation on Hong Kong, and, with Government
encouragement, has been aurprisingly out-spoken in its support for
Goverment's measures to frustrate Communist pressures and maintain law
and order. There is evidence that the Communists (both local and
mainland) have been taken aback by the strngth of public opposition.
After their earlier demonstrations in Kowloon had incurred much public
odium because hoolganism was encouraged and took over, they switched to
the Macao pattern of endeavouring to humiliate the Governor within
Government House. When this failed, they resorted to fomenting disorders
in the central district of Victoria, encouraged by venomous inflammatory
loudspeakers, principally from the Peking-owned Bank of China. In the
face of firm police action and public disapprobation, these tactics
ceased on Tuesday 23 May, which appears to have been a day of
reappraisal by the Communists. Today 24 May the emphasis is on a number
of stoppages (unrelated to any industrial dispute) in the bus and tram
services. So far this action has been reasonably orderly; but there is
evidence of strong feeling amongst several Communist unions that more
violent
methods should be used in order to create incidents which can be
exploited.
4. On the other hand there are indications of some disillusionment and
disagreement in the local Communist leadership;
some are reported to be feeling that they have to some extent blundered
by exposing themselves too early, by misjudging public reaction, and by
underestimating the efficacy of Government's response.
5. If however Communists decide to prese their campaign vigorously,
their most likely tactics aeem to be:-
(a) Engineering stoppages in public utilities, Government
Departments, etc., accompanied by intimidation on a considerable scale.
(b) Provoking the police by fresh and more violent
riotous demonstrations using women and children as a screen (as in
Macao).
(c) Maintaining a general atmosphere of tension, e-ge by
use of loudspeakers, poster and press campaigns, intimidation by
telephone and letter, spreading rumours, and propagandist Red @uard
style demonstrations on the frontier.
(4)
-
Attempting by all available means to subvert and intimi- date the
police, and over-stretch their resources. (e) Assaulting exposed
Europeans and well-disposed Chinese.
The kind of situation envisaged in paragraph 5 above, if it were
vigorously sustained over a period of, say, two to four weeks could lead
to the exhaustion of the police and of the troops, who in these
circumstances would of necessity have been called in (they have not been
yet), Before this point was reached, over-extension of e security forces
would require them to be used in smaller numbers at each incident; they
would then have to use greater force to restore the situation; this
would cause mounting casualties and loss of life, and hence a vicious
spiral of exacerbation.
SECRET
SECRET
7. This raises the question whether the local Communists capable of
sustained and vigorous enough action to over- extend and exhaust the
security forces. By themselves they probably are not. But the perennial
danger especially in Kowloon and parts of Hong Kong Island, is that any
rumpus draws a crowd, and any crowd can quickly become a mob. Communists
have in fact used this technique already (paragraph 3) and could revert
to it again. If they did so systematically and on a wide acale, we would
need to take very tough measures to avoid being swamped.
The
8.
To deal successfully with all this, it will be crucial to maintain
general public confidence (which task will get more difficult the longer
the crisis lasts), and particularly the confidence and morale of the
police. We must continue to show firmness and steadiness here, backed by
reaffirmations of H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government's
measures (this latter is vital). We must strive to retain the initiative
in Hong Kong, which we have now secured, to help to show that public
confidence in us is not misplaced. We must be prepared to counter-attack
selectively, taking care to avoid so far as possible direct challenges
to the Peking Government of a sort that would oblige them to intervene
more actively.
Passed as requested with advance copy
for Sir Saville Garner and to F.E.D.)
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Consular Sept.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
7365)-Mr. Henn 7163)-Major Koo 5131) N.0.2.
SECRET
REGISTRY
No.
L
CYPHER
REPETITION OF TELEGRAM
(1) Telegram Section,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
(Despatched).
YT 4
25/1 79.
198
Please repeat to the posts shown below telegram No. 678.
from 40. Hong Kong.
te....
کرد
M.
dated..
0.25 may (81
No.....
(Date). 25
No. 33/
No..........
No........
No......
No.......
En-clair:
Code
Cypher
(2) Division CONCERNED (FOR ARCHIVES).
K.R.
(Signed)......
(Dept.) for Res Clark
2575-
(Date)....
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 21
301
FD!/1
FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 24 May 1967 R. 24
04352
82
PRIORITY SECRET No.680
containing
For Garner from Galsworthy.
Your telegram No.1000.
pa
오라
I am sending later today three telegrams
(a)
our analysis and appreciation of situation;
(b) summary of measures already adopted
by Hong Kong Government to deal with situation;
(c) recommendations concerning further
measures which may have to be taken.
2. These telegrams are being prepared in close consultation with
Governor and C.B.F. and are endorsed by Bolland.
Distribution
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Cory sent to Rm. 9%
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COʻKONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 25 May 1967
R. 25
0550Z
** FIVED IN FAPT HIVES No.31
- 1 JUN 1967
FAC
81
FLASH SECRET No.69*
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
"Peking No.267 (C.0. please pass)
ра
Following from Galsworthy for Forster.
उँ
Please ensure S. of S. has following information before Thursday
D.O.P.C. meeting. Reference paragraph 4 of appreciation in our telegram
from Hong Kong No.685.
aph
S. of S. will wish to know that evidence 18 accumulating from several
sources in touch with pro-Communists that high level Communist official
from Cauton has arrived in Colony to investigate situation. The reports
indicate that Peking are gravely dissatisfied with local Communist
apparatus for their conduct of recent events. Local leadership is
reportedly being criticised for misjudging and misreporting the extent
of their own support, of public opposition to themselves and
determination of the Government. There are less reliable reports that
they are also being criticised for inflating and miзreporting the nature
of the "Pascist atrocities" and generally for the way in which they have
misled Peking. It appears likely that this man's mission is to report to
Canton and to advise on whether a further, all-out effort should be made
against Hong Kong or not. Loss reliably, he is reported to have
instructed that, pending a decision, some form of pressure should be
maintained but that no serious incidents should be fomented.
2. Another (and curious) development is that Ho Yin is now in Hong Kong.
It will be recalled that he is a prominent pro- Communist millionaire in
Macao who, having played an important part initially in the crisis
there, was thought to have been discarded. He has apparently now
returned to some degree of favour with Peking. He is said to have been
seen by Chou In-Lai in April.
3. It appears that he has come over on the auggestion of R.C. Lee (one
of the Governor's intermediaries) and with the approval of Canton where
we believe he might have been yesterday. He has been having
consultations with the "millionaire wing" ofr the Communist leadership
here (who are known to be disturbed oa two counts, first that Peking
were not happy about the escalation, second, because the campaign was
not going well). He has indicated a desire to make some direct contact
with Cater on the Governor's staff: and we are hoping that a meeting
between
/Cater
SECRET
SECRET
Cater and Ho Yin, with R.C. Lee and another Chinese friendly to us, will
take place at 4.30 this afternoon at the Hang Seng Bank building. (Ho
Yin's brother is connected with this bank
4. Frobably nothing but courtesies will emerge from t meeting today. But
it could be that Ho Yin may be probing (either for his own reasons or on
instructions) for some face saving gesture to enable the Communists to
disengage.
The Governor has instructed Cater to go to the meeting primarily to
listen. But if this or subsequent meetings go well, Cater has been
authorised to make certain points:-
(1)
(2)
that the Governor, knowing a need to save face would arise, had already
deliberately permitted demonstrations outside the main gate of
Government House which were allowed to reach a degree of unruliness
before being stopped that would not otherwise have been allowed (this
was in fact one of the Governor's reasons for tolerance):
that a positive indication of good faith will be required of them, such
as the physical removal of the loudspeakers from the Bank of China
building:
(3) that he felt it probable the Governor would not
wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the
last few days provided all Communist action now ceased, although he
could not of course intervene where charges had already been laid:
The
(4) that, before going on leave, the Governor night
in a television or radio interview make a generally conciliatory (though
not of course apologetic) reference to recent events, including the
theme of no victimisation. major part of the subject matter in any such
interview would be references to general progress in Hong Kong,
including kention of steps to be taken to improve labour relations.
The Governor has some other ideas which could be held in reserve! the
above seems enough for a start.
5.
Governor, however, has also asked me to emphasise that too much should
not be made of these developments and that, although all is quiet today,
Hong Kong is by no means out of the wood.
6. All this provides a further strong reason for not taking action
against N.C.N.A. in London.
7. During this lull, though Governor has been preparing for tougher
measures he has not had to use any. Since publication yesterday of
regulations dealing with inflammatory loudspeakers, there have been
virtually no such broadcasta. Governor had not therefore yet had to
declare any buildings closed areas.
It is good that he has these measures still up his sleeve. It is
important to recognise that, if the Communists decide after this lull to
have another go, Governor may have to hit them with all he has got.
8. Bolland would be grateful if copy could be passed at once to Private
Office, Foreign Office.
SECRET
/(Passed
SECRET
(Passed to Resident Clerk and Private Office, Foreign Office)
(Passed to Peking an advance copies to Hessrs. de la Mare
and Wilson)
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זו
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it
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Mr. Denaon
軒
Kr. Foggon
Treasury
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11
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Major Koe
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Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
INWARD TELFORAN
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFIC (The Secretary of State)
S
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
24 MAY 1967
FO1/11
FROM MONG KONG (Information Servicea)
En Clair
D. 23 May 1967 R. 23
+643Z
ро
(80
PRESS
Hong Kong enjoyed a day free from serious incidents today. There were no
demonstrations and the main focal point of the "propaganda" war, was the
battle of loudspeakers in Central district where Government equipment
drowned public address broadcasts from the Bank of China. It is
estimated that Communist broadcasts are being made from seventeen or
more places in the Colony.
It was announced, towards the end of the day, that people who allowed
their property to be used by broadcasts by public address systems for
incitement to violence may (repeat may) be prosecuted.
Public transport has operated normally in Kowloon, but on Hong Kong
Island vehicles of the China Motor Bus Company did not (repeat not)
appear on the streets. Taxia and trams are r'mning normally.
Rumours about a water cut-off have been circulating, but there is no
(repeat no) basis for then. And Government have warned people against
paying heed to malicious rumoura.
Government has also acted against those who are trying to persuade young
workers to join demonstrations by intimidation. Details will soon be
announced of how threatened workers can reglater for new jobs.
This morning Government House announced that the British Government
stood four square behind the authorities in its determination to
preserve peace in Hong Kong.
The statement said Sir Arthur Galsworthy brought with him fullest
confirmation of Britain's support.
On the labour front, a management and workers of the Hong Kong
Artificial Flower Works met this morning at the Labour Department and
agreed in principle to reopen the injection moulding department of the
factory as soon as possible. It was also agreed that re-employed workers
would receive compensation and terms and conditions in force at the time
of the close down would stay the same.
of the two hundre.. and three people arrested yesterday on Hong Kong
Island one hundred and ten have so far been charged. Total arrests since
disturbances began until eight o'clock this morning stood at seven
hundred and eighty one and six hundret and seventy one have been
charged.
For Boxall above cable sent.
(Passed to Resident Clerk)
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D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson Denson
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Kr. Foggon
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Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. C.H. Henn Major Koe N.0.2
SECRET
INWARD TELEGR U
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 23 Kay, 1967. R. 23
+
13152
117 @
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31.
24 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
0/11
IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 678.
Bides.
1.
Da
4/25/
Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).
"Peking No. 255.
Repeated
H
"P.A. Singapore No. 123.
* Washington No. 134 (8. of 8. please
pasa PRIORITY to all).
My telegram No. 663. -FD 1/1/72
SITREP as at 232000 hours.
It has been a quiet day on both Hong Kong and Kowloon The effective
measures taken by the Police yesterday and the new restrictions on
processions seem to have robbed the Communist leadership of the
initiative.
2. There has been a proliferation of loudspeakers broadcasting from
Communist offices and stores. Though they have limited themselves to
tape recordings of extracte from newspapers and of music, they are a
potential danger and steps are being taken to prevent their use. The
main loudspeaker system in the Bank of China has been successfully
jammed all day.
3. There has been increased industrial activity. The China Motor Bus
Company remained on strike on the Hong Kong side and the Communist trade
union in the Tram Company staged a walk-out in sympathy this evening. in
bringing the tram workers out: union members continued to work. brief
protest strike in shipyard.
Intimidation played a part but most of the right wing There has also
been one
4. There have again been numerous rumours of a water shortage and of the
P.L.A. maesing on the border. The management of right wing and neutral
factories were rung up
during the morning and told that since the C.P.G. was definitely going
to take over here and the British were preparing to evacuate, they had
better change their policies. An official and categorical denial of this
was made over the radio.
5. Right-Wing posters have appeared in a number of places in Kowloon and
in two towns in the New Territories. There is, however, no sign at egent
of strife building up on a large scale between these two factions.
Whe
6. A crowd, 2,000 strong and including 300 soldiers and some militia was
seen on 22 May in China near the border. military element fixed bayonets
and paraded up and four near the border. The numbers involved are not
unusual though the
SECRET
/presence
SECRET
presence of armed soldiers 18. This demonstration was clearly designed
for Hong Kong consumption.
7. A major conference has been taking place all day long between
representatives of all pro-Communist and sympathetic unions and circles.
Their prolonged deliberations may indicate that they are somewhat unsure
of what to do next. The Communist leadership is thought to be opposed to
strikes which will inconvenience the population as a whole since they
see their major task is winning more public support. Nonetheless the
most likely development is more industrial action, backed up with
intimidation of both workers and management.
(Passed as requested)
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