on what has not been done.
7. I had hoped to avoid personalities in this account. It is, however,
impossible not to refer to the prominent part played by Mrs. Elsie
Elliott, a school teacher who was elected to the Urban Council in 1963
and since then has filled the role of chief censor of Government. It was
Mrs. Elliott who organised, and fanned, the opposition to the increase
in ferry charges, by collecting signatures and encouraging
demonstrations. And it was Mrs. Elliott, and her counsel, who for long
periods monopolised the attention of the Commission of Enquiry. She was
accused by one witness of bribing a youth to foment a riot; she
countered with an equally improbable allegation that the police had
manufactured the riots in order to discredit her. Eventually, Mrs.
Elliott was held to be in contempt of the Commission for blatantly
failing to disclose the source of the information on which she based her
allegation against the police. One section of popular opinion still
holds that she was unjustly persecuted; more thinking people regard her
as slightly off her head; but mud always sticks and she has succeeded in
giving the impression to many that the police, who acted with a
restraint that was favourably remarked upon at the time, are brutal and
corrupt.
४. There is no evidence that these disturbances were inspired by outside
political influences. Indeed, although the local Left-wing Press gave
mild support to the agitation against the increase in ferry fares, it
denounced the riots and (in striking contrast to the stand it look after
the 1956 riots) made no attempt to complain about the effectiveness of
the methods used to suppress them.
9. Indeed, the colony's position vis-à-vis the CPG could be said to be
reasonably satisfactory. It is now clear that a review of Chinese policy
towards Hong Kong followed President Johnson's decision in the early
summer of 1965 to commil greatly increased numbers of troops to the
Viet-Namese theatre. The conclusion was apparently reached that although
the colony was an integral part of China, and must sooner or later be
returned to it, it would not be in China's economic or political
interests if it were taken back now. Hence even if the Viet-Namese war
were expanded, Peking would wish the status of Hong Kong to remain
unchanged. But there were three basic conditions: Hong Kong must not be
used as a base for "aggression "either against China or against
Viet-Nam, and "patriotic workers and organisations "in Hong Kong must
not be
persecuted ".
10. Almost immediately afterwards, by an unfortunate coincidence, a
United States military aircraft taking 70 soldiers back to Viet-Nam from
leave in the colony crashed in Hong Kong harbour with much loss of life
of those on board. Chinese reactions were quick and harsh. A Note handed
to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking contended that Hong Kong
was increasingly being used by the United States as a base of operations
for their war of aggression and that this was an increasingly grave
threat to Chinese security. Unless Her Majesty's Government immediately
stopped "all the activities of the United States aggressor forces in
Hong Kong" they would, in the familiar phrase, "bear full responsibility
for all the consequences arising".
**
11. The violent wording of the protest created the impression that
Peking was determined once again to make things difficult for Hong Kong.
Official Chinese complaints were made at the same time about two further
incidents and the local Left-wing Press began a campaign against United
States activities of all sorts in the colony. There was however no
sustained effort to bring about a change in the Hong Kong Government's
policy and, although the local pro-Communist Press continued to complain
whenever large United States ships arrived in the harbour, it became
clear that these protests were becoming a matter of routine. During the
last nine months there has been no formal Chinese protest against United
States military activities in the colony.
SECRF1
SECRET
3
12. Any incident which could possibly be construed as support for the
idea of "Two Chinas" has remained a constant potential irritant in
relations between Hong Kong and the CPG. In fact, as Peking is certainly
well aware, Hong Kong has continued to achieve great success in
suppressing the most important and most dangerous nationalist activity
here, which is the use of the colony as a base for sabotage activities
against the mainland. Between April 1965 and May 1966 over 70 Kuomintang
Intelligence Service agents were arrested; and several large illegal
caches of explosives and offensive weapons. often stored in crowded
areas at great risk to the safety of the public, have been seized by the
police.
13. Few other of the traditional (if trivial) bones of contention
between China and the colony have caused trouble. Indeed the Chinese
have on several occasions taken positive action to co-operate with the
Hong Kong Government at a working level.
14. In the economic field the Chinese have made great efforts to expand
their trade with the colony, now their largest export market in the
world. In 1965 their total exports to Hong Kong increased by 17 per cent
over the 1964 level, and over the first eight months of 1966, despite a
slight recession in exports during the first two quarters, there was a
further 11 per cent increase as compared with the previous year. At the
same time the CPG continues to invest in the colony, largely in retail
trade. By mid-1966 there were for instance some 34 large department
stores trading solely in mainland products.
15. In short, although the intensification of the war in Viet-Nam
initially resulted in greater sensitivity on the part of the Chinese
about United States activities in Hong Kong, there has been no sign at
all recently of increased aggressiveness by local pro-Communists in
other directions,
16. It is a question how far this policy will be affected by the most
recent developments in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The appearance
in the middle of August of the Red Guards, and their initial rampage
through China, were watched with fascination and apprehension in the
colony. Chinese visiting the mainland from Hong Kong were reported to
have had their hair forcibly cut and to have been made to discard their
Western-style shoes and clothes. The Red Guards announced that Hong Kong
would henceforth be named Ch'un Ti- "Expel Imperialism City".
17. But by the beginning of October nothing had happened to suggest any
change in Chinese policy towards Hong Kong. One or two minor incidents
occurred on the frontier in the month following the emergence of the Red
Guards; nevertheless, there was fairly clear evidence that the Chinese
authorities were determined not to let the situation get out of hand.
For the time being realism still seems to be the basis of Chinese policy
towards Hong Kong.
18. In this somewhat delicate state of equilibrium any major
constitutional changes in the colony are out of court: this is generally
accepted by responsible opinion. There has, however. been a growing
interest in the machinery of Government and a growing criticism of some
of its aspects which, though ill-informed for the most part, indicates
that further steps are desirable to promote better understanding between
the Administration and the people: differences in culture and language
will always be a barrier requiring unusual measures to overcome. It is
probable that feelings of this kind, whether conscious or unconscious,
were in the minds of some of those who took part in the riots: others
were mere hoodlums, It is nevertheless easy to assert, and virtually
impossible to rebut, that one of the principal causes of the outbreak
was Government's indifference to, and neglect of the wishes and
aspirations of the people.
19. Against this background I have recently tried to stimulate public
interest in the possibilities of improving the system of local
government, which, as one outcome, may permit an increased measure of
popular participation, and so ought, in theory at least, to increase and
strengthen the links between Government and people. The political
implications of a development of this nature are, of course,
considerably less significant than corresponding changes in the
structure of the Central Government. But, political considerations
apart, the introduction of a more up-to-date and effective system of
local government ought to offer substantial administrative and other
advantages.
7620
SFCRET
SECRET
20. There are formidable difficulties to be overcome before any
effective changes in this system can be made. A major factor is the very
novelty of the concept that the mass of the population should take an
active part in any processes of government. This concept, indeed, is not
in keeping with the traditional Chinese view of the proper relationship
between government and governed and, while times are changing, it is
possible that the popular response to the requirements of the new system
will be slow: it is even possible that this response will be
unfavourable.
L
21. One of the arguments put forward against the increase in ferry fares
was that it would cause an inflationary spiral". This argument could not
be justified by the trivial increase proposed but it was said to be part
of a general pattern of rising prices and economic depression; and it
gained ground among those who had been affected by the events of the
early part of 1965 when two Chinese-owned banks failed and there was a
run on others. I referred to this briefly in my last despatch but it was
not then possible to assess the situation fully.
22. The lack of confidence in Chinese banks did not cease with the end
of the run, and it was not until a controlling interest in the largest
(and, in fact, onC of the soundest of these banks had been voluntarily
offered to and acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, and certain others had received support from that bank, the
Chartered Bank and Government, that a still uneasy calm redescended on
the banking world sad the process of rebuilding confidence began.
23. In retrospect, it can be seen that the break had come in consequence
of an over-rapid expansion of credit and of the unsound leading policies
of certain banks, of over-speculation in real estate and of
over-speculation in stocks and shares a picture similar to that in many
other financial centres during the last year or two.
24. These events constituted a considerable check to progress. Something
of a credit squeeze developed, partly because of the relative slump in
real estate (many developers being left with unrealisable assets in the
shape of completed or half-completed schemes); partly because the
financing of small industry and business was disrupted by the loss of
deposits experienced by the smaller Chinese banks, their normal source
of credit; and partly because banks as a whole became cautious, and
eager, not only to restore, but also to increase their liquidity.
25. It seems probable that economic growth, which had in recent years
been in the range of 10 per cent to 14 per cent a year, fell to
somewhere round 6-7 per cent (which, to the business world, appeared
severe depression). These circumstances affected not only the
development of trade and industry but also revenue receipts. Both
economic activity and revenue began to recover somewhat towards the end
of the year. The final out-turn of the public accounts for 1965-66 was a
deficit of £84 million, the first deficit since 1960,
26. The 1966-67 Budget forecasts a further deficit of £12 million, in
spite of increased taxation (including the first increase in income tax
since 1950) designed to produce an additional £54 million. Economic
recovery appears, however, to be accelerating again (a spectacular
increase in tourist traffic being one of the elements) and it seems
likely that while there will be a deficit, it will not be as large as
forecast. Even the real estate market is showing some signs of recovery
at the cheaper end. Business confidence is returning and the existence
of a state of depression is no longer an article of faith in the
business world.
27. There has continued to be a substantial inward flow of funds,
although partly, but only partly, offset for a time by an outflow to the
United States during sterling's difficulties. Bank deposits have
continued to grow reasonably fast. although their policy on advances is
still cautious. In the year ended 31st August, 1966. deposits rose by 14
per cent but advances by only 3 per cent. The liquidity ratio of the
whole banking system is now 48 per cent against 29 per cent prior to the
bank run of February last year.
28. Throughout this difficult period there has been constant pressure on
Government, and a constant temptation, to use surplus official funds
held abroad to buttress the ailing parts of the economy, in particular,
the real estate market.
SECRET
SECRET
5
This has been resisted; even the deficits have been financed by running
down official deposits with commercial banks in Hong Kong. It has been
painful medicine for the economy, but it has been fast-working medicine.
Events have administered a powerful purge, which has, I believe,
restored our body economic to a healthy state from the overstrained and,
in some sectors, unsound position it was in 18 months ago. While the
process was painful for many, progress, although slowed down, was never
brought to a halt and, while wages and employment in the over-inflated
construction industry came down to earth, the general level of wages and
employment has not been adversely affected. And, while economic growth
is unlikely ever again to reach the spectacular levels of the early
1960s, we have now, I believe, a more solid base for steady expansion-
always provided the channels of international trade remain open and
there is no worldwide slump.
SECRET
I have, &c.
TRENCH.
FED
Ref: SCR 1/4841/55
Nc. 2879
Sir,
SECRET
CHIEF REGISTRAR'S OFFICE 2.; DEC 170
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, DEPENDENT TERRITORIS
DIVISION.
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG.
‹ December, 1966.
1
I have the honour in this despatch to atte: pt a review of the principal
developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic
despatch dated 23rd April, 1965.
2.
The main excitement was undoubtedly the three days of rioting in April
this year. By the standards of other countries it was a minor affair and
the injury to persons and property was slight. Its significance lies in
the fact that it happened at all. Since the clash between communists and
nationalists in 1956 Hong Kong has been free from mob violence. Nearly
four million people contrive to earn a living in this crowded territory
and they have managed to rub along without producing more than an
occasional spark, and when disturbances did flare up there was a
disproportionate feeling of shock and apprehension,
3.
The ostensible cause of the riots was a proposal to increase the first
class fare of one of the cross-harbour ferry services by five cents (the
equivalent of three farthings). On 5th April a youth called $0 Sau-chung
staged a hunger strike in protest at the Star Ferry pier. His action
came as jam to the press,
who excited public interest in him and in the issue generally. His
arrest, for obstruction, increased the tension and led to a peaceful,
but excited, protest march (mainly by teenagers and childrea) through
Kowloon on the night of 5th/6th April. Tension continued to grow and
further demonstrations on the following night degenerated into violence,
which, however, did not spread beyond the south-west quarter of Kowloon,
A curfew was ordered and by the early hours of the morning order had
been restored. Violence, however, broke out again the following evening,
though it was confined to a smaller area, and a curfew was again
imposed. Precautionary curfews were ordered for the following two nights
and there
no further trouble. One person was killed as a result of police fire and
16 injured persons were treated in Government hospitals. Others were no
doubt treated privately. 1,465 persons were arrested; of these 905 were
charged with various offences (790 with breach of curfew alone).
WEA
4.
So much for the actual events. The under- lying causes - the
'groundswell of discontent
as
/the Times.........
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
FREDERICK LEE, M.P.
SECRET.
+
SECRET
2 -
-TI
the Times called it are not so easy to analyse. A Commission of Enquiry
was set up and has
I do not want to completed hearing evidence. anticipate the Commission's
conclusions, but a sketch of the background is necessary for the riots
to be seen in perspective,
5.
Before the war and for some time afterwards the population of Hong Kong,
both Chinese and
However long European, was essentially transient, people lived here,
their roots and their real homes were elsewhere, But now not only are
there far more people but they are a morc settled community though not
necessarily from choice; many young people are growing up who have never
known and have They no foreseeable hope of knowing another home live in
a quite appallingly overcrowded city, in a fiercely competitive
environment, where poverty and
Real considerable wealth arc seca side by sidc. wages have been rising
much faster than the cost of living but, while there has been a
considerablc improvement in living conditions gcnerally, this in itself
has inspired the desire for still further improvement.
6.
These feelings have been encouraged by a small group of the less
rcsponsible of our local politicians. They have so far failed in their
cfforts to arouse any genuine political-mindedness among the population,
and their talents are mainly employed in trying to persuade people that
they are discontented. They ignore the advances that have been made in
social welfare (represented, among other things, by the provision of
Government housing for a million people) and concentrate their attention
on what has not been done.
7
1.
I had hoped to avoid pcrsonalities in this account. It is, however,
impossible not to refer to the prominent part played by Mrs. Elsie
Elliott, a school teacher who was elected to the Urban Council in 1963
and since then has filled the
It was role of chief consor of Government, kīrs. Elliott who organised,
and fanned, the opposition to the increase in ferry charges, by
collecting signatures and encouraging demonstrations And it was Mrs.
Elliott, and her counsel, who for long periods monopolised the attention
of the Commission of Enquiry. She was sccused by one witacss of bribing
a youth to foment a riot; she countered. ith an equally improbable
allegation that the Police had manufactured the riots in order to
discredit her. Eventually, Mrs. Elliott was held to be in contempt of
the Commission for blatantly failing to disclose the source of the
information on which she based her allegation against the Police. One
section of popular opinion still holds that she was unjustly perse-
cuted; more thinking people regard her as slightly off her head; but mud
always sticks and she has
/succeeded...
SECRET
SECRET
3
S...
succceded in giving the impression to many that the Police, who acted
with a restraint that was favour- ably remarked upon at the time, arc
brutal and corrupt.
8.
There is no evidence that these disturbances were inspired by outside
political influences. Indeed, although the local left-wing press gave
mild support to the agitation against the increase in ferry fares, it
denounced the riots and (in striking contrast to the stand it took after
the
about the 1956 riots) made no attempt to complain effectiveness of the
methods used to suppress them.
9.
Indeed, the Colony's position vis-à-vis the C.P.G. could be said to be
reasonably satisfactory. It is now clear that a review of Chinese policy
towards Hong Kong followed President Johnson's decision in the early
summer of 1965 to commit greatly increased numbers of troops to the
Vietnamcse theatre. The conclusion was apparently reached that although
the Colony was an integral part of China, and must sooner or later be
returned to it, it would not be in China's economic or political
Hence even interests if it were taken back now. if the Vietnamese war
were expanded, Peking would wish the status of Hong Kong to remain
unchanged. But there were three basic conditions; Hong Kong must not be
used as a base for "aggression" either against China or against Vietnam,
and "patriotic workers and organisations" in Hong Kong must not be
"persecuted".
10.
"all
:
Almost immediately afterwards, by an unfortunate coincidence, a U.S.
military aircraft taking seventy soldiers back to Vietnam from leave in
the Colony crashed in Hong Kong harbour with much
Chinese reactions loss of life of those on board.
A Note handed to H., Charge were quick and harsh. d'Affaires in Peking
contended that Hong Kong was increasingly being used by the U,S, "as a
base of operations for their war of aggression" and that this was an
increasingly grave threat to Chinese security. Unless H..G. immediately
stopped the activities of the U.S. aggressor forces in Hong Kong" they
would, in the familiar phrase, "bear full responsibility for all the
consequences arising".
11.
The violent wording of the protest created the impression that Feking
was determined once again
Official to make things difficult for Hong Kong. Chinese complaints were
made at the same time about two further incidents and the local
left-wing press began a campaign against U.S. activities of ali
There was however no sustained sorts in the Colony. effort to bring
about e change in the Hong Kong Government's policy and, although the
local pro- communist press continued to complain whenever large U.S.
ships arrived in the harbour, it became clear that these protests were
becoming a matter of routine. During the last nine months there has been
no formal Chinese protest against U.S. military activities in the
Colony.
SECRET
/12. Any.........
|0008120
964
SECRET
>
I
In fact,
12.
Any incident which could possibly be construed as support for the idea
of "Two Chinas" has remained & constant potential irritant in relations
between Hong Kong and the C.P.G. as Peking is certainly well aware, Hong
Kong has continued to achieve great success in suppressing the most
important and most dangerous Nationalist activity here, which is the use
of the Colony as a base for sabotage activities against the mainland.
Between April 1965 and May 1966 over 70 Kuomintang Intelligence Service
agents were arrested; and several large illegal caches of explosives and
offensive weapons, often stored in crowded areas at great risk to the
safety of the public, have been seized by the police.
13.
Few other of the traditional (if trivial) bones of contention between
China and the Colony have caused trouble. Indeed the Chinese have on
several occasions taken positive action to co-operate with the Rong Kong
Government at a working level.
14.
In the economic field the Chinese have made great efforts to expand
their trade with the Colony,
In now their largest export market in the world. 1965 their total
exports to hong Köng increased by 17% over the 1965 level, and over the
first eight months of 1966, despite e slight recession in exports during
the first two quarters, there was a further
& 11% increase as compared with the previous year. At the same time the
C.F.G. continues to invest in the Colony, largely in retail trade. By
mid-1966, there were for instance some 34 large department stores
trading solely in mainland products.
15.
In short, although the intensification of the war in Vietnam initially
resulted in greater sensitivity on the part of the Chinese about U.S.
activities in Hong Kong, there has been no sign at all recently of
increased aggressiveness by local pro-Communists in other directions.
16.
It is a question how far this policy will be affected by the most recent
developments in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, The appearance in the
middle of August of the Red Guards, and their initial rampage through
China, were watched with fascination and apprehension in the Colony.
Chinese visiting the mainland from Hong Kong were reported to have had
their hair forcibly cut and to have been made to discard their
Western-style shoes and clothes. The Red Guards announced that Hong Kong
would henceforth be named Ch'un Ti "Expel Imperialism City".
-
17.
But by the beginning of October nothing had happened to suggest any
change in Chinese policy towards Hong Kong. One or two minor incidents
occurred on the frontier in the month following the emergence of the Red
Guards; never- theless, there was fairly clear cvidence that the
SECRET
/Chinese....
NO CZ, 114
SECRET
- 5 -
Chinese authorities were determined not to let the situation get out of
hand, For the time being realism still seems to be the basis of Chinese
policy towards Hong Kong.
18.
In this somewhat delicate statc of equili- brium any major
constitutional changes in the Colony are out of court; this is generally
accepted bcen by responsible opinion. There has, however, a growing
interest in the machinery of Government and growing criticism of some of
its aspects which, though ill-informed for the most part, indicates that
further steps arc desirable to promote better understanding between the
administra- tion and the people: differences in culture and lenguage
will always be a barrier requiring unusual measures to overcome. It is
probable that feelings of this kind, whether conscious or unconscious,
were in the minds of some of those who took part in the riota: others
were mere hoodlums. It is nevertheless easy to assert, and virtually
impossible to rebut, that one of the principal causes of the outbreak
was Government's indifference to, and neglect of, the wishes and
espirations of the people
19.
Against this background I have recently tried to stimulate public
interest in the possibilities of improving the system of local
government, which, as one outcome, may permit an increased measure of
populer participation, and so ought, in theory at least, to increase and
strengthen the links between Government and people. The political
implications
of a development of this nature arc, of course, considerably less
significant than corresponding changes in the structure of the central
government. But, political considerations apart, the introduction of a
more up-to-date and effectivc system of local government ought to offer
substential administrative and other advantages.
20.
There are formidable difficulties to be overcome before any effective
changes in this system can be made. A major factor is the very novelty
of the concept that the mass of the population should take an active
part in any processes of government. This concept, indeed, is not in
keeping with the traditional Chinese view of the proper relationship
between government and governed and, while times arc changing, it is
possible that the popular response to the requirements of the new system
will be slow: it is even possible that this response will be
unfavourable.
21.
One of the arguments put forward against the increase in ferry fares was
that it would cause an 'inflationary spiral'. This argument could not be
justified by the trivial increase proposed but it was said to be part of
a general pattern of rising prices and economic depression; and it
gained ground among those who had been affected by the events of the
early part of 1965
/when.....
SECRET
1
SECRET
6
-
when two Chinese-owned banks failed and there was a run on others, I
referred to this briefly in my last despatch but it was not then
possible to assess the situation fully,
22.
The lack of confidence in Chinese banks did not cease with the end of
the run, and it was not until a controlling interest in the largest
(and, in fact, one of the soundest) of these banks had been voluntarily
offered to and acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation; and certain others had received support from that bank, the
Chartered Bank and Government; that a still uneasy calm redescended on
the banking world and the process of rebuilding confidence began.
24.
23,
In retrospect, it can be seen that the break had come in consequence of
an over-rapid expansion of credit and of the unsound lending policies of
certain banks, of over-speculation in real estate and of
over-speculation in stocks and shares a picture similar to that in many
other financial centres during the last year or two.
These events constituted a considerable check to progress. Something of
a credit squeeze developed, partly because of the relative slump in rcal
estate (many developcrs being left with unrealisable assets in the shape
of completed or half-completed schemes); partly because the financing of
small industry and business was disrupted by the loss of deposits
experienced by the smaller Chinese banks, their normal source of crcdit;
and partly because banks as a whole became cautious, and eager, not only
to restore, but also to increase their liquidity.
25.
It seems probable that economic growth, which had in recent ycers been
in the range of 10% to 14% a year, fell to somewhere round 6% - 7%
(which, to the business world, appeared severe depression), These
circumstances affected not only the development of trade and industry
but also revenue receipts, Both economic activity end revenue began to
recover somewhat towards the end of the year, The final out-turn of the
public accounts for 1965-66 was a deficit of £81⁄2 million, the first
deficit since 1960.
26.
The 1966-67 budget forecasts a further deficit of £12 million, in spite
of increased taxation (including the first increase in income tax since
1950) designed to produce an additional £5 million, Economic recovery
appears, however, to be accelerating again (a spectacular increase in
tourist traffic being one of the elements) and it secms likely that
while there will be a deficit, it will not be as large as forecast, Even
the real estate market is showing some signs of recovery at the cheaper
end, Business
/confidence...........
SECRET
SECRET
- 7 -
confidence is returning and the existence of a state of depression is no
longer an article of faith in the business vorld.
27.
There has continued to be a substantial inward flow of funds, although
partly, but only partly, offset for a time by an outflow to the
Bank U.S.A. during sterling's difficulties, deposits have continued to
grow reasonably fast, although their policy on advances is still
cautious. In the year ended 31st August, 1966, deposits rose by 14% but
advances by only 3%. The liquidity ratio of the whole banking system is
now 48% against 29% prior to the bank run of February last year.
28.
Throughout this difficult period there has been constant pressure on
Government, and a constant temptation, to use surplus official funds
hold abroad to buttress the ailing parts of the economy, in particular,
the real estate market. This has been resisted; even the deficits have
been financed by running down official deposits
It has been with commercial banks in Hong Kong. painful medicine for the
economy, but it has been fast-working medicine, Events have administered
a powerful purge, which has, I believe, restored our body economic to a
healthy state from the over- strained and, in some sectors, unsound
position it was in eighteen months ago. While the process was painful
for many, progress, although slowed down, was never brought to a halt
and, while wages and employment in the over-inflated construction
indstry came down to carth, the general level of wages and employment
has not been adversely affected. And, while economic growth is unlikely
ever again to reach the spectacular levels of the early 1960's, we have
now, I believe, a morc solid base for stoady expansion always provided
the channels of international trade remein open and there is no
worldwide slump.
J
-
I have the honour to bc,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
Bench
GOVERNOR
1
906
SECRET
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