MEETING FACILITIES IN TOWN: ARIED GUARDS ESCIRLCING PREKISES VILE
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4. TUCIDENTS-OHLY NECENT INSTANCE PEXING VIOLENCE THAT DANCIA PERSONALLY
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IN, AND DANCIA BELIEVED FACTIONAL LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR INCIDENT HAD
BEEN EXECUTED AS COUNTER-SEVOLUTIONARIES, OANCIA CONFIRMED AFP REPORTS
THAT. PEKING DAILY IN HID-JAHUARY RAN SPECIAL ISSUES RECOUNTING RECENT
FACTIONAL STRIFE PEKING AREA, AGREED THAT PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO
DRAMATIZE AND PROVIDE RATIQUALE FOR CURRENT SERIES TRIALS, HEAVY
PUNISHMENT HALEFACTORS. OANCIA PARTICULARLY INTRIGURED BY PEKING DAILY
ACCOUNT OF SCUFFLE AT PZKING RAILWAY STATION, AS HE HAD VISITED STATION
SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER, 'FOUND IT HEAVILY PROTECTED WITH BARBED WIRE, GUN
EXPLACEMENTS, ETC. HE PERSONALLY SUSPECTED PLA TROOPS HAD SEEN ACTIVE
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STAGE AS PORTRAYED BY PAPER. (AIRGRAM FOLLOWS.) DARTIN
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RECEIVED JAN ARCHIVES No.31
23 FEB 1968
ACCESS TO COLUNIST PRISONERS IN HONG KONG
TC MR. GREY
FO13/8
Froblem
The Governor has suggested some modifications to our
proposals about how the matter of access to prisoners should
be handled in Hong Kong and Peking; but he also takes the
opportunity to repeat bis warning that the concessions and arrangements
may run us into dangerous repercussions in Hong Kong. His suggestions
involve a rather more precise statement in Peking of the conditions
under which we are prepared to allow visits to prisoners in Hong Kong,
but they do not redically alter the substance of our approach. The
Chargé d'Affaires in
Peking has proposed one modification
and ourselves
-
►
acceptable to the Governor
and has pressed for early instructions. The crux
of the metter remains whether the. importance we attach to
obtaining access to kr. Grey justifies the risks involved in
the concessions we would be making to the Chinese over access
to prisoners in Hong Kong.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that
(a) we accept the Governor's proposed modifications,
particularly since they seem to go some way towards reducing the risks
in Hong Kong to which he has
drawn attention;
(b) subject to the Governor's final concurrance, we now
instruct Sir Donald Hopson to take action with the
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Chinese.
I attach draft telegrans to Hong Kong and Peking.
Office have already concurred.
Background and Argument
Commonwealth
3. The background is set out in my submission of 22 February.
Cur proposals, on which the Governor has now commented, are
I, in 0.0. telegrama 323, 324 and 325 to Hong Kong.
4. The Governor has from the start been most reluctant to allow N.C.N.A.
access to non-N.C.N.A. Journalists in prison. He has, however, already
accepted (as he acknowledges in paragraph 1 of his telegram No. 241)
that access to Mr. Grey is a compelling reason for special treatment of
the latter category. The points at issue in telegram No. 241 are
therefore not of principle (though he takes the occasion to remind us
strongly that he conceded the issue of principle only reluctantly), but
a matter of tactics. The Governor has from the outset been anxious that
we should spell out in detail to the Chinese in Peking the conditions
under which we were prepared to allow visits. His concern was that if we
did not do so and there were subsequently difficulties over detail in
Hong Kong, we
Sir Donald would be charged by the Chinese with bad faith. Hopson has
thought that detailed points were better dealt with in Hong Kong
(paragraph 5 of Peking telegram No. 133). Pre- sumably he has been
concerned lest the whole exercise might founder on an argument over
detail in Peking.
For reasons set
out in paragraph 3 of Commonwealth Office telegram No. 325, the
Commonwealth Office and ourselves decided on balance that
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it would be better that discussion of detailed arrangements
should take place in Hong Kong. However the arguments advanced in
paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No. 241 about the risks
of substantive discussion in Hong Kong are impressive. I
think therefore that we should be prepared to meet the Governor
over this; in particular I think he is right in stressing that
we should avoid entering into any commitment with the Chinese about more
than a single visit to each prisoner until we have achieved the quid pro
quo in respect of Mr. Grey.
5. The Governor's proposals meet the only point of substance which Sir
D. Hopson raised (in Peking telegram No. 147) on our original proposals.
I cant a personal message to Sir D. Hopson that we would get
instructions to him as soon as possible, but that they could not arrive
in time for action on 27 February.
The risks which the proposed concessions and arrangements
involve are discussed in paragraph 9 of my submission of
22 February, to which I have nothing to add. In view of the importance
of obtaining access to Kr. Grey, I think it is right to accept them. As
I see it, the purpose of the Governor in his latest telegram has not
been to call in question the decision
and Sir D. Hopson of principle, but to remind us difficulties he has
been making are not merely obstructiveness
on his part.
Copies to:
Sir D. Allṣn
Fr. Carter
-
Jon Mary
(James Kurray)
27 February, 1968
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Incusque with to Rodgers who appuntit
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I RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES NÚ.31
28 FEB 1368
156
FC13/8
ACCESS TO MR. GREY AND COMMUNIST PRISONERS IN
HONG KONG
Problem
The Chinese have indicated that they may be prepared to
grant access to Mr. Grey if representatives of the New China News Agency
(N.C.N.A.) in Hong Kong are allowed to make formal
visits to
(a) two imprisoned N.C.N.A. journalists and
(b) a number of "other patriotic journaliste" in
prison in Hong Kong.
The Governor has always been prepared to grant the first, but fears that
agreement to the second would create precedents for N.C.N.A. to act in a
quasi-consular role and would also dis- criminate unfairly between
different categories of prisoners.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that
(a) N.C.N.A. should be allowed to make a special visit
to the two N.C.N.A. journalists;
(b) the employers of other journalists should be allowed
to make special visits accompanied by a representa- tive of N.C.N.A.,
and that N.C.N.A. should be allowed
to stand in for the employer if the latter is
unavailable;
(c) approaches to the Chinese should be made in such a
way that the minimum is conceded towards a quasi-
consular status for N.C.N.A.
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I attach draft telegrams to Peking and Hong Kong. A parallel
submission is being made in the Commonwealth Office.
Background and Argument
3. There are two.N.C.N.A. journalists in prison in Hong
Kong together with at least twelve other communist journalists.
It is not, however, absolutely clear how many people the
Chinese consider to be in the category of "patriotic journaliste"
Flag A (Hong Kong telegram No. 185). In common with other prisoners
F01/29/these people all receive visits once a month from relatives or Fc
3/3/238
friends, and the N.C.N.A. journalists have already been visited
by representatives of their organisation in the guise of friends.
4. Despite these regular visits the Chinese have since July,
1967, insisted that official visits should be allowed to the
N.C.N.A. journalists and since December, 1967, that official
visits by N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong should be allowed to the
"patriotic journalists" as well. They have used the failure
to agree to such official visits as an excuse for not granting
access to Mr. Grey.
5. On 22 December the N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong demanded that official
visits should be allowed to the N.C.N.A. and "patriotic
journalista" and prisoners from other communist organisations Flag B
(Hong Kong telegram No. 1908). They also demanded that they
FD13/8(5) should be allowed to bring food and clothing to the prisoners.
These visits were to be made at the time of Chinese New Year
(30 January) and the communist press began a campaign of
propaganda about ill-treatment of prisoners with the clear
/intention
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Flag B
FD13 1857.
Flag C
intention of using the visits as part of their propaganda
barrage. The Governor said that Hong Kong's prison rules
only allowed visits on the application of the prisoners them-
selves, that clothing could only be left for a prisoner on
release and that extra food for prisoners could not be allowed (Hong
Kong telegram No. 1908). When these points were put to
the Chinese in Peking on 31 December they said that the reply
was unsatisfactory. In particular, they said they could not
agree that applications for visite must come from the prisoners
themselves. They added that, if their demands were met, "they
might consider allowing the British Office to send personnel
to visit Mr. Grey "(Peking telegram No. 1).
FD13/8 596.
Flag D
On 28 January the Chinese made a further approach and
said in effect that, if official visits by N.C.N.A. were allowed
to N.C.N.A. and other "patriotic journalists", they could "consider
arrangements for an official British visit to Mr.
*3/2 (207) to
Flag E
Grey" (Peking telegram No. 84). Sir Donald Hopson took this 7to mean
that a visit to Mr. Grey would in the event be arranged, although this
was by no means certain since the Chinese could
have reverted to their third demand (visits to other "patriotic"
prisoners) before allowing access to him. The Governor agreed
to allow visits to the N.C.N.A. Journalists but not to the others (Hong
Kong telegram No. 132); the N.C.N.A. did not take up the suggestion
about how such visits might be made and the
matter was dropped.
For 7863up
7. The Governor (whom we asked to reconsider the matter) has
now put forward suggestions which go some way towards meeting
/the
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Flag F
FD1/1 (303)
the Chinese demands (Hong Kong telegram No. 212). He is
prepared, albeit with reluctance, to agree that, besides
official visits to N.C.N.A. journalists, official visits
should also be allowed by their employers to other "patriotic
journalists". He is prepared to hint that representatives of
N.C.N.A. could accompany the employers. He is, however, under-
standably anxious that the N.C.N.A. should not arrogate to
itself a quasi-consular status in demanding right of access
to a wide range of prisoners. The fear that N.C.N.A. may
build itself into an alternative focus of loyalty in Hong
Kong is long-standing and well-founded.
Flag G1498.
As Sir D. Hopson has pointed out (Peking telegram No. 133)
+FDI/1245
24< the
the Governor's suggestions go only part of the way towards
meeting the Chinese demands and I agree with him in thinking
that, put in this form, they would almost certainly fail to
secure our prime objective: access to Mr. Grey. He has
recommended strongly that we should meet the Chinese on all
their points and believes that, if we do so, we have a very
good chance of succeeding.
9. I am not myself fully convinced that the Chinese will not
produce further "demands" before agreeing to access to Mr. Grey,
but I think it is very important that we test them. Access to
Mr. Grey is an urgent necessity and at the very worst, if the
move fails, we shall at least know that the Chinese are not
seriously interested in a reasonable quid pro quo for visita.
There are, however, dangers in agreeing to the Chinese demands
of which Ministers should be aware. Besides the obvious one
/of
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.
of whetting the Chinese appetite for further concessions,
these are:
(a) By equating visits to Mr. Grey with visits to
more than the two N.C.N.A. journalists, we
make it likely that an exchange, if it can
be arranged, will have to be on the same basis.
This would not matter much if all the journalists
could be deported to China; but it would be
unacceptable if the Chinese demanded instead
that they should be released in Hong Kong-
(b) We are conceding that the N.C.N.A. are in a
special relationship to members of other
organisations in Hong Kong (who may even be
British citizens); in the past they have acted
mainly as an intermediary for the Chinese Govern-
ment. This could be the thin edge of the wedge
and will need handling with care. We must ensure
that the Governor retains the right to decide who
is properly in the category of those to whom visits
can be allowed.
10. Despite all the difficulties, I think we must try to use
visits in Hong Kong as a means of securing access to Mr. Grey.
This will mean persuading the Governor to go a little further
than he has at present offered to do. He will have to be given
a chance to comment before a decision is finally made.
attached telegrams I have suggested a way in which the opera-
tion might be handled, providing that the Governor and Sir D.
Hopson agree.
In the
/11.
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6
11.
Although we are still waiting for a reply to the approach
made to the Chinese on 7 February about visa problems for our
Mission and Chinese intentions with regard Mr. Grey (including
the suggestion of an exchange), Sir D. Hopson does not think
that a separate approach now on prison visits would cut across
the exercise. I agreei it could even provide us with an
opportunity to prod the Chinese into replying to our proposals
of 7 February.
12. It must be recognised that the proposed approach, even if
it fails, is as far as we should go in making concessions in
Hong Kong to gain access to Hr. Grey. To go any further might
put at risk our position in Hong Kong; we would be abandoning
the policy of firmness which in our dealings with the Chinese
over the Colony has brought us through the recent troubles,
and we would be encouraging Chinese hopes that we can still
be pushed into making substantial concessions there. for the
sake of our Mission and other British subjects in China.
(There
can be little doubt that the achievement of some form of
"Macao-type" situation in Hong Kong remains the ultimate Chinese
objective.)
Copies to:
Kr. Samuel
Kr. Carter, 0.0.
James Humaye
(James Murray)
22 February, 1968
In Mr. Rodgers' absence I arth the draft telegrams,
Consular Department. subject to C.O. clearance.
C.O. uncured with my winc
modifientions
17
1920 AAMCONFI
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CONFIDENTIAL
YPHER/CAT.A
RIORITY
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
ZELNO. 325
23 FEBRUARY 1968 (H.K.D. & F.D.)
28 FEB 1953
FC131
1
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 325 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING.
FOLLOWING FROM GALSWORTHY.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 234: PRISON VISITS.
YOUR TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED AFTER OUR TELEGRAMS NOS 323 AND 324
HAD BEEN APPROVED.
WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE FULLY ACCEPT POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2
OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS IS REFLECTED IN
PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 323.
3. WE REALISE THAT YOU WOULD PREFER THAT NOTIFICATION OF CONDITIONS (1)
TO (V) SHOULD FIRST BE MADE TO CHINESE IN PEKING (PARAGRAPH 3 YOUR
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE HOWEVER STILL FEEL ON
BALANCE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THE DISCUSSION
WE OF DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN HONG KONG. RECOGNISE
THAT WHEREVER THE NOTIFICATION IS MADE THERE IS RISK OF FURTHER ARGUMENT
ABOUT THE CONDITIONS, AND ALSO OF CONFUSION
BUT BY THE CHINESE IN TRANSMISSION BETWEEN PEKING AND N C N A. OUR
ASSESSMENT IS THAT ON THE WHOLE THE BEST CHANCE OF SETTLING THIS ASPECT
OF THE MATTER LIES IN DIRECT EXCHANGES WITH N CNA IN HONG KONG, WE TAKE
POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 3.
OF OUR TELEGRAM HE SUGGEST THAT HOPSON SHOULD ADD (PARAGRAPH 1(A)
NO 324) THAT THE SPECIAL VISITS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY
AGREEMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL ADVISER AND N
CNA A PHRASE OF THIS SORT WOULD GIVE SOME PROTECTION AGAINST CHARGES OF
BAD FAITH IF THE CHINESE PRODUCED A LIST OF SUCH LENGTH THAT IT COULD
NOT BE ACCEPTED IN TOTO AND THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT BROKE DOWN IN
CONSEQUENCE.
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SIMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO HONG KONG
2.
YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. WOULD WE NECESSARILY WANT TO REFER AT THIS TAGE TO A
SINGLE VISIT? CLEARLY IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD
IT THERE COULD ONLY BE ONE SET OF CHINESE VISITS IN EXCHANGE
ONE VISIT TO GREY. BUT IF WE ACHIEVE A VISIT TO GREY ON THE BASIS OW
SUGGESTED, WE MIGHT WELL WANT TO TRY TO REPEAT THE PATTERN
L
A FUTURE OCCASION OR OCCASIONS. WE FEEL THEREFORE THAT IN
·NDEAVOURING TO MOUNT THIS OPERATION WE SHOULD USE LANGUAGE WHICH
LD IMPLY NEITHER THAT WE WERE THINKING PURELY AND SIMPLY IN AMS OF A
ONCE FOR ALL OPERATION, NOR THAT WE WERE INTENDING
NECESSARILY TO BE A PRECURSOR OF OTHERS TO FOLLOW,
י
+
YOUR PARAGRAPH 5.
WE THINK THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE
ITS ALL TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME,
CINCE THE CHINESE MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO GREY UNTIL THE VISITS
VE ALL BEEN MADE OR AT ANY RATE ARRANGED. WE FEEL THAT YOUR POINT OULD
NOT BE MADE TO THE CHINESE UNTIL WE KNOW WHETHER OR NOT E NUMBERS
INVOLVED MAKE SPACING A NECESSARY STIPULATION.
.OSEC
PARTIENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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H.K.D.
F.E.D.
= 35
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JYPHER/CAT A
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CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212
CONFIDENTIAL
19 FEBRUARY 1968
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31
28 FEB 1968
F413/18
CRESSED CO TELNO 212 OF 197 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING.
F23/3 239
DEKING TELEGRAM TO FO 129: PRISONERS.
IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME TO TRY TO CLARIFY JUST WHAT IT IS
AM BEING ASKED TO CONCEDE FOR GREY'S SAKE.
2. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE
■
MINERAL PRINCIPLE OF VISITING BUT ABOUT CAD WHAT IS OR IS NOT
* ''FORMAL'' VISIT SEMICOLON AND (B) TO HOW MANY PEOPLE ''FORMAL'*
VISITS CAN BE MADE.
2. THE RULES ABOUT VISITING WERE SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 2CA)
~~ MY TELEGRAM 1908 OF 23RD DECEMBER. THIS TELEGRAM PERHAPS
RS IN NOT MAKING IT CLEAR HOW LIBERALLY THE RULES ARE NORMALLY
INTERPRETED. IN DETAIL:
(A) ALL PRISONERS ARE, OR CAN BE, VISITED REGULARLY ONCE A
WTH. MORE OR LESS ANYBODY WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES
ND FRIENDS CAN BE LET IN TO SEE THEM ON THESE VISITS PROVIDED
EY DECLARE WHO THEY ARE, WHICH IS A SIMPLE SECURITY PRECAUTION
THE ONE HAND AND A PROTECTION FOR THE PRISONER ON THE OTHER.
-E PRISONER MUST ALSO AGREE TO SEE THEM SEMICOLON OBVIOUSLY
.ISONERS CANNOT BE FORCED TO SEE PEOPLE THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE.
"O) EXTRA VISITS TO INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS CAN BE APPROVED FOR
ASONABLE CAUSE AT THE PRISONER'S REQUEST. AGAIN, ANYBODY
INTING TO SEE A PRISONER FOR ANY SPECIAL REASONS IS OF COURSE
•REE TO ASK TO VISIT HIN SEMICOLON IF THE REASONS ARE COMPELLING,
THE VISIT CAN BE ALLOWED AGAIN SUBJECT TO THE PRISONER'S
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AGREEMENT. A PARTICULARLY RELEVANT EXAMPLE IS THAT AN EMPLOYER
.. USUALLY GRANTED ONE VISIT TO AN EMPLOYEE. THUS, ON 14 FEBRUARY
IN THE MANAGER OF THE COMMUNIST YIEN YIEH COMMERCIAL BANK ASKED
O SEE SIX EMPLOYEES HE WAS ALLOWED CACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHERS FROM
'E BANKO ONE VISIT TO EACH OF THEM CUNDERLINE NEXT WORDD INDIVID-
ALLY.
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HƯNG KUNI TELEINE NU. 212 iu OHIO HEALTH OFFICE
2
(~) TU CUMPLETE THE BACKGROUND, UR HULES GIVE ANY PRISONER & RIGHT OF
HOCESS TO ¤IS CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE AT ANY TIME:
BUT THIS oF COURSE REZdans TU A FÜRKAL REPRESENTATIVE.
THE QUESTION IS WHETHER KÄRÄNGSAENTS FOR THE "FORMAL" VISITS KËQUESTED
BY THE CHINESE CAN BE MADE HITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK
OF THE Lurkan VISITING PATriin SET OUT ABOVE. I AM NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT
THE CHINESA INTEND THE WORD "FORMAL" TU NA SEMI- COLON BUT FROM OUR PULT
OF VIỂM THERE ARE TWO POINTS THAT IT IS
ESSENTIAL TO AVOLD GUN[EDING:
(A) ANY DAISSION OF A FORMAL RIGHT or REPRESENTATIVES OF
LUNIST ORGANISATIONS TO VISIT FRISONERS, PARTICULARLY #IDE AND
ILL-DEFINED GALEGORIES OF PRISCAENS OR GROUPS OF PRISONERS
TGETHER SEMICOLÜN AND
(B) THE IMPLIED ADMISSION OF SUME FORM OF QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS
FOR NA 26.
ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE USED 6 2 G ORGAND AS CHANNELS FUR COMUNICATIO, FROM
TIMS TO TIME, I STILL FEEL WE NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN THE LÜNFTERM
INTEREST OF HUNG KONG ABOUT GUMJEDING
"JASI-CONSULAR STATUS TO TEL. THE CONCESSION THẤT WE HAVE ALREADY .
AMUE, OF GRANTING Ân a ~ N A VISĀT TU NUNA'S OWN EMPLOYLES
CAN BE JUSTIFIED UNDER OUR EXISTING RULES.
5. ON RECUMS LUERING THE MATIEK NOW, IT SEEMS TU ME THAT IT KIGHT
DE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE A NEW PROPOSAL TO THE CHINESE THAT WOULD
GỤ SULE HAI TOWARDS MEETING THEIR REQUEST #ITHOUT CONCEDING EITHER
or THE Two PROCIPLES ABOVE. I WOULD SUGGEST TELLING THEL THAT IN
THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THEIR REQUEST PUR VISITS TU JOURNALISTS
(PARiGitarĦ 1(A) OF PRALNO TELOGRAM 84) IT OCCURRED TO US THAT THERE
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