HK100
Miss Mills & Western & Southern European section)
A
be helpline to have the
I+
would
information
Chow
the
ÖNN
worked
in practice.
16 August 1973
P.M. Kelly (Mic)
HILLOD
+
x245
SEGRET
J
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1
R J Stratton Esq
HONG KONG
Telephone 01-
Your reference
Our reference
Date
23 July 1973
•
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. You will have received last month a copy of the record of the
conversation between the Secretary of State and Chi P'eng-fei on the
afternoon of 7 June, at which bilateral subjects were discussed.
Attached to the record was a copy of the aide-memoire on Chinese
official representation which the Secretary of State gave Chi. For
convenience I attach spare copies of both the record and the aide-
memoire.
2. The discussion of this subject with Chi went off better than we had
expected. As you will have seen from paras 9-11 of the record, Chi's
response was relaxed. In rehearsing the familiar Chinese arguments in
favour of a Representative Chi could hardly have said less than he did.
The subsequent initialling of the Air Services Agreement suggests that
his references to the likely con- tinuance of difficulties in that and
other fields were primarily for the record. At all events our negative
reply, which the Chinese must have expected, did nothing to detract from
the extremely cordial, not to say euphoric, atmosphere of the visit as a
whole.
3. The Chinese can, however, be expected to revert to the subject again,
if not earlier, during the Prime Minister's visit to China (see the last
sentence of para 11 of the record of the talk with Chi). As you are
aware, early January has now been proposed as a possible date for the
visit. We shall have to provide Mr Heath with à full brief. It would be
helpful in this connection to have your comments, and those of HM
Embassy in Peking, on the suggestion made by Chi that the Chinese
Government would be willing to consider reciprocal representation of the
Hong Kong Government in Canton. Does Chi's proposal in any way affect or
modify your perception of Chinese intentions in putting forward their
request for official representation in Hong Kong; and your views about
the nature of the answer Mr Heath should be briefed to give Chou En-lai
when the latter brings up the matter?
co: JD I Boyd PEKING
blind copies:
HKIOD
PUSD
SEORET
R BR Hervey Far Eastern Department
+
5/59
TJ George Bog
AL..
Tk... XO.U
COMPI DENT LA L
+
BRIRI HVBUSY
74
ISING
10 July 1973
ľ
10
You will no dubt huve noticed that in the KCN report (070745) of the
memorial secting held in Hong Kong in honour of Mr Chang Shih-chno on 7
Fly amongst thoac listed as attend- ing is "Erigadier Rainald
Lowthwaite, Director of irotocol of the Hong Kong Government". As far as
we know this is the first time we have seen a reference to "the llong
Kong Goverment" wither than to "the Hong Kong authorities En checking up
the original story carried in the Leople's Daily on e July, in onse
there had been a zis-translation, we see that indeed the officiel terz
"chengfu" is used.
2.
Since t'.is is a subject on wich the Chinese are in our experience
invariably very punctilious it seems unlikely that the term has been
used by mistake. Nevertheless we are hesita: t
In to rezd any great significance into this change of usage, one or two
other instances recently the Chinese have shown them- solves more ready
to recognise in the vords they use the "re:lities of the concrete
situation in ilong Kong: for example, Then Thang Ti-chin of last
suropawn Department raised the question of the special flight to pick up
Chang Jhli-chu:o's ushes he said that the Chinese were "requesting
permission" to land in Hong Kong. *e should be interested to know of any
other signs you have had of this change of attitude.
0.0.
Miss K Saunders RIO HONG KONG
I Walker Esq Research Dept 100
11 11 Davies Bug FED FOO
I C ОТТ
7817
1) Mr Hervey
2) HKIOD B
3) Enter +
* MERVARER, 171,
ורן
Далматинской
CONFIDENTIAL
FE
Part
PUSTR
нк
4
DAILY TELEGRAPH
719 JUN 1973
cutting dated
19
·
CHINA SEEKING REPRESENTATIVE
IN HONGKONG
By Our Staff Correspondent in Hongkong
The Chinese authorities are still pressing for a "representa- tive" in
Hongkong. A Commu nist leader told me that they had not pressed the
issue during recent negotiations for a Sino- British air service, but it
was "ever in their minds."
H
The Chinese claim they need a "responsible person to be in a pochion to
issue visas and represent China as other coup- tries are represented in
Hong- kong by a consul-general.
The British reply is that there are already eight or nine major
Communist Chinese banks in Hongkong and they, together with the China
Travel Service. provide sufficient representation. 1 understand the
British would have no objection to the China Travel Service issuing
visas.
for fa!
Cha
*
F
CONFIDENTIAL
tê ། 100
LAMEEST BETWEEN MIR SHORETARY OF ORATTI POW WOWRIGY AD COLORWEALTH
AFFAIRS AND THE CHIVESE FOREIGN MINISTER HELD AT TIDE FOREIGN AND
COMMONWPALTH OFFICE OF THURSDAY 7 JIE 1975 AT 10.30am
Present:
The Rt. Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT 10
Fr Anthony Royle MP
HE Sir John Addis
Sir Denis Greenhill
Sir Eric Norris
Mr A A Acland
Mr JEG Leahy
Hr R H Evans
GE Clark
Mr P M Gratton
HE Mr Chi Pleng-fei HE Miss Wang Hai-jung
HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang Mr Weng Tung
Mr Chou Chueh
Hr Kao Chien-chung
Mr Hsu Wei-chin
Mr Chang Yi--chun Mr Ma Yu-chen
Miss Tang Wen-sheng
(interpreter)
Mr Chao Ching-tien
Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was very pleased to resume the
contacts which he had made in Peking with Chi Pleng-fei. He honed that
in their talks they would cover international affairs of common concern
and outstanding bilateral questions, He apologised for the fact that he
would have to leave London the following day before Chi P'eng-fei's
visit ended. With Chi P'eng-fei's permission he would like to begin with
a short review of the international scene, and ther hear Chi Plong-fei's
views.
It
2. Sir Alec
Dougles-Home said that, although the United States was our close ally,
we were not happy with a world which was dominated by the two
super-powers. We were glad that China was now taking an active part in
the international scene. We ourselves were determined to play our full
part in Europe, where we were building a new economic and political
entity. There was also an element of defence in it, but our security
must continue to be based on the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union had
become so powerful that the unity of Western Eurone was essential; and
so was the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union did
not like the new Europe which was emerging. had tried unsuccessfully to
prevent its creation. low the Soviet Union was tryire to weaken NATO by
a calculated campaign to create an atmosphere of detente, and to
separate Europe from the United States. The members of the European
Community would approach the CSCE with extreme caution. Their aim was to
make it a negotiation about sub- stance, and to oblige the Russians to
agree to a worthwhile rackare. The Russians, on the other hand, were
clearly playing on the nomlarity in the Western democracies of
disarmament to create an atmosphere in which they could make rains
without any corresponding concessions. We did not wish to miss any
opportunities for a genuine detente, but we were alert to the dangers of
upsetting the existing narrow balance of power.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would like to hear China's views on
this question. He hoped that the Chinese would appoint a
/representative
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
representative to the European Communities, which would help them keep
in touch with European affairs. He would like to hear Chi Peng-fei's
views also on the situation outside Europe, especially on the role of
Japan, and on developments in Vietnam.
4.
Chi P'eng-fei said that basically he agreed with Sir Alec's views. The
two major nuclear nowers wished to maintain their hegemony and to decide
the fate of the world by themselves; but of the two the United States
was on the defensive now and the Soviet Union on the offensive. The
Soviet Union did not however, dare launch a nuclear war, because of the
pressure of world public opinion. Nor did it dare to attack China, with
the aim of destroying its muclear bases (which it had long wanted to
do). The Czechoslovak affair had put the Soviet Inion in a bad light and
exposed its ambitions. He also had domestic problems and economic
difficulties. Although the joint statement issued by the Soviet Union
and the United States last year at the SALT talks was evidence that each
wished to divide the world between them, the real Soviet intention was
to control the fate of the whole world. As it was unable to launch a
major war, its only recourse was to wave the olive branch and carry out
a peace offensive. The Soviet Union had put forward a series of peace
propocals: the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the
Asian collective security system; and a declaration on the renunciation
of the use of force and the banning of nuclear weapons at the United
Nations. Everywhere it was trying to portray itself as an apostle of
peace.
But all its proposals were intended to deceive. This was especially true
of its proposals in relation to the CSCE here. The Soviet Union was
making use of the desire of the European peoples for peace after the
disasters of two world wars to make it look as if only the Soviet Union
was in favour of peace.
But the Soviet concept of peace was one with nuclear war- heads hanging
overhead. If the Soviet Union was genuinely interested in peace, why was
it steadily increasing its military expenditure, adding to the numbers
of its troops and developing nuclear weapons as fast as possible" The
Chinese view was that the Soviet peace offensive was camouflage for
their ambitions for world domination, and aimed at lulling people into a
sense of false security which would facilitate the division of peoples
and countries, the sowing of discord and their absorption one by one. As
China was a unified country, the situation in the east was not so easy
for the Soviet Union; but Europe was com- posed of many countries with
differing views, and it was for this reason that the Soviet Union was
making greater efforts there.
5. Sir Alec Douglas-llome said that the United Kingdom possessed a
nuclear deterrent, and the French had the makings of one, but only the
united force of NATO was an effective obstacle to the Soviet Union.
Naturally, the main element in this was the United States. There were
pressures for the reduction of conventional forces both externally and
within the United States. We would try to insist on balanced reductions
by the Soviet side. Unless this happened, there was a real dancer that
by reducing the size of conventional forces, we should be bringing the
inevitable use of nuclear weapons nearer in the event of a conflict. The
United States wished to reduce their ground forces, but he hoped that
the Nixon administration would stick to its view that there should be no
such reductions unless there were reductions in the level of Soviet
forces in Europe.
CONFIDENTIAL
16.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sir Alec Dourlas-Home added that he noted a change in Chi P'en-fei's
view about the Soviet desire to "take out" China's muclear weapons since
their last meeting in October. He fully agreed that a conventional
Soviet attack on China would not succeed, and he believed that Chi
P'enr- fei was right to say now that the pressure of world opinion would
prevent a Soviet attempt to destroy China's nuclear capacity.
+
7. Chi Plent-fei said that China hoped to see European countries develop
their unity on the basis of sovereignty and independence, and on that
basis to continue their alliance with the United States. He was aware of
the nuclear capability of the United Kingdom and France, but in
comparison with the weight of weapons of the Soviet Union it was not
sufficient; Europe would continue to have to rely on the "nited States.
That was why Chairman Mao had told . Schumann that in a
M. nuclear war Europe would have to rely on the United States. China
believed that the United States would stand by her. He referred to the
Pompidou-Hixon conversations, and President Pompidou's statement that he
did not wish to see an excessive reduction of Western forcer or a
unilateral withdrawal of United States forces from Eurone. From the
Chinese noint of view, Europe's reliance on the United States was
understandable until it could develop an adequate defensive system of
its own.
8. Chi P'eng-fei said that he agreed with Sir Alec's view that the
reduction of conventional forces could increase the likelihood of the
use of nuclear weapons. Chinese intelligence suggested that there might
be an agreement by which the Soviet Union would reduce its forces by
80,000 men and the United States by 30,000. Even if this were true we
could be sure that before the Soviet Union made any reductions that they
would. increase their existing total surreptitiously.
9. Chi D'eng-fei continued that the Soviet Union was laying stress on
the Felsinki Conference in order to deceive people. Hany Foreign
Ministers from Europe had come to China to say that the CSCE(r) could
achieve great results (he noted that Sir Alec's views were different),
and that China's views about the possibilities were too pessimistic. The
Chinese leaders had been at pains to point out that the Vienna
Conference was the more important. If force reductions were not achieved
there was no point in the CSCE. It would he a bad mistake if people
became muddle-headed and lost their vigilance in Helsinki.
10. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the Europeau Security Conference was
not really to do with security at all. The name was a misnomer. The
Western aim at the Conference was to establish more freedom of movement
of people and ideas between the West and the Soviet Union; for example,
to allow journalists to move around more freely there, and to get the
Russians to reduce their censorship on books from the West. The only
aspect of security which might be settled in Helsinki was a scheme for
mutual notification in advance of military manoeuvres, Chi P'eng-fei was
quite right: the Vienna Conference was the one which mattered in terms
of the balance of power. He thought that other European Foreign
Ministers would come in the end to see this.
11. Sir Alec Douglas Home then asked where Japan fitted in. We wanted to
see Japanese strength put into the score on the side of law and order.
Chinese experience of Japan was perhaps greater than ours, but Japanese
economic Elrength had already created problems in Europe and the United
States. He wanted to know how the Chinese saw Japan fitting in in the
Far East.
CONFIDENTIAL
/12.
CONFIDENTIAL
12. Chi Plong foi said that Japanese economic development had been
abnormal. Jänan had been relieved for 20 years from military burdens and
expenditure and the Japanese had used this to develop their civil
industries. As a result their economy had advanced very quickly. Yet
their industry was entirely a processing industry. They had no domestic
raw materials: consequently in one sense their economy was very weak.
Moreover, because of their rapid economic development they had pursued a
policy of fierce competitiveness abroad. There was still fear of Japan
in South East Asia; and this competitiveness had not improved her
reputation. The Chinese had often discussed this question with the
Japanese and urged them not to repeat the historical mistakes of the
Second World War. Japan was at a crossroads: it could continue its
economic expansion abroad as at present; or it could try on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit to seek a more balanced path of development,
for instance by helping the more backward countries. The Chinese
believed that this was the better course. On the whole, the Japanese
seemed receptive to this view; they too wanted to avoid repeating the
mistakes of the Second World Wer. They were also aware of their bad
reputation: in South East Asia they were known as "economic animals",
which was a hindrance in their expansion. The Chinese virw was that, if
Japanese economic expansion continued at its present rate it would lead
to political expansion, then military expansion, and finally to a
repetition of their earlier defeat. But if the Japanese chose à more
co-operative path they could restore their reputation and avoid their
earlier mistakes. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that this was our view too,
but it was more impressive coming from China which was a near neighbour
and friend of Japan. He wanted now to turn to Vietnam.
13. He asked where China's interest lay. He was very disturbed hy
Canada's intention to withdrew from the ISSC, on the grounds that the
North Vietnamese had made its work impossible. He wondered whether
Soviet arms were a factor in the reactivisation of the fighting. Chi
P'enc-fei said that it was four months since the Paris conference It was
clearly stated in the Paris Agreement that there were two admin-
istrations and two centres of power in South Vietnam. But President
Thieu did not recognise this. He thought that US intelligence was not
very accurate; they reported an increase of military forces whereas in
fact there had only been a redeployment of existing forces.
14. The real cause of the continued fighting was President Thieu, who
was continuing to launch attacks in South Vietnam. It was no secret that
Soviet military material had stopped roing by land through China since
March. China of course could not speak about what the Soviet Union might
have sent by sea. The Chinese leaders were confident that the North
Vietnamese wanted a period of peace and were sincere in their
implementation of the Paris Agreement. They wished to heal the wounds of
20 years of war. He believed that Le Duc Tho and Dr Kissinger were
continuing their talks in Faris and it was possible that they right
reach agreements soon.
15. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was very worried by what the
Canadiens hau gaid. The Canadians were very public spirited; moreover,
they were opposed in general to the United States policy in Vietnam. Yet
they laid the whole blame on the North Vietnamese side for the
frustration of their efforts to carry out their task in the Commission.
Whenever
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Whenever incidents or complaints took place (according to the
Cerediens), the "orth Vietnamese said they would not agree to any
investigation; as their agreement was an essential prerequisite to
action, the Commission was therefore unable to move. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home asked the Chinese Foreign Minister to investigate the
matter and use his influence with the North Vietnamese. He was
disturbed, too, by the fact that there had been no withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and Laos as envisaged in the Paris
Agreement.
16. Chi P'eng-fei said that he understood that the withdrawals envisaged
in the Agreement from Laos and Cambodia were now under discus- sion. It
looked as though the explanations now offered for these provisions were
quite different from those put forward in Paris four months ago. On
Vietnam, he pointed out that there were four countries in the TCCS and
there was a two-party Joint Commission. He thought the reports of the
other parties would be worthy of study. He admit- ted that one could not
disregard the Canadians' report. But the reports of all the parties
involved, including those of the "provisional revolutionary government",
should be studied. It was unfair to say that only North Vietnam was to
blame. Others were also responsible for the situation in Vietnam. The
whole situation was worth further study. China earnestly wanted
implementation of the Paris Arreement and honed that it would lead to a
solution of the Indo-China problem.
17. The Laotian problem, (he continued), did not appear too difficult;
both sides were already talking to each other. The main problem was
Combodia. It was yet to be resolved who would talk to whom. Prince
Sihanouk would not talk to lor Nol; the United States would not talk to
Sihanouk. Meanwhile fighting continued, as did United States bombing,
Calls for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops were premature while
15 bombing continued. In any case, only a few North Vietnamese were
there. The opposition to Ton Nol was mainly Cambodian.
Mr Royle asked whether Sihanouk would talk to Lon Hol if Ion Nol were
willing to talk to Sihanouk. Chi P'enr-fei said this was out of the
question; Sihanouk would not pardon Lọn Nol for his part in the coup
d'etat against himself. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that it seemed there
was deadlock. Accounts of the situation obviously differed; but our aim
was the same as that of the Chinese, namely to get the Paris Agreement
working. Chi F'eng-fei said that this was not a simple issue. The
Indo-China problem was greater than the sum of its parts. But if one
part were not settled the whole thing would drag on. The focus of
Chinese attention was Cambodia. If the fighting ended there, this might
be the key to the whole problem. As for Vietnam, the Paris Agreements
existed, as did international guarantees. Although mutual accusations
were being bandied about and the facts were not cleur he was confident
that in time this problem could be sellied. In Iaos, both sides were
talking on the basis of the 1962 Agreements. In Cambodia, however, there
was at present no prospect of a dialogue. The Chinese Government were
considering how they might help; they could not play a big part because
the parties directly concerned should settle the issues by themselves
without outside intervention.
18. Sir Alec Dourlas-Home then asked about the Chinese attitude to the
Korean question. The United Kingdom wanted both sides to talk without
outside intervention, unless that outside intervention could be helpful.
Chi l'eng-fei commented that at present outside inter- vention existed
in the shape of UCURK. The two sides should be
CONFIDENTIAL
/Яllowed
CONFIDENTIAL
allowed to solve the question themselves. He believed that conditions
were better now for a solution; a dialogue had started, visita and
conversations were taking place. China believed that they should
actually support these contacts in order to facilitate a solution. He
asked what the British Government thought about a UN General Assembly
Debate. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that we did not think that a General
Assembly Debate would serve much useful purpose; it would arouse
emotions and perhaps might spoil the existing contacts. Fr Royle said
that we were prepared to wait and see what South and North Korea wanted.
If they wanted a debate, we could accept it. The British line on this
matter was pragmatic. Chi P'eng-fei said that quiet negotiations were a
good thing. But he did not see how the United Nations could create the
conditions for a good dialogue. He thought that Korth Koren would want
both South and North Korea to participate if there were a debate. It had
been unfair in the past that only one side had taken part. When asked
how the talks between the two sides were going, he said that the issues
under discussion had not yet been solved and were not easy to solve at a
stroke. Sir Alec Dourlas-Home said that the fact that both sides were
already talking was a sign of hope.
19. Sir Alec Douglas-ilome then suggested that they should talk about
South Yemen. This was a more important issue than it seemed. The
Russians vere very active; they were aware of the importance to the West
of the oil of the Persian Gulf. Trouble could easily spread from South
Yemen into the Gulf. The British Government were disturbed by the
possiblilities for Soviet subversion of the area. He asked for Chinese
views on the situation. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese believed
this Soviet activity to be part of a general Soviet strategy. They were
obliged to pretend to seek stability in Europe. In the East they faced
certain difficulties. They were therefore trying to break out in the
Middle East, through Iraq and down to the Indian Ocean. Their activity
in the Yemen was a part of general Soviet expan- sionism. They were
therefore giving substantial military aid.
He
20.
Sir Alec Dourlas-Home asked what the Chinese felt about this. assumed
that they sympathised with the revolutionary movement in the Yemen which
had taken over. But were they so sanguine when faced with a Soviet
attempt to disturb the existing situation? He assumed that stability in
the Persian Gulf was in Chine's interest. He asked whether China would
help the revolutionary movement now in power in the Yemen to prevent
itself from being used as an instrument of Soviet subversion throughout
the area. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese had never stopped giving
assistance themselves, on a small scale, to South Yemen. The South
Yemenis had sent delegations to China. China's aim was reunification of
the North and the South. Stability vas certainly needed in the area. The
Chinese had dreym the South Yomoniet attention to the implications of
Soviet assistance. It was clear that the Soviet Union was trying to
break through in the Gulf and get down to the Indian Ocean.
-
21. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was rlad to hear that the Chinese
had pointed out these dangers to South Yemen. He wanted to turn now to
Africa. The Chinese Prime Minister had said in 1964 that Africa was ripe
for revolution, and he was in a certair sense right. He believed that
the Chinese were still helping revolutionary movements there. But he
wanted to ask about their objectives. For example, Somalia had
territorial claims against both Kenya and Ethiopi; and
/insofer
CONFIDENTIAL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
-
-
Lusofor or she pressed them she was stirring up a revolutionary
ciluation. Bu onya and Ethiopia were both sensible countries ruled by
sensible men (unlike Arin in Uganda), and in our view their continued
stability was important for resistance to Soviet objectives in Africa.
Sir Alec Douglas-Hone said he could understand why the Chinese wanted to
get the British out of Africa they had been very successful in that but
he wanted to know why they wished to foment further revolution in Africa
now. Chi P'en-fei said that what the Chinese meant by revolution in this
context was the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist movement. The African
people were striving for inde- pendence and liberation. China had no
objections to the Furopeens having relations with Africa provided they
did not practice discrim- ination against Africans. What Premier Chou
En-lai had meant was that Africa had been dominated for too long by
foreign forces and had a right to be free of them. He was not talking
about proletarian revolution. Sir Alec Douglas-Home again asked why the
Chinese wished to assist Somelia with arms which would probably be used
against Kenya. Any arms or money given to Somalia would probably be used
against Kenya or Ethiopia because the Somalis felt very stronely about
their territorial claims. Moreover, when the Emperor of Ethiopia died,
the temptation to Somalia to attack Éthiopia would be irresistible if
they had heavy ares. Chi P'enr-fei said that China did not agree with
the territorial claims of Somalia. Foreover, one of the reasons Somalia
was so isolated at the recent African Summit was because of her attitude
to the border claims. He admitted that China had given some light
weapons arms to equip about 5,000 men but the Chinese had made it clear
that these were for self-defence and not for use in border conflict. The
Soviet Union was the main provider of heavy arms to the Somali army.
China was more concerned, however, at the naval bases the Soviet Union
was constructing in Somalia, which were aimed at dominating the Indian
Ocean. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he had been pointing out for
years the dangers of possible Soviet control of the Indian Ocean, but no
one would listen. He hoped that, now that the Chinese Foreign Minister
had expressed the same views, they would hereafter.
-
Small
Chi F'eng-fei said that the Somalis had asserted many times that the
port under construction was a fishing port, but it was clear that Soviet
naval ships could moor there. In any case it was no secret that Soviet
"fishing vessels" were usually armed.
22.
Chi P'eng-fei then said that he would like to raise two issues. The
first was South Asia. The way in which Britain leaned towards India was
very worrisome to the Pakistanis. Sir Alec Dourlas-Fome said that this
was not quite the case. It was a fact of life that India was the most
important power in the subcontinert. We, however, wished to continue to
be friends with Pakistan. We were trying to use what influence we had to
promote a settlement, There was one hopeful factor in the situation now:
President Bhutto was no longer required to recognise Bangladesh before
the rest of the settlement could be consid- ered.
The only major question outstanding was the return of prisoners of war.
India had got rather tangled up on the prisoner of var question. Sheikh
Mujib was not the easiest person to deal with. It was not in our
interest to see Fakistan further fragmented, We wanted to see an
economically strong Pakistan. He was roine to a meeting of the CENTO
Council at the end of the week. He hoped to be able to talk to the
Pakistani delegate and explain our position more fully.
123.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
22. Chi rllong-fei said that he was -lad to hear that, China heljeveč
that influence should be used to help countries settle their own
problems. If the prisoner of war question was settled, it would be
easier to solve the rest; and if that were settled, it would be easier
for China to solve the question of her relations with India and
Bangladesh. that Britain would speak out more on behalf of small
countries.
-
He hoped
24. Chi P'enc-fei then asked whether Britain had settled her dispute
with Iceland. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that we had not. We had gone to
the International Court because we wanted to avoid a dispute. We had
asked the Court to set reasonable limits on catches as an interim
settlement pending the Law of the Sea Conference in 2 years time. The
International Court had proposed a catch limited to 170,000 tons (i.e.
30,000 tons less than normal catches in the last few years). In the
interests of seeking a settlement, we had proposed to limit our catches
even further to 145,000 tons. To go lower than this would be very
difficult for us because of the importance of our own fishing industry.
At present, we were fishing on the basis of the interim award by the
International Court. British fishermen had been harassed by the
Icelanders. There had been some nasty accidents. It was for this reason
that we had sent in Royal Navy protection; without it no fishing was
possible. We should like to continue negotiations. We had tried to avoid
the use of force. We would prefer to talk. The present situation was an
unhappy one. We would remove the Royal Navy as soon as the Icelanders
promised not to harass our trawlers. Unfortunately, the Icelanders had
not accepted the award of the International Court and talked of limiting
catches to 117,000 tons which was far too low for us.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home added that he did not think that Iceland would
leave NATO over this question; it was a useful threat for a small
country to make, but he did not think that Iceland would carry it out.
25. Chi Pleng-fei said that bigger countries sometimes had to make
concessions to smaller countries. He was afraid that someone else might
use the dispute as a pretext to intervene. He had noticed that Iceland
was buying two gunboats from the Soviet Union. He commented that the
only thing which the Soviet Union feared was lack of confusion ander
heaven.
26.
It was agreed at Chi P'eng-fei's request that nothing about the
substance of the discussions should be given to the press, even unat-
tributably.
+
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION
соду
only.
PS/PH
Mr Cradock, Cabinet Office
PS/ Amery PS/Lord Balniel PS/Lady Tweedsmuir PS/Mr Royle
PS/HUS
Six E Norzis
Sir T Brímelow
Mr Wright
Mr Wilford
Mr Virgin
Mr Robinson
FED TO ENTER
News Dept
Planning Staff WOD
ETD
EESD SELD MED EAD SAL WED
ys(2)
CHANCERIES:-
Peking
Washington
Moscow
Ottawa
Vientiane
Paris
UKDEL NATO
UKIS New York
Saigon/
Phnom Penh
Tokyo/
Seoul
Ader
Canberra
Wellington
Tokyo New Delhi
Singapore
Kuala Lumpur ·
CONFIDENTIAL
כניון
RDFE) FASH ARD
شا
CONFIDENTIAL
co
RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HELD AT THE
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON THURSDAY 7 JUNE 1973 AT 4PM
Present:-
1.
The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home
Mr Anthony Royle MP
HE Sir John Addis
Sir Donis Greenhill
Mr K M Wilford
Mr A A Acland
Mr R M Evans
Mr G E Clark
Mr J G B Weait
Mr P M Gratton
KT MP
1
HE Mr Chi P'eng-fel
HE Miss Wang Hai-jung
HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang
Mr Wang Tung
Mr Chou Chueh
Mr Kạo Chien-chung
Mr Hsu Wei-chin
Mr Chang Yi-chun
Mr Ma Yu-chen
Miss Tang Wen-sheng
(interpreter)
Mr Chao Ching-tien
Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would like to talk first at this
session about bilateral subjects; any international subjects which had
not been covered during the morning could also be raised. Anglo-Chinese
relations were developing well, particularly exchanges on the cultural
side. Chinese teachers and students had come in great numbers to the
United Kingdom. Indeed, there were more Chinese students in the United
Kingdom than in all other European countries put together. We wanted to
encourage cultural contacts. We were pleased with the success of the
London Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Peking; we were looking forward
to the visit of the Chinese acrobats and to the Chinese Exhibition of
Cultural Treasures which would open in the autumn.
2. Trade was going well. We were pleased at the Chinese interest in
British aircraft. He understood that tae British Aircraft Corporation
had made an offer on VC10s and were awaiting a Chinese reply. On the
Spey engine project, we were aware that Sir Kenneth Keith had promised
en answer to the Chinese by the end of June and we
/would
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
would do our best to see that he was in a position to give such an
answer. We would also look with great cara al all the other projects
which were under discussion.
3.
L
Sir Alec Douglas-Home then said that Premier Chou En-lai had asked him
in Peking to consider again the question of a Chinese official
representative in Hong Kong. He wished now to give Chi P'eng-fei his
answer to the Chinese Prime Minister's request. Sir Alec then read from
the text attached at Annex A to this record and handed a copy of it to
the Chinese Foreign Minister,
4. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese side too was pleased at the
increase în cultural and economic contacts between our two countries
since Sir Alec's visit to Peking. He was also convinced that they would
continue to expand in future. Any problems which existed in these fields
could easily be solved by our two Embassies.
5. There was one subject left over from the morning cession which he
wished to turn to now; China's contacts with the European Community. He
would like to ask questions about some aspects of Community affairs.
China was in favour of the Nine-state Common Market. Some people had
expressed the hope that it would accredit an Ambassador to the Common
Market, either by particular accredita- tion or by the accreditation of
an Ambassador elsewhere. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the best thing
was to have someone who could be in close and constant touch with the
Commission. He could be an Ambassador already accredited to one of the
member countries; but the main point was that he should have regular
discussions with the Commission. Mr Royle said that China should act in
the knowledge that in the future more and more of the trading
negotiations of Western Europe would be carried out by the Commission.
Major decisions were of course taken by the Council of Ministers, but
they were carried out by the Commission. It would therefore be worth
China's while to have a representative in Brussels who would be able to
have day-to-day contact with the Commission. China's Ambassador to
Belgium would be perfectly suitable. and the other eight members of the
Community would welcome the formal accreditation of an Ambassador to the
Community.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.