are concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation
in Hong Kong is a factor of importance. If, therefore,
we share an interest in preserving good relations
between our two countries, we also share an interest
in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could
disturb the situation there.
"I would therefore ask you not to press your
proposal.
We do not think that the time has come for
a change in the pattern of your representation in
Hong Kong.
(If Pressed)
"We shall, of course, give careful consideration
/to your
:
+
to your proposal if you decide at any time to renew
it.
But we do not expect any early change in the
circumstances which now prevail."
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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Sir ri
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SECRET
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13
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CHINESE KOMMENTATION IN HONG KONG
Froblem
to think about it.
есть
1. The Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister
both broached this subject with the Secretary of State during
his visit to Feking last autumn. On 1 November, the Secretary
of State told Chou En-lai that he would like to think about the
matter and that he would get in touch with Chi F'eng-fei in due
course. Chi P'eng-fei is bound to bring the subject up during
his visit to this country from 22 February to 25 February. How
should the Secretary of State respond?
Background
2. The Chinese have proposed that a representative of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking should be established in
Hong Kong. They first made this proposal in 1956. It was
rejected by Mr Selwyn Lloyd in 1958.
Chou En-lai brought it up
again with Mr Denson in February 1971. It has since been
pursued by Chang Wen-chin with Sir John Addis (in March 1972);
by Ch'iao Kuan-hua with Mr Royle (in May 1972); and by Chi
P'eng-fei and Chou En-lai with the Secretary of State (in October
and November 1972). The history of the case is set out in
detail in paragraphs 2 to 6 of Sir John Addis's despatch of
18 December 1972.
Argument
L
3. In May 1972, Mr Royle told Ch'iao Kuan-hua that we could
not accept the Chinese proposal. The Secretary of State
maintained this refusal in the autumn (though he undertook to
think the matter over). The course which will be open to the
/Secretary
1
SECRET
SECHET
A
C
赶
Secretary of State when he meets Chi P'eng-fei at the end of
this month are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
4.
To maintain our refusal to consider the Chinese proposal;
To say that we have given very careful consideration
to the Chinese proposal, but that we do not think the
time is ripe for the Chinese to pursue it;
To say that we might be prepared to consider the Chinese
proposal on condition that the Chinese would be prepared
to designate their official representative as a Consul
General;
To say that we are prepared to explore the implications
of the Chinese proposal in confidential bilateral
discussions;
To accept the Chinese proposal in principle as it stands;
and
To say that we need further time to consider the Chinese
proposal.
The course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose is course
(a). His essential point is that he sees "the seeds of conflict
and confrontation" in acceptance of the Chinese proposal
(paragraph 13 (c) of his despatch of 11 January 1973). Sir
John Addis favours course (d). The nub of his argument is that
rejection of the Chinese proposal would entail "a steady
deterioration in bilateral relations on all fronts, political
as well as commercial" (paragraph 7 of his despatch of
18 December). The principal argument for and against each of
the courses are set out in a paper recently prepared by the
Department.
- 2 -
SECRET
15.
·
SECRET
G,
F
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H
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I
5. In discussion with you, Mr Royle agreed that we should
recommend course (b) to the Secretary of State. With this in
mind, we drafted a form of words for the Secretary of State to
use in speaking to Chi P'eng-fei. We put this form of words to
Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis, inviting their comments
(FCO telegram No 116 to Hong Kong). It is clear from their
replies that Sir Murray MacLehose still favours course (a)
(Hong Kong telegrams No 133 and No 142) and Sir John Addis
favours course (d), perhaps to some extent modified (Peking
telegram No 109). These attitudes are not reconcilable.
6. I believe that our purpose should be to get the Chinese
to desist from pressing their proposal for a period of years
in the manner which is least likely to harm Anglo-Chinese
relations. I believe that course (b) is the course which gives
us the best chance of achieving this purpose. It would be less
likely to damage Anglo-Chinese relations than course (a); and
I do not believe (pace Sir Murray MacLehose) that it need
entail us in a more or less continuing dialogue with the
Chinese (Hong Kong telegram No 142, paragraph 2). In order,
however, to reduce the risk of encouraging the Chinese to
return to the charge, I have substituted fresh language for
the four final sentences in the form of words which we
telegraphed to Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis.
you will see, I have made the concluding passage shorter; to
compensate, however, I have added two sentences for the
Secretary of State to use if pressed. I have also adopted the
amendment suggested by Sir John Addis (Peking telegram No 109,
paragraph 3).
As
- 3 -
SECRET
17.
SECRET
7.
There are also two tactical problems:
(a)
Ought the Secretary of State to bring up the subject
or to leave the running to Chi P'eng-fei;
(b)
Ought the Secretary of State to give Chi P'eng-fei
anything in writing.
So far as (a) is concerned, it might be better for the
Secretary of State to broach the subject himself. He has under-
taken to get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei; and it is certain that
Chi Feng-fei will bring the subject up if he does not do this
himself. As regards (b), there is a strong case for the
Secretary of State to give hi P'eng-fei something in writing.
The Chinese set great store by exact forms of words; and there
is a danger that the nuances of what the Secretary of State has
to say will be lost during interpretation.
Recommendation
8.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Against this background, my recommendations are that:
The Secretary of State should himself broach the subject
with Chi P'eng-fei;
He should speak in the terms of the form of words
attached to this submission; and
He should give Chi P'eng-fei a copy of this form of words.
9. Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
R.M. Erans
R M
Evans
6 February 1973
Co
Mr Logan
Sir Duncan Watson (with attachments)
Mr Stuart
Mr Hervey
Far Eastern Department
4
SECRET
After hulka discussion the final paragraph of the form I word. "has
again beer redrafted, and the two sextence for une it presord" referred
to in pan 5 of Its submission have been removed.
If the recommended lime is accepted, opcasting notes In subsequent
discussia with the Chinese (which wit, I imagine, certainly take plans)
will be prodenced.
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dealing
recoquire that we are with a very fragile thing - confidence
in Hong Kong.
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I believe
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A.R/%/10
2
173.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(3)L 51-2406)
SECRET
"I discussed this subject with you and
with the Prime Minister when I visited
China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister
on 1 November that I would like to think
about the matter and I would get in touch
with you in due course.
"The positions of our two Governments
on the status of Hong Kong are necessarily
different. But, as I see it, we have two
important interests in common. These are
to preserve the stability and prosperity
of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship
which has developed between our two countries.
So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability
and prosperity depend on confidence.
Confidence is a tender plant: it grows
only slowly, but can wilt very quickly.
If, as I believe, we share an interest in
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong,
it follows that we also share an interest
in the preservation of confidence there.
"As far as the relations between
Britain and China are concerned, there can
be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong
is a factor of importance. If, therefore,
we share an interest in preserving good
relations between our two countries, we
also share an interest in doing nothing in,
SECRET
/or
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
51-7406
SECRET
or over, Hong Kong which could disturb
the situation there,
"I have given most careful consideration
to your proposal since I spoke to you and
the Trime Minister last eutumn, in the
light of this con-ideration I have come
to the conclusion that tio time is not ripe
for a change in the pattern of your
representation in Hong Kong. I would
therefore ask you not to press your
proposal. It is my judgment that it will
be some time a matter of years)- before
ممتع
circumstances might change in such a way as
to warrant an alteration in the arrangements
which now exist."
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
(12)
SECRET
TC:
COPY
I
FM HONG KONG #29858Z
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE
PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 109.
FEM 3.
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS,
PARA, 2, 1ST SENTENCE: QUITE RIGHT; BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN
COURSE (B) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) SO FAR AS THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE IS CONCERNED.
2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURN ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS
CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF
KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RPT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY
WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER NIGHT
BE RIGHT.
3. BUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS
WRONG WE WILL HAVE GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.
MACLEHOSE
FILED HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD FS/MR ROYLE SIR E NORRIS
SECRET
I
2015/02
∞OF CO
00 PEKING
CRPS 12#
CYPHER/CAT A
FN HONG KONG #2685BZ
SECRET
SECRET
ADVANCE COPY
Referred to
Sin E. Norris
на
FED.
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE
PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 189.
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
Not the intention.
R.E. 22.
PARA. 2, 1ST SENTENCE: QUITE RIGHT, BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN
COURSE (3) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) - SO FAR AS THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE 18 CONCERNED.
2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURK ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS
CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF
KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RÅT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY
WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER MIGHT
BE RIGHT.
3. BUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS
WRONG WE WILL HAVE GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.
MACLEHOSE
NNNN
BENT AT 18442/#2 EJH
!
SECRET
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Luene
to
(сору бани
siment)
Rolperven
212
SECRET
+IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
OP
Ει
D
FM PEKING #18818Z
SECRET
DE DIP
+
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 109 OF 1 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
• GOVERNOR).
YOUR TELNO 116 TO HONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELNO 133: CHINESE
PEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. MY OWN RECOMMENDATION HAS TO BE AS YOU KNOW IN FAVOUR OF COURSE D
WHICH MIGHT HOWEVER BE COMBINED WITH SOMETHING OF COURSE B. THAT IS TO
SAY WHILE INFORMING THE CHINESE THAT THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE FOR
AGREEING TO THEIR REQUEST WE COULD LOOK FORWARD TO CONFIDENTIAL
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT A LATER STAGE. SOMETHING OF THIS KIND WOULD I
THINK BE THE BEST WAY TO GUARD AGAINST CONTINUING AND INCREASING
PRESSURE.
2.
SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE IN HIS TELEGRAM SEEMS TO ME TO PE REALLY ADVOCATING
COURSE A. I THINK THAT THE ARGUMENT IN HIS PARAGRAPH 2 IS WRONG, IF WE
NOW GIVE WHAT THE CHINESE INTERPRET AS A FIRM REFUSAL LOOKING FORWARD TO
NO RELAXATION IN THE FUTURE THAT 1S IN MY OPINION THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE
THAT PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE AND POSSIBLY ALSO THAT A CHANGE OF POLICY
MAY BE DECIDED ON IN CHINESE CONDUCT TOWARDS HONG KONG.
3. IF THE RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TO BE IN FAVOUR
OF AN UNMODIFIED COURSE B THE ONLY CHANGE WHICH I WOULD SUGGEST IN THE
DRAFT IM YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 IS TO REPLACE THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES BY THE
FOLLOWING SENTENCE: ''THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS
OF HONG KONG ARE NECESSARILY DIFFERENT''.
ADDIS
FILES: HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
PS/MR. ROYLE SIN E. NONRIS
SECRET
P
+
INMEDIATE
SECRET
P
+
HER/CAT A ONO KONG
311032Z
TOP CORY
CORVATE
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 133 OF 31ST JANUARY, 1973. INFO IM PEKING.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR FOR NORRIS.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 116: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1 AM NATURALLY GLAD AND RELIEVED THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND THAT WE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST THIS CHINESE PROPOSAL.
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING SEEMS TO ME TO BE THAT IN SPEAKING TO CHI
P'ENG FEI THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD USE TERMINOLOGY WHICH, IN THE
OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT AND OF HM AMBASSADOR AT PEKING, IS BEST
CALCULATED TO ENSURE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT DEDUCE THAT WE WILL GIVE
WAY NEXT YEAR IT NOT THIS, IF THEY KEEP PRESSING. IM AMBASSADOR MIGHT
REPLY THAT THEY WILL PRESS ANYWAY, BUT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR HUNTING TO VIEW AND RUNNING A DOUBTFUL LINE.
3. SHOULD HAVE THOUGH THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS EFFECT WOULD BE
TO STICK AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN PEKING. THIS WOULD
INDICATE THAT ON RECONSIDERATION OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, AND AVOID
ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BASED ON COMPARISON OF WHAT WAS SAID ON THE TWO
OCCASIONS.
4. FOR THIS REASON I SUGGEST YOU SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE LAST 3
SENTENCES OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. THIS GOES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THAN
WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN PEKING ('TIME IS A HEALER''), WHICH
ITSELF WAS AN ADVANCE ON WHAT WAS SAID BY MR. ROYLE, WHO OFFERED NO HOPE
OF ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE OF VIEW.
SECRET
/ 5. I THINK
-
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5. I THINK THAT OUR OBJECT SHOULD BE TO USE WORDS TO WHICH KM AMBASSADOR
CAN REFER AS EXCLUDING FURTHER DISCUSSION IF PRESSED BY THE MFA, AND DO
NOT EXPOSE HIM OR HIS SUCCESSOR TO RENEWED REPRESENTATIONS, IN THE WAY
THE LANGUAGE USED IN 1956 EXPOSED US TO REPRESENTATIONS AS SOON AS
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED.
6. HAVING MADE THIS GENERAL POINT, I WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE IT TO YOU AND
HM AMBASSADOR TO DECIDE HOW IT CAN BEST BE MET.
7. YOUR PARA. 4. NOTED.
L
·
MACLEHOSE
FILES:
HEAD FED
HEAD AKIOD
P5/MR. ROYLE
EIR E. NORRIS
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+
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+
!
I
:
·
·
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
CYPHER CAT A
19
FM FC0 3016202
DEDIP
SECRET
FOR 3/5/1
1973
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 116 OF 33 JAN./INFO IMMEDIATE
PEK ING.
61
(PERSO..AL FOR COVERLOR)
FALLOVING FROM KORRIS.
YOUR DESPATCH OF 11 JANUARY AND SIR JOHN ADDIS'S DESPATCH OF 18
DECEMBER: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN KONG KONG
1.. THE COURSES OPEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHEN HE MEETS CHI
P?ENG FE! ARE:
30
(A) TO MAINTAIN OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL: (B) TO SAY
THAT WE HAVE GIVEN VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL,
BUT THAT WE DO NOT THINK THE TIE IS RIPE FOR THE CHINESE TO PURSUE IT:
(C)
(D)
TO SAY THAT WE NIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE
THEIR OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A CONSUL
GENERAL:
+
TO SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL IN CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONSE (E) TO ACCEPT THE
CHINESE PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE AS IT STANDS:
AND
(F)
TO SAY THAT WE NEED FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE
P.OPOSAL.
2. R ROYLE HAS AGREED THAT HE SHOULD RECOMMEND COURSE (B) TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, LE HAS ASKED US TO PREPARE THE DRAFT OF A STATEMENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO USE IN SPEAKING TO CHI P'ENO FEI. THIS
FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. I SHOULD SE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD
TELEGRAPH YOUR COMENTS BY 1330Z ON 31 JANJARY AND IF SIR JOHN ADDIS
WOULD TELEGRAPH HIS COMMENTS TAKING YOURS
INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SAME TIME ON 1 FEBRUARY.
3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT.
PEGINS:
" I DISCUSSED
SECRET
SECRET
''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER WHEN I VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUIN. I TOLD THE PRIME MI
ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE HATTER AND THAT I
WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DUE COURSE.
"'WE DISAGREE ADOUT THE STATUS OF HONG KONG. THAT IS SOME- THING WHICH
IS A FACT ALD WHICH I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DISCUSS. BUT,
AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE 1:0 1-PORTANT INTERESTS IN
COM.ON. THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG
AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO
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