SCOTTISH HOUSING AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
2.39 p.m.
The Earl of DUNDEE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Quartión which
stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
Tisk Her Majesty's Government What functions they foresce for housing
associations and housing socialios-in their proposal for solving the
outstand- ing problem of Sportsh housing.
The MINISTER or STATE, SCOT. TISIL OFFICE (LORD POLWARTII): My
leofds, the Government look to the.. Housing Corporation under new
Chairman, Lord Goodiem, to help the lic using associatiques and housing
societies.
1
WEDNESDAY 9 MAY 1973
fan spanlı
THE LORD BROCKWAY:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether China has requested the
establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hong Kong; and, of so, what
decision has been reached.
ANSWER
(BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE, MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE)
My Lords, The Chinese Government has proposed that a representative of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong Kong. This
proposal is still under consideration.
み
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supup.
(17296) DL297473 Im 12/72 0.WB.Led Op.363
House of Lords
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
for ORAL answer on.
Wednesday 9 May
Mr. Davies, FED May we have your draft reply by 5 pm on Friday, 4 May
please.
Lady Tweedsmuir's Office 17 April
WEDNESL
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stablishment
ent at a digi muatic
History of the Request
In February 1956, the Chinese Government
proposed that a representative of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong
Kong. In February 1958, the then Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs told the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires that we could not agree to the proposal.
The Chinese Government revived their proposal in
March 1972. My Hon Friend, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State (Mr Royle), and My Rt
Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the subject with
members of the Chinese Government during their
visitSto Peking in 1972. The proposAT is still
under consideration.
Mr Clark
Mr Evans
A
B & C
D
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1=
Mr Kevin Sinclair, the Daily Express correspondent in Hong Kong, has
sent a further telegram to Mr Royle, to follow up his earlier exchange.
Mr Sinclair was the author of the front page article in the South China
Morning Post of 26 April reported in Hong Kong telegram no. 445.
2. Mr Guest has minuted that in replying to Mr Sinclair's request, Mr
Royle naturally feels he cannot go any further than Lady Tweedsmuir, who
will be answering a Parliamentary Question on this subject today.
3. I think we might ask the Governor to try to persuade Mr Sinclair to
avoid this channel of communication in future since he derives no
benefit from it (and it involves everybody in a certain amount of
unnecessary work).
4.
I submit a draft telegram. HKIOD and News Department
concur.
9 May 1973
H L. Davies
Far Eastern Department
+
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETS
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GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
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15/5.
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4th May 1973 FED comment for.
FED. for
used in briefing. Mu
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
Thank you for your letter of 17 April.
I agree that CH'IAO Kuan-hua went no further with Charles Smith than he
did with Mr. Royle last June. In many ways what he said reflects more
closely what CHANG Wen-chin had to say to Denis Greenhill in October.
2.
14/
Naturally Smith's story has been widely taken up in the local press. The
piece by Kevin Sinclair in the "South China Morning Post of 26 April
(our telegram No. 445) perhaps went into the most detail. There has been
a certain amount of editorial comment. Initially some of this was
superficially favourable to what was known of the Chinese proposal; this
was an entirely predictable piece of re-insurance and should not be
taken to reflect the real views of the Chinese community in Hong Kong.
You will have seen the piece in last week's Far Eastern Economic Review,
which suggested that in return for accepting a representative we should
get some promise that the New Territories lease should at least run its
course. (Any such promise would of course be quite meaningless, and
Derek Davies should know better than to suggest such a deal).
Middle-of-the-road comment in the Chinese press has suggested that,
although representation was a natural step on the path of the
normalisation of relations with China, if the proposal was accepted the
terms of reference of the representative should be closely written so
that he had no right to concern himself with Hong Kong's internal
affairs or with the activities of Chinese people here. The right-wing
press has naturally been more openly opposed to the proposal. Although
the implication of much of what has been written is that a
representative may one day be
K.M. Wilford Esq., CMG
SECRET
SECRET
2.
Thaur
the amph :
allowed, the conditions suggested for his acceptance are such as to
negate the generally forthcoming tone of the editorials. Indeed a group
of leading Chinese editors explained to Jack Cater that while
of course they were completely opposed to the idea, 1
they felt they had to be careful what they wrote. they wrote too openly
against the idea, and then
If
a Representative came, their position would be difficult. The editorial
in the South China Morning Post" of 30 April (copy enclosed) reflects a
fairly mature
3.
The story was probably as responsible as any other factor for knocking
300 points off the Hang Seng stock exchange index.
4.
Dick
The public airing of the proposal appears to have caught the local
communist hierarchy on the hop and unbriefed. Our own sources suggest
that there has been no officially-inspired discussion at least in the
middle and lower echelons in Hong Kong, and there has been a tendency to
discount the reliability of the accounts in the newspapers. Stratton's
letter of 25 April to Richard Evans related the very negative attitude
to the proposal taken by K.C. Jay. To what extent this means that the
local hierarchy are not at one with Peking on this is hard to say, but
it is significant that they were not briefed by Peking on the deliberate
airing of the issue with the Hong Kong journalists, and so were caught
short when the story broke. I listed Chinese motives for pressing for an
official Representative in para 13(a) of my despatch of 11 January. I
think one can now add to these a desire to oust the old brigade, bring
in new blood, and impose direct Peking (MFA) control. They are
proceeding with this anyway but it would obviously be timely, from their
point of view, to give the reformed mission official status. Of course
if I am right, this would account for the surprising absence of briefing
of the local hierarchy by Peking.
5.
I fully agree that we need not change our negotiating position for the
air services talks. I expect that representation will come up at some
point during the discussions, but not necessarily in
SECRET
SECRET
3.
A contingency brust with the mended for
M
the first round or indeed at the negotiating table itself. If it is
raised formally we may then have to consider whether the Secretary of
State should be advised to get his reply in, if only to clear the air.
But this is for the future. We look forward to seeing the British team
in Hong Kong at the end of the month. One problem will be to ensure that
if the issue does arise the strong BOAC element in the team are aware of
the implications (assuming that they will be present at the more
general, non-technical discussions).
5.
On your paragraph 4: one would like
His
to see the full text. At first sight in view of what he said afterwards
it may be that what CH'IAO meant was that the problem of Hong Kong's
future need not come up for some time. I don't think one can read into
it any wish for early reversion. claim that there was no time to discuss
representation during his visit to London last autumn is presumably Ye
quite disingenuous. The same would be true of a
similar claim in respect of subsequent meetings between British and
Chinese ministers, when the matter was not mentioned.
6.
I am sending a copy of this to
Morgan in Peking.
Yes, but Ika
Chinese have a
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discussed by foreign to incsting Ministes.
R.E. 1575.
SECRET
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1
Soul: China Morning Post
MONDAY, APRIL 30, 1973
Confidence must be our first concern
In any consideration of official Chinese representation in Hongkong the
dominant issue is not whether the Chinese authorities desire it, but how
it can be resolved without disturbing the confidence of the people of
Hongkong-
"It wit be generally agreed that in the state of relations between
Hongkong and China today any move this community can make to develop
closer ties with a country so deeply linked by blood, culture, custom
and commerce, is a step in the right direction.
Indeed, this newspaper has suggested a number of ways in which Hongkong
and China could become more, closely linked such as container
transportation, communications and economic services..
China is now reported to have expressed a desire to be represented by
some more official presence. And it is likely that people here will, in
time, accept this as being in the best interests of Hongkong and China.
It would be wrong, however, to plunge into this without recognising that
there are substantial doubts about the consequences; these stem less
from the role which the Chinese Government might expect their
representative to play than the way in which his position might be
exploited here.
It is admittedly unlikely that the Chinese authorities would appoint a
consul-general to a territory which they do not consider to be
"foreign."
There are, however, other titles which could be devised to make this
distinction, though this is of far less concern to people in Hongkong,
who have long accepted Chinese statemeats on the future of the Colony
with equanimity, than the duties lie is accorded.
+
The main demand is likely to be that any official representative should
deal purely with official business but in no way involve himself with
domestic matters which remain the sole concern of the Hongkong
Government.
If there were to be any departure from this principle it would very
rapidly lead to a damaging loss of confidence with serious repercussions
on the social and economic fabric of Hongkong.
Moreover, any breach could lead to a rapid deterioration in relations
which would be inimical to Hongkong's interests AS well 85 an
embarrassment to China.
These are just some of the reasons why the proposal deserves very
careful thought in Peking, London and Hongkong before it is taken any
further.
In the meantime, it is difficult to believe that the continued absence
of an official representative can pose any greater difficulties or
problems to Peking than it has experienced in the past 24 years.
Indeed, during this time we have advanced a long way to setting up good
contacts at official levels which have proved hoth practical and
workable and have resulted in smooth relations in matters such as
communications, rail and sea links, trade, travel, finance and banking,
to name the most obvious,
Hongkong welcomes this trend as a tangible expression of ever-improving
relations. Our mais desire, however, is to ensure that any further step
we take contributes to the
+
+
SECRET & PERSONAL
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Dar
H.T.J.O. Dept.
BRITISH EMBASSY
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1 May 1973
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R.E.
FED
7/5.
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
PARDON DN1
Dear Michael,
38
@
Yes.
R.E.
7/5.
CLARE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1 Thank you for a copy of your letter of 17 april and of Charles omith's
record. it is inter-stin, that Ch'iao Auan-bua should arrogated to
himself with what has traditionally been chou n-lai's role in providing
leaks to non-officials designed afarently to influence a Government's
policy.
2 un the face of it, Un'iao's remarks on the future of mong kong
represent a tightening of the time-scale since Chi E'eng fei told the
secretary of state on 31 uctober last year that "Hi Government should be
clear about China's general policy; that they are not in a hurry to
recover uong kong". But uni did not of course say, nor so far as I am
aware has vhou ever said, that 1998 is the earliest date that the
chinese would expect to rɩcover ang nong. it would not be characteristic
of the chinese to close their options in this way. Moreover, the chinese
nave clearly uerived encouragement from further developments in the rar
Lastern situation during the last six montus and their curious ceremony
in the ureat all of the reople on 28 rebruary suggests that they may Low
see some real prospect over the I wonder. Dext few years of a Taiwan
reunification which would in turn influence the лong nong relationship.
R.E.
7/5.
3
üh'iao's remarks art tous not definite enoughto indicate a change of
policy on the long term issue; but I think we snould interpret them
(since he would have expected them to get back to us) as an attempt to
soften us up and, at the
SECRET & FEROVNAL
2/.....
アー
DEURE) AND PERSONAL
- 2 -
same time, as a ballon d'essai on the question of official
representation. what we have seen from here of public reaction in mong
song and London may, I think, have con- firmed the chinese in their view
that taey can tighten the screws without riskin, too much. However, in
the snort term, the Chinese Goverment has as much interest as we have in
the maintenance of Jusiness confidence and stacility in nong kong and
this in turn will strengthen our hand in dealing with any pressures. I
agree, therefore, that
ing
Ch'iao's remarks should not influence our initial, position /negotiat-
in the forthcoming talks on an air services agreement. But we must
recognise that we may encounter obstacles that have more to do with
Chinese tactics for securing their objective on representation than with
the merits of the case itself.
I am still sponnistic
That the Chinese will
or link mero issues
during our tovincomming talks with Them.
R.E.
Your Ey
Jhorl.
(Mn Morgan)
7/5.
Copied to: oir hurray maclehose aʊNG MBE
Governor of dong hong
ソ
DELMET AND PERSONAL
Caliberia!
EXTRACT
Extract Trae Eastcend Economic Review
25/25/23
73
补
OUR MAN IN HONGKONG
CHINA is continuing the process of establishing Triendly bilateral
relations with the countries on its periphery, with the obvious
exception of the Soviet Union. It is hardly conceivable that in 12
months' Lime, China's relations with India and Bangladesh will be as
artificially strained as they are today. It is even possible that China
will close the circle. Just as Peking's vitriolic attacks on US
imperialism rose lo a climax prior to the arrival in China of Henry
Kissin- ger, so the level of abuse being directed against Mos- cow today
could conceivably presage an attempt to achieve a détente with the
"social imperialists.
1
The revival of the suggestion that China should et up a representative
government office in Hong- kong must be seen within the context of
China's eneral campaign to clear the decks of any obstacles that could
impede the smooth operation of its for- ign relations and foreign trade.
Peking has given various verbal assurances to British ministers that the
question of Hongkong is of no particular mo- inent and can wait until
the problem of Taiwan has een settled. China's need to import
sophisticated foreign technology makes Hongkong's contribution to its
foreign reserves now running at about £500 nillion (US$1,245 million)
annually an essential Factor in China's economic equation, for the
recent barvest setbacks will ensure that Peking will go on mporting
cereals at least for the next few years, vhile its generous foreign aki
programme also cats nto the limited supply of hard cash. An official
nission could facilitate the flow of trade and could cuarantee that
Hongkong would more efficiently ex- and its future role as a "shop
window" for foreign technology on China's doorstep, within a commu- nity
offering no political challenge to China which obviates the need to have
foreign sales representa tives stationed permanently in Peking or
Canton.
Counting tomorrows
-
At first glance, it would appear that the advan- ages to Hongkong would
be even greater than those iccruing to China. By establishing such a
mission, Peking would come close to giving de Jure recogni- on to the
"separateness" of the enclave on its oast, thus conferring an even
longer term future on community which has until recently been unable To
count its tomorrows.
Nevertheless, Hongkong and Britain (which will be the final arbiter of
the response to Peking) are de- ermined to look this gift horse very
cautiously in he mouth. The colony's past experience of a Chi- ese
commissioner who represented the Nationalist Government until 1950 was
not a happy one. Less Trusting souls recall the excesses of the 1967
riots
nd ask themselves how much more embarrassed the
P
Hongkong Government would have been had there been a Peking
representative in the colony at that time.*
But even if China's foreign policies do not change drainatically yet
again, the head of any such mission would be an obvious target for
petitions from disgruntled elements in Hongkong's society, from striking
schoolteachers and evicled tenants to those resentful of increased Crown
tents and the landlords of opium divans and unregistered doctors
operating within the "Walled City." Presumably Hongkong will want a
fairly watertight guarantee that the mission would not give l'eking's
backing to such causes. If not, the Governor could easily find himself
in the situation feared by one of his prede- cessors, Sir Alexander
Grantham, who was against the proposal (when mooted in 1956) on the
ground that it would present him with a "rival" governor.
A question of face
On the other hand, Hongkong's colonial, proto- colaire society does not
accord proper prestige to the Government of the People's Republic -
diplo matically or socially. It is widely recognised that the heads of
the New China News Agency, the Bank of China and of the other branches
of China's govern- ment in Hongkong are in every sense official re-
presentatives (a fact which in itself disposes of most of Hongkong's
worries about how the head of a Pe- king mission would conduct himself).
Inadequate steps are taken to ensure that these distinguished men are
accorded their proper importance within the life of the colony.
On balance, it would seem that the gains to Hongkong's status and the
other marginal advan- tages which would accrue from such a mission out-
weigh the possible disadvantages listed by the cau- tious. Another
factor which must now enter into the calculations is the loss of
goodwill that would result from a refusal by London to respond to
Peking's feelers.
There is one way of swinging the scales defini- Lively in Hongkong's
favour. London could point out to Peking that Hongkong exists today by
virtue of certain 19th-century treaties denounced by China as "unequal"
and therefore invalid. If China is to establish an official mission in
Hongkong, London coukl justifiably ask China to take advantage of the
occasion to state in black and white that it was will. ing, of its own
volition and obviously under no duress, at least to let the New
Territories lease run its course. It would be a fair request, and there
is no reason China should remain enigmatically evasive on the issue.
With such a guarantee, Hongkong could welcome with open arms the arrival
of Peking's man.
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
APRIL 18H 73
L
Peking office will
'solve snago
Peking. Apr. 17. The Chinese Government favours opening "representative
organisation" in Hongkong, an authoritative Chinese source said today.
He was commenting na reports from London concerning the eventual opening
of a Chinese mission in the Bitish Colony,
"The Chinese Government has already posed the problem of establishing a
representative organisation of the Chinese Government in Hongkong," the
source said.
"The Chinese Government considers that establishment of such an
organisation would be useful for resaiving many concrele problems
between Kwangchow (Canton) and Hongkong.
H
He did not specify the nature of the "representative organisation" that
Was envisaged. However, observers here excluded the possibility that it
would be a consulate. For Peking, the British Colony 19 an integral part
of Chinese
territory.
The comments. of the authoritative Chinese source left the impression in
the question of a "representative organisation" in Hongkong had been
raised several times.
Reports from Hongkong recently indicated that that was the case.
- AFP.
L
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Mr Wilford
Wilto:
Mr Goodenough
Parliamentary Unit
CONFIDENTIAL
A.&✓
FER
For off
LORD BROCKWAY: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION: CHINESE OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I submit a draft reply and draft Notes for Supplementaries.
They incorporate suggestions by the Governor of Hong Kong. The
Embassy at Peking concur. I also submit a background note on
the history of the problem and our current attitude towards it.
2. Lord Brockway's interest in the subject will have been
aroused by a number of press articles on the subject, particularly
that in the Financial Times of 13 April.
3.
The Chinese last mentioned their proposal to us officially
on 29 December, when the Chinese Ambassador referred to it during
a call on the Permanent Under-Secretary. The Permanent Under-
Secretary told the Ambassador that the Secretary of State was
giving the matter his personal consideration, but that, because
of the problems this raised for us, this consideration would have
to be long and careful. The Secretary of State intends to give the
Chinese Foreign Minister (Chi P'eng-fei) our definitive
answer when the latter visits Britain later this year. The visit
was postponed from February and new dates remain to be settled.
The Secretary of State did not think it appropriate to refer to
the subject when he met the Chinese Foreign Minister during the
Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris in February and the latter did
! not bring it up. When the Secretary of State does speak to Chi
P'eng-fei, he will speak from the attached document and give Chi
whe
C
-
CONFIDENTIAL
/P'eng-fei
CONFIDENTIAL
A
E
F
P'eng-fei a copy (this document is very strictly Confidential
until the Secretary of State has given it to the Chinese).
Although the matter was not raised by the Chinese with
Mr Walker or Mr Heseltine during their visit to China in March,
the Chinese took advantage of the presence of British press men
in Peking to leak details of their proposal. The senior Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs "(Ch'iao/Kuan-hua) told Mr Alan Hare
and Mr Charles Smith of the Financial Times about it during a
discussion on 31 March (a transcript of the discussion has been
given to us on a confidential basis by the Financial Times).
As a result, the Secretary of State was questioned by the
Financial Times during an unattributable press briefing on
13 April. The Secretary of State said that the question of
official Chinese representation in Hong Kong had been a live one
for some time; it would need careful consideration. He did not
think, however, that the lack of a solution need hold up the
development of commercial relations between Britain and China.
Nor did he think that it would in fact have this effect.
The
Financial Times published an article on the following day.
There has been some subsequent publicity including a front page
article in the South China Morning Post, a leader in the Far
Eastern Economic Review and an article in the Economist,
The article in the South China Morning Post makes it clear that
Lord Brockway favours the Chinese proposal.
5.
хх
The Chinese decision to leak their proposal is part of a
well-established pattern in their negotiating tactics. When the
question of Chinese official representation was a live issue in the
1950s, the Chinese used precisely the same tactics; as a result,
Parliamentary interest was aroused. Mr Selwyn Lloyd replied to
/a Parliamentary
- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
a Parliamentary question on the subject on 6 June 1956. During
the negotiations for the exchange of Ambassadors rakakians with
China, Chou En-lai leaked details of the talks to Mr Neville
Maxwell, who subsequently published a detailed article in the
Sunday Times.
16.
The subject is of considerable delicacy. On the one hand,
we do not wish to say anything publicly which could be interpreted
by the Chinese as shutting the door in their face before the
Secretary of State has spoken to the Chinese Foreign Minister.
On the other hand, we do not wish to imply that further study of
the proposal will lead us to accept it. The reply has been
[drafted with these considerations in mind.
7.
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
3 May 1973
R.M. Evens
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
When hady Turademir has rear the pp she
aught
and
like to have
Falk with F.E.D.
Ken Wilfe 40.
- 3-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BACKGROUND
1.
There is a long history to this problem. The Nationalist Government had
an Official Commissioner in Hong Kong from 1945 to October 1949. He gave
the Government of Hong Kong a great deal of trouble by, for example,
claiming a status superior to that of the consular representatives of
other countries. 2. In February 1956 the present Chinese Government
formally proposed to our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they should
be allowed to establish in Hong Kong an "Office of a Commissioner of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China". We told the Chinese
in February 1958 that we could not agree to this proposal.
3. When agreement was reached on the exchange of Ambassadors in March
1972 the Chinese formally revived their 1956 proposal on Representation.
It was discussed at some length during both Mr Royle's visit to Peking
in May and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit in October.
Both Mr Royle and Sir Alec Douglas-Home told the Chinese that we could
not accept their proposal. The Chinese asked us to give further
consideration to it. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed to do
so but he held out no hope that he would change his mind. Не intends to
take the matter up with the Chinese Foreign Minister when the latter
visits Britain later this year.
i 4+
The main reason for our dislike of the Chinese proposal is that we
believe the establishment of a representative of the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs would have a strongly adverse effect on confidence in
the future of the Colony. We do not believe that sufficient practical
benefits would accrue to justify the risk of such an appointment. There
are already a large number of Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong
(eg in the Bank of China, NCNA and the China Travel Service) who deal
very efficiently with all practical questions of commerce, culture,
information and transport.
N.C.HR. Cauchina News Dying-
New
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.