CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF SECURING TERMS FOR
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH WOULD WORK OUT ACCEPTABLY FOR
US, IF THERE IS SUCH A CHANCE THEN IT IS WORTH WHILE TAKING CHANG
WEN-CHIN UP ON HIS OFFER OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS
WITHOUT COMMITMENT, IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR DECISION IS THAT THERE
IS NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GETTING ' THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO AND ABIDE BY
ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG THEN
IT IS BETTER THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT A FIRMLY
NEGATIVE ANSWER SOON AND STICK BY IT.
2.
PARAGRAPH 15 OF HONG KONG DESPATCH OF 5 MAY STATES IF THE CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO CONDUCT HIMSELF LIKE ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE
HERE, KEEP OUT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, REFRAIN FROM MANIPULATING THE LEVERS OF
CPG INFLUENCE AND FROM DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE POSITION
OF THE HONG KONG GOVERN- MENT, HE WOULD BE A POSITIVE ASSET IN MANY
PRACTICAL AND POLIT- ICAL WAYS''. MY RECOMMENDATION FROM THIS POST MUST
BE THAT IT IS WORTH OUR WHILE TO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF THE CHINESE
GOVERN- MENT TO REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG ON PRECISELY SUCH RESTRICTED
LINES. I SUGGEST I SHOULD SPEAK TO CHAN GWEN-CHIN ON THE LINES OF THE
FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.
3. I HAVE NOW LOOKED UP THE EARLIER FILES TO WHICH HE REFERRED AT OUR
LAST MEETING, NEITHER THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1956 NOR ITS
REPETITION TO MR ERROLL IN OCTOBER 1957 ( PEKING TELEGRAMS NOS 132 OF 25
FEBRUARY 1956 AND NO526 OF 31 OCTOBER 1957) GIVE A PRECISE IDEA OF WHAT
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND. SPEAKING TO MR HAROLD WILSON ON 25
FEBRUARY 1958, HOWEVER, CHOU EN-LAI WAS MORE EXPLICIT CHINA HAS STATE
ENTERPRISES, BANKS AND OTHER PROPERTIES IN HONG KONG, WITH NEARLY 1,000
EMPLOYEES, LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE HONG KONG
POLULATION IS CHINESE. WE HAVE MANY BUSINESS MATTERS ON WHICH CONTACTS
HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES. IT IS
SECRET
30
215
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+
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IT IS REASONABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVE THERE.'' WE SHOULD BE READY TO AGREE THAT CHINESE
REPRESENTATION ON SUCH A BASIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES. WE SHOULD FIRST, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SATISIFIED THAT THE
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE EXCEED THE DEFINITION OF
HIS FUNCTIONS GIVEN BY
PREMIER CHOU TO MR WILSON: AND THIS LIMITATION OF HIS FUNCTIONS WOULD
HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE INHABITANTS OF HONG KONG FROM THE OUTSET.
WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH US IN MAKING
THIS CLEAR THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS ALSO. IT MUST BE CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN US AT THIS STAGE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO EXCEED THESE FUNCTIONS AND INTERVENE IN MATTERS
WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD
AT ONCE HAVE TO STOP DEALING WITH HIM AND ASK THE CHINESE GOVERN- MENT
TO WITHDRAW HIM. I COULD SUPPORT MY ARGUMENTS BY DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE
ON HONG KONG TELNO 398.
4. IF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAIL TO GIVE US COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON
THESE TERMS WE SHOULD THEN INFORM THEM THAT THEIR PROPOSAL IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE AND WE SHOULD STAND BY THIS POSITION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT
FURTHER ARGUMENT WOULD BE USELESS, I THINK A CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL WOULD BE
BETTER BOTH FOR SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS AND FOR THE POSITION OF HONG KONG
THAN A LONG DRAWN OUT AND
INCONCLUSIVE DIALOGUE.
ADDI S
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
¿COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/
FILES
FEQ HKIOD
N AV D P/S
P/S TO WR ROYLE
MR WILFORD SIR L MONSON
NNUNN
·
COPIES TO:
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE
2
1
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·
216
Mr Logan
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET
4
A
B (file
attached)
C D E F
GH
GH
I
J K
L
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
吓
You will no doubt wish to show Mr Royle the most important papers on
this subject before he holds his meeting at 4.30 pa today. The file has
become pretty thick. But I think that the papers which matter most are
the following:-
32
2.
(a)
(b)
(c)
23
Peking telegram No 132 of 1956 (This telegram describes the original
Chinese proposal, which has now been revived);
"Guide lines for the Governor Designate of Hong Kong Paper C"
(paragraphs 8 to 16 deal with the subject of Chinese representation);
Peking telegrams No 245, No 251, No 28 to Hong Kong, and No 401 (these
telegrams describe the exchanges which Mr Addis has recently had with
the Head of the West European Department in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and give his own views);
Hong Kong telegrams No 272, No 31 to Peking and No 398 (these telegrams
set out the Governor's +view);
FCO telegrams No 265 to Hong Kong and No 338 to Hong Kong (these
telegrams set out our own views);
Mr Grattan's letter to Lord Bridges of ↳ May, which reviews the history
of the case.
It seems to me that the courses open to us are:-
Effectively to reject this proposal now;
To say nothing to the Chinese until we are pressed, but then to reject
their proposal;
To accept the Chinese proposal;
(a) To make a counter proposal to the Chinese.
I see little point in our playing for time if we do not intend in due
course to reject the Chinese proposal.
1
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET
13.
35
217
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET
(a) •
3. The Governor favours course (a). Mr Addis favours something
approximating to course (a) (ie considering whether the Chinese request
contains the elements of a negotiable arrangement). It seems to me that
course (a) is better than course (b) if we are to reject the Chinese
proposal. It also seems to me that course (c) is better than course (d)
if we are to accept it; what the Chinese want in Hong Kong is "A
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China" (a
title which implies that the Chinese acknowledge that Hong Kong has a
status which differs from that of the rest of mainland China). If we are
to regard the Governor's assessment of the implications of the Chinese
proposal as the over-riding consideration (FC0 telegram No 265 to Hong
Kong), it follows that we must plump for course (a).
11 May 1972
R.M. Evans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
cc
Sir Leslie Monson
Mr Wilford
Mr Laird
without attachments
P.S.
Mr Hervey
Mr Davies
I also attach a copy of the Governor's despatch of 5 May, which reached
the Department this morning. I am sending copies to all recipients of
this minute.
2 -
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET
218
+
Cypher/OTP.
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM PEKING WO FOREIGN OFFICE
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUNION
!
Mr. O'Neill
No: 132
February 25, 1956.
CONFIDENTIAL
D: 6.14 a.m. February 25, 1956.
R: 8.52 a.m. February 25, 1956.
1. C 1143/1 ||FC
Addressed to Forsign Office telerren No: 132 of February 25. Repeated
for information to:
Hong Kong.
and Saving to:
Hong Kong.
Vashington.
Singapore.
The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this morning.
Reading from a prepared text he said that in view of increasing business
relations between Hong Kong and the Interior and in order to facilitate
negotiations of common interest and discussion of commercial questions,
the Chinese Government would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of
a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The
office would consist of a Commissioner together with diplomatic and
other staff. He asked me to convey this to you and said that the Chinese
Government would like to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government.
2. I will telegraph my comments Monday.
Foreign Office pass Washington and Singapore as my Saving telegrams Nos:
39 and 21.
[Repeated Saving to Washington and Singapore]
DISTRIBUTED TO:
Far Eastern Department.
South-East Asia Department.
Economic Relations Department. Mutual Aid Department.
JJJJJ
3
25
FED
1903
*IA TID
ΠΑ
+
{"
CYPHER CAT.
+
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EHC KING 280534Z
CONFIDENTIAL
1
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1.
DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SIPO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
| AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH
DENSON IN MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY
QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS
VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS
STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED
WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE
TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S
REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. ↑ REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT
HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS
AK OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE
LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS, ¦ ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE
VISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT
THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG, HE
WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE ENVISAGED..
ADDIS
FILES
FED HAD
P & C D NAM D
PS
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I
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
H
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- CYPHER CAT. A
CKING 2981452
SECRET
P
+
+
·
LL
---
--
+
TO PRIORITY FCO TEINO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR
GOVERNOR).
+
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEROSE BEFORE HE LEFT
LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM
THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT
SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM,
REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CAMMOT
EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EẠCH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS
IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NČNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE
REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON NORMALISATION
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS
A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER
TIME, TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE MIKWARD IF MADE
LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF
OUR SILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MÀY
AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG
REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO
NO MORE THAN THE NONA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO
SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG. THEY WOULD DO
THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER
OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
I
13.
I
SECRET
-
+
1
ウ
1
را
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THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE
"RMS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
FING KONG
IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED
A MOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED
INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SIRO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.
L
THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
P
DUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT
BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT
IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD.
IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE
COODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED
AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO
SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING
CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE GREATER PART
OF OUR STAKE.
Em
·
THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE
HOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO
SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHIER IT CONTAINS THE
ELEMENTS OF A NECOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE HIGHT FOR EXAMPLE DE ABLE TO
TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS
BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD,
HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING
SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE
REW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE
WOULD DE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE DEING
REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
+
•
I
-2- SECRET
L
++
17.
I
+
(IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT, WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ..SSURANCES
NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA,
OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT
EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR KOT
THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
[REPEATED AS RE WESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
"NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P
ADAMS, CABINET OFTICE/
DEPARKMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
WPD
N M.D.
TOD
FSD
CONS D
IRD NEWS D
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+
L
CYPHER CAT. A
FK PEKING PAP653Z
L
SECRET
SEORET
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
- 1 MAY 1972
FEH 3/301/2
TO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 28 CF 24 APRIL
INFO F C C.
a) YOUR TEL NO.31:
10
1.
CHINEGE FEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THANK YOU. THIS WILL HELP ME IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY
THE HAND WHEN THE CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT. 1 SHALL
NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.
2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND
NETHOD. THUS I WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT FOR THE TIME DE ING
I AM CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL
NO. 251 TO F CO. WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW
THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT
BY TRYING TO ''SIT TIGHT** WE MAY GET OURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE
WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET
AN EVOLVING SITUATION.
ADDIS
FILES
FED
SKD
NAM D
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE MR WILFORD
FFFFF
:
r
COPIES TO SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE
+
SECRET
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
SECRET
YOP COPY
+
FM PEKING #52738Z
- 5 MAY 1972
SECRET
FEH 3 태
باشه
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 401 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG PERSONAL
FOR GOVERNOR).
MY TELNO 28 TO HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1. AT THE
END OF MY MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY, AFTER I HAD GONE
THROUGH MY LIST OF POINTS TO PE RAISED, CHANG WEK-CHIN TURNED TO THE
QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE DID THIS IN A
RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CHANGING THE MOOD OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE
DISCUSSION WITH WHICH WE HAD DEALT WITH THE PREVIOUS POINTS. THERE WAS
NO HINT IN HIS MANNER THAT THIS COULD BE A DIFFICULT OR CONTENTIOUS
ISSUE BETWEEN US. 2. HE SAID THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED
THAT
P
IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE HANDLING OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING HONG KONG
AND OF RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA THE CHINESE GOVERNMENTWOULD
LIKE TO SEND A SPECIAL COMMISSIONER'' TO HONG KONG. I HAD ASKED WHAT
FUNCTIONS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND FOR SUCH AN OFFICIAL. HE
HAD NOW LOOKED UP OLD FILES AND FOUND THAT IN FEBRUARY 1956 THE CHINESE
FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION, THE
STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE WERE EXPLAINED QUITE CLEARLY
IN THESE PROPOSALS. IN 1958 THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE HAD REPLIED THAT
IN THEIR VIEW THE ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS
NOT RIGHT FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE MATTER HAD THEREFORE BEEN SUSPENDED.
THE SITUATION NOW WAS OF COURSE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN 1958.
MOREOVER PEFORE 1949 DURING THE TIME OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT, THERE
HAD BEEN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. IT WAS ONLY
AFTER 1949 THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCONTINUED. PAST EXPERIENCE HAD THEREFORE
SHOWN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN • ORGAN OF REPRESENTATION
WAS TO THE BENIFIT OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THERE WAS A REAL NEED FOR
SUCH A PRESENCE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS
OF THE 1956 PROPOSAL.
SECRET
:
//HE HOPED
I
SECRET
E HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER IT AGAIN.
J
I SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL FROM LONDON AND
WE COULD THEN DISCUSS IT IN MORE DETAIL AT A LATER DATE. WAS THE CHINESE
VIEW THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 1956 SHOULD, IN
BROAD ESSENTIALS, BE MADE AGAIN NOW? CHANG REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT
THE PROPOSAL MADE THEN WAS A CONSIDERED ONE: THE IDEA WAS ONE WHICH
OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED. SINCE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN
DETAIL IN THE PAST HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
THOUGHT APOUT
IT NOW. BASICALLY SPEAKING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WISHED FOR SOME KIND
OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1 REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT I SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMENT AT
THIS STAGE UNTIL I HAD LOOKED UP THE 1954 PROPOSAL. WE COULD THEN MEET
AGAIN AND HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION, WHAT
WE BOTH WANTED WAS AN ARRANGEMENT TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. CHANG AGREED AND
SAID THAT AFTER HAD STUDIED THE PROPOSAL WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND
CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION ON THE SAME EXPLORATORY BASIS AS BEFORE, WITHOUT
COMMITMENT TO EITHER SIDE.
ADDIS
FILES
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]
FED
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I
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS/MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
-2-
SECRET
:
I
COPIES TO
I
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE
:
L
•
י
L
CYPHER/CAT A
OLANDI
T
FM HONG KONG 300488Z
SECRET
I
TEH 3/22
11
TO ROUTINE FCC TELNO 272 OF 36LMARCH INFOI PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 251 TO YOU.
וד
ŕ
じ
OP COF
+
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
MY VICWS WERE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 16 OF PAPER QUOTE
C UNQUOTE IN THE QUOTE GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNOR DESIGNATE
UNQUOTE DRAWN UP BEFORE I LEFT LONDON. I WOULD PREFER TO DEFER FURTHER
COMMENT UNTIL I SEE YOUR OWN REACTIONS.
2. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE FULL RECORD AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH THE ISSUE WAS RAISED, THERE IS A CURIOUS DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN THE MFA'S VERSION OF WHAT CHOU SAID AND JOHN DENSON'S RECORD. AS
RECORDED CHOU'S POINT WAS ONLY OUR ILLOGIC IN WISHING TO RETAIN A
CONSULATE IN TAIYAN WHEN THE C.P.G. HAD NO REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG.
IF DENSON'S RECOLLECTION IS CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY IS OF SOME
SIGNIFICANCE,
3. 1 PRESUME IT IS REALISED BY ALL CONCERNED THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL
WERE LEAKED DELIBERATELY OR INADVERTENTLY IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST
SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS HERE. I DO TRUST THEREFORE THAT SPECIAL
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO SECURE THE INFORMATION THAT THIS
APPROACH HAS BEEN MADE.
MACLEHOSE
+
I
[REPEATED AS NEX;UESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST &
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
PCD
Trb
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PSD
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NEWS D
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P
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++
IMMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY Nɔ.52
TOP COPY
FM HONG KONG 268635Z
26 APR 1972
4
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO
ROUTINE F C 0.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FCO.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.