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427 FILE NOFEH
3/301/2
(Part B )
HONG KONG
TITLE: RELATION.S BETWEEN
CHINA.
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(and dept. when necessary)
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REFER TO
YEAR STAMP
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יו--וי-ם
CYPHER CAT A
FM F C O 291841Z
CIFIDENTIAL
FEC 3/548/8 Enier. R.E.
1972
4.
TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG
(PERSONAL) -
MIPT.
1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECEMBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.
J 4
2. GREENHILL MENTIONED FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS
AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL WITH
CHINA. HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED (AND WHICH
CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO
BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND
NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT SPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY
ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.
A SUNG THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION
IN HONG KONG. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY
UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE
UNQUOTE. OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP
STABILITY IN HONG
1
KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA: IT COULD NOT HAVE A
NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTE AND TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I WAS
GIVING THE MATTER MY PERSONAL CONSIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THE
PROBLEMS WHICH THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR THIS REASON
CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE LONG AND CAREFUL.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES:
ITEAD OF FED
HEAD OF
KIOD
HEAD OF FU3D
PO
went to Head PEELS
PS TO MR. ROYLE PS TO FUS
SIR E. NORRIS MR. WILFORD SIR D. WATSON
CONFIDENTIAL
I
PUMPEDENITAL
اچھے
seek
IN HONG KONG 29MBiBZ
CONFIDENTIAL
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1252 OF 99 DECENBER.1972
YOUR TELEGRAM 1142.
PERSONAL FOR WILFORD FROM GOVERNOR',
CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
MANY THANKS FOR THIS INDICATION OF TIMING,
TOP COPY
谢了
3/3062
su
HAD KNOVH THAT JOHN
2015 WAS PREPARING A DESPATCH ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE LIGHT OF THE
S. CF S'S VISIT AND HAD BEEN WAITING TO SEE IT BEFORE ADDING
TO WHAT I HAD ALREADY SAID IN MY TELECRAM 1953 1.E. NO HEED TO CHANGE CA
LINE FOR CHIAO KUAN HUA'S VISIT,
?. Í GATHER THAT WE MAY NOW EXPECT THE PEKING DESPATCH NEXT WEEK
·D THEREAFTER I WILL EITHER WRITE OR TELEGRAPH.
MACLEHOSE
ว
FUS
I E HORRIS
1
ERE MIKECH MR WILFORD
+
SONPEDENITAL
i
PRIORITY CYPRES CAT/A
F., FCO 2317452
SECRET
SECRET
[FE]
TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELEGRA: NUMBER 1142 OF 28 DECEMBER/1972
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM WILFORD
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. I HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF WRITING TO YOU ADOUT HOW WE
SHOULD TAKE THIS MATTER FORWARD WHEN PEKING TELEGRAM NO 1427 ARRIVED. (
THIS HAS BEEN REPEATED TO YOU) THIS SUGGESTS THAT WE
MAY HAVE THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN LONDON EARLIER NEXT
YEAR THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT KNOW YET WHETHER
THE DATES IN LATE FEBRUARY ARE LIKELY TO BE SUITABLE FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, WHO ALREADY HAS A VERY FULL PROGRAMME.
;
I THINK VE MUST TRY TO NAKE UP OUR MINDS SOON HOW TO PLAY OUR CARDS.
+
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD CHU EIFLA1 ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT HE
WOULD II: DUE COURSE GET IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN
MINISTER. WE MUST THEREFORE BE PREPARED FOR A MOTHER ROUND OF
EXCHANGES WHEN CHI'S VISIT TAKES PLACE. WHEN YOU DISCUSSED
THE SUBJECT WITH DENIS GREENHILL IT WAS, I THINK, LEFT THAT YOU WOULD
LET US HAVE YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS AND ADVICE WHEN YOU HAD
TIME TO BROOD A LITTLE MORE, AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO HAVE FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR UNOFFICIALS WHEN THEY HAD HAD TIME TO
THIK OVER THEIR EXCHANGES WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IT
WOULD THEREFORE BE MUST HILPFUL IF YOU COULD LET US HAVE YOUR
FURTHER THOUGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS IN A PERSONAL LETTER TO
DENIS OR TO ME. WE SHALL WANT TO PUT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF
STATE BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY AND IT WOULD BE FARTICULARLY HELPFUL
FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, SINCE I A TO ACCOMPANY LORD CARRINGTON ON HIS
TRIP WHICH BEGINS ON 21 JANUARY, IF YOU WERS ABLE TO GET YOUR COMMENTS
TO US BY ABOUT 15 JANUARY. THIS WOULD ALLOW JOHN ADDIS WHO RETURNS TO
PEKING ON 6 JANUARY TINE TO COMMENT BY TELEGRAM BEFORE WE NEEDED TO
START DRAFTING HERE
AND BEFORE I LEFT LONDON.
SECRET
/ 3. I
SECRET
3. 1 AK LOT REPEATING THIS TO PEKING. YOU WILL NO DOUBT SEE JOIN ON HIS
WAY BACK TO CHINA AND CAN TELL HIM HOW THE PROGRAMME ABOVE LOOKS TO YOU
SO THAT HE WILL KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT.
DOUBLAS-110. E
FILES
FED
HKIOD
FS TO PUS
JIR E NORRIS SIRD WATSON
MR WILFORD
- 2
SECRET
}
+
I
4
C.8. 41A
10077
20,000-10/71-294667
REF.
CONFIDENTIAL
BY BAG
TS 2/1126/50
R M Evans Esq
FED
F CO
My Jean Richart,
3/30/1
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
22 December 1972
Mi Dev
Pe. opeor.
R.K,
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO PEKING: REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
CHINESE
102
I notice that in the last two sentences of paragraph 9 of his despatch
No. 3/70 of 5 December John Addis has included a, rather compressed,
reference to the discussion of possible Chinese representation in Hong
Kong. For reasons of which you are well aware I hope that if you decide
to have this despatch printed these two sentences could be omitted; or,
if this is impossible, that you will be able to ensure that the despatch
does not have A or Q distribution.
CC
MJ Morgan Esq PEKING
JAN Graham Esq CMG WASHINGTON
I B A Scott Esq
MOSCOW
N J Barrington Esq
TOKYO
es,
Your
Zich.
(R J Stratton)
R WH du Boulay Esq CVO
PARIS
%%.
A
agari
Mi Davi
རི:ཀ་
frier and X
Ac
R.E.
371.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
SUMMARY
1
태
F
101
The Chinese proposal for an official Chinese representative in
Hong Kong was discussed with you in Peking and you undertook to
communicate further on the matter with the Foreign Minister
(paragraph 1).
Background
There was a Chinese Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Hong Kong
1945-49. Since 1949 there have only been semi-official agencies
there (paragraph 2). In 1955-56 and 1956 the Chinese Government
proposed the appointment of a Foreign Affairs Commissioner. In 1958
they were teld in writing that Her Majesty's Goverment could not
agree (paragraph 3). Chou En-lai revived the proposal in 1971 in
the context of the improvement of relations between Her Majesty's
Government and the Chinese Government, but it was not made an issue
in the negotiations on exchange of ambassadors. It was raised again
as soon as the agreement was concluded. In May the Chinese Government
were told that Her Majesty's Government could not agree (paragraph 5).
The Chinese Case
Chou En-lai and the Foreign Minister gave you some clarifications
and assurances on the Chinese proposal during your visit. They
wanted a co-ordinater of the specialised Chinese agencies in
Hong Kong and an official representative.
of setting up a dual régize (paragraph 6).
Argument
There was no intention
There is ferce in the Chinese argument that since the improvement
in our relations the absence of official Chinese representation in
Hong Kong is an anomaly. It is clear that not to agree to the
SECRET
/Chinese
SECRET
Chinese proposal would adversely affect the relations between the United
Kingdom and China (paragraph 7). Our improved relations with
China are of political importance at the present juncture of world
affairs (paragraph 8). Commercially, we have the chance of big
contracts in the fields of civil aviation and industrial development
(paragraph 9). Our position in Hong Kong needs the Chinese
Government's goodwill in the evolving situation up to the end
of the Lease. The appointment of an official Chinese representative
would formalise their acquiescence in the status quo (paragraph 10).
Recommendations
In further discussions with the Chinese we should attempt to limit
and define the functions of the proposed representative to our
satisfaction and try to make it part of a wider agreement on the
normalisation of relations between Hong Kong and China (paragraphs
11-13).
3/56
SECRET
10
BRITISH EMBASSY
FEKING
The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Hone KT MP
etc etc etc.
18 December 1972
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Sir
1. The question of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong
was raised with you by Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Foreign
Minister during your visit to Peking. You explained Her Majesty's
Government's objections, and the Chinese leaders gave some clarifi-
cations and assurances on their proposal. It was left that you
would think over what was said and communicate again with the
Foreign Minister.
Background
2. The Nationalist Government had a Foreign Affairs Commissioner
in Hong Kong from 1945 to 1949. He was sometimes troublesome to the
Hong Kong Goverment in interesting himself in cases of individual
Chinese residents. Since the establishment of the present Government
in Peking there has been no official Chinese representation in
Hong Kong apart from such specialised organs as the New China News
Agency and the Bank of China,
3. In 1955 and 1956 the Chinese Government proposed the appointment
of a Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Hong Kong. Sir Con O'Neill,
who was then Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, recommended in favour of
agreeing; Sir Alexander Grantham, as Governor of Hong Kong, was
opposed, on the ground that the ill-defined duties, status and
authority of the proposed Commissioner would inevitably result in
/interference
1 SECRET
[
SECRET
interference in Hong Kong's internal affairs, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, as
Secretary of State, ruled against the proposal and decided not to
send any reply. Chou En-lai reverted to the proposal three times
with British visitors in 1957 and 1958, In February 1958 Mr Floyd
informed the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London in writing that,
having regard to the fact that the Chinese Government were not at that
time prepared to acknowledge the legitimate point of view of the
Hong Kong Government so as to co-operate with it on the problems
arising between them, Her Majesty's Government regretted that "the
present climate of relations does not appear suitable" for the
appointment of a Chinese Commissioner in Hong Kong.
40 The outline of these events in 1955-58, and in particular the
difference of view between the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking and the
Governor of Hong Kong, were apparently revealed in a volume of
reminiscences by Sir A Grantham published in Hong Kong in 1965.
The difference of view is further discussed in the July/September 1972
issue of The China Quarterly. It must therefore be known to the
Chinese.
5. Chou En-lai revived the proposal in March 1971 in the context
of the improvement of relations between Her Majesty's Government and
the Chinese Government. It was not however made an issue in the nego-
tiations for an exchange of ambassadors. But as soon as the agreement
on ambassadors was concluded in March this year, it was raised with
ne on two occasions and with Mr Royle by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires
in London. When Mr Royle visited Peking, he informed the Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government could not
accept the Chinese proposal.
2
SECRET
/The Chinese Case
SECRET
The Chinese Case
6.
Chou En-lai and Chi P'eng-fei set out the Chinese Government's
position more clearly than before in their talks with you.
(a)
(b)
(0)
The Chinese, they said, are in no hurry to recover
Hong Kong The question should be settled by negotiation.
There was no need to discuss this issue now. They would
not take surprise action, or take over the Colony by force.
The free port should be maintained because it was in
the interests of both countries.
The establishment of an official representative was a
logical consequence of the exchange of ambassadors.
The existing professional (or specialist) agencies needed
an overall (or co-ordinating) body. An official represen-
tative was needed to deal with such questions as trade,
communications (air, rail, shipping, visas), water supply
and border incidents. He would act as the link between
the Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government.
Moreover, by explaining the Chinese Government's policies
to local Chinese, he could improve relations and prevent
troubles like those of 1967.
The proposal for official representation had no ulterior
motive. The representative would not have a special rôle
but would only perform official duties. There was no
intention to set up a dual régime the result of that
would be daily quarrels between the Governor and the
representative. Her Majesty's Government were ruling
Hong Kong and were responsible.
The Chinese Government
did not quarrel with that and respected the British
position.
3
SECRET
/(a)
SECRET
(a)
If the question remained unsettled problems might arise
and unpleasant things might happen not serious, but
unpleasant.
The Chinese Government could not guarantee
that frictions would not arise. If there were delay in
settling the question the British Government would be
This was a big
responsible for the consequences,
question, a question of principle.
Argument
7. There is force in the Chinese Goverment's contention that the
absence of official representation in Hong Kong is an anomaly. It
was not inappropriate while there were not full diplomatic relations
between the Chinese Government and Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom; but it is not in conformity with the exchange of
ambassadors and our new relationship. Official Chinese representa-
tion in Hong Kong is a logical consequence of the normalisation of
our state relations. While we delay our reply to the renewed
request, it is certain that we shall make no progress on any
bilateral matters directly affecting Hong Kong such as an air
services agreement which are of importance in a wider context than
that of Hong Kong's own interests.
wn interests. If our reply is unreasonably
delayed, or if we return a definite refusal, we can expect a steady
deterioration in bilateral relations on all fronts, political as
well as commercial.
8. How much would that matter? The answer must take a broad view,
taking into account China's growing importance in world affairs.
This year we have established a new relationship of "respect and
understanding", as you put it, with the Chinese Goverment. The
moves to establish that relationship the agreement on exchange of
/Ambassadors,
-
SECRET
SECRET
ambassadors and the frank discussions which you and other Ministers
have had with the Chinese leaders over the whole field of foreign
affairs have been in conformity with the main stream of events in
Asia, with President Nixon's visit to Peking and the normalisation
of relations between China and Japan. We are now in consequence well
placed to have our say and make our voice heard in the discussions
of Asian affairs at the crucial juncture when so many of the basic
positions are in movement China-the United States, China-Japan,
the two Koreas, Vietnam, South East Asia and the South Asian sub-
continent. It is against that background that the political value
of the improvement in our relations with China needs to be assessed.
It acquires an added importance from our entry into the European
Economic Community.
9.
-
Commercial consideratione are also important.
The Chinese have
begun a long-range plan for the expansion of their civil aviation.
We stand a good chance of getting in on the ground floor as their
main supplier. They are also probably about to embark on a large
industrial development programe involving the purchase of complete
plants, peasibly on deferred payment terms. At present we are well
placed to get our share of these orders too.
10.
Moreover our position in Hong Kong itself depends on the Chinese
Government's good will1. Our position there cannot be static but must
evolve with developing circumstances, particularly over the next
quarter of a century up to the end of the Lerse. We shall need the
Chinese Goverment's co-operation over each stage of this evolving
situation. The appointment of a Chinese official representative in
Hong Kong now would have the double advantage of both facilitating
that co-operation in the future and formalising their acquiescence
in the present position now.
5
SECRET
/Recommendation
SECRET
Recommendation
11. We should not therefore delay long in giving your reply to
Chou En-lai's and Chi P'eng-fei's representations to you, and your
reply should not be negative. They have already given you some
assurances of their intentions, to meet the misgivings put forward
from our side. We should now in further discussions try to tie
them down further. Our aim should be to define as closely as
possible the functions and status of the Chinese Government
representative in Hong Kong so that Her Majesty's Government's
misgivings can be further set at rest; and we should seek te dress
up the appointment in such a way that it can be presented to public
opinion without shaking confidence in Hong Kong. How can this aim
be achieved?
12. The Chinese leaders themselves have given us a clue in sugges-
ting that the representative for whom they have asked should have
an "overall" responsibility over Chinese Government agencies in
Hong Kong. They already have in Hong Kong the New China News Agency,
the Bank of China and the China Travel Service performing their
legitimate specialised functions. In addition, these agencies have
to perform other functions, such as issuing visas, for which the
proper agencies do not at present exist. Let us therefore agree
that the Chinese Government should set up the agencies or sub-agencies
which they now require for their legitimate official business
e g for issuing visas, for dealing with seamen and shipping matters,
and for handling all aspects of the air travel to China which we
hope will start soon. We could then agree in addition to the
appointment of an offical to exercise "overall" authority over
these agencies on behalf of the Chinese Goverment. He should be
the co-ordinater in charge of the specialised agencies. He should
6
SECRET
/not
SECRET
not be called the Chinese Government Representative, which could imply
too wide powers, or the Commissioner, which is also too vague and has an
unfortunate precedent. Ideally, from our point of view,
he should be called the Consul-General, which implies well-defined
functions. The Chinese Government are scarcely likely to agree to
that, in view of their claim to sovereignty, but we could try it on
28 a first gambit. If they reject the title, as they are likely to,
we can ask them to propose an alternative, bearing in mind the need
to define the functions of the official as an overall co-ordinater
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.