CHINA (RELATIONS WITH
HONG KONG)
42. Mr. Younger asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what
request he has received from the Government of the People's Republic of
China for the establishment of relations with the Gov ernment of Hong
Kong: and what answer has been returned.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: On 25th February the Chinese Government informed Her
Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they would like to establish
in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China with diplomatic and other staff. This
proposal raises a number of issues which are still under consideration.
Mr. Younger: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that in a recent public
statement Mr. Chou En-lai said that this was one of a number of matters
which made an improvement in relations between the two countries
difficult? Since this request apparently came in February, is it not
about time that Her Majesty's Govern- ment made up their minds about
what seems to be a quite normal proposal between States which recognise
cach other diplomatically?
Mr. Lloyd: I think that upon reflection the right hon. Member will
realise that this question does raise a number of points. I do not think
that real complaint can be taken about the time which wo have so far
taken to consider the matter. After all, it was about four years after
the Labour Government recognised them that the Chinese Government
decided to send a chargé d'affaires to London. These matters want
consideration, and we will consider them.
- 3 JUN 1950
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1903/4G Daily 110-
WHAT CHINA
Y first question to Mfr. Chou Ba-la about the relations between our two
-countries provoked a blunt reply.
MA
* Stno-British reinliaria are at a standst115," he said. * In fact,
during the past two yesta they have got worse rather than baller."
I recalled that severni yetu had passed sizes the Bestiah Government,
with Best Berto sa Forsign Minuter, had decided to reward full
recogaltion. to the new Poodle's Government of CHILL
Tel to the day there was at ANY a Breach Charge
aadates in Péking and a Chinese Charge d'apare tu London.
Much hat happened arter then; Forex, the jerkte të
arent__The_TESTOMERIZIN of Postra China to the United Nations, the
embargo on their IELA, CAUNE .. and analy?" † amid, "tha thie des come
when me CRL bary the past and beem to build up new and better
Chat Kalach slogent Mack
and mouth spread foto ndy gria. Wilkes always desired good. tlong with
Britala,
• Ma bollera that the people
of Chiụa and Melinda can ret en very well together, provided
that there be no outside later
Beteken."
Baked him what be muht
ELAMA 13,
A
1957.
engaged in iONALAS CAL propaganda and mollerling in dignita in formation
for 14ko againNT GA
- We cannot astept the idea that sinig Kong should be used at AD AITAKOJ
outpost of the Amentia propuganda and inteligence service"
H
British Government restrictiol China have been sand-despës T approval.
With
78
There was no threat in LIC W In the tone of voler, BONITATEA
clearly left to make Die
aan
ER
On all these gennaioru, 201 the questing of the aIE. J., Popkea Cluna id
be 12, 18 N
Does that mean closer and better Britain and China? NO. TRADE LESS
IMPORTANT LATIONSHIP,
FACTORS
Who said so? CHOU EN-DAI, CH AND FOREIGN MINISTER,
He said it in a frank, personu William Werbey, Labour MP, who' from
China. Høre is-
WILLIAM WARI YI 'EXCLUSIVE REPORI
poter la to aPTURE THOUGUIN NË
has become politically mong de two Chinku. Che People's Repok pending on
the Dhire dates. Be and Tuma. Both of them. the AbstricaDE MELEE could
have a seat in the Unked
* We can never norwać tkka pulley, Talmas ja an Integr part of Chowk, 21
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BAD AS A PANTO
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The Americans had been) ha, quite content to let antais
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bestes they know that the Adventure would feel and "LIKATIONAS Dould
then step in and take over Britain's position to the middle butt.
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The United Nations and the
trade cokerys, I thought I wa * 1
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"The del obataclą" kald ile 30% das Vindi, Tewath Choo Berlas,
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عطا
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sketched out bus view.
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American, mekete in Fest Mesa Made A aoliben of the problema nawe ungrat
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pearvoal jabaliem
*In any case. Dieser tørketa AYA HAI 1 seriosa threat to TRUE TI I Ching
Kalabark when mani bank sati, nad on. Tha rockets make his position
sener Insceste. If he were wemalble he would cama ja terma NICH
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* We are quite peady for that, 4 pornded than in Tesult
A Taiwan being resotted with the Chinase People's Republik "
Pros Porkom. 197. Chou Bo fal switched to Hong Kong
"We have naked för an effeá Chimese representatiY
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Expanding
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their economy have been well AN Lewly Did they will seri, Tom 13 and
allies wherever thera get them: Inda, Boula-Sant Asra, Intan and France,
Bud, above all, the Dorset Union mad the "People's Demoteke
That lɛ why, however much PUMA Buda they may diviège ideologieatti
during the evening years, that will be no publie disagreement betwema
Pekung and Meacon und the day when peaceful car escoleure bronales The
Dong reality of International VESA barva, and pot just a slipen
zu dem W and be world sudo make borer,
-411
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When that day dawnt tha Will BARS Out her clatin; le world. Lenderahig
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SECRET
OUTWARD SAVING MELDGRAN
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
By Bag
No. 41 Saving
May 7, 1956.
SECREN
DEPARTMENTAL. DISERTEUTION
Addressed to Peling telegram No. 41 Saving of Key L Repeated for
information Saving to long Hong
Singaporo No. 187 Washington No. 2075
Your telegran No. 190 [of March 26: Chinese representation in Hong Kong]
After careful consideration the conclusion has been reached that the
Chinese proposal cannot be accepted. I do not agrco that it indicates
any readiness on the part of the Chinese to accept the status quo, but
would regard it rather as a deliberate move by them in the campaign of
encroachment on our position. As the Governor of Hong Kong rightly
pointed out in his Saving telegran No. 460 [of March 13] it must be
judged in the general context of various recent Chinese efforts (which
have already caused us con- cern) to bring the people of Hong Kong into
closer relationship with the mainland. A Chinese official representative
would be bound to maintain that he had a right to be consulted about all
measures in Hong Kong likely to affect Chinese Nationals. He might
insist on being represented at all court cases affecting people of
Chinese race, and he night claim to exercise jurisdiction over the
Kowloon Walled City. His presence could hardly fail to place the
Governor in an embarrassing position. Koreover his activitios would make
it increasingly difficult for the Hong Kong authorities to follow a
policy of impartiality in dealing with all persons of Chinese race in
Hong Kong.
2. You were of course right to refer to the Chinese capacity for
mischief in Hong Kong. It is no doubt true that China intends to recover
the Colony in the end, but the timing of the operation will perhaps
depend very largely on what happens in Formosa. long as the Nationalists
remain in Formosa mder United States protection the Chinese are likely
to be impressed with the risks
/ of
As
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L
SEORIT
Forel Office telegram No. 41 Saving to Peking
-2-
of trying to force the issue in Hong Kong. Even if they did increase
pressure by neang short of armed attack, much would still depend on
local morale. We can best unintain morale by making it clear that we are
not going to give way to gra- dual Communist encroachment in Hong Kong
and that there is therefore no immediate need to reinsure with the
Communists.
3. I agree, however, that it would be difficult to give an outright
refusal to this secmingly friendly proposal. I would profer therefore to
make no reply at all for the time being. If the Chinese revert to it,
you should say that you will ascertain the prosent position. Thereafter
you would be instructed to say that the proposal raised nany complicated
issues which were still under consideration by Her Majesty's Government.
If a substantive reply were unduly delayed it would of course be clear
to the Chinese that we had in fact rejected their proposal; but this
tactic would make it more difficult for them to accuse us of open
unfriendliness.
Live The Chinese will certainly be angry at or failure to take up their
offer. They may conclude that their scoringly friendly policy has failed
and adjust their plans accordingly But it is difficult to say whether
they would decide to accept the situation for the time being, or try to
increase our dif- ficulties in Hong Kong. They should be aware, however,
that a more actively hostile policy towards Hong Kong would only drive
us into the arms of the Arcricans. Since they have been at great pains
to divide us, they may well prefer not to jeopar dise this objective.
DISTRIBUTED M:-
Far Eastern Department South East Asia Department
EHEJE
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950.92
Flag A
C114316 €
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Problem
F
On February 25 the Chinese Government informed Her
Kajesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that in view of increasing
business relations between Hong Kong and the interior" and to facilitate
negotiations of common interest,
they would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China with diplomatic and
other staff (Peking telegram no.132).
FC1143/4 Discussion
Flag B
Flag C
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2.
The problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong has a long history.
The question of the appointment of a Chinese Consul-General in Hong Kong
was first raised as long ago as 1869 and the Chinese renewed their
efforts for representation 1a 1940. In 1945 on our re-occupation of the
Colony the Nationalists with our approval appointed a Mr. T.. Kwok aa
Special Delegate in Hong Kong. Mr. Kwok faded away in 1949
on the approach of the Communists. (A note by the Research
Department is attached).
3.
Her Majesty'a Chargé d'Affaires in Peking is in favour
of accepting the present Chinese proposal. In Peking telegram
no. 135 he argued that:
(a)
The proposal amounts in effect to Chinese
recognition of the status quo in Hong Kong
at any rate in the immediate future; (b) It would provide an official
channel for
conducting business, and relieve
organisations such as the New China News
Agenoy and the China Travel Service of the
quasi-consuler functions which they now
perform;
/(0)
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(c) It might contribute to an increase in the
proportion of traâs with China channelled
through Hong Kong.
Although the Governor of Hong Kong has set out his opposition
to the proposal (see paragraph 4 below) Kr. O'Neill has
returned to the charge. He argues that although the present
Chinese Government may find it of advantage to accept our
presence in Hong Kong now and possibly for some time to come,
they do not intend to accept it indefinitely. Therefore,
though at present they may have no intention of pushing
matters to extremes, their policy is not entirely passive,
and if we reject their present proposal they may feel it
necessary to accelerate their programme for taking over the
Colony, choosing means much more embarrassing than the
present proposal to create difficulties for us in Hong Kong.
He adds that in any case it would be difficult to find
grounds to explain our rejection of the proposal (Peking
telegram no. 19).
4.
The Governor of Hong Kong'a arguments against
accepting the Chinese proposal are cogently set out in Hong
Kong savingram no. 460. They are:
(a) Any Chinese representative in Hong Kong
would be bound to interest himself in
matters which were in our view beyond his
competence e.g. immigration controls and
court cases involving China's "sovereign
immunity", and would certainly, as the
representative of "the motherland", I
participate in the many left-wing
activities in the Colony.
/(b)
Flag D
Flag E
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Flag F
76.
5.
(b) The present informal and low level
contacts with the Hong Kong offices
of Chinese official bodies suit our
purposes since they can to a large
extent be used or ignored as we please.
(e) The existing Chinese Communist
commercial organisations in Hong Kong
are well able to facilitate any increase
in trade.
(a) The appointment would have a bad effect
on the local inhabitants who would
regard it as a first step in the
Chinese take-over and as evidence
that we were unable to resist pressure
from the Communista.
The Colonial Secretary bas informed us that he finds the
Governor's arguments quite conclusive, and adds that if the
acceptance of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong gave the
Chinese Government the slightest grounds to press for
representation elsewhere in our territories, for example, in
Singapore, it should be resisted on that ground alone,
6.
We too are impressed by the Governor's argumente.
We cannot agree with Mr. O'Neill that the proposal indicates
any readiness on the part of the Chinese to accept the status
quo in Hong Kong. We would regard it rather as a further and
dangerous step in Chipese efforts to undermine our position
there. As the Governor rightly pointa out, it must be judged
in the general context of various recent Chinese efforts (which
have already caused us concern) to bring the people of Hong
Kong into ever closer relationship with the mainland, and to
suggest that Hong Kong is part of mainland China. They are,
for instance, busily trying to promote cultural exchanges,
unrestricted travel over the border and visits to exhibitions
/and
congresses in Canton. A Chinese official representative would
be bound to maintain that he had a right to be consulted about
ell measures in Hong Kong likely to affect Chinese nationals.
He might insist on being represented at all court cases affecting
people of Chinese race and he might claim to exercise jurisdiction
over Kowloon Walled City. His presence could hardly fail to place
the Governor in a most embarrassing position particularly since he
would no doubt try to get himself regarded as "gauleiter" designate
ready to take over from the Governor when Hong Kong should rovert
to China. Although we recognise the Communist Government, the
Hong Kong authorities have tried to take a strictly neutral
line between the Communists and Nationalists in Hong Kong and
have been prepared to treat all persons of Chinese race on a
basis of equality provided they behave themselves in the Colony.
If we accepted a Chinese Communist official representative it
would be increasingly difficult to follov such a policy,
particularly since the latter could be expected to exploit bis influence
to the detriment of Chinese of non-Communist sympathies.
Mr. O'Neill is of course right to remind us that the
Chinese if they so desire have great capacity for mischier in
Hong Kong By withholding food supplies from the mainland or
by stirring up labour troubles, particularly in the public
utilities, they could indeed make our position very difficult.
But we must look at the situation in its international context.
It is no doubt true that China intends to recover Hong Kong in
the end but the timing of the operation will depend vary
largely on what happens in Formosa. As long as the Nationalists
remain in Formosa under United States protection the Chinese are
likely to be impressed with the risks of trying to force the
issue in Hong Kong. Even if they did increase the pressure on
Hong Kong by means short of armed attack, much would still
depend on the local morale. It is important therefore that we
7.
/should
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Americans, but they have been at great pains to divide us from
the Americans and they may well prefer not to jeopardise this
objective.
Recomendations
11.
It is recommended that:
(a) We should not agree to Chinese representation
in Hong Kong.
(b) We should not reply to the Chinese communication
for the present but when the Chinese remind us,
should give a temporizing reply.
(a) The Colonial Secretary should be informed of
our views on the lines of the attached draft.
(d) Her Majesty'a Chargé d'Affaires in Peking
should be informed of our decisions in due
course.
-
C.F. Crove April 11, 1956.
Flag G
+
Since the above was typed we have received further comments from Hong
Kong, prompted by Peking's telegram no. 190 discussed in paragraph 2
above. The Governor is evidently afraid that we may accept the proposal
and is searching for ways to impose delay and to make it as little
harmful as possible. He accordingly suggests that, if we do accept, we
make the appointment conditional on the prior exchange of Ambassadors.
This does not seem either feasible or desirable. We do not
want to exchange Ambassadors at this stage and even if we did the
initiative should come from the Chinese. All proposals for an exchange
bave in the past come from us and we do not want to appear to be running
after the Chinese any more on this. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether
the appointment of
16.
/a
should maintain that morale.
We can best do this by
making it clear that we intend to remain in Hong Kong,
that we are not going to give way to gradual Communist
encroachment, and that there is therefore no immediate
need to re-ipsure with the Communista.
8.
We have examined whether we might not overcome
some of the dangers of the present proposal by agreeing to
the appointment of a Trade Commissioner with strictly limited
functione. We doubt if there would be advantage in this.
The Chinese are unlikely to accept it; and ip any case whatever
the official was called, the embarrassments from his presence
are likely to be much the same,
9.
We
As Mr. O'Neill points out, it will be difficult to give
an outright refusal to this seemingly friendly proposal.
might on this occasion therefore take a leaf from the
Communist book and make no reply at all for the time being.
When the Chinese revert to it, Mr. O'Neill might after
consulting us be instructed to say that the proposal raised
many complicated issues which were still under consideration.
If a substantive reply wore unduly @layed, it would of course
be clear to the Chinese that we had in fact rejected their
proposel; but this tactic would make it more difficult for
them to accuse us of open unfriendliness.
10%.
The Chinese will certainly be angry at our failure to
take up their offer. Coming after the Nationalist sircraft
incident and the refusal to send a Parliamentary delegation
they may conclude that their seemingly friendly policy has failed and
adjust their plans accordingly.
But it is difficult
to say whether they would decide to accept the situation for the
time being or try to increase our difficulties in Hong Kong.
They should be aware however that a more actively bostile policy
towards Hong Kong would only drive us into the arms of the
/Americana
+
4
a Chinese representative after an exchange of Ambassadors
would in fact have a lesa harmful effect on morale in Hong
Kong, and it would in no way remove the other dangers to
which we have drawo attention in paragraph 6.
In the circumstances I do not wish to alter our
recommendations. There seems little doubt that they will
be acceptable to the Governor since he still clearly dislikes
the proposal intensoly.
I bave amended the draft to the Colonial Secretary
to take account of this telegram.
Y
18. M.
стать #/
I agree with these recommendations
Jagree
and the draft letter to the Colonial Secretary.
Sic 1. Kirkpatrick
Dallm. "14.
Lord Reaching
See. of siali
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I think this is right.
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E
ECRET ·
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
FROM HONG KONG (Sir A. Grantham)
Simplex
D. 7th April, 1956.
R. 7th
SECRET AND GUARD
No. 278.
13.00 hrs.
с-рос
Addressed to S. of S.
FC 1143/619/
Repeated to Peking, No. 105, and by saving to
Washington, No. 26, and
Commissioner-General, South East
Asia, No. 36.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.