R.GETRY No.50
- 1 bal 1972
FEH 3/301/2
(FE)
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELKO 330 OF 28 APRIL.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM HR ROYLE.
21) YOUR TELEGRAM TO PEKING NO 31: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. LESLIE MONSON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS TALK WITH YOU AND YOUR ADVISERS AND
I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE FURTHER ANALYSIS SET OUR 1
YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE,
7. I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HYSELF
FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE POSITION THOUGH AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE WE
MUST AWAIT AUY FURTHER COMMENT FROM ADDIS BEFORE WE FORMALLY GIVE OUR
POLICY DECISION. THEREAFTER WE MUST ALL STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE,
INCLUDING OF COURSE MYSELF IN PEKING.
3. AN AT PRESENT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRAVELLING TO PEKING BY
RAF COHET BUT THIS IS SUBJECT TO FINAL AGREEMENT HERE AND FROM PEKING. I
UNDERSTAND THAT YOU THINK IT GENERALLY UNDESIRABLE FOR A MINISTER TO GO
INTO CHINA VIA HONG KONG BUT WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO MY RETURNING
FROM CHINA VIA HONG KONG? I WOULD ONLY STOP FOR A SHORT TIME IN HONG
KONG BUT I WOULD MUCH LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MY VISIT TO
PEKING. I SHOULD HAVE TO HOLD A PRESS COMFERENCE IN HONG KONG OF COURSE
BUT I THINK THAT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL AND I WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH YOU
BEFORE HAND,
4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU THINK THIS 1 DEA
MAKES SENSE,
DOUGLAS-HOME
PILES
FED
HKD
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON
MR WILFORD
FFFFF
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
+
REGLED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
TUP COPY
FM HONG KONG 260635Z
26 APR 1972
که
باران
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO
ROUTINE F C 0.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FC0.
J
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON, I WOULD LIKE TO
DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR
OWN THESIS TO HIM. THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH.
2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO
BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRMS THE PROBLEMS THEREIN FORESEEN
IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF
THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER THAN TO EASIER
RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE SITUATION.
3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC
HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE
COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND
THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE NUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY.
FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS
APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)
/4. MY
SECRET
SECRET
MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND:
A)
B)
5.
THAT WE CAN SEE NORACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT WAS
PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS NOT
UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE CPG
WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE
PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NONA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY
SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS
COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A
FAR LARGER SET-UP THAN WE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED
WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.
CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG,
THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO
ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY
THE RIOTS OF $67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW.
THIS POLICY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S
BELIEF THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT. HENCE THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC
LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS
AND CADRES.
YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF
SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED,
WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO
IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S
POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT
PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING,
WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE
REQUESTS . FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED
FROM ME, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND
OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.
-2-
SECRET
/6. ALL
SECRET
ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS VIEW. THE
QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH
CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD
FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:
A)
B}
1)
THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.
THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR
LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CRINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT
DOES NOT TAKE US VERY FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN
PEKING.
RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING.
E.G.
THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:
THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED BY CHANG
WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : ITI) THE WAY
THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LA! ON HONG KONG
TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVEN THE
CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.
C) THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO
WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO SIT TIGHT
ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.
7.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON
SHOULD NOW BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK
POLITICAL TRICKS TO TAKE ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND
THE CASE FOR GIVING THEM REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST OUR IMMEDIATE
OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE
IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE
OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED. HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL
FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
-3- SECRET
/8. SINCE
SECRET
3. SINCE I THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER BATE
RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT
THAT IT WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE
ALSO PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE
UNLIKELY TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT,,
AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM OFF QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE
LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO GRUMBLES. BUT THERE COULD BE
REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN MOMENTUM.
MACLEHOSE
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE]
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SR & Massond
L
+
-4-
SECRET
J
3
1
ᅥ
7
IMMEDIATE
I think we are all pretty well
аджет.
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 268635Z
SECRET
Mi
리
21
SECRET
Myselfund .! FESD.
the Govenor.
ATRE-
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO
ROUTINE F C 0.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FCO.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
10
26/4
OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON. I WOULD LIKE TO
DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR
OWN THESIS TO HIM. THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH,
2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO
BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRMS THE PROBLEMS THERE IN
FORESEEN IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN
INEVITABILITY OF THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER
THAN TO EASIER RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE
SITUATION.
3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC
HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE
COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND
THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE NUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY, I
FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS
APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)
SECRET
/4. MY
SECRET
I
L
E
MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND:
4.
A)
}
THAT WE CAN SEE NO ·RACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT
WAS PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS
NOT UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE
CPG WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE
PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NONA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY
SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS
COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A
FAR LARGER SET-UP THAR WE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED
WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.
. B) CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG.
5.
THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO
ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY
THE RIOTS OF '67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW.
THIS POLICY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S
BELJE THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT. HENCE THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC
LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS
AND CADRES.
YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF
SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED,
WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO
IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S
POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT
PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING,
WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE
REQUESTS. FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED
FROM ME, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND
OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.
-2-
SECRET
/6. ALL
SECRET
ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS VIEW, THE
QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH
CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD
FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:
A)
THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.
THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR
LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT
DOES NOT TAKE US VERY FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN
PEKING. B) RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING,
E.G.
1) THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:
II) THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED
BY CHANG WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : 111)
THE WAY THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LAI ON HONG KONG
TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVER THE
CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.
C) THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO
WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO SIT TIGHT
ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.
7.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON
SHOULD NOW BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK POLITICAL TRICKS
TO TAKE ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CASE FOR GIVING
THEM REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST
OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE
IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE
OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED, HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL
FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
-3- SECRET
/8. SINCE
7
SECRET
8. SINCE I THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER- BATE
RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IT
WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE ALSO
PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE UNLIKELY
TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT, AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM OFF
QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE
LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO GRUMBLES, BUT THERE COULD BE
REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN MOMENTUM.
MACLEHOSE
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE /
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
+
-4-
SECRET
!
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
FEA 3'2!
(E)
(J)
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.
It
Research Department's minute of March 1956 provides a
summary which I shall not attempt to duplicate of the historical
background until the establishment of the People's Republic.
is clear that after the War and until 1949 the then Chinese
Government maintained a representative in Hong Kong, agreement
on this point having been reached in 1945. Hong Kong telegram
No 460 Saving of 1956 states that this representative held the
title of "Special Commissioner of the Chinese Ministry for
Foreign Affairs", and that he could be troublesome on occasion,
eg in interesting himself in cases of individual Chinese residents
and in claiming a position superior to that of a normal consular
officer. The man in question was concurrently "Special Delegate
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kwangtung and Kwangsi".
In this connection it is interesting that Chou En-lai claimed in
1957 that the PRC was "more moderate" than Chiang Kai-shek. Chou
claimed that when Chiang was in power in China he declared that
the Chinese Governor in Canton was also his representative for
Hong Kong This was as good as claiming that Hong Kong came
under his jurisdiction.
*
11
All we ask for is an official
representative in Hong Kong
2.
+
The matter was not apparently formally raised by the
Government of the People's Republic until 1956. It seems from
references however that Chou En-lai may have raised it informally
SECRET
/on a number
SECRET
(N)
B
12
on a number of previous occasions, in particular during his
discussions with the Governor of Hong Kong during the latter's
visit to Feking in 1955.
3.
On 25 February 1956 a Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
summoned the British Chargé d'Affaires (Mr O'Neill) and informed
him that China wished to establish "an Office of a Commissioner
of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China" in Hong
Kong (Peking telegram No 132 of 1956), The Office would
consist of a Commissioner together with diplomatic and other
staff. The question was given full and careful consideration
in London. Mr O'Neill was in favour of accepting the proposal
C and D (Peking telegrams Nos 135 and 190 of 1956). The Governor,
however, was strongly against it. (Hong Kong telegrams No 460
Saving and 278 of 1956) The Secretary of State agreed with
tir Crowe's submission of 11 April 1956 that we should support
the Governor'a views. It was decided that we should take "#
leaf from the Communist book" and send no reply at all for the
time being. If the Chinese reverted to the matter we should reply
that it raised complicated issues and was still under considera-
tion. If a substantive reply were unduly delayed the Chinese
would clearly realise that we had rejected the proposal,
Instructions on these lines were sent to Peking (FCO telegram
No 41 Saving of 1956.)
F
G
H
2
SECRET
14.
J
SECRET
H
J
K
4.
It seems from the papers that the Chinese did not revert
to the subject formally with the Chargé d'Affaires. But in
June 1956 Chou En-lai gave an interview to the Reuter's
correspondent in Peking in which he cited our failure to give
a reply to the Chinese wish "to enter into relations" with the
Hong Kong Government as one of two examples to show that the
British Government's approach was not the same as the Chinese.
The Reuters report inspired a Parliamentary Question on the
subject. The Foreign Secretary replied to the question by
acknowledging that the Chinese had made an approach in February,
but saying that it raised a number of issues which were still
under consideration.
5.
During 1957 Chou En-lai referred to the matter twice.
The first occasion was in an interview with a Labour MP, Mr Warbey,
which was subsequently published in the "Daily Herald" on
19 June 1957.
The second occasion was when Chou met the
Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Board of Trade, Mr Erroll,
who visited Peking in October 1957 (Peking telegram No 526).
In commenting on this the Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that the
Chinese had no intention of dropping the question and that it
had been raised on other occasions "in recent days", for instance
in discussion with the Chargé by the Mayor of Peking. He then
commented in his telegram No 535 that he hoped that the possibility
of giving a more positive answer to the Chinese would now be very
/seriously
3
SECRET
SECRET
M
seriously considered.
N
The Governor, in his telegram No 265,
strongly reiterated his views that we should not agree to the
Chinese proposal.
6.
In 1958 Chou En-lai again took the question up with
two further British visitors, a Colonel Cantlie on 30 January
and Mr Harold Wilson on 25 February. There were some discrep-
ancies between his statements on the subject on these two
occasions. Col Cantlie claimed that Chou had spoken of a
Chinese "Consul" in Hong Kong; Mr wilson said that Chou said
specifically that the Chinese representative should not be a
Consul. Chou also drew some parallels with our representation
in Shanghai. To Mr Erroll in October 1957 he seemed to have
mentioned this simply as a general justification for some kind
of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, but in speaking to
Mr Wilson he apparently went further and pressed for representation
in Hong Kong parallel to ours in Shanghai. In commenting on
this, Far Eastern Department thought that the proposal presumably
envisaged a Counsellor from the Chinese mission in London
detached for duty in Hong Kong and nominally reporting to the
mission in London. The Governor of Hong Kong indicated however,
that even this proposal was unacceptable to hip. The approved
record of Kr wilson's talks with Chou En-lai subsequently became
available to us and it became clear that Chou had made no specific
suggestion of parallelism. (I have included these details,
therefore, merely to show the lines along which our thinking was going)
4.
SECRET
17.
SECRET
7.
On 27 February 1958 the Foreign Secretary summoned the
Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. In the course of a lengthy exchange
in which the Secretary of State covered a number of points on
Sino-British relations and on general international issues, he
told the Chargé d'Affaires that the British Government could not
agree to the appointment of a Chinese representative in Hong
Kong in the present climate of relations. The Chargé d'Affaires
replied that he thought Chinese representation in Hong Kong
could be beneficial and not the reverse. There the matter
apparently rested. The Chinese do not appear to have reverted
to it formally again.
In his Review for 1958 the Governor of
Hong Kong expressed pleasure that we had continued to refuse to
accept the Chinese proposal.
8.
The matter came up again during Mr Denson's call on
Chou En-lai on 2 riarch 1971. We know that the Chinese version
of what Chou En-lai said to Mr Denson differs from our own
version.
According to Mr Denson's account, Chou raised the matter
at the end of his talk in a roundabout fashion. Mr Denson's
record is as follows:
"Chou said that there was one more question relating
Should the authorities in Hong Kong
to Hong Kong.
contact the Kwangtung provincial authorities or the
authorities in Peking? Sometimes contact was made with
the Kwangtung authorities and sometimes with the Peking
authorities via the office of the Chargé d'Affaires.
But there was no official relationship with Hong Kong.
Yet we maintain that we must have an official office
5
SECRET
/in the
SECRET
9.
in the province of Taiwan.
contradictory position.
This was a
"The Chargé said that he was not very familiar
he believed that this
with this problem
matter had been discussed with Mr O'Neill when
he had been Chargé.
"Chou said that he thought it was with Mr Trevelyan.
The Chinese found Mr Trevelyan easier to talk to
than Mr O'Neill .."
The Chinese version (as distributed to Communists in
Hong Kong) accorded much more prominence to this exchange,
which appeared in their version, for one thing, to have
taken place much earlier in the interview. Presumably
Chang Wen-chin was relying on the same version when he
raised the matter with Mr Addis on 27 March.
that Premier Chou En-lai "had raised the old question that
among the many affairs which involved the Hong Kong
authorities and China some were taken up with the central
government and some with the local authorities. This
state of affairs was not convenient.
Chang said
Premier Chou had
asked whether it would be possible to send an official
representative to Hong Kong. What was the British reaction?"
10. The discrepancy is now of little consequence since the
Chinese have made clear both to Mr Addis on 27 March and to
Mr Wilford on 7 April that they regard what Chou said last
year as a renewal of the long-standing Chinese proposal to
send an official representative to Hong Kong.
FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT
17 April 1972
6
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
FC 1051/21
Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution
+
CHINA
March 4, 1958
Section I
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE CHINESE CHARGÉ
D'AFFAIRES ON FEBRUARY 27, 1958
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Wilson (Peking)
(No. 19. Confidential)
Foreign Office,
(47)
Sir,
March 4, 1958. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires called on me at my request
on the 27th of February.
2. told Mr. Huan Hsiang that I had asked him to come to see me in order
that I might explain to him the views of Her Majesty's Government on a
number of matters affecting Anglo-Chinese relations with particular
reference to the remarks made by Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Erroll in Peking
on the 29th of October of last year (your telegram No. 526 of the 31st
of October). I then spoke on the lines of the enclosed aide-mémoire, a
copy of which was given to Mr. Huan at the end of the interview.
3. At the end of my remarks, Mr. Huan thanked me for having given him
our views. He said that he could not at once comment on all the points
made in such a comprehensive statement but that he would like to take up
one or two of them. He believed that there were no questions between our
two countries that could not be settled and he was glad to note our
expressed desire for an improvement in our relations. He agreed that
these were at present unsatisfactory. He had noted my statement of
complaints against his Government but felt bound to say that the Chinese
Government for their part were very dissatisfied with various aspects of
our behaviour, particularly over Formosa and Hong Kong.
L
4. As regards Formosa, Mr. Huan maintained that there had been a marked
increase recently in contacts between this country and the Nationalist
authorities and it seemed to the Chinese that we were following the
Americans in supporting a "Two Chinas" policy. There were four attitudes
that Governments could take over the question of their relations with
Formosa. They could fully support the Chinese Government, they could
fully support Chiang Kai-shek, they could abstain or they could support
the Chinese Government de jure while recognising and dealing with the
Nationalists de facto. The last, in the Chinese view, was a
double-faced" attitude and perhaps the worst of the four. Unfortunately,
it was this attitude that seemed to be adopted by the United Kingdom.
Mr. Huan then rehearsed the familiar evidence" that this was our
attitude, citing in particular the appearance in London last year of a
theatrical group from Formosa, the alleged "many" official visitors to
this country from Formosa and the encouragement given by Her Majesty's
Consul at Tamsui to increase contacts between the United Kingdom and the
Nationalist authorities.
5. Both Mr. Erroll, whom I had invited to be present at the interview,
and I told Mr. Huan that cultural activities such as the appearance of
the theatrical group, had no political significance in this country,
that such officials from Formosa as might have come here in a private
capacity (and they were certainly not many" had received no official
cognisance from Her Majesty's Government and that, as I had previously
said, trade relations with Formosa did not imply recognition. In New
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.