fco-21-1018-relations-between-hong-kong-and-china — Page 1

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JR

EASTERN

(Part_Ĥ__)

5/9/14

HONG KONG & CHINA

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept, when necessary)

TO SEE:

DATE

NAME (and dept, when necessary)

TO

NAME

TO

DATE

DATE

SEE:

(and dept, when necessary) SEE:

FCO 21/1018

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gradut document contennad in 1). The appropriate wegrading ship must be
affixed whenever necessary.)

SECRET

CLOSED UNTIL

20031

Registry Address

Room No....

King Charles Street.

2.

YEAR STAMP

1972

REFER TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

TOP COPY

FM F C 0 051815Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE PEKING TELNO 299 OF 5 MAY,

30

KORGAN'S LETTER TO EVANS 3/56 OF 26 APRIL, CHINESE REPRESENTATION

INI HORS KONG,

WE SENT YOU A MEMORANDUM ON THE HISTORY OF THIS PROBLEM BY THE BAG VICH
LEFT IRRE ON 3 MAY, YOU WILL NO DOUBT LET US KNOW IF YOU WOULD LIKE ANY
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL.

DOUGLAS-HOKE

VILES

FED

FR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

33

[

*

www

Miteve Mo Mi Davies

FERGY TO འ༢

J.

1. Sueling of The

24 safe.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

1972

14

P/S to Dr Roy li 2. Mr Wilferdew JiBcull-but- 3-FED

ઝાડ

$74.

Theme

of sme significance the Sits's attitude.

Mu.

R.E. 8/5.

sarily

1hh Ken Benous arge enti

enti have it

until we can tell in ea

with

In your letter of 27 April, you asked how the problem of Chinese
representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view
was at present taken of the requests made by the Chinese Government.

The case has a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the
Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nationalist Government maintained
a representative in Hong Kong. He gave the Hong Kong Government a great
deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the
Consular officers of other countries, based on the Chinese view
(Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 19th Century
treaties and hence that Hong Kong belonged to Claina.

In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally proposed the
establishment in Hong Kong of an "Office of a Commissioner of Forelm
Affairs of the People's Republic of Okinal Mr. Selwyn Lloyd decided that
we ought not to accede to the Chinese request, but that it would be
wiser not to refuse it outright. No reply was therefore sent to the
Chinese.

Although the Chinese did not revert to the subject formally during the
next two years, Chou En-lai mentioned it to a number of British
visitors. This led to some publicity in the British press and there were
questions in Parliament. Chou En-lai brought up the issue again with the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade (Mr. Erroll) when he
visited China in 1957. It was therefore decided that a formi

reply to the Chinese request was necessary. In February 1950, Mr. Selwyn
Lloyd told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that, given the climate of our
relations at the time, we could not agree to the appointment of an
official Chinese representative in Hong Kong.

The Chinese did not refer to the matter again until last year.

In March 1971. Chou En-lai brought it up during conversation with our
Chargé d'Affaires. He spoke of "ONE" contradictory position" in
maintaining a Consulate on Taiwan

/while

or Bridges,

10 Downing Street

Alt

5/5

SECRET

SECRET

while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship with Hong
Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal
request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.

The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The
first was when our Ambassador called on the Director of the West
European Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange
which took place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I
enclose a copy. Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was
envisaged that any official Chinese representative in Hong 2ɔng would
have and Chang undertook to make enquiries. The second occasion was when
the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the
Department at d recèption at the chinese Embassy here on 7 April.

Our Ambassador subsequently commented that he thought there was a case
for considering whether the Chinese response contained the elements of a
negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose
a copy). But the Governor believes that the establishment of official
Chinese Teprésentation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position
and damage, rather than improve, relations between China and for. Kong.
His arguments are set out in detail in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to
Peking. Sir Alec Douglas-Home agrees

with the Governor.

When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official
Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have, as we must expect them to
do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the terms
of our response.

(Sgd) P. H. Grattan

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W. 1

R.C.5/5. (c) Mi Crampign: say, 1972

Hong thongs Deparîmeni

1 Cars 5/5

к

TEH 3/20.1in Rally 100

Работ The Harry

71575 Enter

R.E.5/5.

In your lecter of 27 April, you asked how the pro: lem of Chinese
representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view
was at present taken of the

uests made by the Chinese Governmenć.

2. case nas a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the
Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nacionalist Government maintained
a representative in Hong Kong. He gave the Hong Kong Government a great
deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the
Consular officers of other countrics, based on the Chinese view
(Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 29 Century treaties
and hence that hong Kong belonged to 2..iTA.

-

In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally vosed the
establishment in Hong Kong of an "Office of Dhum ... 03-Onor of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic

.. Colwyn Lloyd decided that we ought noc co ton, to the Chinese
request, but that it would be wiser 3. refuse it wutriót.

-

No reply was therefore sent to

T

Cainese.

c

Ahough the Cataese did not revert to the subjecc - during the next two
years, Chou En-lai mentioned 1

uwer of Britis.. visitors. 1.4s led to some publicity ritish press and
there were questions in Parlimen ou Melai brought up the issue in with
the Parliament:

e-Succccary at the Board of War (Iir. Erroll) when ced China in 1957. I
was therefore decided that a far al to the Chinese request was
necessary. In February 2:36, Sel: Lloyd told the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires tim", res the climate of our relations at the time, we could
no

to the appointment of an official Chinese representač.. - Mong Kong.

-

+

Anc Chinese did not refer to Le matter again unnal Labs year.

In March 1971, Chou in-in' brought it up suTIT * ... convmrunuion with
our Chargé d'hifalves. He spoke of u soutradictory position" in
maintaining a Consulate on Taivan

-I

axes,

.ming Street

/while

2

SECRET

.

while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship with Hong
Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal
request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.

The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The
first was when our Ambassador called on the Director of the West
European Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange
which took place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I
enclose a copy. Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was
envisaged that any official Chinese representative in Hong Kong would
have and Chang undertook to make enquiries. The second occasion was when
the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the
Department at a reception at the Chinese Embassy here on 7 April.

Our Ambassador subsequently commented that he thought there was a case
for considering whether the Chinese response contained the elements of a
negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose
a copy). But the Governor believes that the establishment of official
Chinese representation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position
and damage, rather than improve, relations between China and Hong Kong.
His arguments are set out in detail in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to
Peking. Sir Alec Douglas-Home agrees with the Governor.

When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official
Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have, as we must expect them to
do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the terms
of our response.

SECRET

(Sed) P. H. Grattan

CYPHER CAT, A

+

KING 296145Z

SECRET

+

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERCONAL FOR
GOVERNOR).

P

CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. 1 DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON AND
AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM THAT IT
WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE
WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG,
MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN
MINE.

2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE DE THE LONG-TERM

INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CANNOT
EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF
THE CHINESE COVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS
TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED.
CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY
ON NORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF
A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER
TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE ALIKWARD IF
MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR BILATERAL
RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE
LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG

REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH

TO IMPOSE SERT COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO
NO MORE THAN THE NONA DOES SEXI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.

I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO SUPPORT
DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG, THEY WOULD DO THIS IN
ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT
THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.

+

13.

SECRET

+

·

3.

THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE WHO WOULD
HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY

THE CHINESE COVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN

LONG KONG.

IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT
UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE
EFFECT ON SIMO/BRITISH RELATIONS

GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.

OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.

L

THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS

BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT

BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST

PLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.

5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD.
IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE
CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED

AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO

SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.

IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING
CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE

GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.

6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE

YOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO
SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER

IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE MIGHT FOR
EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN GUR REPLY THAT THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO
FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE
PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE
CHANGE WOULD NOT LPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR
INTRODUCE NEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.

SECRET

+

17.

F IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ..SSURANCES NOW
THESE WOULD DE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR
IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT
EVENTTHERE WOULD BE

A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR KOT THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE. ·

ADDIS

/REPEATED AS REWESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SEG ROTARY

"NO. 10 DOWNING ET & TO SIR P

ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

PROT & CONF D

AD

NAM.D.

POD

PSD

CONS D

IRD NEWS D

+

+

-3-

SECRET

+

+

1

J

CYPHER CAT. A

ING 280530Z

CUMFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE

HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,

DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT

OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED PE THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED THE
QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH NDENSON IN
MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY

QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,

A

COPE OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS
VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS

-

-+ | OF AFFAIRS WAS HOT CONVENIENT, THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WAITHER IT
WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE

| REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S

REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT
HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS

OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE LIGHT OF OUR
NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FURCTIONS HE

:SAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING, HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT
THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG

AMS. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE CNVISAGED..

ADDIS

11

#

MA

HKD

AM D

PS 10 FUS MIR VILJORD

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTE.

P

-

Hervey

SECRET

Reference 113

Gj

My Evans

prchummary

ü

moiste

to see

these

verly

notes. The historical background

falling into place, but of with require

considerably more fitting together.

copies of the

mool mpstart popus

1

Quem

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可如

taken which I

propose

пробе

to subtrant with

a exvering

mante. Some

Me are

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and I have arkered

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them from Library Reference Room.

the 1956/57 pps show that:

Chargé

(c) the views of the then charge d'Afferen

The Add.

closely accorded with those I th

3) the views of the Governor were

strongly against.

(c) we headed not to reply to the Chinese an

without saying the best methird of refuring

10.

4) Chan En lai made the matter public in

Aar

interview subsequently carried by the "Daily Heralda"?

All there points are

exercise

M

and

certainly relevant to the current will have to properly taken into
account.

Evans.

13/4

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1314

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3/56

RESTRICTED

BRITISH EMBASSY

FERING

26 April 1972

3-

Ext

33

Sec

+

E Evans Esq

Far Eastern Dept

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