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of the above I said I personally knew nothing of such projects and should we wish for any specific reason to send British naval units into Chinese ports I was sure that we should (?) ask his permission before we do. In my opinion his reason for anxiety on this score is that he realises that his political opponents will attack him over Hong Kong and he wishes now to forestall any criticism concerning Chinese ports.

5.

On returning to my office I found F.0. 984. I think that course of action suggestod therein will have a most unfortunate effect on our future relations with Generalissimo and his Government in view of fact that Generalissimo suggested delegating surrender to U.S. in his capacity of C.-in-C. China theatre. Had we been able to contribute to the capture of Hong Kong I feel we might have had some reason to object, but unfortunately we have done nothing and had the war lasted a few weeks longer the Colony would undoubtedly have been liberated by Chinese forces.

6.

I would like to suggest for your consideration possibility of representative of H.M. Government being nominated to accept civic and territorial surrender of Hong Kong from Japanese Governor. Whilst at the same time British representative could accept military surrender of Japanese garrison on behalf of the C,-in-C. China theatre. This compromise would be something similar to the surrender of Gorman forces in Holland to C.-in-C. 21st Army Group. I do not know whether such a course of action would be acceptable to the Generalissimo, but it seems a possible solution to the present impasse.

T.0.0. 260300Z

Circulation.

First Sea Lord.

C.I.G.S.

C.A.S.

Foreign Office.

Defcnco Office.

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