FO371-46253 — Page 102

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Minutes.

83

5941

MARGIN.

IN

THIS

NOTHING TO

BE WRITTEN

FS89/G

F5589

General Ismay's Letter of Aug 24

It may be well to explain the origin of Z of this letter and the sequel to it.

My letter to Colonel Price of August 23rd, enclosing a draft reply for the concur- rence of the Chiefs of Staff, left the Foreign Office via Room 6 by tube about 11 p.m. on the night of August 23rd. The empty tube was returned within 10 minutes and the letter must therefore have been received before mid- night. As it was marked "Most Immediate" it is difficult to understand why it was not brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff before they considered Chungking telegram No. 909 at their meeting on the following morning.

I was in a meeting of the Far Eastern Planning Unit on the afternoon of August 24th when I received the attached letter from General Ismay asking me to go to see him. I did so about 5 p.m. and he then explained what is stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of his letter of August 24th to Sir G. Gater. That letter was in fact written to Sir G. Gater after and in the light of my conversation with General Ismay. General Ismay's view was that in the light of our wider relations with the Americans we should be well advised to accept Chiang Kai-shek's proposed compromise as recorded in Chungking telegram No. 909 as he thought that the Americans would support that compromise and would be impatient of any attempt on our part to argue further.

I said that I thought it was a matter for Ministers to settle, since, while I appreciated the wider aspect of relations with the Americans, there seemed little doubt that Chiang Kai-shek had put forward this compromise in order to put him in a good position for subsequent negotiations about Hong Kong. pointed out also that, if the Officer Commanding the British Force which took over Hong Kong did so as the delegate of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Kai-shek might claim to go on exercising military authority over Hong Kong after the surrender.

I

I subsequently explained the position and the pros and cons resulting from my conversa- tion with General Ismay to the Secretary of State personally. The Secretary of State took the view that, regardless of any discussions which might be necessary in the future with the Chinese about Hong Kong, we must first resume possession of our own property. He held this view strongly and was not prepared to compromise on it. He authorised me to discuss our proposed draft reply to Chungking telegram No. 909 further with the Colonial Office to soften any asperities within this over-riding principle. Mr. Gent, Mr. Paskin and I agreed subsequently on a modified text. This I read over to the Secretary of State by

telephone...

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