FO371-46251 — Page 214

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(8) Concurrently with our efforts to provide for the attachment of a British Civil Affairs Unit to any regular troops who may operate against liong Kong, it was agreed that ve must also consider the situation which would arise if the Colony were re-taken by guerilla troops either

a) guerilla troops claiming to owe allegiance to the Central Government or later being recognised by the Central Government or (b) communist troops not recognised by the Central Government.

(9) It was agreed that it would be useless to expect the Generalissimo to agree to any plan providing for this latter contingency since it would be improbable that he would overtly recognise the possibility that Hong Kong would or could be captured by communist troops. Therefore, arrangements which we made for this emergency should preferably be done without prior consultation with the Chinese Government.

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(10) On the other hand, the Ambassador has made it clear and the Foreign Office confirmed that it would not be practicable to evolve any secret plan (whether involving 3.0.E. or not) in China since the Ambassador is "completely committed to keeping General Wedemayer informed of all British plans and activities in the military field" and it is known that General Wedemayer has placed himself under the same commitment with General Chiang Kai Shek,

(11) It was agreed, therefore, that a solution to this difficulty must be found on the lines indicated in paragraph 7 of the 0.0.C.'e telegram, namely by the formation of a party based outside China. It was agreed that this would probably have to be an S.0.E. operation and that it is desirable the Colonial Office should now approach S.0.8. with a similar request to that put to the G.0.C., British troops in China in War Office telegram No. 58502. If meanwhile American and Chinese agreement had been obtained to the establishment of a straight Civil Affairs party in China, so much the better.

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(12) The Foreign Office pointed out that if an 8.0.E. operation of this kind aiming at the introduction of British personnel into Hong Kong to act as a rallying centre for local Chinese were to involve "fighting" against Chinese guerillas claiming to owe allegiance to the Central Government and thus to involve a clash between ourselves and our ally, China, it would place us in an extremely embarrassing situation. On the other hand, once the right of British Civil Affairs Officers to participate in the liberation of Hong Kong had been recognised, it would be ressonable that British personnel should be introduced into Hong Kong by 8.0.E. if circumstances demanded and unreasonable that they should be obstructed by Chinese forces.

(13) It was agreed that the Foreign Office should be kept informed and before any arrangements with 3.0.8. were finalised should be given the opportunity of submitting the matter to the Chiefs of Staff and possibly the Cabinet.

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