FO371-27622 — Page 264

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2.

48/40

From: bol. Hollis

China

FAR EASTERN

F10334 / G 34/G

5 OCT 1941

Defence of Hong Kong

221

Searsmits copy of copy of mitted to every is minute If Sept.10 sub- mitted to the Prime minister recommending

(W.C.O.) to Mr Stern- that banada be asked to send one or two

the

dale Bennelt

Dated: Oct. 4

that

baltations to Hong Kong,

hong, together with a later minute of Gett. 2 recommlading Recewed: bet. 5 this rejnforcement take place as sood as poss

Last Paper.

F3ay/327/0

References.

158/861

Fy304

Fbbiy

F3546

F5400 | 250 | G34/61 54/61 250/634/61

F2838

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(Print.)

523!G 17/23 10 17/23

F324323/0

(How disposed of.)

Ift love Hollis,

love W.6.0. from Insiz dale Bennett

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(Action completed.)

EC.1/11

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Oct

8/10.

(Ingex.)

Next Paper.

4

10690/98/10

ible. The P.M.

tho

objection

agres providing the S.fS!.

sus

I submit that, so far from demurring, we should warmly welcome this proposal.

Ideas on the defence of Hong Kong have fluctuated during the past year. The question whether Hong Kong should be defended at the risk of sacrificing alte garrison was discussed on F 4767/G of 1940 and the conclusion reached by the Chiefs of Staff, with our concurrence, was that Hong Kong must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible. The Commander- in-Chief proposed to reinforce the garrison in a telegram of January 6th (F 327/G). In May, however, the Chiefs of Staff took the view that Hong Kong must be regarded as a strategic liability unlikely to be of any great use as an advance base for operations against Japanese lines of communication. See Boxes telegram No. 43 to Washington of May 18th in F 3576/G. But the United States Chiefs of Staff did not agree and suggested that Hong Kong might, like the Philippines, perform a useful service in containing or delaying Japanese forces which might otherwise be employed in a more decisive theatre.

In the latest version of the draft A.D.B. (Singapore Conference) Staff Agreement, which our Chiefs of Staff have submitted to the United States and Dutch General Staffs, the following passage occurs:-

A land attack on Malaya, "if undertaken before the reduction of Hong Kong and Manila, involves a long and precarious line of communications. Even though Hong Kong is unlikely to be used by us as a naval base, its retention in our hands for as long as possible is of value as a means of containing Japanese blockade forces. #!

The present strength of the Hong Kong garrison is given at Flag A in Annex III to the attached copy of C.0.S.(41) 152 (0).

Far Eastern Department entirely agree with paragraph 4 of Colonel Hollis's minute of September 10th in this paper.

I submit a draft.

22107 1/41 F.O.P

17-

Jesterndale Bennett,

6th October, 1941.

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