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General Conclusions.

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

The whole defence scheme of Hong Kong rests

on being r lieved by the Navy in some three to four months. That basis has been altogether swept away.

Were Hong Kong to be attacked in force its fall would be merely a question of time: meanwhile the slaughter of civilians, mostly Chinese, would be prodigious; would be the destruction of property.

SO

It is still possible, though it would be

invidious, to withdraw the greater part of the garrison for service elsewhere and to declare Hong Kong an open town in the military sense, as it is an open port in the commercial.

Admittedly this would mean some loss of "Face", but not more so than if the defence were to collapse for reasons stated above not long after an attack had begun.

The demilitarization of the Colony would

not make it any less an integral part of the Empire, aggression upon which would constitute a canus belli. Nor would it make any more likely an attack upon Hong Kong by Japan, for it is inconceivable that in present circumstances the Japanese are being or would be deterred from anti-British measures by the military strength of the Colony.

Conceivably the U.S.A. Government, following its "No change in the Pacific" principle, might be more inclined to guarantee Hong Kong if it were an open undefended port, than otherwise.

(vii) If that were so, Chinese apprehensions and

resentment would be largely allayed: indeed, having regard to the use which Chungking makes of Hong Kong they might welcome the step.

(viii) If His Majesty's Government could be relieved

of anxiety on the score of Hong Kong, qua fortress, the British position in the Far East would be clarified and a weak spot in Britain's war front would be repaired,

(Sgd.) G.A.S. NORTHCOTE,

Governor, Hong Kong,

17th September, 1940.

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