FO371-24688 — Page 279

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5.

From a military point of view these new factors alter the situation but little, The presence of a belligerent United States fleet in Far Eastern waters, with the ability to operate from Manila, might increase the chances of preventing the fall of Hong Kong or at any rate harassing the attacking forces. Without full knowledge of the part which the U.S.A. will play and the naval strategy she will adopt, we see no reason to alter our opinion that, from a purely military point of view, Hong Kong remains an undesirable commitment.

6.

The question of its demilitarisation is thus largely a political one and in formulating our views we have consulted the Foreign Office.

7.

Immediate demilitarisation of Hong Kong would, we think, have the following effects:-

8.

(a) The show of weakness and the blow to our prestige involved in such a step would have a most discouraging effect on Chinese resistance, would encourage Japan to adopt an even more rapid expansionist policy, and would discourage the U.S.A. from taking a firm line against the Japanese.

(b) The withdrawal of our garrison would lead to the rapid Japanese control of Hong Kong by peaceful penetration.

On the other hand the retention of the garrison and our avowed. intention of defending our territory:-

9.

(a) Would cause the Japanese to hesitate before

attacking it.

(b) Would encourage the U.S.A. to take a firm line.

Its gallant defence might be an important factor in bringing them into the war.

In fact the possible loss of prestige due to the fall of Hong Kong in war even with all its attendant horrors would have less serious results than the loss of prestige from its demilitarisation under present conditions.

10.

We therefore are firmly of the opinion, with which we understand the Foreign Office are in agreement, that demilitarisation is out of the question at the present time. In the event of war Hong Kong must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible.

11. We would however recommend that very early steps should be taken by the Administration to remedy the unsatisfactory state of the A.R. P. and fire fighting arrangements which apparently exists at Hong Kong.

WA

Shmill

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Admin stain

"There with mergy and d patch to

Cabinet War Room,

October, 1940.

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