FO371-23523 — Page 135

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15.12.39.

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presence there (as far as China is concerned) is largely symbolic?

If it is worth while leaving ships at the Coastal Ports for that

reason does not the same argument apply to the Yangtsze?

(2) Use of the gunboats elsewhere. True, it may very well be that

the practical value of the gunboats elsewhere is far greater than it

is in the Yangtsze or for that matter on the China Station at all.

for

,or

I

Equally it seems clear that the retention of ships at Shanghai and Canton presents fewer practical difficulties than their retention upon

the Yangtaze where, as you remarked yesterday afternoon, there are the

complications arising from changes of personnel, maintaining the gunboats at strength, etc. Yet, in so far as the maintenance of ships at the Ports is based on their symbolic value, do we not come back to the fact that our position on the River is symbolically weakened? realise that's keeping ships at the Ports there may be other than symbolic reasons. There may be, for example, Pacific requirements to be thought of not directly connected with China at all,and these, no

doubt, have weighed with the Admiralty. Yet that is only another way of saying, is it not, that there has been a balancing of practical

needs against less practical considerations, i.e. the symbolic values. (3) Some counter-balancing step. Accordingly, if the logic of the foregoing paragraphs is sound, would it not be possible to take some

step that would strengthen the symbolic side of the account, such for example as increasing our naval strength at the Ports by some slight addition or by some statement in Parliament about the importance of

>

our interests in China?

As I said yesterday evening, a great deal is

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