CO_968_583_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 7

I agree that we should include this point when we next submit anything to Ministers on the subject of the garrison. I do not however think that we want to delude ourselves about the probability of there being any reinforcement of Hong Kong in the event of Chinese aggression.

2.

The position is that plans exist to fly up a battalion of the Gurkha Division from Malaya, and I think that the move would be completed in something like five days. I am not quite sure of the figures without referring to papers. But the Chiefs of Staff have not provided Hong Kong with a garrison designed to defend it: the units that are there are designed for internal security (three battalions plus the Royal Artillery and to maintain a show of force on the frontier (one infantry battalion and armoured regiment). The Chinese are estimated to be capable of mustering something like a strength of three Chinese armies on the frontier at fairly short notice, and as they would have air cover and we would not, it cannot be pretended that the ensuing operations would be anything more than a walk-over. I don't see there being anything like a battle unless the units earmarked for internal security were relieved of this necessity at the time when the Chinese attacked. This, I think, would be most unlikely.

3. This being so, although the decision about reinforcement would no doubt be taken at the time, and would also no doubt be taken in the light of the result of the talks with the Americans, I would expect the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff to be that reinforcement would amount to putting troops into a sieve. The only possibility of there being a change in this attitude would be if the Americans committed themselves to the defence of Hong Kong and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in doing so.

Namahu

(A. Campbell)

28th November, 1957

2 NIG

al

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Mr. Campbell (though the Agen

Thank you.

I knew that it was not expected that the Hong Kong garrison should put up any lasting defence against an all-out attack. I had however in my newness supposed that there was an intention to try to hold up an attack at least for long enough to try and enable/women and children to be evacuated.

2. I suggest that these papers be registered on DEF.75/51/02 and that we proceed as you suggest at X above.

3. In another minute on a separate sheet, which I have placed in this box, I have suggested that when we next submit anything to Ministers about the garrison we should bring out quite clearly the fact that the evacuation of women and children in the event of a Chinese attack, always a doubtful proposition, becomes more and more improbable to the extent that the small garrison (naval, military and air) is reduced.

European/

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(W.I.J. Wallace)

4.12.57.