Page 278.
4。
The Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association, a
Communist dominated body, at its eighth annual general meeting on 24th November was advised by Chan Kwan Po, the V.I.C. chairman, to take note of the following points for future action:-
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
5.
(vi)
Activities of local bad characters;
Efforts of Director of Education to dismiss certain school teachers;
Excessive school fees;
The retrenchment of workers e.g. Royal Naval Dockyard;
Arms smuggling into Hong Kong;
Housing problem.
On 21st November, Hong Kong police seized a number of documents of a political intelligence nature, which led to the arrest of a number of Chinese and the seizure of further documents and an illegal wireless transmitter-receiver used for transmitting messages to Formosa. Persons arrested are all members of an intelligence unit under control of Second Department of Nationalist Ministry of National Defence using Hong Kong as a base for intelligence activities on the Chine se mainland.
бо
On 15th November a five member delegation of the "Chinese First Mechanics Union" from the Chinese mainland left
for Japan at invitation of the Japan Shipbuilders Union and the Japan Vehicle Production Amalgamated Union after a stay of four days in the guest house of the Bank of China,
(Copies sent to Foreign Office for repetition
to Commissioner General and Peking and by bag to Washington.)
Hong Kong Intelligence Report external distribution sent,
Page 278
Page 278
Того сору
8/02 Page245/67/62 Mr. Carstairs
283
(321) on DEF.75/ 51/02 - Part D
(326) on DEF.75/
51/02 - Part D.
TOP SECRET
for auf 75/51/02. 150105 650 279 of 2485
ISD
HONG KONG GARRISON
Page
After the riots in October 1956, C.B.F., Hong Kong, made
a new assessment of the forces which he required in Hong Kong in order to fulfil his directive. These forces were to cover his three main tasks:-
2.
(a) to assist the police in the maintenance of internal
security;
(b) to maintain local confidence by being able to put up
a show of force on the frontier; and
(c) in extreme emergency to cover the evacuation of
civilians (of whom there are about 14,000, and
many loyal Chinese).
To meet these respective requirements C.B.F. said that the following were necessary:-
(a) 3 infantry battalions, each with an armoured scout
detachment of 8 armoured cars each;
(b) R.A.F. Jet squadron and an armoured regiment;
(c) 4 infantry battalions, one field regiment of Royal
The Artillery and a field squadron Royal Engineers. 4 infantry battalions were in addition to the 3 in (a).
The total of (a), (b) and (c) is 9 major units, plus a Venom squadron.
3.
These proposals were supported by B.D.C. C., Far East, and See X on page 3 of also by the Governor, Hong Kong. They represent in fact the
nearest that Sir Alexander Grantham has gone to state in precise terms what his force requirements are.
We have been very heavily engaged, as you know, over the last fourteen months in fighting against the withdrawal of individual units, and each one of these has been opposed by Sir Alexander Grantham as "reducing the garrison to inadequate levels", or a phrase of that kind.
#
(306) on 75/51/02 (6) & (20) on Part A (1957/9)·
+
In addition to the above land and air forces, B.D.C.C.(F.E.) endorsed the C.B.F's requirement under (o) above for naval forces. They were 2 destroyers or frigates, 10 seaward defence motor launches, 11 motor minesweepers, whilst other naval forces would, in order to protect evacuation, have to be within 3, 4 or 21 days' steaming at the outbreak of hostilities.
5. These proposals were never considered as such by the Chiefs of Staff because the Defence Committee became seized of the problem of the Hong Kong garrison in January and February 1957 when they reconsidered their previous decision taken before the October 1956 riots to withdraw the jet squadron and the armoured regiment. At the same time C.0.S. were conducting their Long Term Defence Review. In this Review C.0.S. assessed the minimam garrison necessary for the purpose of maintaining law and order as six major units. If further forces had to be found for Hong Kong they would have to be taken away from some- where else. The R.A.F. squadron went out under the Long Term Defence Review, but an additional infantry battalion was conceded over 2(a) and (b) above, to maintain a show of force on the frontier. The Chiefs of Staff based themselves on the grounds that the nuclear deterrent provided the guarantee against Chinese aggression, and that a calculated risk had to be taken that an emergency demanding evacuation would not arise.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.