CO_968_583_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 182

Alternative Dafr.

9/5

TOP SECRET

File No. DEF.75/51/02.

Page 182

Mr.. Ashton

Mr.. Campbell

See chin

Mr.. Melville...

Mr...

Sir

X Permt. U.S. of S. X

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

Your Reference.. C. I.G.S/BM/8068.

Date...

May, 1958.....

DRAFT

LETTER FOR SIGNATURE OF SIR JOHN MACPHERSON,

SIR GERALD TEMPLER,

FIELD-MARSHAL

GC, GCMG., KBE., DSO.,

CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE, S.W.1.

(229) - Flag G

that

Flas H

H

(85) FED 821454/0

FURTHER ACTION

Page 182

(P8493) 45337/7500 2MP 10/57 AT&S. 768.

<

Many thanks for your letter of 3rd May, 1958, about

the additional Artillery units for the garrison of

Hongkong.

C

We very much share your concern at the difficulties

1.

✓

and delays in getting the despatch of these units approved.

and arranged. The trouble has, however, been that opinion

in Whitehall is not unanimous on the importance-of-the

in ang mast matter. In particular, the financial side of the War Office

bas hitherto taken the view that the present long-term

garrison-is-sufficient for the degree of imperial defence

possible in Hongkong and that anything more would be a- possible in lions on

luxury which the Hongkong Government-must either foregå

or pay for. That position has been maintained despite the

Chiefs of Staff view expressed, for example, at their

( and wispite of the

R

meeting of 20th February, in the words of Stratton •

"the Chiefs of Staff view was that this force six major

units was insufficient even for dealing with subversion

and infiltration, under certain conditions, and could not

defend the colony against open aggression for the 48 hours

or more needed before any American nuclear weapons could be

brought to bear."

-") And,I would add, we have again heard from

the Governor in the last few days in a letter on another

subject, that in his view, the garrison "is completely

Page 182 7inadequate

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

inadequapagor the feßence of Hongkong, and insufficient for

support to the civil power in serious rioting under the

conditions which we believe would prevail in Hongkong."

It is acciple. The im Hop Kng. Nor has the War Office been able to accept our view that

in the circumstances of Hongkong internal security is inseparable from Amperial defence and that the responsibility

for internal security should not therefore be left as an

exclusive financial responsibility of the Hongkong Government.

For these reasons it has so far been impossible over

a long period to reach agreement about who should pay for

any additional units, or at least pay the excess costs of

maintaining them in Hongkong rather than in the United Kingdom.

Hongkong

S

The HongKong Government has leant over backwards to try and

reach agreement, and twice recently has improved the terms

for the units, of its financial offer, asking only that any payments/should

be taken into account in fixing the terms of compensation

for the surrender of some of the land held by the War Office

The suggestions in in the Colony. Against this background, as we see it, para. 4

of the Governor's telegram No. 350, to which you refer, will

not necessarily solve the problem. He asks there that, in

return for payments to be made by Hongkong (straightaway), in

any subsequent land negotiations he may be assured of my

Secretary of State's strongest support in resisting claims

for compensation by the War Department in contravention of the

principle stated in para. 5 of his telegram No. 262, ly,

that the Services cannot properly claim any interest in the

increased value of land which they occupy otherwise than by

right of purchase in the open market. We do not think that

our Secretary of State could give the Governor such an assurance

without the risk of inadvertently misleading him, unless he, the

Secretary of Ståte, had first himself been assured of the

compliance of the other U.K. Departments concerned on this point.

Without that compliance in Whitehall, the effect of replying

favourably to para. 4 of the telegram would simply be that the Hongkong Government would pay for the units without having any

receioning an equivalent substantial prospect of balancing/financial advantage in the

TORIALE.

/subsequent

A.