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The Colonial Office were also concerned at the proposal in paragraph 10(c) of the report that joint political and military measures should be planned with th Americans for countering subversion in Hong Kong. The maintenance of the British position in Hong Kong was dependent on holding a neutral balance between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists, and the introduction of American initiative in counter subversive measures, before a state of emergency arose, might destroy the basis of our position there. For this reason there should be no overt announcement of the backing of United States nuclear forces for our position in Hong Kong, though it might be necessary to let the Chinese Communist Government know by some means that we would have this backing.
SIR WILLIAM STRATTON said that although he saw the force of the Colonial Office argument, he thought they under-estimated the extent of the United States existing knowledge of our strengths and capabilities in Hong Kong. The only thing unknown to the United States, because it had been forbidden to disclose any details, was the future run down of our forces there and in the Far East generally. The American Commanders in the Far East already had detailed schedules prepared for the evacuation of British forces and civilians from Hong Kong in an emergency.
The views of the Joint Planning Staff and Colonial Office on the sequence of planning were not so far apart as they might seem. He thought that it would be quite wrong to attempt to produce in London a United Kingdom def nce plan for Hong Kong, for the information of the United States authorities. But the Working Group should be prepared to answer questions quite frankly on the size of the present and future garrison of Hong Kong, and available re-inforcements, and to indicate what our military objectives were on the lines of the existing directive to the Commander, British Forces.
He agreed that a public statement on United States nuclear backing might be dangerous, but it should be made quite cle-r to the Communist Government that such backing existed; how and when they should receive the information was a matter for the Foreign Office to consider, but if they did not know we should gain nothing from the combined talks with the United States.
MR. MORLAND (Foreign Office) said that although their might be a close understanding between United States and United Kingdom military commanders in the Far East about one another's plans and capabilities, this knowledge was probably not shared at the political level in Washington. We should lose nothing by offering to the Working Group full and frank details of our own strengths and capabilities at this stage; that would keep the United States interested in our proposals and help them to make the considerable political step involved in agreement to the political assumptions.
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL HUDLESTON said that a brief should be provided for use as necessary by the United Kingdom representative in the Working Group. A detailed knowledge of our limitations might encourage rather than discourage the merican exceptance of·
commitment. If the present negotiations were successful it would mean that the security of Hong Kong would rest in ruture on the deterrent value of United States nucler forcus. The effect- iveness of a deterrent was, in his opinion,lways greater if
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