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from which to menace the right flank of the Colony's
defence.
APPENDIX 'C'
CAF SORTIE RATES & BOMB LOADS
TYPES OF A/C
MAXIMUM SORTIES
PER MONTH
MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD
COMBAT RADIUS
Sustained Intensive
TU 4
9
15
10,000-20,000
1700 n.m
lbs
TU 2
9
18
3,300-7,000 lbs
400
50 n.m
IL 10
20
40
800 lbs
170 n.m
LA 9/11
15
30
(3 x 25mm cannon)
440 n.m
IL 28
10
20
6.600 lbs
570 n.m
MIG 15
20
40
2 x 550 lbs
360 n.m
MIG 17
20
40
2 x 550 lbs
280 n.m
MIG fighters can carry bombs, rockets, napalm and possibly
before the end of the period, air to ground guided missiles.
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en FED 82/454(01(TS).
(6720) Wt. 49810/D.1188 60m 8/56 P.I. Gp. 1144.
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COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE MADE WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY.CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
1.
HONG KONG
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
DO
C.0.S.(58)47TH MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY, 20TH FEBRUARY, 1958
(40)
JP 57)165(Revised Final)-(+)
JP(58)8(Revised Final)83 PED 82/454/0I (TS)
THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff on the political asumptions and planning procedures to be adopted in the Anglo/American talks in Washington on measures to meet the threat to Hong Kong from Communist China. A second report by the Joint Planning Staff on the brief for the United Kingdom representatives on the Anglo/American Working Group was also considered.
SIR WILLIAM STRATTON questioned whether the planning procedure proposed in JP(57)165 was logical, and whether it was likely to be fruitful. He thought a better sequence of planning would be, firstly, to decide the importance of Hong Kong; to agree the threat (this had already been done in Washington); then to decide that to meet the threat would require a deterrent plus a shield force of a certain size, sufficient to hold Hong Kong for long enough to bring the nuclear forces to bear; and finally to consider what forces both
It was countries were prepared to provide to meet the bill. at this stage that we should surely be prepared to discuss the possible size of the shield forces which we could provide. Both the Joint Planning Staff reports made flat statements of the maximum United Kingdom contribution, based on a garrison of six major units. The Chiefs of Staff view was that this force was insufficient even for dealing with subversion and infiltration, under certain conditions, and could not defend the Colony against open aggression for the 48 hours or more needed before any American nuclear weapons could be brought to bear. It was unrealistic to expect the United States to make a commitment to defend Hong Kong if we were convinced that it could not be defended and were not prepared to negotiate over the shield force required. If, therefore, we were to start negotiations on this basis, we would risk having a failure of the talks.
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