File No. D/EX
Ongnal
TOP SECRET & PERSONAL
on. FED 82/454/08 (TS)
(Dear Angus)
NIR
49
Page 55
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG.
11th June, 1959.
In DCC(FE) (59)59, dated 12th March, the Secretary of the British Defence Co-ordination Committee invited my views and those of the Commander British Forces on the Joint Planning Staff report on the defence of Hong Kong, written against the background of the preliminary report on Exercise White Dragon. Although, of course, I have not seen this latter report, the C.B.F. and my Defence Secretary have reported on it to me informally, and I believe that I am therefore reasonably well informed on the general conclusions of the exercise.
2. You will be receiving, in due course, through Army channels, a paper containing comments on the Annex to DCC(FE) (59)59. The Commander British Forces and I have agreed that it can go forward as an expression of our views on the military aspects of the paper on which we were asked to comment. I feel however that I should make a fuller and more deliberate statement of my views on the political side and I have written what follows after discussion with Edric Bastyan.
3. While I do not disagree with the main conclusion of the paper, which is that "tactical nuclear weapons should not be introduced into Hong Kong until Communist China is known to be in possession of similar nuclear weapons and that, at that stage, the political and internal security implications should be reassessed before the decision is taken to introduce these weapons", I wish to ensure that none of us should be deceived about the strength of the political objections against introducing them at any time. In other words, although I do not wish to prejudice such an issue, I do not to-day believe that, in the foreseeable future, it will be any easier than it is now to set aside the political objections to the introduction of nuclear weapons into Hong Kong.
4. I am quite clear that, at the present time, we should be taking a very serious risk of provoking China if we brought nuclear weapons of any kind into Hong Kong, and I know that the Commander British Forces agrees. China is exceedingly sensitive to any possibility of Hong Kong being used against her in an offensive way, and, even if the nuclear potential were very slight and intended for defensive purposes only, she will affect not to believe that, and there will almost certainly be an intensive campaign against Hong Kong, the imperialist British Government, the American Chiang bandits and so on. It would provide a wonderful opportunity to the Communists in Hong Kong to make rapid headway with their United Front activities, and I believe that China would change immediately and radically the tempo of her planned measures affecting Hong Kong. Moreover there would be no satisfactory answer to the Chinese propaganda, no answer at any rate that would have any reassuring effect upon the population of Hong Kong.
5. Even after China has nuclear weapons, I estimate that much the same political considerations will apply. It may be argued that, in that case, it could hardly be considered provocative to hold nuclear weapons in Hong Kong, but I think this misses the point. A thing does not, with the Chinese, have to be provocative to be labelled provocative. They are quite capable of considering the sudden importation of nuclear weapons as provocative, even if they have them themselves. Their motives will be pure and ours disingenuous. They will not hesitate to depict our action in a completely unfavourable light while laying no stress on their own nuclear potential. Nor do I feel that, in these circumstances, people in Hong Kong would be in the least reassured by the presence of nuclear weapons; in fact, public confidence would, according to my judgment, be seriously impaired. The knowledge that China had nuclear weapons would admittedly cause grave apprehension.
Of course, it is not unlikely that
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