CO_968_580_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 168

Cypher/OTP

SECRET

FROM TAMSUI TO F OREIGN OFFICE

Page 168 of

192.

FOREIGN OFFI CE (SECRET) AND

WHITEHALL (SECRET)

DISTRIBUTION

Her Majesty's Consul No. 18

D. 1.00 a.m.

February 8, 1957

R. 8.48 a.m.

February 9, 1957 February 9, 1957

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 18 of

February 8

Repeated for information to Hong Kong

-

Singapore

and Saving to

Washington Peking

GUARD

The Associated Press representative here, who is a British subject well known to us, yesterday confidentially told the Deputy-Consul that his head office had asked him to look into the story that there was a firm though tacit Anglo-American understanding that the Seventh Fleet would actively participate in the defence of Hong Kong (particularly air defence) in the event of Chinese Communist attack. We understand he intends to ask the United States Formosan Defence Command for confirmation.

2. For brief comment by the American Ambassador here on Hong Kong defence, please see paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 140 of December 10 to you.

3. Crozier of the Economist, while here in the first week of January, told me that the United States Consul-General had quite definitely given him to understand that the Americans were committed to the defence of Hong Kong.

4. For what it is worth, as seen from here, my guess is that for some time to come any attack on Hong Kong is highly improbable. If Peking contemplates the solution of Hong Kong by peaceful means they will be tempted to continue to wait until such time as they are in the United Nations. Full diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom could then be established and request made for negotiations on the return of Hong Kong. If force is contemplated, the attack is far more likely to coincide with a move against. Formosa. For some years, certainly until Communist China has atomic weapons, I consider Peking would regard any move against Formosa as suicide. The move against Hong Kong without simultaneous attack on Formosa would seem highly risky. It could be expected to alarm all countries in South-East Asia with Chinese minorities. It would end Anglo-American differences on Far- East policy, might lead to American intervention, and would have virtually no positive advantages. Peking can, of course, be expected to continue attempts at the internal subversion of the colony which would be facilitated if Nationalist sympathizers are intimidated or eliminated.

5. The above might account for the fact of Peking's criticism that British policy in Hong Kong is almost invariably linked with accusations of connivance with the Kuomintang and Nationalist agents. Needless to say this does not prevent the Chinese Communists from claiming that the Kuomintang and they have twice

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