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THE MILITARY THREAT TO KONG HONG UP TO 1960
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In this paper we examine the circumstances under which an attack might be made on Hong Kong, its probable scale and nature and the extent to which the attack might be reduced by nuclear counter-action.
2. In addition to the external military threat there is the ever present threat of internal sabotage and subversion. We have taken into consideration the report of the Local Intelligence Committee, Hong Kong on the Vulnerability of Hong Kong to Non-Military Aggression, dated June 1955, whose conclusions are as follows:
"The Communists have it in their power at any time to create disturbances in the Colony. The degree to which they might do so would, of course, depend on the circumstances of the time and the object of the operation (e.g. limited pressure for a specific purpose or an all out campaign, verging on civil war, for the complete dislocation and ultimate fall of the Colony). The degree of success that they might achieve and the extent to which they might win over or cow the population would be greatly influenced by the attitude and actions of the Hong
In the worst case Kong Government, the Armed Forces and HG.
it would, however, be possible for the Communists, should they decide on an all out effort, to disrupt the administration and interfere with the economic life of the Colony to a point where outside assistance would be required."
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3. We believe that, in view of the isolated position of Hong Kong and the large preponderance of Chinese conventional forces available in the area, nuclear weapons must be used by the Allies the very moment the attack begins.
4.
We have assumed that, during the period under review, the Chinese will not have developed a nuclear capability of their own nor will the Russians give them one.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ATTACK
5. We have appreciated elsewhere that the Communist Chinese are unlikely to embark on a deliberate war by themselves so long
They as it contains the risk of allied nuclear counter action. are likely, however, to increase their influence in Hong Kong by subversion and infiltration and to become increasingly capable of causing internal troubles. They might be tempted to think that our professed determination to defend Hong Kong is only a bluff and that in the end wc would not regard it as worth a war with them. It is therefore possible that after a campaign of subvers- ion and infiltration, they might attempt to overrun the Colony in the hope of a quick victory before reinforcements could arrive. On balance, however, we believe that even if they do decide to embark on a more hostile policy, they will probably not have re- course to military action.
6. In global war, however, the Chinese would probably regard Hong Kong as an objective to be attacked in order to gain an early victory, which could be exploited for morale and prop- aganda purposes. They would also wish to neutralize it as a
that Hong centre for intelligence. It seems likely, therefore, Kong would be attacked almost immediatley on the outbreak of war and simultaneously we could expect serious outbreaks of
Other campaigns terrorism and sabotage in Hong Kong itself. in the Far East would probably be undertaken at the same time but .we do not think that these would simificantly affect the scale of the threat to Hong Kong. Although the Russians might assist
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