9
36.
If the Chinese Communists employed only the Southern Fleet, they would probably mount small scale amphibious landings in the Castle Peak and Por's Sholter areas lifting a force of about 9,000 lightly equipped troops from tho Pearl River or Bias Bay.
This force would probably be supplemented by motor junks and similar craft giving an additional lift of about 20,000 troops. The Southern Fleet would also probably conduct minor harassing operations against our forces in support of the land battle and attempting to oppose the landings using their frigate MTBS and MGBs.
37. It is considered more likely, however, that the Chinese Communists would wish to ensure the success of their Naval operation in any attack on Hong kong in which event clemonts of the Northern Flect (soo Appendix A Part I(b)) might be used to re-inforce the Southern Fleet. These additional ships and craft would give an amphibious lift of about 110,000 troops hould it be desired, and the landings would in this case be covered by submarine patrols and offensive sweeps using destroyers, frigates and MTBs.
38. The mining campaign will, in the main, probably be directed against the supply routes with Hong Kong, but it could also be successfully exploited to provide considerable embarrassment to our own Naval Forces operating in support of the land battle and opposing the amphibious landings. At the same time, the shore batteries on the Communist held islands ringed round Hong Kong would also considerably embarrass our shipping approaching Hong
; Kong, and our Naval Forces operating in the area.
Air
39.
Kai Tak and Sek Kong airfields would be the first priority targets for the CAF. When these were neutralized the woight of aorial attack would be directed against naval forces supporting Hong Kong and in support of the ground operations against our strong points and lines of communications or support of amphibious landings. An estimate of the CCAP sortie rates is at Appendix C. We believe that the Chinese would wish if possible to capture Hong Kong with its installations and facilities intact and would therefore refrain from bombing such targets. If, however, resistance were to be prolonged
attacks might be made on installations.
Warning of Attack
40.
Security measures in Communist China are strictly enforced, and information on movement of the armed forces is accordingly difficult to obtain. It is considered unlikely therefore, that a precise warning of imminent attack would be obtained other than in exceptional circumstances.
41. An attack on the Colony, however, is unlikely to take place without a prior worsening of international relations and very possibly of the internal situation in Hong Kong possibly leading even to closure of the land frontier and restrictions on sca movement. At the same time, Chinose Communist land forces might be built up and re-positioned, and an amphibious and supporting fleet might have to be assembled.
42.
In this connection, the build-up of Chinese Communist ground forces North of the land frontier is unlikely in itself to provide warning of imminent attack, since such a build up may take place progressively over a long period, and could be maintained as a threat without being unleashed.
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