and part of its fish, edible oils and fats, and tea. Details on this aspect and on the question of fuel supplies are attached at Appendices A and B. The present aim is to maintain a reserve stock of rice of 35,000 tons (about 2 months' imported supply) and 3,800 tons of flour (about 6 weeks' supply), a three months' supply of petroleum products, a two months' supply of coal and a six weeks' supply of firewood. Although, relying on internal production and reserve stocks held, the Colony could probably maintain itself for a short time without large imports,
this position could probably not be maintained for more than a month or so. Moreover, in the event of internal disturbance, both internal production and the distribution of stocks might well become extremely difficult. This in turn could lead to food riots and disorders. For the reasons given in paragraphs 11 and 14 above, the handling of any supplies brought from outside could also become extremely difficult and, if the armed forces were unable to help, owing to preoccupation with the frontier, it might be necessary to bring additional manpower from outside the Colony for dock work etc. (see also paragraphs 24 and 25 below).
22.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICE
It is believed that, at least in the early stages of an emergency, the Police would remain loyal and effective. As pressure was increased, however, and particularly if this were combined with an armed attack on the Colony, the situation might well get beyond their control. Both loyalty and effectiveness would be likely to depend in great measure on the degree of support provided by the armed forces.
23.
A list of some 1,800 communist personalities has been compiled with a view to arrest in the event of trouble. The CPG will, however, be aware that many of their present supporters will be known and liable to arrest. It seems likely, therefore, that, should they contemplate the promotion of large-scale disturbances, they will take steps to maintain a "second string" of potential leaders or will introduce these into the Colony shortly before an "emergency". While, therefore, the arrest of present known leaders might impede their plans to some extent, it must not be assumed that it would prevent action on the lines suggested.
24.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ESSENTIAL SERVICES CORPS
The object of this Corps is to enable certain essential under- takings, both Government and private, to continue in operation at a minimum level in the event of a large-scale defection of labour. The basis of the Corps is the reliable employees of the undertakings concerned, "reliable" in this sense being synonymous with non-Chinese, To this is added, in theory, reliable persons from non-essential undertakings sufficient to enable the Corps to work at the agreed level. In spite, however, of the conscriptive measures which have been in force since 1951, the Corps suffers from a serious shortage of reliable manpower, since there are not enough reliable persons in Hong Kong to meet all the emergency demands for manpower of the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force, Special Constabulary and other emergency organisations.
25.
The total establishment of the Corps is at present 5,300, with a strength of 1,837 "reliables". In the worst case, therefore, with no improvement in strength, the Corps would be largely ineffective and the best that could be done would be to define "essential service" even more stringently and concentrate the available manpower on even fewer under- takings (e.g. water, food and power) and these only of the utmost importance. In the best case, i.e. with no threat of hostile attack and no more than mild disorders, the manpower shortage might to a greater or lesser extent be overcome by switching manpower from other emergency units, e.g. the R.H.K.D. F. or the Civil Aid Service (Civil Defence). Further, in the best case, sufficient Chinese regular employees to ease the man- power shortage might, in fact, prove reliable.
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